In the Matter of: Carole Anne Rosemary Dobson, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0922

In the Matter of:
Carole Anne Rosemary Dobson,
Respondent,

vs.

Ryan Leon Solee,
Appellant.

Filed April 29, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Clearwater County District Court
File No. 15-FA-18-162

Carole Anne Rosemary Dobson, Clearbrook, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Jason Steck, Law Office of Jason Steck, Edina, Minnesota; and

Richard C. Mollin, Gonvick, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judg e; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Ryan Leon Solee challenges the district court’s issu ance of an order for
protection (OFP) requested by So lee’s former wife, respondent C arol Anne Rosemary
Dobson. This OFP was the second OFP that Solee’s former wife o btained against Solee.

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Solee argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding video evidence at the
OFP hearing and by taking judicial notice of a provision in the parties’ divorce decree.
Solee also argues that the distr ict court’s conduct at the OFP hearing denied him due
process of law. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2017, Solee and Dobson divorced. The divorce decree grante d possession of the
parties’ marital house in Clearbrook, Minnesota to Dobson. Prior to their divorce, Dobson
obtained an OFP against Solee. That OFP expired on April 1, 2018.
On April 3, 2018, two days late r, Solee entered the marital house. Dobson was not
there at the time. Police Chief Dan Gazelka, a friend of Solee ’s, accompanied Solee.
Gazelka used a body camera to take a video of Solee entering th e house. While in the
house, Solee changed the locks. After doing so, Solee contacte d Dobson’s brother and
informed him that he had moved into the house and changed the locks.
On April 4, 2018, Dobson petitioned the district court for a ne w OFP based on
Solee’s entry into the house. D obson indicated in the petition that Solee broke into her
house while she was at work, changed the locks, and removed her belongings. Dobson
stated that Solee did not have a key. Dobson also stated that she was scared of Solee and
would not return to the house b ecause she feared him. In the p etition, she also described
previous abuse that Solee committed against her.
The district court held a contested hearing on the OFP petitio n. Both Dobson and
Solee appeared pro se.

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Dobson testified first. She explained that she learned that So lee entered the house
from her brother. She testified that she did not know how Solee gained entry because she
had changed the locks after Solee moved out. She also indicated that she was still residing
at the house but also lived part-time with her brother in Bemidji, where she was working.
She testified that she had not gone to the house after learning that Solee was there because
she did not want to be near him. Additionally, Dobson describe d previous instances of
physical abuse that Solee committed against her, including an i ncident in which Solee
choked Dobson while she was in bed.
Solee called five witnesses, including himself. Three witness es testified primarily
about Dobson’s living arrangements. Solee’s father testified t hat he heard through
Dobson’s son that Dobson had move d in with her brother. An acq uaintance of Dobson’s
brother testified that she heard from Dobson’s brother that Dobson planned to move out of
the house and that Dobson was living with her brother in the in t e r i m . T h e c i t y c l e r k
treasurer testified that Dobson had requested that the city turn off the utilities at the house
and told the clerk to let Solee know.
Solee also called Chief Gazelka. Gazelka testified that the c ity clerk asked him to
tell Solee about Dobson’s re quest to turn off the utilities. G azelka testified that he went
with Solee to the house on April 3, 2018 and recorded the entry on video. Before Solee
offered the video, the district court interrupted Gazelka’s testimony and ruled that the video
was irrelevant. The district court indicated that evidence regarding whether the house was
vacant when Solee entered—includi ng the video of Solee entering the house—was
irrelevant.

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Solee testified last. He admitted that he entered the house a nd changed the locks.
He testified that he entered the house because he was concerned that the pipes in the house
would freeze after Dobson stopped paying the utilities. Solee claimed that when he entered
the house, he did not understand that he did not have a right t o enter. He further testified
that he thought he could live in the house because he was under the impression that Dobson
had moved out. But, he agreed that the divorce decree gave pos session of the house to
Dobson and he had no right to enter it. Solee also testified that he entered the house using
the original key to the house (contradicting Dobson’s testimony that she had changed the
locks after Solee moved out) and that the house appeared to be empty. He indicated that
the video that the court excluded would show him using a key to enter and would also show
that the house was vacant.
The district court questioned both parties during their testimo ny, but questioned
Solee more extensively. Some of the district court’s questioni ng merely clarified Solee’s
testimony and maintained focus on the relevant issues. In other instances, the district court
asked Solee pointed, leading ques tions. The district court als o interrupted both parties
throughout the hearing to enforce rules of evidence, to questio n witnesses, and to explain
its evidentiary rulings to the pa rties. During the hearing, th e district court took judicial
notice that the divorce decree granted Dobson sole possession o f the house even though
the parties owned the house as tenants in common.
After both parties rested and testimony concluded, Solee mentioned in his closing
argument that he was a part-time police officer. The district court made remarks to Solee

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about his occupation and his understanding of domestic violence , and implied that Solee
should have known better than to enter Dobson’s residence because he was a police officer.
The district court did not find credible Solee’s testimony that he believed he had a
right to enter the residence. The court indicated at the close of the hearing that Solee “knew
who had possession” because he “negotiated that through [his] attorney” in the dissolution.
The district court also declared, “I don’t believe you had a key. I don’t know how you got
in there. But, you knew you didn’t have a possessory interest.” The district court granted
the OFP after asking Dobson whether she still wanted the order.
The district court filed a written order granting the OFP. Th e written order indicated
that “[Dobson] had an order for protection against [Solee] whic h expired on 4/1/18. On
4/3/18 [Solee] broke into [Dobson’s] residence and changed the locks preventing [Dobson]
from returning to her home.” The district court further found that Dobson reasonably
feared physical harm from Solee. Finally, the district court made an additional finding that
“the property [Solee] broke into was decreed to both parties in the dissolution action as
tenants in common but [Dobson] was granted possession of said property prior to its sale.”
Solee retained an attorney and brought a motion to reconsider on May 2, 2018. In
his motion, Solee asked the district court to vacate the OFP, p ermit a new hearing, and
accept an offer of proof of the video recording made by Gazelka. In support of the motion,
Solee submitted an affidavit from Gazelka in which Gazelka stat ed that the body camera
video that he took shows Solee en tered the house using a key an d the house was empty
except for a few items of furniture. The district court denied Solee’s motion.
Solee appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
Solee argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the video taken
by Gazelka and by taking judicial notice of facts not in the record. Solee also argues that
the district court denied him the due process afforded by the U nited States Constitution.
We address each issue in turn.1
I. The district court properly exercised its discretion when it excluded the video
evidence.

Solee contends that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded the video
of him entering the house for lack of relevancy. “Evidentiary rulings concerning
materiality, foundation, remotene ss, relevancy, or the cumulati ve nature of the evidence
are within the [district] court’s sound discretion and will onl y be reversed when that
discretion has been clearly abused.” Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594, 601
(Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted). A party challenging an evide ntiary ruling made in an
OFP hearing “must demonstrate prejudicial error to be entitled to a new trial or hearing.”
Olson on behalf of A.C.O. v. Olson , 892 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation
omitted).

1 Though the OFP at issue here has expired, we note that this ap peal is not moot because
of the collateral consequences that attach to an OFP. Specifically, if another OFP is granted
against Solee, it could be in effect for up to 50 years based on the fact that Dobson has had
two or more OFPs in effect against Solee. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a(c)(2) (2018)
(providing that a court may grant a subsequent OFP for a period of up to 50 years if the
court finds that “the petitioner has had two or more orders for protection in effect against
the same respondent”); Pechovnik v. Pechovnik , 765 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. App. 2009)
(concluding that the appeal of an expired OFP was not moot cons idering the collateral
consequences of an OFP, includin g the extension of an OFP and t he issuance of a
subsequent OFP).

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Evidence is relevant if it has a “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. “The fact to be established need not be an
ultimate fact or a vital fact. I t need only be a fact that is of some consequence to the
disposition of the litigation.” Minn. R. Evid. 401 1977 comm. cmt. Evidence is relevant
if it “logically tends to prove or disprove a material fact in issue.” Boland v. Morrill, 132
N.W.2d 711, 719 (Minn. 1965). “[A]ll relevant evidence is pres umptively admissible
unless exclusion is mandated by other controlling law.” Kalia v. St. Cloud State Univ., 539
N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. App. 1995); see also Minn. R. Evid. 402 (providing that relevant
evidence is generally admissible unless other law establishes inadmissibility).
Solee maintains that the body ca mera video was relevant to (1) whether he used a
key to enter the residence, (2) whether the house was vacant, and (3) Dobson’s credibility.
Solee argues that the exclusion of the evidence was prejudicial because the district court
based its decision to grant the OFP, in part, on a finding that Solee did not have a key. We
are not persuaded.
Because Dobson had a prior expired OFP against Solee, the distr ict court had the
authority to grant a new OFP upon a showing that Dobson was “re asonably in fear of
physical harm from” Solee. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a(b)(2) (2018). Thus, the issue
to be decided by the district court at the OFP hearing was whet her Dobson reasonably
feared harm from Solee. In reaching its decision, the district court focused on the fact that
Solee entered the house when he did not have a right to do so—not on how he entered. The
district court also based its decision on the fact that Solee changed the locks after entering,

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thereby preventing Dobson from entering her own home. At the c onclusion of the OFP
hearing, the district court told Solee:
And being a [p]olice [o]ffice r I am shocked that you would
make those decisions to just go and I know you think it’s your
house, or whatever. But, you knew who had possession. You
negotiated that through your attorney, you knew who had
possession, okay. And I can only tell you that if you don’t
know how terrifying it would be if someone went into my
home, I don’t care my ex-wife, whoever it was, that is a place
where I am supposed to feel safe and they just took it over.
When the [c]ourt says she has possession of it. You knew that.

As this passage indicates, the district court did not base its decision to grant the OFP on
whether Solee used a key to enter the house. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (noting that a
district court may recite findings of fact and conclusions of l aw orally after the close of
evidence). And, although the district court expressed disbelief as to Solee’s statement that
he used an original key to enter the house, it was Solee’s entr y into the home when he
lacked a right to do so and the changing of the locks that was determinative in the court’s
analysis. The district court’s denial of Solee’s motion to reconsider and accept an offer of
proof of the video further demon strates that the district court ultimately determined that
Solee’s method of entry did not influence its decision to issue the OFP.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the video. The evidence
that Solee entered the house and changed the locks, considered in light of the previous
abuse that Solee committed, was s ufficient to support the distr ict court’s finding that
Dobson reasonably feared physical harm from Solee. Whether Sol ee entered using an
original key to the property was not a material fact at issue b ecause Dobson’s fear was
reasonable whether Solee entered with an original key or not. Evidence that tended to

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prove how Solee entered the house was not relevant under these circumstances.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it excluded
the video evidence purportedly showing Solee entering with a key for lack of relevancy.
At the OFP hearing, the district court also determined that the v i d e o w a s n o t
admissible to show that the house was vacant because that fact was not relevant to whether
Dobson reasonably feared Solee. We agree with the district cou rt’s conclusion. Dobson
had the right to possess the house, and Solee interfered with that right by entering the house
and changing the locks. In light of the prior abuse, Solee’s a cts caused Dobson to
reasonably fear physical harm from Solee. That fear resulted b ecause Solee entered the
house when he had no right to do so regardless of whether it wa s vacant. As a result of
Solee’s actions, Dobson did not return to the house because she was afraid that he would
be there. The district court did not clearly abuse its discret ion in excluding evidence to
prove whether the house was vacant at the time Solee entered.
Even if the video was relevant to showing either that Solee entered with an original
key or that the house was vacant when he entered, we conclude t hat Solee has not
demonstrated that the exclusion of the video was prejudicial. “An evidentiary error is
prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the fact-finder and changed the result of
the proceeding.” Olson, 892 N.W.2d at 842. As stated above, the most important
considerations in issuing the OFP were that Solee entered the house and changed the locks
without the right to do so. Based on these facts, and consider ing past abuse, the district
court found that Dobson reasonably feared Solee. Considering t he district court’s
statements at the hearing and the findings included in the OFP itself, we conclude that the

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video would not have changed the result of the hearing and that the district court would
have issued the OFP even if Solee proved that he entered the ho use using an original key
and knowing that the house was vacant. Based on our review of the record, we determine
that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of t he hearing would have been
different had the district court received the video.
Finally, Solee argues that the vid eo was relevant to impeach Do bson’s credibility
because it would contradict Dobson’s testimony that she lived in the residence and that she
changed the locks after Solee moved out. Dobson’s credibility was a material issue. But
the video would not have demonstrated that either aspect of Dob son’s testimony was
untrue. The video would have showed that the house was barren, not that Dobson had
stopped living there. 2 The video would have showed Sol ee entering with a key, but th e
only evidence that it was Solee’s original key was Solee’s own testimony, which the district
court heard. More importantly, neither of these facts were ult imately relevant or material
to the district court’s decision to issue the OFP. The distric t court’s finding that Dobson
reasonably feared harm from Solee was supported by the evidence that Solee entered the
house and changed the locks and the evidence of prior abuse. A ccordingly, we conclude
that the district court acted with in its discretion when it exc luded the video evidence and
that there was no resulting prejudice to Solee.

2 Gazelka’s affidavit indicated that the video would show that the house was empty “except
for two or three chairs in the kitchen” and a “bare mattress in one of the bedrooms.” The
cupboards and cabinets had been “cleaned out.”

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II. The district court acted within its discretion when it took judicial notice of
provisions in the parties’ divorce decree.

Solee contends that the district court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice
of the parties’ divorce decree—specifically, that the decree ga ve possession of the house
to Dobson. He argues that the district court misinterpreted the divorce decree because the
divorce decree did not expressly bar him from the house. Solee also maintains that Dobson
violated the divorce decree by turning off the utilities, there by failing to pay the normal
maintenance as required by the decree.3
We review a district court’s decision to take judicial notice of facts for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Zemple, 489 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Minn. App. 1992). A court may take
judicial notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute tha t is capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned. Minn. R.
Evid. 201(b). A court is permitted to take judicial notice of its own records. In re Welfare
of Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. 1980). Because the district court is permitted to
take judicial notice of its own records, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in taking judicial notice of the provision of the di vorce decree that granted
possession of the house to Dobson.
Solee’s other arguments regarding the divorce decree also lack merit. Though Solee
argues that the divorce decree did not expressly prohibit him f rom going to the house, he
agreed at the OFP hearing that Dobson had sole possession of the house and that he had no
right to enter the house. Despite his knowledge of these facts , Solee entered the house

3 The divorce decree is not in the record.

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without Dobson’s permission or awareness two days after the fir st OFP expired and
changed the locks. Finally, whet her Dobson violated a provisio n of the divorce decree
regarding the payment of utility bills is irrelevant to whether Solee caused Dobson to fear
harm from him. The district court’s interpretation of the divorce decree was not challenged
at the OFP hearing, and we conclude that the provisions of the decree (or lack of provisions)
that Solee cites on appeal do not alter the district court’s re asoning that Solee was not
permitted to enter the house and change the locks. We find no abuse of discretion under
these circumstances.
III. The district court did not d eprive Solee of his right to due process.

Solee argues that the district court deprived him of the right to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal in viola tion of the Due Process Clause o f the United States
Constitution. He argues that the d istrict court’s conduct at t he hearing demonstrated that
it had preconceived notions of the evidence and that the district court’s evidentiary rulings
precluded him from contradicting those notions. Citing Hansen v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. ,
43 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1950), he argues that the district co urt’s questioning and
comments demonstrated that the district court improperly took on the role of an advocate.
Finally, he argues that the district court held Solee to an “elevated standard” because Solee
was a police officer. We are not persuaded.
“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal
in both civil and criminal cases.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S. Ct.
1610, 1613 (1980). The presence of a biased judge acting as a fact-finder is a structural
error that deprives a litigant of his right to a fair trial. State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238,

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252-53 (Minn. 2005). The lack of an impartial judge requires a utomatic reversal. Id. at
253. We review de novo whether a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to
an impartial finder of fact. Id. at 249.
A judge is presumed to be impar tial and approach the case with a “neutral and
objective disposition.” Troxel v. State , 875 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted). The presumption may be rebutted by evidence of “favo ritism or antagonism.”
State v. Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. 2008). The judge’s conduct must be fair to
both sides. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 250. But “[b]ias or prejudice, to be disqualifying, must
stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other
than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” In re Estate of Lange, 398
N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. App. 1986) (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31-35,
41 S. Ct. 230, 232-33 (1921)).
There is no evidence that the district court had any preconcept ions of the merits of
the case derived from outside sources. While the district cour t often interrupted Solee’s
attempts to introduce evidence or testify, a significant number of those interruptions were
merely to clarify Solee’s testimony and maintain focus on relevant issues. Moreover, the
district court also interrupted Dobson’s testimony and cross-ex amination. Because the
record demonstrates neither that Solee overcame the presumption that the judge was
impartial nor that the judge was, in fact, biased against Solee, we conclude that Solee was
not denied the right to a fair and impartial tribunal.
A new trial is also warranted when the district court “departs from the standards of
judicial impartiality and prejudic es the losing party’s rights. ” State v. Erickson , 610

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N.W.2d 335, 341 (Minn. 2000) (citing Hansen, 43 N.W.2d at 265). In Hansen, the supreme
court concluded that a new trial was required due to the “gratuitous observations, remarks,
and reprimands of the trial court” that “prejudiced defendants’ case and deprived them of
a fair trial.” 43 N.W.2d at 262. The conduct in Hansen was in the presence of a jury, and
the district court frequently interjected during testimony to m ake comments about the
evidence and chastise the defense attorney. Id. at 262-64.
There is, however, an “appropriate reduction in concern” for the district court’s tone
and the content of its questions in a bench trial. In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170,
176 (Minn. App. 1997) (citing Block v. Target Stores, Inc., 458 N.W.2d 705, 712-13 (Minn.
App. 1990) (criticizing trial judg e for lengthy and sarcastic q uestioning of a witness
especially because of the possibl e effect on the jury’s view of the case), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 28, 1990)). In a bench trial, “sharp and argument ative” questioning by the
district court can be tolerated, and the district court “may ha ve not only the right but the
duty to interrogate a witness” if the court is doubtful about the witness’s testimony. Olson
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 269 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Minn. 1978); see also Minn. R. Evid.
614 (permitting the court to call and interrogate witnesses).
Even if a district court makes inappropriate comments, however, “appellate courts
will not intervene unless the co mments were prejudicial, biased or deprived [a party] of
their right to a fair trial.” D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d at 176 (quotation omitted).
Solee’s argument that the district court denied him an impartial hearing through its
evidentiary rulings fails. As discussed above, the district court did not abuse its discretion

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in excluding the video evidence or taking judicial notice of th e divorce decree. These
evidentiary rulings did not violate Solee’s right to due process.
Solee’s argument that the distric t court’s confrontational and narrow questioning
deprived him of due process also fails. The district court questioned both parties, primarily
to guide the testimony to relevant issues and clarify the narrative testimony of two pro se
litigants. We agree that the district court’s questioning of S o l e e w a s s h a r p a n d
argumentative at times. But the sharp questioning occurred aft er Solee had admitted that
he entered the house without Dobson’s knowledge or consent. Th is was a hearing before
a judge, not a jury, and the district court was permitted, if not required, to question a witness
if it had doubts about the witness’s testimony. Olson, 269 N.W.2d at 702.
Finally, Solee argues that the district court held “Solee to an elevated standard due
to his background as a police officer.” Though the district co urt made remarks regarding
Solee’s position as a police officer, we find nothing in the record to support that the district
court held Solee to an “elevated standard” when determining whe ther Dobson reasonably
feared Solee based on his actions. We find no basis in the rec ord to conclude that the
district court’s conduct departed from the standards of impartiality and prejudiced Solee’s
rights.
Affirmed.