Michael Opeoluwa Adebayo, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0940

Michael Opeoluwa Adebayo, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 10, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-4154

Herbert A. Igbanugo, Jason A. Nielson, Igbanugo Partners Int’l Law Firm, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Atto rney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochr an, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Ju dge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Michael Opeoluwa Adeb ayo filed a petition for postcon viction relief,
asserting that his plea was inva lid. On appeal, Adebayo challe nges the postconviction

2
court’s decision to deny his petition without holding an eviden tiary hearing. Because
Adebayo failed to allege facts in his petition that, if true, w ould entitle him to relief, we
affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Michael Opeoluwa Adebayo with simple robbery under
Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2016) for an incident that occurred on Fe bruary 9, 2017. The
complaint alleged that Adebayo was “dancing around” the aisle o n a light rail train,
appeared nervous, and kept looking at K.M., a passenger on the train. As the train doors
began to close at a stop, Adebayo grabbed K.M.’s phone and ran off the train. K.M. chased
after Adebayo and caught him. Adebayo punched and kicked K.M. before K.M. was able
to take his phone back from Adebayo. K.M. called 911, reported t h e i n c i d e n t , a n d
described Adebayo.
Adebayo later admitted to police that he took K.M.’s phone. Ad ebayo told police
that he had decided to “play a game” with K.M. because he thought that K.M. was someone
that he knew from high school. He stated that he realized K.M. was not his classmate just
before K.M. tackled him. When Adebayo was shown a video recording of the incident, he
denied fighting K.M. He claimed that K.M. was “leaching onto” him and that he gave the
phone back to K.M.
Adebayo pleaded guilty to simple robbery on July 28, 2017. The plea was entered
pursuant to an agreement that called for a stay of imposition of sentence. Adebayo’s public
defender (the public defender) was not available at the plea he aring, so another public
defender (the substitute attorney) appeared with Adebayo. At the plea hearing, the district

3
court asked Adebayo whether he w as “pleading guilty to this cha rge freely and
voluntarily,” and Adebayo responded “correct.” The district court asked Adebayo whether
he was “thinking clearly today,” and Adebayo responded “yes.”
Adebayo also submitted a plea petition at the plea hearing. The petition included a
series of statements about the circumstances of the plea and Ad ebayo’s understanding of
the rights given up by entering a guilty plea. Adebayo checked a box on the petition that
indicated that he had been a patient in a mental hospital, but there was no indication on the
petition of when he had been hosp italized. At the plea hearing , he also testified that he
went over the petition line by line with his attorney that afte rnoon and that he understood
the constitutional rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty.
Adebayo then testified about the charged incident and the facts that made him guilty
of simple robbery. Adebayo explained that he and other people from his high school “play
games” with each other on the bus lines. He claimed that he was not “100-percent” himself
that day and that he was acting in an “e-got-tic” way, meaning that he was acting with an
“overbearing ego.” He admitted that he took K.M.’s phone but stated that he gave it back
to K.M. after he “rethought the situation.” At that point, the district court interrupted
Adebayo’s testimony and said to Adebayo’s attorney that it could not accept a guilty plea
from Adebayo if he claimed to be innocent. Without consulting with his attorney, Adebayo
immediately responded to the court, “Oh, I did, definitely, then. I did, I did take the phone
out of the individual’s hand. I did steal his phone.” In resp onse to questioning, Adebayo
stated that he did not know K.M., that he used some manner of force to take K.M.’s phone,

4
and that he ran off the train. The district court accepted Ade bayo’s guilty plea and
scheduled a sentencing hearing.
A presentence-investigation repo rt (PSI) was prepared before th e sentencing
hearing. Adebayo told the PSI w riter that he took K.M.’s phone because he thought he
knew K.M. and that he was “just playing.” Adebayo told the PSI writer that he enjoyed
working out, music, and “switchi ng characters.” When asked abo ut his future goals,
Adebayo told the PSI writer, “I am a confirmed being of the earth; a said being and travel
experiment. It’s a different motion of advancement. Man vs. w ild.” Adebayo also told
the PSI writer that he had been h ospitalized for mental-health issues about two months
before the PSI interview. He sa id that he spent five days in t he hospital before being
released.
The PSI writer also spoke with Adebayo’s aunt. The aunt expressed concern about
Adebayo’s mental health. She ind icated that she recently took Adebayo to the hospital
because Adebayo had been engaging in irrational behavior within the past year and because
Adebayo had been “ranting about things that make no sense.” Sh e claimed that Adebayo
refused to take medications at the hospital and that he was released after several days.
Based on the interviews with Adebayo and his aunt, the PSI writ er indicated that
Adebayo “appears to have mental health issues that have not bee n addressed.”
Consequently, the PSI writer recommended that Adebayo complete a mental-health
evaluation as a condition of probation.
The district court sentenced Adebayo on September 20, 2017. The public defender
appeared with Adebayo. She asked the district court to place A debayo on a shorter

5
probation period in light of the mental-health concerns noted b y the PSI writer. 1 T h e
district court stayed imposition of the sentence for five years and placed Adebayo on
probation. As a condition of pr obation, the district court ord ered Adebayo to complete a
mental-health evaluation and follow the recommendations of the evaluation. Adebayo
indicated that he understood that he had to comply with the mental-health evaluation. The
district court explained that it was ordering the mental-health evaluation, in part, based on
Adebayo’s family members’ concerns expressed in the PSI. Adeba yo replied, “Um, in
t e r m s o f f a m i l y , y o u k n o w , I d o n ’ t f e e l t h a t t h e y ’ r e e f f i c i e n t enough to make that
statement.” At the end of the s entencing hearing, the district court asked Adebayo if he
understood the sentence, and Adeb ayo replied, “Yes, I do.” The district court asked
Adebayo if he had any questions, and Adebayo replied, “No, I do not.”
After sentencing, Adebayo retain ed a private attorney and filed a petition for
postconviction relief. In the petition, Adebayo alleged that his plea was not valid because
he suffered from mental-health problems. He further alleged th at his plea was not valid
because he received ineffective a ssistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to
request a competency evaluation during the criminal proceedings . He asked the
postconviction court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. He did not request a hearing
on the petition.
In support of the petition, Adebayo submitted several exhibits. Exhibits 1 and 2 are
the transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings in this mat ter. Exhibit 3 is a transcript

1 The PSI writer recommended a probation period of ten years. The public defender asked
for five years.

6
of a November 13, 2017 bond hearing and a November 16, 2017 master calendar hearing
in a federal immigration matter involving Adebayo. These heari ngs occurred
approximately two months after the district court sentenced Ade bayo in this matter.
Adebayo made combative and illogi cal statements at the federal hearings. Adebayo
expressed a belief that there was a conspiracy against him. Th e immigration court
ultimately scheduled a hearing to assess Adebayo’s competency.
Exhibit 4 is an affidavit signed by the public defender dated N ovember 27, 2017.
The public defender stated that while she represented him, Adeb ayo “behaved somewhat
strangely and would occasionally m ake comments that did not see m to be logical during
[her] representation of him.” But the public defender also said that she was “unaware that
he was experiencing delusional thoughts that there was a conspi racy against him.” She
stated that had she known that Adebayo was having delusional th oughts, she would have
requested a competency evaluation.
Exhibit 5 is the PSI prepared in this case. Exhibit 6 is a collection of police reports
related to the February 9, 2017 simple robbery to which Adebayo pleaded guilty.
Exhibit 7 is a hospital visit su m m a r y . T h e s u m m a r y s h o w s t h a t Adebayo was
hospitalized for five days in April 2017. Adebayo was diagnose d with “adjustment
disorder with mixed disturbance of conduct and emotion” and “in termittent explosive
disorder.” Adebayo was not prescribed any medications.
In January 2018, Adebayo submitte d two additional documents to supplement his
postconviction petition. First, Ad ebayo submitted a collection of medical records
generated while he was incarcerate d in the Sherburne County Jai l from October to

7
December 2017. The medical records indicate that, as of October 26, 2017, Adebayo was
showing signs of mental illness. The medical records also show that while incarcerated,
his thought content revealed evidence of paranoid delusions and thought disorder. Second,
Adebayo submitted a transcript of a December 15, 2017 competency hearing in the federal
immigration court matter. At the end of the hearing, the immig ration court found that
Adebayo was incompetent based on his bizarre behavior and state ments at the hearings,
including his statements that t he immigration court judge did n ot understand the
proceedings and was incompetent.
In January 2018, the state filed a memorandum opposing Adebayo’s postconviction
petition. The postconviction cour t took the matter under advis ement but did not hold a
hearing on the petition. The district court judge who considered Adebayo’s postconviction
petition was the same judge who presided over Adebayo’s plea and sentencing hearings.
In April 2018, the postconviction court issued a detailed order denying Adebayo’s
petition. The postconviction court concluded that there were no signs of incompetency at
the plea hearing and that, based on the evidence submitted, Adebayo’s plea was accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. The postconviction court found tha t Adebayo appeared to
understand the rights he was giv ing up and the nature of the pr oceedings. The
postconviction court noted that A debayo testified that he was t hinking clearly when he
pleaded guilty, that he entered into the plea negotiation freel y, and that he stated that he
understood the rights that he was giving up at the plea hearing . The postconviction court
also noted that there were no i ndications at the sentencing hea ring that Adebayo was not
tracking or comprehending the proceedings.

8
The postconviction court also indicated that, while the PSI wri ter and Adebayo’s
family expressed concerns for Adebayo’s mental health, there was no reason for the district
court to believe that Adebayo was legally incompetent at the plea hearing or the sentencing
hearing, given Adebayo’s apparent ability to understand and participate in the proceedings.
The postconviction court discusse d the distinction between bein g mentally ill and being
incompetent for the purpose of a criminal proceeding.
The postconviction court also noted that the severity of a ment al-health condition
can vary over short periods of time. The court recognized that Adebayo was incompetent
in December 2017, but concluded th at Adebayo’s incompetency in December 2017 was
not evidence that Adebayo was incompetent at the plea hearing i n July 2017 or the
sentencing hearing in September 2017. The postconviction court also found that the
Sherburne County Jail medical records and the immigration court hearing transcripts were
not relevant to whether Adebayo was competent at the plea hearing and sentencing hearing
because they were based on behaviors that occurred after Adebay o’s criminal case
concluded.
Finally, the postconviction court determined that the public defender’s affidavit did
not demonstrate that the plea was invalid. The postconviction court noted that the public
defender expressly stated in her affidavit that she was not awa re that Adebayo was
experiencing any delusional thoughts during the criminal proceedings, and also stated that
she would have requested a competency evaluation for Adebayo if she had known he was
experiencing such thoughts. The postconviction court found tha t there was “no reason
advanced that [the public defender] should have known, nor any evidence presented that

9
[Adebayo] actually was experiencing delusions during the period of his plea hearing or
sentencing hearing.” The postconviction court ultimately concluded that Adebayo had not
demonstrated that he had receive d ineffective assistance of cou nsel because he did not
show that the public defender’s failure to request a competency evaluation was
unreasonable under the circumstances and because Adebayo did not show that there was a
reasonable probability that a comp etency evaluation would have revealed that Adebayo
was incompetent to proceed.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Adebayo argues that the postcon viction court erred in denying his postconviction
petition without a hearing. A co urt must hold an evidentiary h earing on a postconviction
petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show
that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 5 90.04, subd. 1 (2016). To
determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required, the postc onviction court must
consider the facts alleged in the petition as true and view them in “the light most favorable
to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State , 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018) (quotation
omitted). If the petition, evidence, and record “conclusively show that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief,” the court may deny the petition without a hearing. Martin v. State, 825
N.W.2d 734, 740 (Minn. 2013) . But if there are material facts in dispute and “the
allegations in the petition, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, then the court must
schedule an evidentiary hearing.” Id. Any doubts regarding whether to grant a hearing
should be resolved in favor of a hearing. Campbell v. State, 916 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Minn.

10
2018). We review a postconviction court’s decision to not hold an evidentiary hearing for
an abuse of discretion, reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal issues de novo.
Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 214 (Minn. 2016).
I. The postconviction court acte d within its discretion in dism issing Adebayo’s
claim that his plea was invalid because he received ineffective assistance of
counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Adebayo contends that the postconviction court abused its discretion in dismissing
his claim that his plea was invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel when it dismissed
his claim without holding an evidentiary hearing. Adebayo argu es that he alleged facts
that, if proved, would entitle him to relief and that there are “disputed medical facts
regarding his mental health that needed to be resolved in order to reach the merits of his
post-conviction claim.” We are not persuaded.
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffect ive assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must allege facts that, if proved by a fa ir preponderance of the
evidence, would satisfy the two-prong Strickland test. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516
(Minn. 2012). Under the Strickland test, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel arising out of the plea process must show that (1) his attorney’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)).
Adebayo argues that the public defender’s failure to request a competency
evaluation under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 fell below an objectiv e standard of

11
reasonableness given the evidence supporting his postconviction petition. He argues that
he was prejudiced by the public defender’s failure to request a competency evaluation
because he may have been found incompetent had the court ordered the evaluation.
The reasonableness of an attorney ’s performance is measured aga inst the
“representation by an attorney e xercising the customary skills and diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney wou ld perform under similar circu mstances.”
Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). There is a
strong presumption that an attorney’s performance was reasonable. Id.
“A defendant has a due process right not to be tried or convicted of a criminal charge
if he or she is legally incompetent.” Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011).
“The prosecutor, defense attorney , and the court share the duty to protect the right of a
defendant not to be tried or convicted while incompetent.” Id. A defendant is incompetent
if, due to mental illness or cognitive impairment, he lacks the ability to rationally consult
with counsel or understand the proceedings or participate in the defense. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20.01, subd. 2. If defense counsel doubts a defendant’s com petency at any time, she
must make a motion challenging competency. Id., s u b d . 3 . A d e f e n d a n t w h o i s
incompetent must not plead guilty or be sentenced. Id., subd. 2. Evidence of a defendant’s
irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to
stand trial are all relevant in determining whether there is reason to doubt the defendant’s
competence. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 172 (Minn. 1997).
Because Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 requires a defense attorney to make a motion
challenging competency if she, at any time, doubts a defendant’s competency, Adebayo’s

12
attorneys’ performance was ine ffective if a reasonably competen t attorney would have
doubted Adebayo’s competency and requested a competency evaluat ion under similar
circumstances.
We must determine whether Adebayo alleged facts in his petition and supporting
exhibits that, if proved, showed that his attorneys’ failure to request a competency
evaluation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. If he did, the postconviction
court erred in denying the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.
In support of his postconviction petition, Adebayo provided Sherburne County Jail
medical records and the federal immigration court transcripts. These documents did not
exist until after the sentencing hearing and relate to events o ccurring after Adebayo’s
sentencing. Neither the public defender nor the substitute attorney could have known about
these events while the criminal case proceeded. Consequently, Adebayo’s attorneys could
not be ineffective for failing to act on them, and they are irrelevant to determining whether
the attorneys provided ineffective assistance.
The evidence presented with the petition that is arguably relev ant to whether
Adebayo’s attorneys sh ould have requested a competency evaluati on is (1) the behavior
alleged in the complaint and police reports (specifically, the fact that Adebayo was
“dancing” on the light rail and purportedly believed that he wa s “playing a game” with
K.M., whom he believed he knew); (2) the fact that Adebayo was hospitalized in April
2017 and diagnosed with “adjustme nt disorder with mixed disturb ance of conduct and
emotion” and “interm ittent explosive disorder”; (3) the public defender’s statement that
Adebayo “behaved somewhat strangely and would occasionally make comments that did

13
not seem to be logical”; (4) Adebayo’s use of the word “e-got-tic” at the plea hearing and
his testimony that he was not “100-percent” himself on the day of the charged incident;
(5) Adebayo’s statements in the PSI that he enjoyed “switching characters” and, “I am a
confirmed being of the earth; a said being and travel experiment. It’s a different motion of
advancement. Man vs. wild”; (6) Adebayo’s aunt’s statements de scribing Adebayo’s
irrational behavior and expressi ng a concern for Adebayo’s ment al-health; and
(7) Adebayo’s misuse of the word “efficient” at the sentencing hearing.
These allegations and supporting evidence, if proved and viewed in a light most
favorable to Adebayo, demonstrate that Adebayo was suffering fr om mental-health
problems at around the same time that he pleaded guilty and was sentenced in this matter.
But while mental-health problems sometimes overlap with legal incompetency, the two are
not the same, as the postconviction court correctly noted.2
Even considering the evidence pr esented by Adebayo about his me ntal condition
around the time of the plea and sentencing hearings, there is strong evidence in the record
that Adebayo was legally competent at both the plea and sentencing hearings. In totality,
Adebayo’s responses to questions at both hearings were reasonable and coherent. Though
some of Adebayo’s testimony included yes-or-no responses to leading questions, Adebayo
also provided testimony that was spontaneous and logical. Afte r the district court told
Adebayo’s attorney that it woul d not accept a guilty plea from Adebayo if Adebayo

2 We also recognize that there is no evidence in the record that describes the symptoms of
the two mental-health diagnoses t hat Adebayo received in April 2017, or how those
diagnoses might affect Adebayo’s competency to proceed in a criminal case.

14
maintained his innocence, Adeba yo, on his own initiative, state d, “Oh, I did, definitely,
then. I did, I did take the phone out of the individual’s hand. I did steal his phone.” This
statement demonstrates that Adebayo was able to understand why the court was hesitant to
accept his guilty plea and that Adebayo was able to provide a r ational response as to why
he was in fact guilty of the crime to which he was pleading gui lty. In other instances,
Adebayo disagreed with leading que stions that his attorney pose d and offered his own
explanation of the charged incident. Adebayo was polite and re spectful at both criminal
hearings in contrast to his beha vior during the subsequent immi gration hearings.
Considering Adebayo’s demeanor a nd apparent ability to understa nd the plea and
sentencing proceedings, the other evidence of his mental health presented with his petition
was not significantly probative of his alleged incompetency at the time of his plea.
Moreover, Adebayo’s decision to accept a plea offer and his ability to consult with
his attorney are further evidence that a reasonable attorney, u nder similar circumstances,
would not have doubted Adebayo’s competency despite the signs o f mental illness.
Adebayo’s decision to accept a plea offer that called for a stay of imposition was a rational
choice given the video evidence that purportedly depicted the F ebruary 9 incident.
Adebayo filled out a plea petition with his attorney and review ed it with her line-by-line
before he pleaded guilty—further demonstrating that Adebayo was able to rationally
consult with his attorney. Adeba yo testified that he understoo d the rights that he was
waiving when he pleaded guilty—demonstrating that, at the time of the hearings, Adebayo
was able to understand the proceedings.

15
In light of Adebayo’s lucid demeanor and logical statements at the hearings, and his
apparent ability to make rational decisions and consult with his attorneys, we conclude that
Adebayo failed to allege facts that, if proved, showed that a reasonably competent attorney
under similar circumstances would have doubted Adebayo’s compet ency and requested a
competency evaluation. Thus, A debayo’s petition failed to alle ge facts that, if proved,
would satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Consequently, we conclude that the postconviction court acted within its discretion when
it dismissed his claim that his plea was invalid because he rec eived ineffective assistance
of counsel without first holding an evidentiary hearing.
II. The postconviction court acte d within its discretion in dis missing Adebayo’s
claim that his plea was not accurate and intelligent without ho lding an
evidentiary hearing.

Adebayo also asserted in his po stconviction petition that his p lea was not valid
because it was not accurate or in telligent. The postconviction court also dismissed these
claims without holding an evidentiary hearing.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his gui lty plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But, a court must allow with drawal if it is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Id. A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is
not valid. Id. at 94. A valid plea is accura te, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. The validity
of a plea is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Id.

16
A. Adebayo did not allege facts that, if proved, demonstrate th at his plea
was not accurate.

Adebayo argues that his plea was not accurate because his testi mony did not
establish the requisite mental state for simple robbery. He argues that because he testified
at the plea hearing that he was playing a “game” with K.M. when he took K.M.’s phone,
that his later testimony that he stole the phone was not suffic ient to establish that he had
the requisite mental state.
“The accuracy requirement protect s a defendant from pleading gu ilty to a more
serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.”
Id. An accurate plea must be established on a proper factual basi s. Lussier v. State, 821
N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). A proper factual basis exists “i f the record contains a
showing that there is credible e vidence available which would s upport a jury verdict that
defendant is guilty of at least a s great a crime as that to whi ch he pled guilty.” Nelson v.
State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
The mens rea element required to establish a simple robbery und er Minn.
Stat. § 609.24 is that the defendant have knowledge that he is not entitled to take personal
property from the person. State v. Sandve, 156 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. 1968). Adebayo’s
plea would be inaccurate if he genuinely believed that he was e ntitled to take the phone
from K.M. But Adebayo testifie d that he knew he was not entitl ed to take the property
from K.M., and agreed that he “ripped” the phone out of K.M.’s hands. Adebayo also
testified that he stole the phon e from K.M. Adebayo’s testimon y therefore satisfied the

17
mental element of simple robbery. Consequently, the postconviction court acted within its
discretion when it dismissed Adebayo’s postconviction petition on this basis.
B. Adebayo did not allege facts that, if proved, demonstrate th at his plea
was unintelligent.

Adebayo argues that his plea was not intelligent because he was not competent at
the plea hearing. He argues that the postconviction court abus ed its discretion in denying
this claim without an evidentiary hearing because there were “d isputed medical facts
regarding his mental health that needed to be resolved in order to reach the merits” of his
claim.
A plea is intelligent if the defendant “understands the charges against him, the rights
he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. As discussed
above, the allegations made by Adebayo and the supporting evide nce, viewed in a light
most favorable to Adebayo’s claims, were not sufficient to caus e a reasonably competent
attorney to doubt that Adebayo wa s competent. The postconvicti on court accepted
Adebayo’s evidence and allegations as true in dismissing this c laim, and thus Adebayo’s
argument that disputed facts required an evidentiary hearing is without merit. Considering
the same evidence and factors, we conclude that Adebayo failed to allege facts that, if
proved, would demonstrate that h e did not understand the charge s against him, the rights
he was waiving, or the consequences of his plea. On the contrary, the record conclusively
demonstrates that Adebayo’s plea was intelligently entered. Adebayo’s decision to enter a
plea negotiation, his ability to consult with his attorney and complete a plea petition, and
his testimony at the plea hearing all demonstrate that Adebayo understood the proceedings,

18
the rights he waived, and the consequences of his plea. Accord ingly, the postconviction
court acted within its discretion when it dismissed Adebayo’s postconviction claim that his
plea was not intelligent without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.