Alissa Boehm, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0941

Alissa Boehm,
Respondent,

vs.

Melanie Glick, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed March 25, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-8970

Alissa Boehm, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Gregory S. Bachmeier, Bachmeier Law Office, Maple Grove, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s judgment following a court trial in favor of
respondent, ordering appellants to return a cat. They claim that the district court’s findings
of fact are clearly erroneous, ask this court to consider an argument not raised at trial, and

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claim that the district court erred by not applying a “best for all concerned” standard that
Minnesota has not adopted. We affirm.
FACTS
This case is about who is the rightful owner of a cat . Sometime in May of 2015 , a
woman found and took in a stray cat, hereinafter referred to as Django. The woman gave
Django to appellants, Melanie Glick and BaoHan Tong, who lived together in a home with
Tong’s father. Django’s back legs had some medical issues and appellants paid for
veterinary care to address these issues.
Roughly one month after appellants took Djan go in, they messaged respondent
Alissa Boehm asking her and her two then-roommates if they could provide Django with
a home. Just before they gave Django to respondent, the cat was diagnosed with a
contagious infection commonly known as “cat flu.” But Glick had two other cats and
Tong’s father was allergic to cats, so they asked respondent to take the cat. Appellants had
also rescued two other stray cats and gave them to friends in the two years before they gave
Django to respondent.
In September of 2015 , Glick moved into a house wit h respondent and two other
roommates. Tong did not live with them, but frequently visited during the week and stayed
on weekends. Prior to Glick moving in with respondent, appellants only visited Django
socially and never referred to themselves as the cat’s owner s. On the application for the
rental where respondent and Glick lived together, respondent listed a cat named Django as
her pet and Glick did not. While living together, respondent and Glick exchanged several
text messages wherein respondent referred to Django as her cat and Glick did not contradict

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her. In another exchange, respondent and Glick discussed a schedule for cleaning the litter
boxes that the three cats who lived at the residence shared. Glick, who owned the other
two cats, stated that she was fine with cleaning the litter box es four days out of the week
because she owned two cats.
In the winter of 2015, after hearing a rumor that Glick was planning on taking
Django when she moved out, respondent asked appellants about their plans. Appellants
stated that they would not take Django when Glick moved out.
In July of 2016, Glick moved out of the residence that she lived in with respondent
and took Django with her. Respondent was out of town when this happened and received
a text message from Tong informing her that appellants had taken Django. When she
arrived back in town a few days later , respondent contacted the police to report Django
stolen. Police created an incident report suggesting that a ppellants be charged with theft .
It is unclear from the record before us if either appellants were ever charged, but in any
event, neither Glick nor Tong was convicted.
Early the following year, respondent filed an action in conciliation court seeking to
have Django returned. The conciliation court found in favor of respondent an d ordered
appellants to return the cat, as well as other property related to Django’s care. Appellants
demanded removal of the matter to district court and the conciliation court order was
vacated. Following a court trial, t he district court found for re spondent and ordered
appellants to return Django and related property to respondent. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
“On appeal from judgment following a court trial, this court reviews whether the
district court’s findings were clearly erroneous and whether the district court erred as a
matter of law.” In re Distribution of Attorney’s Fees between Stowman Law Firm, P.A. &
Lori Peterson Law Firm, 855 N.W.2d 760, 761 (Minn. App. 2014), aff’d, 870 N.W.2d 755
(Minn. 2015). We review questions of law de novo. Id.
“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
[district] court to judge the credibilit y of the witnesses.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. In
applying Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, “we view the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment of the district court.” Rogers v. Moore , 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999).
“The decision of a district court should not be reversed merely because the appellate court
views the evidence differently.” Id. “Rather, the findings must be manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
I. Findings of fact

Appellants first argue that the district court’s finding that appellants held respondent
out to be Django’s owner through their conduct is clearly erroneous. But the district court’s
finding has support in the record. One of respondent’s roommates at the time testified that
when appellant Glick dropped off the cat , respondent and both of her then-roommates
agreed that respondent would own Django. A mutual friend of respondent and appellants
testified that respondent was known to be the owner and primary caregiver of Django.

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Respondent testified that appellants had always treated her as Django’s owner. The district
court found all of these individuals’ testimonies to be credible, but did not find appellants’
contradictory testimonies to be credible. Further, text messages between respondent and
appellant Glick strongly imply that respondent owns Django. On the rental application for
the residence where respondent lived with appellant Glick, respondent listed that she
owned a cat named Django. When appellant Glick filled out her rental application for the
same residence, she did not state that she owned Django. Given that we are obliged to
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, see Rogers, 603 N.W.2d at
656, we conclude that the district court’s finding that appellants held respondent out as
Django’s owner is not clearly erroneous.
As part of the above claim, appellants also appear to argue that the district court’s
implicit finding that appellants were not solely financially responsible for Django is clearly
erroneous. But as the district court noted, appellants own two cats other than Django, and
the majority of appellants’ receipts did not indicate that the expenses incurred were for
Django. The receipt for the initial veterinarian payment to take care of Django’s back legs,
which did specifically reference Django , was from before appellants gave the cat to
respondent.1 To contrast, respondent submitted receipts for cat expenses from the relevant
period and did not own another cat at that time. The district court found credible testimony
that respondent paid for all of Django’s expenses and did not find appellants’ contrary

1 Appellants also submitted receipts from the period of time after they took Django from
the shared home, but these are obviously not relevant to the question of who was financially
responsible for Django before appellants took the cat without permission.

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testimony to be credible. Because “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
[district] court to judge t he credibility of the witnesses,” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, w e
conclude th at the district court’s finding that respondent, rather than appellants, bore
financial responsibility for Django is not clearly erroneous.
Appellants also challenge the district court’s implicit findings about why respondent
accepted responsibility for cleaning the litter boxes. It is uncontested that respondent took
responsibility for cleaning the litter boxes three days a week, while appellants were
responsible for cleaning them the other four days. Appellants argue that the district court
erred in concluding that the fact respondent took on this responsibility showed that
appellants acknowledged that respondent owned Django.
Respondent argues that they split up the cleaning the way that they did because she
owned Django while appellants owned two other cats. Glick testified that she offered to
clean the litter boxes more often because she was working long hours and was not able to
clean them as often as respondent wanted. The district court’s finding that Glick only
accepted this responsibility because she owned two cats and respondent only owned
Django i s supported by the record. Specifically, appellant sent a text message to
respondent accepting respondent’s proposed cleaning schedule by stating, “I’m fine with
doing 4 days cause I have 2 babies.” We conclude that the district court’s finding is not
clearly erroneous.
Appellants also challenge the district court’s findings that respondent provided for
Django financially and emotionally. But respondent provided veterinary and financial
records showing that she provided for Django before appellants took him without her

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permission in July of 2016 . The district court found that multiple witnesses credibly
testified that respondent provided for Django financial ly and was the primary caregiver
during the relevant period . Given the deference we grant to the district court’s ability to
make credibility determinations, we cannot say that these findings are clearly erroneous.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
II. Gift

Appellants also argue that respondent has no claim of ownership over Django
because respondent failed to establish the elements of a valid gift at trial. “The elements
of a gift are (1) delivery; (2) intention to make a gift; and (3) absolute disposition by the
donor of the thing which the donor intends as a gift.” Weber v. Hvass, 626 N.W.2d 426,
431 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. June 27, 2001).
The district court did not address this argument because appellants did not raise it
during the trial. Because we will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the
district court, w e conclude that appellants forfeited this argument . Thiele v. Stich , 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
But even if this argument were not forfeited , these elements were all clearly met.
Appellants delivered Django to respondent when they physically gave the cat to her. The
district court’s findings su pport a conclusion that the second and third elements are met
because appellants no longer held themselves out to be Django’s owners after they gave
him to respondent. Regarding donative intent, the district court also did not find testimony
credible from either appellant that they only intended to give Dja ngo to respondent
temporarily, and appellants make no claim that they received anything in exchange for

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Django. In addition, the district court found credible testimony from a mutual friend of the
parties that appellants had previously taken in and given away two other stray cats before
Django.
III. Minnesota law controls
Appellants finally argue that the district court committed reversible error by not
applying a “best for all concerned” stan dard to determine who should receive ownership
of the cat. But the only authority appellants submit where this standard was applied is a
case from an intermediate appellate court in New York. And in fact , binding Minnesota
precedent instructs that pets are to be treated as any other personal property. Sawh v. City
of Lino Lakes , 823 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 2012) (“[W]hile animal owners have
considerable sentimental attachment to their pets, Minnesota law treats an animal like any
other item of tangible pe rsonal property.”). Appellants’ claim that the New York case is
“one of the only apposite cases in the entire country” and that the district court erred in
failing to apply this standard is therefore without merit because the treatment of pets as
property in the state of Minnesota is settled law.
Affirmed.