In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Edward Eugene Dooley.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0944

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Edward Eugene Dooley.

Filed February 19, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-PR-13-69

Edward E. Dooley, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistan t Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Roden berg, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Edward Eugene Dooley appeals from the district court ’s order denying
both his motion to withdraw his agreement to submit his civil c ommitment case to the
district court for resolution on a stipulated record and his motion to reopen the commitment
proceedings under Minn. R. Civ. P . 60.02. Appellant argues tha t his agreement was not
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant has, by his own estimation, sexually abused 150 vict ims. Respondent
Kandiyohi County petitioned to c ivilly commit appellant as a se xually dangerous person
(SDP) in July 2013. Appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered into an agreement
to submit the matter to the district court for decision on a st ipulated record. The district
court issued an order in January 2014 committing appellant as a SDP. Appellant took no
appeal.
More than four years later, rather than seeking review through the statutory
framework established for civilly committed persons, appellant sought relief by moving
the district court pro se to “withdraw stipulation as a SDP.” Appellant argued that the 2013
stipulation was not made volunt arily, knowingly, and intelligen tly, and that his court-
appointed counsel had been ineffective. The district court appointed counsel to represent
appellant on this new motion.
The district court denied appe llant’s motion after a hearing. It reasoned that
appellant “misunderstands the issue.” Appellant argued to the district court, and maintains
on appeal, that he stipulated in 2013 that he was a SDP. The d istrict court found that the
record from 2013 is clear that the case was submitted to the di strict court as a contested
matter based upon stipulated evidence. The district court also rejected appellant’s
argument that he received ineff ective assistance of counsel. D espite appellant’s original

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court-appointed counsel’s recent arrest for drug charges, 1 the district court found that
appellant failed to demonstrate that he received less-than-appropriate legal advice in 2013.
This appeal followed. 2
D E C I S I O N
Appellant’s argument that the d istrict court erred by denying his motion is based on
a false premise. Whether by r eason of misrepresentation or mis apprehension, appellant
incorrectly asserts that he stipulated in 2013 to being a SPD. That is incorrect. As noted
by the district court, appellant agreed to submit the case for decision based on a stipulated
record. The district court made clear at that time that the case would proceed as a contested
matter.
Appellant seeks to vacate the commitment judgment. A district court has
discretionary power to grant re lief from a final judgment, Minn . R. Civ. P. 60.02, and a
district court’s denial of such relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Charson v.
Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. 1988).
A party may seek relief from a “final judgment . . . , order, o r proceeding” for the
following reasons:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(b) Newly discovered evidence . . . ;

1 The state filed a criminal complaint on Feb. 2, 2018, charging appellant’s former attorney,
R.M., with first-degree sale of 17 grams or more of cocaine or methamphetamine under
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2016), and first-degree possession of 50 grams or more
of cocaine or methamphetamine under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. (2)(a)(1) (2016).

2 Both parties submitted supplemen tal authorities after this app eal was submitted for
decision. We have considered those additional authorities.

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(c) Fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party;
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or
(f) Any other reason justif ying relief from the
operation of the judgment.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Moti ons brought under rule 60.02(a)-(c ) must be brought within
one year of the judgment, order, or proceeding being challenged . Id. Motions brought
under rule 60.02(d)-(f) shall be b rought within a “reasonable t ime.” Id. T h e p a r t i e s
disagree about whether appellant’s motion is timely.
3 Regardless of whether the motion is
timely, it fails on the merits.
Appellate courts may consider i neffective-assistance-of-counsel claims of civilly
committed persons raised by motion under rule 60.02. In re Civil Commitment of
Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d 635, 642 (Minn. 2012).4 We analyze an ineffective-assistance-of-

3 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “[a]ttorney miscon duct has been
characterized as ‘excusable neglect’ under clause (a), to provi de a basis for vacation of a
dismissal, but only if the motion is brought within one year of dismissal.” Chapman v.
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 454 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1990); cf. Cole v. Wutzke , 884
N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016) (analyzing a motion for relief under rule 60.02(a) based on
counsel’s mistake and ignorance of the law). Appellant’s motio n, if based solely on
ineffective assistance of couns el, is untimely. But because ap pellant’s argument
concerning his trial counsel is interrelated with his argument relating to his ability to enter
a voluntary and knowing waiver, we address the merits as if the motion were timely under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f).

4 To the extent that the Commitment Act and Minn. R. Civ. P. 60. 02 present a distinct
conflict, persons committed as a SDP “must seek relief under the procedures set out in the
Commitment Act, not Rule 60.02.” Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d at 641. If there is no distinct
conflict, persons committed as a SDP must follow the procedures s e t o u t i n t h e
Commitment Act if application of rule 60.02 would frustrate the purpose of the act. Id.
Persons civilly committed may not bring any claims under rule 6 0.02 that seek a transfer
or discharge, as it would create a direct conflict with the exc lusive remedies provided by
the Commitment Act. Id. at 641-42. But a civilly committed person may bring claims

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counsel claim in a civil-commitm ent case under the standard set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984) ap plicable to
criminal cases. See In re Dibley, 400 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 25, 1987); see also In re Alleged Mental Illness of Cordie , 372 N.W.2d 24,
28-29 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 1985). To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard, a party must demonstrate that counsel’s
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonablen ess,” and that “but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” .
There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was reasonable. State v.
Pearson, 775 N.W.2d 155, 165 (Minn. 2009).
Appellant argues that his lawyer was ineffective in 2013 becau se he was recently
charged with various drug offens es. We see no support for appe llant’s argument that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant was civi lly committed in January
2014; his former counsel was charged over four years later. An d, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that appellant received less-than-adequate re presentation at the time of
his civil commitment proceedings.5

under rule 60.02, such as ineff ective assistance of counsel and l a c k o f s u b j e c t m a t t e r
jurisdiction, so long as such claims do not frustrate the two-f old purpose of the
Commitment Act—(1) protection of the public, and (2) rehabilitation of the patient. Id. at
642.

5 Appellant also argues that he had a right to counsel for purpo ses of his motion to
“withdraw stipulation as a SDP.” Notwithstanding that a civilly committed person has no
right to counsel in a challenge to the commitment brought under rule 60.02, In re Civil
Commitment of Moen , 837 N.W.2d 40, 51 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 15, 2013), the district court appointed counsel to represent appellant on this motion.

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Appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his stipulatio n because it was not
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. “The decision to vacate a stipulation rests largely in
the discretion of the district court, and its action will not be reversed absent a showing that
the court acted so arbitrarily as to constitute an abuse of that discretion.” In re Commitment
of Rannow, 749 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. A pp. 2008) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 5, 2008). A stipulation cannot ordinarily be repudiated or withdrawn by one
party without consent of the other except by leave of the court for cause shown. Gran v.
City of St. Paul, 143 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 1966). “Stipulations are therefore accorded
the sanctity of binding contracts.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997).
“A stipulation may be vacated whe n it was made improvidently an d in good
conscience and equity should not stand. When there is fraud or duress that prejudices the
party making the stipulation, t he stipulation was improvidently made.” Rannow, 749
N.W.2d at 396-97 (citation omitted). A district court acts within its discretion by refusing
to vacate a stipulation when the party “had a sound, rational b asis for entering into the
stipulation” and the stipulation was made “knowingly and voluntarily.” Id. at 399.
We see no support for appellant’s argument—the district court f ound, during the
civil commitment proceedings, that the agreement to submit the matter to the court on a
stipulated record was a “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent de cision.” Appellant’s trial
counsel stated that both he and his associate had spoken with a ppellant extensively on
several occasions about the deci sion to submit the case on a st ipulated record. The
agreement to submit the case on a stipulated record was accompa nied by an express
understanding that appellant was opposing commitment and that his lawyer would consider

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a constitutional challenge if a ppellant was committed. The dis trict court made clear that
“it is very much a contested hearing.”
Appellant testified at the 2014 hearing that he had extensive discussions concerning
his decision to submit the case on a stipulated record, he ackn owledged having reviewed
and gone over with counsel a written agreement, and he signed the bottom of each page of
that agreement. Appellant further testified that he acknowledg ed that his attorney would
continue to argue that appellant does not meet the criteria of a SDP and that he wished to
go forward on a stipulated record despite a significant chance the district court would not
find in his favor on a constitutional challenge to the civil co mmitment laws as applied to
him. Appellant testified that he was able to think clearly at the time. Appellant said he
understood that he had the right to testify on his own behalf and that he was giving up his
right to testify. Appellant tes tified that no one had pressure d him to make the agreement
and that he was doing so of his own free will on the advice of his attorney. Lastly, the
district court examined appellant and ensured that he understoo d the rights he was giving
up. Appellant confirmed that he wished to proceed on a stipulated record.
The record supports the district court’s findings, and the dist rict court acted within
its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to “withdraw stipulation as a SDP.”6
Affirmed.

6 Appellant argues that he was incompetent to enter into a stipu lation according to Minn.
R. Crim. P. 20.01. We do not consider this argument because it is being raised for the first
time on appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).