In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. R. T. and B. M. K., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0945

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. R. T. and B. M. K., Parents.

Filed October 29, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-JV-17-2033

Timothy H. Dodd, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant B.M.K.)

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Jennifer R. J. Knuts on, Assistant County
Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent Becker County)

Sheri Johnson, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge ; and Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant father challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to reverse an
order for voluntary termination of parental rights (TPR), arguing that: (1) the district court
did not protect his statutory right to counsel; (2) he consente d t o t h e o r d e r u n d e r a
misunderstanding of his counsel’s advice; and (3) failing to vacate the order is contrary to
the best interests of the children. We affirm.

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FACTS
In January 2017, Becker County Human Services (BCHS) filed a ch ild in need of
protection or services (CHIPS) petition regarding the welfare of the three children (K.K.,
C.K., and J.T.) of appellant B.M.K. (father) and C.R.T. (mother). The petition stated that
mother, who had sole custody of the children at the time, had e ngaged in drug use. The
children were placed on a 72-hour emergency hold. Father initially entered a denial to the
CHIPS petition. At a subsequent pre-trial hearing, father rescinded his denial and entered
an admission to the CHIPS petition. During the hearing, the di strict court ordered father
to complete a case plan.1 Father never signed or completed a case plan.
In September 2017, BCHS filed a TPR petition against father. A t the TPR trial in
November 2017, father appeared with counsel and entered an admi ssion to a voluntary
TPR. He answered questions from the district court concerning his understanding of the
matter, his state of mind, and his relationship with the childr en. Father then signed an
affidavit voluntarily consenting to the TPR. In December 2017, the district court issued an
order terminating father’s paren tal rights. The order included a p r o v i s i o n d i s c h a r g i n g
father’s counsel of record.
Less than a month after the district court issued its TPR order , father filed a pro se
“Motion to Reverse Voluntary TPR Order.” The district court de nied father’s motion.
Father, still acting pro se, appealed the district court’s deni al. This court dismissed the
appeal without prejudice and remanded the case to the district court to consider various

1 The district court ordered father to complete a case plan at three different hearings.

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issues regarding the discharge of father’s counsel, including w hether the discharge was
authorized under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 25.06 and whether fathe r’s right to counsel was
protected throughout post-trial proceedings. On remand, the di strict court found that
father’s right to counsel was not protected.
In May 2018, with newly appointed counsel, father filed a new m otion to reverse
and set aside the TPR order. Once again, the district court de nied father’s motion. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“ When a [district] court’s findings in a termination case are ch allenged, appellate
courts are limited to determining whether the findings address the statutory criteria,
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence, and whether they are clearly
erroneous.” In re Welfare of D.D.G. , 558 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. 1997) (quoting In re
M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Minn.1990)). A finding of fact is cl early erroneous if
we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Rasmussen
v. Two Harbors Fish Co. , 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 201 3) (quotations and citations
omitted). A voluntary TPR order can be rescinded only upon a s howing of fraud, duress,
or undue influence. Matter of Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 17-18 (Minn. 1982).
I. Even if father’s right to counsel was not protected, this error was harmless.

Father argues that his right to counsel was not protected because, after the discharge
of his counsel, the district court did not make an affirmative effort to inform him of his
continued right to counsel throughout post-trial proceedings, and this resulted in prejudice
to him. We disagree as to prejudice.

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Due-process rights include the right to counsel. In re Welfare of Children of D.F.,
752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008). Whether father’s due-proc ess rights have been
protected in a TPR proceeding is a question of law, which we re view de novo. Id. To
prevail on his due-process claim, father must demonstrate that the district court committed
an error and that he suffered prejudice as a result. In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M. , 744
N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008). Under Rule 25 of the Minnesota R ules of Juvenile
Protection Procedure, every party has the right to be represent ed by counsel in every
juvenile-protection matter, including through appeal, if any. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 25.01
(emphasis added). This includes the right to be advised by the district court on the record
of the right to representation pursuant to Rule 25 if any party appears in court in a juvenile-
protection case without counsel. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 25.04.
On remand, the district court fo und that it erred in not protec ting father’s right to
counsel. This finding was based on the fact that father’s coun sel was discharged with the
entry of the TPR order, leaving him without counsel for any pos t-trial motions. But, the
inquiry does not end there. Whe ther father’s right to counsel was protected also depends
on whether the district court later informed father on the reco rd of his continued right to
representation under Rule 25 when he filed his pro se motion and pro se appeal.
Here, father makes only a conclusory statement that the district court did not advise
him of his continued right to representation. Father fails to substantiate his claim with any
details as to the times when the district court had a duty to inform him of his right to counsel

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and failed to do so. Father also fails to cite to any relevant l e g a l a u t h o r i t y . W i t h o u t
submission of facts and legal authority to support his claim, father’s argument is forfeited.2
E v e n i f w e w e r e t o c o n s i d e r f a ther’s due-process claim, it stil l lacks merit. In
addition to his burden to show that the district court erred, father has the burden on appeal
to demonstrate that such error caused him prejudice. Bloom v. Hydrotherm , Inc., 499
N.W.2d 842, 845 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. June 28, 1993). Father fails to
proffer any evidence of prejudice, and the record does not support such an allegation.
After the discharge of his first counsel and after remand to the district court, father
was appointed new counsel. This allowed him the opportunity to replead his motion to
reverse the TPR order. Father also had the opportunity to appeal the district court’s denial
of his motion a second time.
In his pro se motion before the district court to reverse the TPR order, father stated
that his first counsel threatened him, lied to him, failed to do what was in his best interests,
and made him feel forced to give his consent to the voluntary T PR. Such statements
contradict father’s claim of prejudice because dismissal of his first counsel presumably
would have relieved father of these issues. Father has not pro vided any evidence to
contradict these previous statements.

2 For this court to consider a claim, litigants must provide citation to relevant legal authority
or legal analysis to support it. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 1(d); Stephens v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn. , 614 N.W.2d 764, 770 n.4 (Minn. App. 2000), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000) (citation omitted).

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We conclude that, because father failed to provide any evidence of prejudice on his
claim of due-process right to counsel and the district court su bsequently provided father
with new counsel, any initial error in not protecting father’s right to counsel was harmless.
II. The district court did not commit clear error in denying father ’s motion to
reverse the voluntary TPR order based on father’s argument that his consent
was based on a misunderstanding of advice from his counsel.

F a t h e r a r g u e s t h a t r e v e r s a l o f t h e v o l u n t a r y T P R o r d e r i s w a r r anted because his
consent was based on a misunders tanding of his counsel’s advice regarding the case plan
and the future consequences of an involuntary TPR. We are not persuaded.
Father contends that he understood his first counsel to advise him not to complete
his case plan. He also notes that his interpretation of the co nsequences of an involuntary
TPR affected him deeply because h e comes from a large family wi th a lot of children.
Father’s argument is belied by h is previous statements in the r ecord, and he fails to offer
any new evidence or legal authority to contradict them.
At the TPR hearing, the district court questioned father as to whether he had an
opportunity to go through the affidavit before signing it and ask his counsel any questions
he may have had. Father responded in the affirmative. The dis trict court inquired as to
whether father understood that, after the hearing, he could not “come back in a month and
say, ‘Oh, I’ve changed my mind.’” Father again responded in the affirmative. At the end
of the hearing, in the presence of the court, father signed an affidavit avowing, among other
things, that he discussed his decision to consent to the voluntary TPR with his counsel and
that he understood the implications of terminating his parental rights.

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In light of father’s previous statements to the district court and the lack of evidence
or legal authority on appeal to the contrary, we conclude that the district court did not
commit clear error in finding tha t father’s alleged misundersta ndings were insufficient
grounds to reverse the voluntary TPR order.
III. The district court did not commit clear error, contrary to the best interests of
the children, in denying father’s motion to reverse the voluntary TPR order.

Father argues that the district court committed clear error in failing to vacate the
TPR order because doing so was contrary to the best interests of the children. We disagree.
In arguing for the reversal of a TPR, a serious and compelling reason must exist in
order to once again displace the children and dramatically change their living environment.
K.T., 327 N.W.2d at 18. In considering the best interests of childre n, stability is a factor
which must be given high priority as it is simply not in the best interests of children for the
parent-child relationship to be continually altered. Id.
Here again, father’s argument is contrary to his previous state ments in the record,
and he fails to offer any legal authority or additional evident iary support to refute them.
Accordingly, his argument is forfeited. Even if we were to con sider his claim, it lacks
merit.
At the TPR hearing, father admitted that he was not involved in the children’s lives
and that it was in their best interests to have his parental ri ghts terminated. Father claims
that he completed a drug-treatment program in February 2018 and has since abstained from
drug use. He claims that, since the issuance of the TPR order, he has worked a case plan
to the extent that another of his children (not part of this proceeding) has been placed with

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him. He also argues that, to the best of his knowledge, his ch ildren remain in foster care
awaiting a permanent option and that he wants to be that option. However, these are merely
conclusory statements regarding a change in his circumstances.
The record indicates that, as of February 2018, two of father’s children (K.K. and
C.K) had been in out-of-home placement for a total of 753 days and father’s youngest child
(J.T.) had been in out-of-home pl acement for a total of 397 day s. Undoubtedly, these
figures have increased significantly since that time. The best interests of the children
require that, at some point, permanence for the children becomes more important than the
natural parent’s right to recons ider their decision, absent ser ious and compelling reasons.
K.T., 327 N.W.2d at 18. Father’s assertions do not rise to the lev el of serious and
compelling reasons to once again displace the children. Theref ore, we conclude that the
district court did not commit clear error in finding that reversal of the voluntary TPR order
was not in the best interests of the children.
Affirmed.