Jessica Lynn Stafford, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0946

Jessica Lynn Stafford, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 13, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Klaphake, Judge*

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19WS-CR-14-9942

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jerome Michael Porter, Eagan City Attorney, Alina Schwartz, Assistant City Attorney,
Campbell Knutson, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
On appeal from the summary denial of her petition for postconviction relief,
appellant Jessica Lynn Stafford argues that (1) her postconviction petition is not time -
barred under the interests-of-justice exception; (2) the district court did not obtain a valid
waiver of her right to counsel prior to her guilty plea; (3) her due -process rights were
violated by the court’s failure to order a rule 20.01 competen cy evaluation; (4) her guilty
plea was invalid; and (5) she should have been granted an evidentiary hearing on her
postconviction claims. Because the district court failed to make express findings related to
when appellant’s claim arose for purposes of det ermining whether appellant’s
postconviction petition should be considered in the interests of justice, we reverse and
remand.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts review a postconviction court’s summary denial of a petition for
postconviction relief for an ab use of discretion. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422
(Minn. 2018). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record, or exercises its
discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Crow v. State , 923 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted).
“Minnesota’s postconviction statute authorizes a person who claims that his
conviction or his sentence violated his constitutional or legal r ights to com mence a
proceeding ‘to secure relief by filing a petition in the district court in the county in which

3
the conviction was had.’” Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2018)) . But a
postconviction petitioner is not entitled to relief if the petitio n is untimely. Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4 (2018). A postconviction petition is untimely if it is filed more than two
years after “the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed.” Id.
at subd. 4(a)(1). The postconviction statute lists five exception s to the statutory two-year
time bar. Id. at subd. 4(b). The fifth exception allows a petitioner to be exempted from the
two-year time bar if she “establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not
frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” Id. at subd. 4(b)(5).
To determine whether hearing a claim is in the interests of justice, courts consider a
list of five nonexhaustive factors:
(1) whether the claim has substantive merit; (2) whether the
defendant deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise the issue
on direct appeal; (3) whether the party alleging error is at fault
for that error and the degree of fault assigned to the party
defending the alleged error; (4) whether some fundamental
unfairness to the defendant needs to be addressed; and
(5) whether application of the interests -of-justice analysis is
necessary to protect the fairness, integrity, and public
reputation of judicial proceedings.

Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 607 (Minn. 2012). These fa ctors do not form a “rigid
test,” and “courts are not required to examine each . . . factor in every case asserting the
interests-of-justice exception.” Id. at 608.
Here, Stafford appeared in court pro se on December 16, 2014 , and pleaded guilty
to misdemeanor domestic assault. More than two years later, on January 30, 2018, Stafford
filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that (A) the district court failed to obtain
an adequate waiver of her right to counsel; (B) her due process rights were violated by the

4
court’s failure to order a rule 20 competency evaluation; and (C) her guilty plea was invalid.
The postconviction court summarily denied the petition as untimely under Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4.
Stafford acknowledges that her postconvic tion petition is untimely, but contends
that the postconviction court abused its discretion by dismissing her petition because the
interests-of-justice exception applies to her case. A petitioner asserting the interests -of-
justice exception “is required to identify an injustice that delayed the filing of the petition.”
Nissalke v. State , 920 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). A nd a claim
invoking this exception must be filed within two years after the claim arises. M inn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(c). The date on which a claim “arises” is determined objectively based
on when a petitioner “knew or should have known ” that a claim existed, not when a
petitioner subjectively knew about a claim. Sanchez v. State , 816 N.W.2d 5 50, 558 -60
(Minn. 2012). “A postconviction court’s determination of when a petitioner knew or should
have known about his or her claim is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.” Bolstad
v. State, 878 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Minn. 2016).
Stafford contends t hat the interests -of-justice exception should be invoked in her
case because her “claims are not frivolous” and the “record reflects that she was never told
that she could appeal her guilty plea.” Stafford argues that her interests-of-justice claim did
not arise until December 2017, when the public defender’s office wa s “first assigned to
[her] case” and informed her that “she had meritorious arguments to withdraw her plea,”
and that she could appeal her case on that basis. Stafford claims that she then fil ed her
postconviction petition with in two years of that date. Stafford further argues that “[a]t

5
minimum, the [postconviction] court abused its discretion by denying [her] a
postconviction evidentiary hearing” because the “postconviction petition and
memorandum did not conclusively show that [she] was not entitled to relief on her claims.”
The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “[a]fter sentencing, the
court must tell the defendant of the right to appeal both the conviction and sentence, and,
if eligible, of the right to appeal at state expense by contacting the state public defender.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 5. Here, the record reflects that Stafford was pro se when
she pleaded guilty, and that at the time of her sentencing, the district court did not follow
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 5 , by failing to inform Stafford that she had “the right to
appeal both [her] conviction and sentence.” Stafford also states in her brief that she did not
meet with an attorney regarding this case until December 2017. But, based on these
circumstances, the postconviction court did not make any express findings on the
dispositive issue of when Stafford knew or should have known of her right to appeal. We
therefore reverse and remand for a determination of when Stafford objectively knew or
should have known when her claim arose and, if filed within two years of that date,
whether, after consideration of the applicable factors, Stafford’s postconviction petition
should be heard in the interests of justice. See Carlton, 816 N.W.2d at 607 (listing five
nonexhaustive factors to be considered by courts in determining whether hearing a claim
is in the interests of justice). On remand, the district court, in its discretion may reopen the
record and hold an evidentiary hearing.
Reversed and remanded.