State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0947

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mario Alejandro Lanas,
Appellant.

Filed March 25, 2019
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-16-11287

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County A ttorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assista nt County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chi ef Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In this appeal from convictions of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon
and intentional discharge of a firearm in a manner that endange red the safety of others,

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appellant Mario Alejandro Lanas argues that the district court deprived him of his right to
present a complete defense by ex cluding evidence of the victim’ s pending charges for
second-degree assault with a dan gerous weapon and kidnapping. Because the victim’s
pending charges are inadmissible character evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
On January 26, 2016, A.A. contacted Lanas in response to Lanas ’s advertisement
for a cell phone on Craigslist, and they arranged to meet at the Walmart in Shakopee later
that evening. Around 6:30 p.m., Lanas met A.A. inside the Walm art entrance. After
meeting inside, Lanas and A.A. walked to Lanas’s car to examine the phone. As they were
discussing the phone, A.A. grabbed the phone and ran away. Lanas yelled for A.A. to stop
and started to chase him. As A.A. ran toward and entered a wai ting vehicle, Lanas fired
14 shots with a handgun1 at A.A. and the moving vehicle. At least three bullets hit A.A.’s
vehicle, and one of those shots resulted in a flat tire as the vehicle drove away. Lanas
entered his own vehicle and sped off. He then called 911 and r eturned to the Walmart
parking lot to speak with law enforcement.
Respondent State of Minnesota c harged Lanas with (1) second-degree assault with
a dangerous weapon in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) , a n d
(2) intentional discharge of a firearm in a manner that endange red the safety of others in

1 At the time of the incident, Lanas had a permit to carry a pis tol pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 624.714 (2016).

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violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1a(a)(2) (2016). In August 2017, Lanas gave notice
of his intent to rely upon the affirmative defense of self-defense at trial.
On January 17, 2018, one day before trial commenced, Lanas ora lly requested to
cross-examine A.A. regarding pending charges for second-degree assault with a dangerous
weapon and kidnapping, stemming from an incident that occurred in November 2017 in
Hennepin County. The state objected to Lanas’s request, arguin g that there was no legal
support for A.A. to be questione d about the allegations, and th at A.A.’s counsel in the
pending matter may want to be present if he were to be question ed regarding the charges.
In response, Lanas asserted that under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), A.A.’s pending charges were
probative of A.A.’s “knowledge an d plan and motiv ation to commi t assaults with
dangerous weapons.” The district court denied Lanas’s request, stating, “[W]ith respect to
[A.A.]’s charges that are simply charges, it would be improper to allow any cross-
examination on that.”
The jury found Lanas guilty of th e charged offenses. The dist rict court sentenced
Lanas to a 36-month term of imprisonment for second-degree assa ult with a dangerous
weapon and a concurrent one-year-and-one-day term for intentional discharge of a firearm
that endangered the safety of others. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The parties dispute the standard of review. Lanas appears to argue that the plain
error standard of review applies because the alleged error in e xcluding the cross-
examination of A.A.’s pending charges was not objected to at tr ial and the line of

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questioning affects Lanas’s constitutional rights to present a complete defense. Despite his
plain-error argument, Lanas contends throughout the remainder of his brief that the district
court abused its discretion. The state maintains that the dist rict court’s evidentiary ruling
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
When a defendant fails to objec t to the admission of evidence, an appellate court
applies the plain-error standard . Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02. Bu t here, Lanas requested to
introduce evidence of A.A.’s pending charges through cross-exam i n a t i o n . L a n a s w a s
therefore unable to object to evidence that he offered, and pla in-error review is
inapplicable. And while generally we review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an
abuse of discretion, State v. Anderson , 789 N.W.2d 227, 234 ( Minn. 2010), where the
district court’s evidentiary ruling results in the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence in
violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, the verdict must be reversed if “there is a
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been differe nt if the evidence had been
admitted.” State v. Graham, 764 N.W.2d 340, 351 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). “In
other words, the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a rea sonable doubt that if the
evidence had been admitted and th e damaging potential of the ev idence fully realized, an
average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” State v. Post,
512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994) (footnote omitted).
2

2 Although neither party includes this standard of review in their respective briefs, appellate
courts decide cases in accordance with the law. State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673
n.7 (Minn. 1990) (applying a legal doctrine that the parties failed to argue in their briefs or
at oral argument because appella te courts have a responsibility to decide cases in
accordance with the law).

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On appeal, Lanas argues that the district court deprived him of his right to present a
complete defense by excluding evidence of A.A.’s pending charge s. The due-process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti tution and article I,
section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution require that every criminal defendant be “afforded
a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta , 467
U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984); State v. Richards , 495 N.W.2d 187, 191
(Minn. 1992). “A criminal defendant’s right to present a compl ete defense includes the
right to call and examine witnesses.” State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 585 (Minn. 2013).
“But the evidence proffered in support of the defense must stil l comply with the rules of
evidence.” State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82, 102 (Minn. 2011).
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs , or acts is not admissible to prove bad character
or a propensity to commit the charged crime. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn.
2006). But such evidence may be admissible for other, limited purposes. State v. Fardan,
773 N.W.2d 303, 315-16 (Minn. 2009) (discussing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 171
(Minn. 1965)). These purposes include evidence offered as “proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of m istake or accident.” Id. at
316 (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)).
Lanas asserts that A.A.’s pending charges are admissible under M i n n . R . E v i d .
404(b) as proof of A.A.’s knowledge, plan, and motivation. Lan as further argues that
A.A.’s pending charges were othe rwise relevant to his claim of self-defense because the

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evidence “went to the precise d isputed fact of whether [A.A.] h a d a w e a p o n w h e n h e
engaged in the criminal behavior of stealing Lanas’s phone.”
W h i l e p e n d i n g c h a r g e s m a y b e u s e d a s o t h e r - c r i m e s e v i d e n c e , A .A.’s pending
charges, including second-degree assault with a dangerous weapo n and kidnapping, are
inadmissible character evidence. See State v. Gustafson, 379 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Minn. 1985)
(concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretio n in excluding evidence of
witnesses’ pending charges that did not go to prove motive, opp ortunity, or plan). At the
district court, Lanas argued that A.A.’s pending charges were p robative to show “his
knowledge and plan and motivation to commit assaults with dangerous weapons.” But the
fact that A.A. allegedly possesse d a dangerous weapon on one oc casion may not be used
to prove that A.A. possessed a gun on the night that he met Lanas in the Walmart parking
lot. By Lanas’s own argument, t he purpose of introducing evide nce of A.A.’s pending
second-degree assault with a da ngerous weapon is to show A.A.’s propensity to carry
dangerous weapons. Moreover, Lanas fails to explain how A.A.’s pending charge for
second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon evidences knowledge, plan, or motivation.
The district court did not err in excluding A.A.’s pending char ges under Minn. R. Evid.
404(b).
While Lanas sought to introduce the pending charges under Minn . R. Evid. 404(b)
at the district court, his proffered use of the evidence appears to go to A.A.’s reputation for
violence. Evidence of other sp ecific crimes or bad acts is not admissible to prove that a
person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But

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“evidence of the victim’s reputation for violence and quarrelsomeness may be admitted in
self-defense cases for the purpose of determining (1) whether the defendant was reasonably
put in apprehension of serious bodily harm or (2) who was the aggressor.” State v. Bland,
337 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1983) (emphasis omitted). The defen dant must have had
prior knowledge of the victim’s reputation in order to show rea sonable apprehension, but
“it is not necessary that the defendant knew the victim’s reput ation” beforehand to show
that the victim was the aggressor. Id. Nonetheless, “evidence of a specific act of violence
is not admissible to prove who was the aggressor.” Id.
Here, there are no facts to indicate that Lanas was aware of A .A.’s reputation prior
to the incident. At trial, Lanas testified that he did not know the individual with whom he
arranged to meet at Walmart, and that he identified A.A. a few days after the incident in a
police photographic lineup. Moreover, the date of the offense for which A.A. was charged
for second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon and kidnapping occurred in November
2017—months after the incident i n the Walmart parking lot. A.A .’s pending charges are
inadmissible to establish that A. A.’s propensity for violence p laced Lanas in reasonable
apprehension so as to justify defensive action. See State v. Irby, 368 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Minn.
App. 1985) (holding that evidence of specific instances of conduct of the victim offered by
the defendant to prove he had a reasonable apprehension of harm “may be admissible if
the prior conduct indicates a violent or quarrelsome dispositio n and if the defendant is
aware of the prior conduct”), review denied (Minn. July 11, 1985).

8
A.A.’s pending charges are also inadmissible to show A.A.’s ch aracter as a witness.
Under Minn. R. Evid. 404(a)(3), ev idence of the character of a witness is admissible as
provided in rules 607, 608, 609. Minn. R. Evid. 607 provides t hat the credibility of a
witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness. Lanas sought
to attack A.A.’s credibility with evidence of his pending charges for second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon and kidnapping. But this rule does not provide a basis to admit
evidence of A.A.’s pending charges.
Minn. R. Evid. 608(a) states that “[t]he credibility of a witne ss may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation,” pr ovided that th e evidence
refers to the witness’s characte r for truthfulness or untruthfu lness and the witness’s
character for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation or opinion evidence. Similarly,
Minn. R. Evid. 608(b) provides that specific instances of condu ct, for the purpose of
attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness, may not be pr oven by extrinsic evidence.
A.A.’s pending charges for second-degree assault with a dangero us weapon and
kidnapping do not pertain to his character for truthfulness, bu t rather tend to show a
character for violence. Evidence of A.A.’s pending charges are inadmissible under Minn.
R. Evid. 608.
Under Minn. R. Evid. 609(a), a witness may be impeached by evid ence that the
witness has been convicted of (1) a felony, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect, or (2) a ny crime involving dishonesty o r false statement. Evidence
of a pending charge is not admissible as impeachment evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 609,

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which requires that the witness be convicted of an offense. See Gustafson, 379 N.W.2d at
84 (stating that dismissed charges that are not convictions are not admissible under Minn.
R. Evid. 609). Because A.A.’s charges were pending at the time of trial, Minn. R. Evid.
609 does not provide a basis for introduction of A.A.’s charges.
Lanas further contends that the district court erred because c ross-examination of
A.A. regarding his pending charges was relevant to show his bias as a witness. Lanas did
not present the argument that A.A.’s pending charges showed his bias as a witness at the
district court. Generally, this court will not decide issues which were not raised before the
district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).
Nonetheless, even if Lanas’s bias argument had not been forfei ted for failure to raise
the issue below, it is unpersuasive. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Davis
v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974). “In criminal cases, the
Confrontation Clause contemplates a cross-examination of the wi tness in which the
defendant has the opportunity to reveal a prototypical form of bias on the part of the
witness.” State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 1995); see also Minn. R. Evid.
616 (“For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of bias, prejudice,
or interest of the witness for or against any party to the case is admissible.”). “Bias is a
catchall term describing attitudes, feelings, or emotions of a witness that might affect [the
witness’s] testimony, leading [the witness] to be more or less favorable to the position of a
party for reasons other than the merits.” Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640 (quotation

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omitted). “But not everything tends to show bias, and courts may exclude evidence that is
only marginally useful for this purpose.” Id. And “[i]n determining whether a restriction
of cross-examination violates the defendant’s right to confront witnesses, a distinction must
be made between general credibility attacks and attacks on a witness’s testimony designed
to reveal bias.” Id.
Lanas argues that A.A.’s pending charges showed A.A.’s bias as a witness because
he “had a motive to avoid further harming his pending criminal matter, which involved a
charge of second-degree assault w ith a dangerous weapon, which could happen if he
admitted in this case to similar behavior of possessing a gun w hile robbing someone.”
Beyond his inherent bias as a victim, A.A.’s pending charges fa il to show bias against
Lanas; instead, the pending charges are relevant for general credibility impeachment. Even
if bias had been considered by the district court, it would not have erred in prohibiting the
introduction of A.A.’s pending charges into evidence.
Even if there was error in excl uding evidence of A.A.’s pending charges, which we
conclude there was not, that error would have been harmless bey ond a reasonable doubt.
Lanas was given the opportunity at trial to impeach the credibi lity of A.A. on his theft
conviction for stealing Lanas’s phone and false statements give n to police officers when
he was first questioned about the incident. Additionally, the state produced testimony
refuting Lanas’s claim that he act ed in self-defense because A. A. flashed a weapon: a
bystander witnessed the encounter in the parking lot and testified that she did not see A.A.
threaten Lanas; another bystander testified that he did not see Lanas make any evasive

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movements; and A.A. and his two companions testified that A.A. did not have a gun on the
night of the incident. Detective Sergeant John Buetow of the Shakopee Police Department
also testified that he interviewed Lanas after the incident, and that Lanas told him “he was
attempting to engage the vehicle that was . . . leaving and dis able it and remove the
passengers out of the vehicle at gunpoint.” Moreover, the fact that Lanas fired 14 shots,
some of which were fired after A.A. jumped into the van and drove away, negates his claim
of self-defense. Any error in limiting the cross-examination o f A.A. to preclude the
introduction of his pending charges into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.