Wesley E. Wills, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0948

Wesley E. Wills,
Appellant,

vs.
Lucinda Jesson, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed February 4, 2019
Affirmed
Dietzen, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-17-5750

Wesley E. Wills, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Matthew M. Hart, Assist ant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Dietzen, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; ** and
Klaphake, Judge.**

* Retired justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court
of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10, and Minn. Stat. § 2.724,
subd. 3 (2018).

** Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
DIETZEN, Judge
Appellant Wills, who is civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
(MSOP), brought this action alleging that respondent Jesson, in her individual and official
capacities, violated the Minnesota Health Records Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 144.291 -
.298 (2018), and the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 13.01-.90 (2018), when another MSOP patient improperly received and read a portion
of Wills’s quarterly treatment progress report. The district court granted respondent ’s
motion to dismiss on the ground that Wills failed to state a claim against Jesson for which
relief may be granted. Because we conclude that the district court did not err, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Wesley E. Wills is a civilly -committed patient in the MSOP facility in
Moose Lake, Minnesota. Wills alleges the following facts1: In October 2014, Wills’s
quarterly treatment progress report was mistakenly placed in the mailbox of another MSOP
patient. The other patient did not realize he had the incorrect report until after he had
started reading the document. The report included information concerning Wills’s medical
history, criminal record , and mental diagnoses. The other patient notified MSOP st aff
about the mistake, and the report was forwarded to Wills. Wills does not have information
as to how the report was given to the wrong patient, or by whom.

1 Because this case reaches us on appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, see
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), the factual record is still undeveloped and the facts recited here
are drawn from Wills’s complaint.

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In October 2017, Wills filed a complaint against Lucinda Jesson, former
Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services —in both her individual
and official capacities—alleging violations of the MHRA and the MGDPA. Jesson filed a
motion to dismiss Wills’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Emily Johnson Piper, the
acting Commissioner of the Minnesot a Department of Human Services at the time the
lawsuit was initiated , joined Jesson’s motion. 2 Following a hearing in April 2018, the
district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, Wills argues that the district court erred in granting Jesson’s motion to
dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant
to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). Specifically, Wills contends that his complaint against Jesson,
in both her individual and official capacities, sets forth cognizable claims for the wrongful
disclosure of his MSOP medical records in violation of the MHRA and MG DPA. We
review de novo a district court ’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule
12.02(e) to determine if the facts alleged in the complaint set forth a legally sufficient claim
for relief. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014).

2 As Wills acknowledges, Jesson is no longer the Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Human Services. At the time this lawsuit was initiated, that role was held
by Emily Johnson Piper. As of January 2019, the role of commis sioner is held by Tony
Lourey. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.04 provides that if a “public officer . . . resigns or
otherwise ceases to hold office during the pendency of an appeal or other appellate
proceeding to which the officer is a party in an official c apacity, the action does not abate
and the successor in office is automatically substituted as a party.” Because Wills sued
Jesson in both her individual and official capacities, Jesson remains a party as to the
individual-capacity claim, and Lourey is substituted as a party as to the official -capacity
claim.

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A complaint must “contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief sought.” Minn. R. Civ.
P. 8.01. A defending party may move to dismiss another party’s complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). Minnesota
courts have rejected the federal plausibility standard for pleading set forth in Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) , and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606. Instead, Minnesota courts have held
that a claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss “if it is possible on any evidence
which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief
demanded.” Id. at 603 (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). “We consider only those
facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and construing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non -moving party. ” In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig ., 806
N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. 2011). But a legal conclusion in the complaint does not bind this
court, and a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bahr v. Capella
Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010). In general, we hold pro se parties to the same
standards as attorneys and require that the parties comply with procedural rules. Minn. R.
Gen. Prac. 1.04; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001); Ronay
v. Ronay, 369 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn. App. 1985).
This case also requires us to interpret statutory law. Statutory inter pretation is a
question of law that we review de novo. Graphic Commc’ns Local 1B Health & Welfare
Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp. , 850 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Minn. 2014). The object of all
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Minn.

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Stat. § 645.16 (2018). We construe a statute to give its words and phrases their plan and
ordinary meaning. 35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d at 815. When the language of a statute
is free from ambiguity, “our role is to enforce the l anguage of the statute, and not explore
the spirit or purpose of the law.” Id.
The complaint sets forth separate claims pursuant to the MHRA and the MGDPA
against Jesson in her individual and official capacities. The complaint does not set forth a
claim against the Minnesota Department of Human Services. We will discuss each claim
in turn.
A. MHRA Claim
In his complaint, Wills alleges that MSOP staff improperly disclosed the report in
violation of the MHRA. The district court dismissed the claim on the ground that Wills
did not allege Jesson released the report.
The MHRA prohibits the release of a patient’s health records without the patient’s
authorization or consent. Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2 . It is undisputed that Wills did
not consent to the release of the report. The question is whether Wills pleaded a cognizable
claim against Jesson. The answer is set forth in Minn. Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2(1), which
provides a “person” who negligently or intentionally requests or releases a patient’s health
records is liable to the patient f or compensatory damages. Thus, a claim may only be
brought against a person for wrongful disclosure of the report.
Wills’s complaint, however, does not allege Jesson released the r eport.
Consequently, the complaint failed to plead a n MHRA claim against Jesson individually
or in her official capacity for which relief may be granted . To avoid the failure to allege

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Jesson was personally responsible for the release, Wills argues for the first time on appeal
that he should have been given an opportunity to identify the person responsible for the
disclosure through discovery. Wills failed to bring this discovery-related argument before
the district court at any point. Accordingly, this argument is forfeited. Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Moreover, even if we reached the argument, it would still
fail. Wills’s claim is against Jesson, not against a third person not named in the complaint.
Because Wills does not allege that Jesson bears personal responsibility for the release of
the report, the district court did not err in dismissing this portion of Wills’s MHRA claim.
Alternatively, Wills asserts that Jesson is vicariously liable for the actions of her
“agents, employees, or representatives.” But the MHRA explicitly imposes liability on the
person who improperly discloses a patient’s health records, and not on anyone else. Minn.
Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2. Accordingly, vicarious liability is unavailable for this claim.
B. MGDPA Claim
Wills alleges in his complaint that Jesson, individually and in her official capacity,
violated the MGDPA. The district court rejected Wills’s MGDPA claim on the ground s
that the statute does not allow a claim against Jesson in her individual capacity and that the
claim in her official capacity fails because Wills did not plead actual damages as a result
of the alleged violation. On appeal, Wills contends that Jesson is liable on the grounds that
she was the “responsible authority,” and that his complaint allege s sufficient damages to
survive a motion to dismiss.
The MGDPA provides for civil remedies to persons who suffer damages due to a
violation of its provisions. Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1. The statute provides:

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[A] responsible authority or government entity which violates
any provision of this chapter is liable to a person . . . who
suffers any damage as a result of the violation, and the person
damaged . . . may bring an action against the responsible
authority or government entity to cover any damages sustained.

Id. To plead a claim under the MGDPA, Wills must allege that: (1) Jesson was a
“responsible authority”; (2) the responsible authority (Jesson) violated the MG DPA; and
(3) as a result of the violation of the MGDPA, Wills suffered damage.
The MGDPA defines the “responsible authority” in a state agency as “the state
official designated by law or by the commissioner as the individual responsible for the
collection, use and dissemination of any set of data on individ uals, government data, or
summary data.” Min n. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 16(a) . Wills alleges that Jesson is the
responsible authority, and we accept that fact as true for purposes of this appeal.
35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d at 815. Thus, the complaint sa tisfies this portion of the
statute.
Wills alleges that Jesson, “through her agents, employees, or representatives,”
violated the MGDPA , and that Jesson is liable under the common -law doctrine of
respondeat superior. But the plain language of the MGDPA limits liability to a responsible
authority if he or she commits a violation of the statute; specifically, the statute does not
extend liability to a responsible authority for the actions of his or her employees, agents,
or representatives. Thus, Wills has not alleged the required second element of a viable
MGDPA claim.
Because Wills did not allege the required second element of Minn. Stat. § 13.08,
subd. 1, it is not necessary for us to reach the third element of the statute regarding damages.

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We do, ho wever, take this opportunity to make two observations. First, a plaintiff can
recover damages for emotional harm under the MGDPA. Navarre v. S. Wash. Cty. Schs.,
652 N.W.2d 9, 30 (Minn. 2002); accord. Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 515 F. Supp.
2d 984, 998 (D. Minn. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s allegations of emotional harm and
fear of possible identify theft were sufficient to state a claim for damages under MGDPA).
Second, “a plaintiff must still satisfy the standard of proof necessary to reco ver such
damages for emotional harm,” and the court should be “careful to limit the availability of
[emotional harm] damages to those plaintiffs who prove that emotional injury occurred
under circumstances tending to guarantee its genuineness.” Navarre, 652 N.W.2d at 30
(quotations omitted).
Here, the district court was rightly concerned that Wills’s complaint does not allege
with particularity the nature or extent of the emotional harm he alleges . Our rule 12.02
dismissal standard, however, requires the court to accept the facts alleged in the complaint
and all reasonable inferences as true. But we need not decide this point, as we have already
concluded Wills has failed to allege that Jesson was the one who violated the MGDPA.
In sum, w e conclude that Wills failed to allege a cognizable claim against Jesson
for alleged violations of the MHRA and MGDPA for the disclosure of his medical records
without his consent. Therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing Wills’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Affirmed.