State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0950

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Travers Davel McDaniel,
Appellant.

Filed March 4, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-17-6178

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Catheryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the accuracy of his plea to a felon -in-possession-of-a-firearm
charge pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). Because we determine that
the plea is accurate, and therefore valid, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 12, 2017, appellant Travers McDaniel and his girlfriend were in their
car which stalled in the middle of the road. McDaniel’s girlfriend flagged down police
officers. While the officers were directing traf fic around the stalled vehicle, McDaniel
entered the driver’s seat of a police squad car. While officers attempted to physically
remove McDaniel from the squad car, a civilian attempted to block the squad car with his
own car in order to assist the officers. McDaniel resisted the officers, drove the squad car
over the curb, hit the civilian car, and fled the scene in the squad car. The squad car
contained a rifle located on the ceiling of the front-passenger compartment. Officers
pursued McDaniel and shortly thereafter discovered the abandoned squad car. The squad
car’s rifle had been moved from its o riginal location on the ceiling to the passenger seat.
With the help of the K9 unit, officers found McDaniel nearby, lying down on the ground.
McDaniel then continued to flee on foot . The officers again used the K9 unit to finally
apprehend him.
Based upon these events, the state charged McDaniel with felon in possession of a
firearm, theft of a firearm, theft of a motor vehicle, fleeing police in a motor vehicle, fleeing
on foot (misde meanor), and third -degree test refusal (gross misdemeanor). At a hearing

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on November 28, 2017, McDaniel planned to plead guilty to the felon-in-possession-of-a-
firearm offense in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. Because McDaniel planned
to argue for departure, the court warned that departure was uncommon and that McDaniel
carried the burden to show that substantial and compelling reasons existed for the court to
depart at sentencing. When the court began to question McDaniel regarding the waiver of
his rights, McDaniel changed his mind. The court granted a recess to give McDaniel time
to speak to his attorney. After the recess, McDaniel again indicated that he wished to plead
guilty, however, he hesitated during the plea colloquy. The court rescheduled the case to
that afternoon to allow McDaniel to have additional time to think about his decision. After
the matter was reconvened, the following exchange occurred on the record:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: On that day you —did you end up in
possession of a firearm?
MCDANIEL: I possessed a vehicle that there was a firearm
inside of; yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you had access to that firearm
while you were inside that vehicle; correct?
MCDANIEL: Correct.

Then the state questioned McDaniel on the record:
STATE: Mr. McDaniel, you were sit —you were seated in the
driver’s seat of that vehicle; correct?
MCDANIEL: Correct.
STATE: And the firearm was located in the passenger seat of
the vehicle; is that correct?
MCDANIEL: I do not know where it was located, I only know
that it was somewhere inside the vehicle.
STATE: Okay. You wouldn ’t disagree that it was located in
the passenger compartment of the vehicle; correct?
MCDANIEL: No.

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The court explained to McDaniel that he should not plead guilty if he could not testify to a
factual basis for the offense. Additionally, the court explained that it was unwilling to take
a plea from “someone that ’s not willing to admit that they violated the law.” The court
then advanced McDaniel’s case and scheduled a pretrial.
At the pretrial hearing, McDaniel again wished to take advantage of the state’s plea
agreement offer. In exchange for McDaniel pleading guilty to the felon -in-possession
charge, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. After reexamining McDaniel on
the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, McDaniel pleaded guilty to the felon -in-
possession-of-a-firearm charge. The following factual basis was elicited during
McDaniel’s felon-in-possession plea:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. McDaniel, you have a controll ed
substance conviction from 2014; correct?1
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you are a convicted felon?
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you do not—you do not have the
right to possess a firearm; correct?
MCDANIEL: No.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Or ammunition?
MCDANIEL: No.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: On September 12th of 2017 you had
the chance that you were in a motor vehicle; correct?
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: A police car?
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you were driving the police car?
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And there was some ammunition in
the police car?

1 Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2016) defines crimes of violence to include chapter 152
controlled-substance crimes. Therefore, the factual basis for McDaniel’s ineligibility to
possess a firearm was properly laid.

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MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And a firearm?
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you knew that there was an
ammunition and some fire—
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: —or a firearm and some ammunition
in the police car?
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You had access to these things?
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And so you would agree that you were
in possession of both the firearm and the ammunition since you
had access to it in the police car–
MCDANIEL: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: and you knew about those items.
MCDANIEL: Yes.

The court then asked McDaniel the following questions:
COURT: In fact, Mr. McDaniel, those firearms in the police
cars are usually mounted like right either behind your head or
down right between the two seats; right?
MCDANIEL: Yes.
COURT: So you could see it when you got into the car.
MCDANIEL: Yes.
COURT: And you knew that you could get ready access to it
because it was — it was there and readily accessible to a police
officer, and certainly now that you’ re in the car, readily
accessible to you?
MCDANIEL: Yes.

The court found that McDaniel’s testimony provided a sufficient factual basis and accepted
McDaniel’s guilty plea. McDaniel now appeals, asserting that he should be allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea because it was inaccurate and therefore invalid.

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D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review
While “[a] defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering
it” withdrawal must be allowed “to correct a manifest injustice.” Taylor v. State , 887
N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.0 5, subd. 1. A
guilty plea is valid if it is intelligent, voluntary, and accurate. Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823.
A plea is invalid and constitutes a manifest injustice if it does not meet those three
requirements. Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). The defendant bears
the burden of proving that the plea was invalid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). On appeal, this court reviews the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id.
II. Accuracy of Plea
McDaniel challenges only the accuracy of his plea. “The accuracy requirement
protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he
could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.” Id. For a guilty plea to be accurate,
it must be supported by a proper factual basis, with “sufficient facts on the record to support
a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead
guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349-50 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). The
factual basis of a plea is inadequate if a defendant makes statements that negate an essential
element of the charged offense. Id. at 350. This court reviews the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the plea from the recor d made when the defendant entered the plea. State v.
Lillemo, 410 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Minn. App. 1987).

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a. The Plea Colloquy Sufficiently Establishes the Elements of the Crime
McDaniel argues that the plea was inaccurate because he did not admit that he ever
possessed the firearm/ammunition and because he did not admit that he ever touched the
firearm/ammunition or knowingly exercised dominion and control over them. According
to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016), in order to support the felon -in-possession
charge the state was required to prove that (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm
or consciously exercised dominion and control over it; (2) the defendant had been
convicted of a crime of violence; and (3) the defendant’s act took place on or a bout
September 12, 2017 in Olmstead County. McDaniel asserts that the factual basis must
include the elements necessary to satisfy constructive possession , which is established by
either (1) proof that the item was in a place under the defendant’s exclusi ve control to
which other people did not normally have access or (2) proof of a strong probability ,
inferable from other evidence, that the defendant was at the time consciously exercising
dominion and control over it, even if the item was in a place to wh ich others had access.
State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). However, we note that the state was
required to prove that the defendant “knowingly possessed a firearm ” or “consciously or
knowingly exercised dominion and control over it.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601
(Minn. 2017). We determine that the factual basis is sufficient to support that McDaniel
knowingly possessed the firearm. At the plea hearing, McDaniel admitted that he had
knowledge of the firearm and ammunition in the police squad car and that he was in
possession of both items.

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McDaniel also argues that even though he knew about the firearm, it does not mean
that he possessed it. State v. Smith, 749 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Minn. App. 2008) (noting that “it
is not illegal for [a prohibited person] to be in the presence of firearms – as long as he does
not possess them”). However, McDaniel was not simply in the “presence of firearms” in
this case. Here, McDaniel was fleeing the police in the police squad car that he had stolen.
The firearm, located in the upper compartment on the passenger side of the squad car, was
clearly visible and accessible to McDaniel.
b. Leading Questions Do Not Render a Plea Inaccurate
McDaniel also argues that the plea was inaccurate because the factual basis was
established through the use of leading questions, rather than through McDaniel’s own
testimony. McDaniel is correct that his admissions consisted exclusively of leading
questions by the attorneys and single -word answers by himself. And the supreme court
has “cautioned against the use of exclusively leading questions to establish a proper factual
basis for a guilty plea.” Lussier v. State , 821 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. 2012) (citations
omitted); see also Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Nevertheless, “[a] defendant may not
withdraw his plea simply because the court failed to elicit proper responses if the record
contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94; see
also Barnslater v. State , 805 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. App. 2011) (“The use of leading
questions is therefore disfavored, but it does not by itself invalidate a guilty plea.”). The
court may “look to the whole record, beyond what the defendant said, when evaluating the
quality of a guilty plea’s factual basis.” Barnslater, 805 N.W.2d at 914. By pleading
guilty, a defendant “in effect judicially admit[s] the allegations contained in the complaint.”

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State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983). “The complaint may provide a factual
basis for a defendant’s plea, and [reviewing courts] are permitted to examine the complaint
to assess whether a defendant’s plea was accurate.” Sanchez v. State , 868 N.W.2d 282,
289 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 890 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2017). Here, the complaint states
that McDaniel stole a police squad car. McDaniel fled in the squad car, disregarded police,
hit a civilian vehicle, and damag ed police property. The squad car was found by police
with the firearm moved from its holding place to the passenger seat. Because the record
contains sufficient evidence to support his conviction, McDaniel’s argument is unavailing.
c. No Statements to Negate Possession Were Made During the Plea
McDaniel argues that statements made during the November hearing negate
elements of the crime. If the defendant’s plea colloquy negates an essential element of the
charged crime, the factual basis is inadequate. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 350. While it is
true that during the November hearing McDaniel made statements that appeared to negate
his knowledge of the firearm inside of the squad car, the district court stopped those
proceedings in order to give McDaniel time to think about his decision to plead gui lty.
During the rescheduled December pretrial hearing—one month later —McDaniel did not
say anything that would negate the possession element of the crime. In fact, as discussed
above, McDaniel agreed that he was in possession of the firearm. Therefore , McDaniel’s
argument that he said things to negate an element of the crime is without merit.

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Based upon our review of the plea colloquy, in conjunction with the facts in the
complaint, we determine that McDaniel’s plea to felon-in-possession is accurate and valid.
Affirmed.