Wilbert Arnold Sandstrom, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0967

Wilbert Arnold Sandstrom, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 25, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge
Dissenting, Klaphake, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-15-958

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota; and

Sharon Chadwick, Assistant County Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s denial of appellant ’s petition for
postconviction relief, appellant argues that his conviction of misdemeanor trespassing must
be reversed because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he returned to
the property with the intent to disturb his neighbor. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Wilbert Sandstrom had a history of legal and personal disputes with his
neighbor. In 2007, following a civil land dispute, a St. Louis County district court enjoined
Sandstrom from trespassing on his neighbor’s land and from destroying any pr operty on
his neighbor’s land.
In late 2015, the neighbor saw Sandstrom driving across his property. This was not
the first time the neighbor saw Sandstrom on his property since the 2007 court order. So
when the neighbor saw Sandstrom again on his property, he was frustrated and approached
Sandstrom. The neighb or asked Sandstrom why he was trespassing on his land, but
Sandstrom ignored his question and drove off.
The neighbor immediately sought help. He called 911 to report that Sandstrom was
again on his land . He also called his brother who lived nearby to come over and take
photographs of Sandstrom on his property as evidence. When the brother arrived, he saw
Sandstrom walking up the gravel driveway toward the neighbor’s home and photographed
him. The brother reminded Sandstrom that he was not supposed t o be there. Sandstrom

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told the brother that he was looking for his lost dog. Then Sandstrom left the property and
returned to his car which he had parked off the property.
At some point after the neighbor first called law enforcement, Sandstrom also called
law enforcement to report his dog was missing and that his neighbor was holding his dog
hostage. Deputy Andrew Feiro of the St. Louis County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to
the neighbor’s home. Sandstrom met with the deputy and told him that his neighbor had
his dog and was not giving him back. He also told Deputy Feiro that he had not trespassed
on his neighbor’s property, but claimed that the field he drove through was a township road
and that he was fighting a court order involving it.
Deputy Feiro then spoke with the neighbor, who had found Sandstrom’s dog by his
garage and had tied him up. The deputy brought Sandstrom’s dog back to him and ticketed
Sandstrom for trespassing in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(7) (2014).
A bench trial was held. At trial, Sandstrom did not dispute that he was on the
property, but disputed that he had returned to the property with the requisite intent to
“abuse, disturb, cause distress in or threaten another,” claiming that his intent was to look
for his dog. However, the neighbor’s brother testified that during the telephone
conversation he received from the neighbor asking him to come over and photograph
Sandstrom on his property, the neighbor had told him that when he first saw Sandstrom on
his land, the dog was with him. The court found Sandstrom guilty of trespassing and
sentenced him to 30 days in jail stayed for one year and one year of probation.
Sandstrom petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of returning to the property with intent to abuse, disturb, cause

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distress in , or threaten another. The postconviction court denied Sandstrom’s petition,
finding that the only rational explanation for why Sandstrom returned to the pr operty was
to disturb his neighbor. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Sandstrom argues that the evidence was insufficie nt to sustain his conviction of
trespassing because he did not intend to disturb his neighbor . Under Minnesota law, a
person is guilty of misdemeanor trespass if the person intentionally “returns to the property
of another with the intent to abuse, disturb, or cause distress in or threaten another, after
being told to leave the property and not to return.” Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(7).
In reviewing whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we
undertake a “painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient” to support the
conviction. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We
review the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial in the same manner as a jury trial.
State v. Lehikoinen, 463 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1990). Upo n review, we assume
that the fact -finder disbelieved any evidence contrary to the verdict. State v. Fox , 868
N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015). “[W]e will not disturb the verdict if the [fact-finder],
acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence an d the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the
charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
Sandstrom and the state agree that the circumstantial -evidence analysis is
appropriate in determining whether the element of intent was prov ed beyond a reasonable

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doubt. Intent is a state of mind that “is generally proved by inferences drawn from a
person’s words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v.
Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1996). See also State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720,
726 (Minn. 2000) (noting that intent is “proved circumstantially, by inference from words
and acts of the actor both before and after the incident”). A jury or fact-finder is permitted
to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her actions.
Id.
When reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-
step analysis. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 –601 (Minn. 2017). The first step is
to identify the circumstances proved “by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the [fact-
finder’s] verdict,” and in deference to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations. Id. at
600. Second, we independently consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the circumstances proved. Id. at 600–01. “To sustain the conviction, the circumstances
proved, when viewed as a whole, must be consistent with a reasonable inference that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at
601.
The circumstances proved at trial are the following findings of the district court: (1)
a court order prohibited Sandstrom from entering his neighbor’s property; (2) Sandstrom
drove his vehicle across his neighbor’s property; (3) the neighbor saw Sandstrom and told
him he was not allowed to enter his property; (4) Sandstrom did not indicate to his neighbor
that he was looking for his dog or offer any other reason for being on the property ; (5) the
neighbor called his brother and 911 to request law enforcement assistance ; (6) Sandstrom

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left the property, but only moments later, returned to the property and began walking up
the driveway toward his neighbor’s residence ; (7) the neighbor’s brother arrived on the
scene and told Sandstrom to leave; and (8) when a deputy sheriff arrived and questioned
Sandstrom about his presence on the property, Sandstrom told him that he had the right to
drive on the neighbor’s property, calling it a township road.
The next step in our analysis is determining the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from those circumstances. See id. Sandstrom argues that the reasonable inference
drawn from the circumstances proved is that he returned to the property with the intent to
look for his missing dog, not to disturb his neighbor.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the only reasonable inference we can
draw is that Sandstrom, when he first drove on the property, knew that his neighbor would
be disturbed. The evidence presented at trial, which the district court found to be credible,
was that when Sandstrom first drove on the neighbor’s field, he was not looking for his
dog. These neighbors had a contentious history that had lasted for more than ten years.
Their relationship was so tense that when a problem arose between them, both called law
enforcement to intervene. And immediately upon seeing Sandstrom on his property again,
the neighbor, obviously disturbed, asked Sandstrom why he was trespassing on his
property. Sandstrom, in response to the neighbor’s objection and frustration, then left the
property, only to return moments later to enter the property again. And, he continued to
enter the property even though he was met by the neighbor’s brother, who was taking
pictures of him as he walked on the neighbor’s property. View ed in light of the history
between these neighbors, it is readily apparent that it was no mere coincidence that

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Sandstrom trespassed on his neighbor’s property . Instead, Sandstrom returned to the
property knowing full well that his entrance upon his neighbor’s property would disturb
his neighbor and perpetuate the drama between them. The district court, as fact -finder,
found that these facts supported guilt, and we defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. See Thorson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. App.
1994).
Sandstrom does not dispute that he entered the property or even that his entry
disturbed his neighbor, but claims that despite the court order prohibiting him from entering
the property, he was justified in entering the property to search for his dog. But, we are
instructed to reject his self -serving explanation because it is not a circ umstance proved.
See State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 670–71 (Minn. 2011). The only reasonable inference
from the circumstances proved is that he went on the property to disturb his neighbor and
either used his dog as an excuse or the dog got loose after he went on the property. There
was evidence that the dog was with him in his vehicle as he drove over the property. When
questioned by police, Sandstrom did not indicate that he was looking for his dog at that
time, but instead claimed that he was driving on what he claimed was a public road over
his neighbor’s land. Sandstrom did tell the police that he was looking for his dog during
his second entrance on his neighbor’s property. But there is no lost -dog exception to the
court order or in caselaw regarding criminal trespass. Instead of directly violating the court
order, Sandstrom could have called his neighbor to inquire about his missing dog. He could
have waited for the deputy to arrive to help him find his dog. Sandstrom instead chose to
violate the court order and trespass on his neighbor’s land twice on the same day: first,

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when he drove across the property in violation of the 2007 court order and was told by the
neighbor to leave, and second, when he , even though he had already been asked to leave
by the neighbor, walked up the driveway towards his neighbor’s home . Given the totality
of these undisputed fac ts, Sandstrom’s contention th at he entered his neighbor’s property
twice in violation of the court order without intending to disturb his neighbor is
unreasonable.
Based upon this record, the only reasonable inference is that Sandstrom, knowing
their history, knew that the natural and probable consequences of his multiple entries onto
his neighbors’ property would frustrate or disturb his neighbor, intending the disturbance
that ultimately occurred. For that reason, we affirm Sandstrom’s conviction for trespass.
Affirmed.

D-1

KLAPHAKE, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. Based on the circumstantial -evidence analysis, another
reasonable inference inconsistent with that of guilt can be drawn —that Sandstrom was on
his neighbor’s property to look for his missing dog.
Sandstrom never disputed that he was on his neighbor’s property. He instead
disputed that there was sufficient evidence under Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(7)
(2014), that he returned to his neighbor’s property with the intent to abuse, disturb, cause
distress, or threaten another. Upon reviewing the circumstances proved, another
reasonable inference can be drawn that is inconsistent with a malicious intent. We can
reasonably conclude that Sandstrom’s intent was to find his missing dog. The
circumstances proved reflect this reasonable inference. Even the property owner testified
that Sandstrom probably returned to his land with the intent to find the missing dog.
Sandstrom enlisted the help of law enforcement by calling 911 to report that his dog was
missing. And Sandstrom’s dog was actually found on his neighbor’s property, tied up in
the garage.
The district court concluded that Sandstrom must have intended to disturb his
neighbor, as no other plausible reason existed for his presence on the property. The
majority agrees. But under the circumstantial-evidence analysis, the circumstances proved
must be consistent with the hypothesis that Sandstrom is guilty and inconsistent with any
other rational hypothesis. State v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). A
rational hypothesis other than guilt is apparent here: Sandstrom exclusively intended to
look for his missing dog. Even if Sandstrom simultaneously intended to look for his dog

D-2

and disturb his neighbor, the heightened -scrutiny circumstantial-evidence analysis would
preclude sustaining his conviction. See id. (“A conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, however, warrants heightened scrutiny.”). If we can reasonably infer that
Sandstrom was looking for his dog, this intent alone is a hypothesis inconsistent with guilt
and we must reverse.
Because it is reasonable to infer, under the circumstantial -evidence analysis, that
Sandstrom entered his neighbor’s land to look for his missing dog, I would reverse
Sandstrom’s conviction.