A18-1103

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0970
A18-1103

Adam Lindsay Williams, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent (A18-0970),
State of Minnesota,
Respondent (A18-1103),

vs.

Adam Lindsay Williams,
Appellant.

Filed May 6, 2019
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Cottonwood County District Court
File Nos. 17-CV-18-12; A17-CR-17-507

Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, L.L.C., Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Leah M. P. Hedman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Public Safety)

Nicholas A. Anderson, Cottonwood County Attorney, K risti L. Meyeraan, Assistant
County Attorney, Windom, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
In this consolidated appeal, appellant Adam Lindsay Williams arg ues that the
district court erred when it determined law enforcement had reasonable, articulable
suspicion to expand the scope of the initial traffic stop and pursue a driving-while-impaired
(DWI) investigation. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2017, Windom Police Officer Jonathon Beck was on duty in his
marked and fully equipped squad car when appellant’s vehicle caught his attention. It was
just after bar close on a Saturday night. Appellant, driving a pickup truck, had signaled a
right turn at an intersection, but then proceeded to travel through the intersection instead.
In Officer Beck ’s experience as an officer, he typically came across impaired drivers
between the hours of about midnight to three in the morning on weekend nig hts. Officer
Beck pursued the truck.
As Officer Beck followed appellant’s truck, he observed multiple traffic violations.
He observed appellant drive on the center line several times, cross into the left lane without
signaling, and travel at 48 miles p er hour (mph) in a 40 -mph zone. After following
appellant’s truck for approximately two minutes, Officer Beck activated his squad car’s
emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. Appellant’s truck pulled over immediately.
Officer Beck radioed dispatch, notifying them of the situation and stating, “[I’m] [t]hinking
this will probably turn into field sobriety.”

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Officer Beck approached appellant’s vehicle and made contact with him. He
identified appellant and explained the reason for the traffic stop, stating, that appellant was
“kind of all over the road” and “driving on lines.” Officer Beck observed that appel lant
had bloodshot eyes, which he knew could “potentially indicate . . . either drugs or alcohol
impairment.” Officer Beck also believed that appellant’s speech was “slightly slurred,”
but without knowing appellant and the sound of his voice, he could not be certain. Officer
Beck asked appellant whether he had been drinking, and appellant stated he had not.
Officer Beck returned to his squad car to verify appellant’s license and registration.
Another officer, Officer Kopperud, arrived at the scene. Officer Beck informed the officer
that he did not smell any alcohol, but described appellant’s driving as “very jerky.” Before
returning to appellant’s truck, Officer Beck stated to Officer Kopperud: “I’m going to talk
to him and see if he will admit to phone use or something like that and if he’s not going to
admit to that than I’ll run fields to make sure that he is fine and not under the influence of
something.”
Officer Beck returned to appellant’s vehicle and inquired whether appellant had
been using his phone while driving. Appellant denied any phone use and stated that he had
his phone on the center console for navigation purposes. Officer Beck replied that he was
concerned about appellant’s driving conduct , especially in light of the time of night, and
instructed appellant to step out of the truck to perform field sobriety tests.
Officer Beck administered field sobriety tests. The tests included the Horizontal
Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, the Walk -And-Turn test, and the One -Leg Stand test.
Appellant failed all three . Thereafter, the officer administered a preliminary breath test

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(PBT), which registered a preliminary result of 0.128. Officer Beck placed appellant under
arrest. After securing appellant in the squad car, Officer Beck stated to Officer Kopperud,
“I didn’t smell anything until I got him out, and then I smelled a light odor.” Officer
Kopperud replied that he also got a “tiny whiff of it.”
Officer Beck transported appellant to the police station. At the station, Officer Beck
read appellant the breath -test advisory, and appellant agr eed to submit to a breath test.
Appellant’s breath test reg istered a result of 0.13 at 2:48 a.m. Appellant was charged by
citation with two counts of driving while impaired and one count of failure to drive in a
single lane. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5) (2016), 169.18, subd. 7(a) (Supp.
2017). As a result of the failed breath test, appellant’s driver’s license was revoked . See
Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4 (2016).
Appellant moved the district court to suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges.
He also petition ed the district court to review and rescind the revocation of his driver’s
license. Appellant argued that Officer Beck’s expansion of the traffic stop was not based
on a reasonable suspicion that he was under the influence. Appellant described his driving
misconduct as “minor,” disp uted having any slurred speech, and challenged whether
having bloodshot eyes was indicative of impairment.
A combined implied-consent and omnibus hearing was held in district court. The
sole issue was whether Officer Beck’s expansion of the initial traff ic stop was supported
by reasonable, articulable suspicion. Officer Beck was the only witness to testify. A full
audio-video recording from Officer Beck’s squad car dash -camera was admitted into

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evidence. The video showed Officer Beck’s initial contact with appellant, the traffic stop,
the officer’s administration of the field sobriety tests and the PBT, and appellant’s arrest.
The district court denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, his motion to
dismiss the charges, and his motion to rescind the revocation of his driver’s license. The
district court found that “[appellant’s] driving conduct, including weaving, driving on the
center line, driving in a jerking manner, and driving on the fog line indicated he might [be]
driving while impaired by drugs or alcohol.” It found Officer Beck to be a credible witness,
and that the officer’s “purpose for the stop was to investigate the basis of [appellant’s] poor
driving conduct.” The district court found that Officer Beck had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to expand the traffic stop based on appellant’s “weaving and driving on lines, the
time of night, [appellant’s] blood shot eyes and possibly slurred speech, and lack of an
explanation for his poor driving.”
Appellant stipulated to the state’s evidence under Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure, 26.01, subdivision 4, to preserve the pretrial suppression ruling for appellate
review. The district court found appellant guilty of all three offenses as charged, and
sentenced appellant to 90 days in jail, stayed for one year. This appeal followed.1

1 Appellant filed two separate appeals ( one for the criminal conviction and the other from
the order denying his motion to rescind the license revocation). Appellant moved this court
to consolidate the appeals, and we granted his motion.

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D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district cour t erred when it determined Officer Beck had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the initial traffic stop and ord er
appellant to submit to field-sobriety and preliminary-breath tests.
When reviewing a pretrial suppression order, this court reviews a district court’s
factual findings for clear error and the legal determinations de novo. State v. Onyelobi,
879 N.W.2d 334, 342-43 n.4 (Minn. 2016); State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn.
2008). A factual finding “is not clearly erroneous if it is reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” State v. Barshaw , 879 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 201 6). We must
give deference to the district court’s credibility determinations. State v. Klamar , 823
N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by th e government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 10. “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” State v.
Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Mi nn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “Generally, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable.” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502. However, a law -
enforcement officer may, without a warrant, initiate a limited, investigatory stop, if the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Munson , 594
N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880
(1968)); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the
officer to be able to articulate that he or s he had a particularized and objective basis for

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suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502
(Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted). Indeed, the officer’s suspicion must be more than the
product of “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. Harris, 572 N.W.2d 333, 337
(Minn. App. 1997) (quotation omitted), aff’d on other grounds , 590 N.W.2d 90 (Minn.
1999).
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop , Minnesota
courts “consider the totality of the circumstances a nd acknowledge that trained law -
enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be
beyond the compe tence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson , 622 N.W.2d 823,
825 (Minn. 200 1); see als o Klamar , 823 N.W.2d at 691 (“The court may consider the
officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information,
including the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and
anything else that is re levant.”). “The factual basis required to justify an investigative
seizure is minimal.” Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 691.
The analysis of a traffic stop involves a dual inquiry. Id. In the first step, this court
inquires whether the stop was justified at its inception. Id. Traffic violations, “however
insignificant,” can provide an objective basis for stopping the vehicle. State v. George ,
557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). In the second step, we must inquire whether the
officer’s actions during the stop “were reasonably related to and justified by the
circumstances that gave rise to the [stop] in the first place.” Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 691-
92 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004)

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(quotations omitted) (“ [E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to
and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.”).
It is undisputed that Officer Beck had reasonable , articulable suspicion to initiate a
traffic stop based on multiple traffic violations: failure to signal a lane change, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 4 (2016); failure to stay entirely within a single lane, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a); and failure to maintain the legal speed limit,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.14 (2016). See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578 (“Ordinarily,
if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the office r has an
objective basis for stopping the vehicle.”). Appellant does not challenge the initial traffic
stop.
Appellant focuses on Officer Beck’s expansion of the stop to investigate impaired
driving. He argues that the district court erred when it deter mined there was reasonable,
articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop. Appellant contends that Officer Beck
“was operating entirely on a hunch,” expanding the stop based on “the driving conduct
itself, and non-descript blood shot eyes.” Appellant asserts that, absent any odor of alcohol,
admission of drinking, observation of empty alcoholic beverages, or behavior, such as
extreme nervousness or evasiveness, the district court’s finding that , under the aggregate
of the circumstances, there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify expansion of
the stop, is erroneous under state law. We do not agree.
In considering t he totality of the circumstances, we conclude there were multiple
indications of intoxication to support the district court’s finding that Officer Beck had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of impairment to warrant an expansion of the stop . See

9
Holtz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 340 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. App. 1983) (stating that “an
officer need only have one objective indication of intoxication to constitute reasonable and
probable grounds to believe a person is under the influence”).
First, as shown in the audio-video recording admitted as evidence, appellant violated
at least three different traffic laws before he was pulled over by Officer Beck. See, e.g.,
State v. Driscoll, 427 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. App. 1988) (failing to observe traffic laws
is indicia of intoxication). Further, appellant’s traffic violations occurred just after 2:00
a.m., late Saturday night, at a time when, as Officer Beck testified, patrol officers generally
encounter drivers who are impaired by alcohol. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378,
383 (Minn. 1998); Giddings v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 354 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Minn. App.
1984); see also State v. Engholm, 290 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. 1980).
Second, when Officer Beck approached appellant’s truck, he observed that appellant
had bloodshot eyes and believed that appellant’s speech may have been slightly slurred.
See, e.g. , Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 696 (concluding that bloodshot and watery ey es are
indicia of intoxication); State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. App. 2004) (articulating
that “bloodshot and watery eyes” and “slurred speech” are included in the common indicia
of intoxication). Officer Beck, who testified that he has specialized training in enforcing
DWI laws, understood that bloodshot eyes could “potentially indicate . . . either drugs or
alcohol impairment.” See Richardson, 622 N.W.2d at 825 (“[T]rained law enforcement
officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the
competence of an untrained person.”).

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Appellant disputes having slurred speech at the time he was pulled over. For
support, he argues that Officer Beck testified that he was not certain whether appellant’s
speech was, in fact, slurred. However, in evaluating reasonableness, we look not to an
individual officer’s subjective state of mind. See State v. Jackson , 742 N.W.2d 163, 179
(Minn. 2007). Rather, “reasonableness is measured in objective terms by examining the
totality of the circum stances.” Id. (quotation omitted). Officer Beck testified that he
believed appellant’s speech may have been slightly slurred , and the district court found
Officer Beck to be credible. See Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 691 (“Deference must be given
to the distri ct court’s credibility determinations.”). Under the totality of the
circumstances—including the time and day of appellant’s traffic violations, his bloodshot
eyes, and lack of any explanation for the driving misconduct—Officer Beck’s observation
that appellant’s speech may have been slurred was reasonable.
Lastly, although the above indicia of intoxication w ere sufficient to permit Officer
Beck to expand the stop and administer field sobriety testing, we note that, once Officer
Beck directed appellant out of his vehicle, Officer Beck smelled the odor of alcohol.
Appellant argues that Officer Beck’s detection of alcohol came after the expansion and
during the field sobriety testing itself. However, as seen in the audio-video footage, Officer
Beck stated to Officer Kopperud, “ I didn’t smell anything until I got him out, and then I
smelled a light odor.” Officer Beck’s comment suggests that he detected the smell of
alcohol once appellant stepped out of his vehicle. And, because Officer Beck made an
initial legal traffic stop, he was permitted, without any additional articulable suspicion of
illegal activity, to order appellant out of the truck. See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 367 (“It

11
is correct that a police officer may order a driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without
an articulated reason.”).
But even if Officer Beck had not detected the odor of alcohol until the stop had
already expanded into a DWI investigation, Officer Beck’s other observations provided
more than “one objective indication of intoxication” warranting an expansion. Appellant
engaged in multiple traffic violations at 2:00 a.m. on a weekend night; he appeared to have
bloodshot eyes and slightly slurred speech; and appellant was unable to provide any
explanation for his poor driving conduct. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer
Beck had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe appellant was driving under the
influence, and thus, his expansion of the stop was lawful.
Affirmed.