In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: L. J. M., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0971

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
L. J. M., Parent.

Filed November 19, 2018
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-17-1341

Dorothy M. Gause, Dorothy M. Gause, LLC, Stillwater, Minnesota (for appellant L.J.M.)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kathryn M. Timm, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent County of Anoka)

Susan Drabek, Circle Pines, Minnesota (for the children)

Jena Schuler, Tenth Judicial District Guardian Ad Litem Program, Ramsey, Minnesota
(guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion because termination is not in the children’s best interests.
Because the district court adequately considered the children’s preferences and did not
abuse its discretion in finding that termination is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant L.J.M. is the maternal grandmother of D.M. (born in 2007) and N.M.
(born in 2008), whose birth mother is B.M. The county removed the children from B.M.’s
care in June 2013 because of B.M.’s drug use and failure to provide for the children’s
special needs, and because the y were exposed to domestic violence. B.M. voluntarily
terminated her parental rights in June 2014. The children were placed with L .J.M. after
removal, and L.J.M. adopted D.M. and N.M. in June 2015.
Both children have special needs. D.M.’s medical providers have diagnosed him
with attention deficient hyperactivity disor der (ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder,
adjustment disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and emotional-behavior disorders ,
which result in displays of aggression and “suicidality.” D.M. has an individualized
education plan (IEP), and receives special education programming for his emotional-
behavioral disorders. D.M. has also participated in individual therapy “off and on” to work
on “emotional regulation” and process trauma.
N.M. has Saethre-Chotzen Syndrome, a genetic condition associated with premature
closure of the skull. N.M.’s condition resulted in vision and hearing problems, and she
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“developed seizures at one point from increased intracranial pressure.” N.M. also has
arthritis and “speech difficulty ” due to “a submucosal cleft of the palate.” N.M. has
undergone several surgeries and receives regular medical care. She also has developmental
delays, and has an IEP. N.M. needs occupational, speech, and physical therapy. N.M. also
needs assistance with daily activities, including eating, getting dressed, and going to the
bathroom.
In August 2015, respondent Anoka County Department of Community Social
Services (the county) received a report from the University of Minnesota Medical Center,
where N.M. received medical treatment. According to the report, hospital staff found
“bottles of alcohol” in N.M.’s hospital room , L.J.M. offered “one of the staff members a
drink,” and L.J.M. fell asleep “standing up at the desk.” When hospital staff confronted
L.J.M., she denied having a drinking problem and stated that she had been drinking because
of a death in the family. The county offered L.J.M. services and she agreed to work with
the county voluntarily. L.J.M. did not follow through with services.
In October 2015, L.J.M.’s neighbor called 911 and reported that L.J.M. was driving
“at a high rate of speed with a child in her lap.” Police officers went to L.J.M.’s home and
L.J.M. admitted that she had driven with D.M. on her lap, but stated that she controlled the
gas and brake pedals, while D.M. steered t he vehicle. While talking to L.J.M., all three
responding officers “detect[ed] an odor of consumed alcoholic beverage,” but did not think
that she was too intoxicated to care for the children.
In March 2016, police officers responded to L.J.M.’s home because a caller reported
that L.J.M.’s boyfriend “verbally and physically” abused L.J.M. and the children. The
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children told the police that the boyfriend threatened to hit them, and that they were afraid.
Police arrested the boyfriend for fifth-degree domestic assault. At around the same time,
D.M. told his teachers that the boyfriend drove him to school with a beer in his hand.
Later that same month, the county received a report that L.J.M. was noticeably
intoxicated when she dropped the children off at school. According to witnesses from the
school, L.J.M. shouted at staff, skipped down the hallway, and “appeared intoxicated.” On
that same day, N.M.’s teachers noticed a “bite mark” on N.M.’s cheek and N.M. said that
D.M. bit her. After “some prompting,” D.M. admitted that he bit N.M. the previous night.
D.M. said that L.J.M. was home when the incident occurred, but had been “too drunk” to
help them.
Police officers conducted a welfare check at L.J.M.’s home that evening and noticed
a strong odor of alcohol when they spoke to L.J.M. The officers asked L.J.M. to submit to
a preliminary breath test (PBT), which she did, with a reading of 0.28. The officers also
saw the bite mark on N.M.’s cheek. L.J.M. told police that it was lip stick and tried to wipe
it off. The officers reported their findings to the county, and the county put the children on
a 72-hour hold and placed them in foster care.
In April 2016, the county filed a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)
petition, and both children were adjudicated in need of protection or services. At the CHIPS
hearing, L.J.M. admitted that “she might have a problem with alcohol.” As part of the
CHIPS adjudication, the court ordered L.J.M. to cooperate with a chemical -dependency
evaluation, a psychological evaluation, to have no use of alcohol and mood- altering
chemicals, and to provide urinalysis (UA) as requested by the county. At the time of the
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CHIPS adjudication, L.J.M. had not brought D.M. to therapy for approximately one year.
Additionally, N.M. was not receiving speech, occupational, and physical therapy , was not
using the recommended eye patch to strengthen her vision, and had not been to a follow-
up appointment with her ophthalmologist.
At a disposition hearing in May 2016, the district court approved a case plan that
addressed three primary areas to support reunification: (1) L.J.M.’s chemical use;
(2) L.J.M.’s mental health; and (3) necessary medical and other services for the children.
L.J.M. had completed a chemical-dependency evaluation, which recommended outpatient
treatment and addiction support group meetings on a daily basis. The case plan also
identified services to help L.J.M. provide a safe home for the children.
L.J.M. made minimal progress on her case plan from April to September 2016.
L.J.M. had a diluted UA in May 2016, and did not complete any UAs in June or July 2016.
L.J.M. missed visits with the children, and on one occasion, brought B.M., the children’ s
biological mother, to a visit, even though B.M. is not allowed to see the children without
previous authorization from the county . The unauthorized visit with B.M. upset the
children.
The county filed a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition on September 22,
2016. After the termination petition was filed, L.J.M. became more engaged with her case
plan. L.J.M. completed a psychological evaluation, attended individual therapy, and
completed the required UAs, which were all negative. L.J.M. also actively participated in
the children’s services, including attending N.M.’s cranial surgery in November 2016.
Based on L.J.M.’s cooperation and progress, the parties agreed to, and the district court
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granted, a continuance of the TPR trial, and the children were reunified with L.J.M. for a
trial home visit in January 2017.
The trial home visit was “short lived,” and unsupervised visits were suspended on
February 2, 2017. The county reported that L.J.M. missed two UAs and tested positive for
alcohol in January.1 Additionally, the children missed therapy sessions and several days of
school. The county also received reports that L.J.M.’s boyfriend and B.M. had been at the
home with the children. Finally, L.J.M. failed to provide the county with attendance slips
from Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings.
L.J.M. completed an updated chemical-dependency evaluation, which
recommended “intensive” outpatient treatment, and L.J.M. entered a treatment program.
In March 2017, the county filed an amended termination petition; L.J.M. entered an
admission on the original TPR and the petition was stayed contingent on several conditions.
L.J.M. substantially complied with the conditions: she continued the treatment program,
attended individual counseling and three to four AA meetings per week, and provided
negative UAs.
Around this time, D.M. was experiencing difficulties in foster care and at school,
and wanted to live with L.J.M. The county reported that D.M. got into fights at the foster
home, stole from his foster mother, and put a knife under his pillow on a few occasions .
D.M. was not able to maintain “any time in his primary general classroom” because of his
behaviors, and “social interactions were not going well.” The county found that L.J.M. was

1 L.J.M.’s testimony offered two explanations for the positive UA. First, she stated that she
soaked her foot in rubbing alcohol, and second, she said that she had consumed Nyquil.
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compliant with the case plan and stay conditions, and the children were reunified with
L.J.M. in June 2017. The stayed TPR petition was dismissed in June 2017.
L.J.M. was discharged from the outpatient treatment program in August 2017, for
not successfully completing the family portion of the treatment and “excessive absences.”
L.J.M. missed several therapy and treatment sessions, and missed UAs in July and August.
L.J.M. also failed to take N.M. to several therapy appointments in June and August 2017,
and L.J.M. failed to arrange for a personal care attendant to care for N.M., which the county
had recommended. In late August 2017, L.J.M. missed another UA, and called the county
to inform them that she and the children were going to Wisconsin to visit her brother. The
county requested that police in Wisconsin complete a welfare check. The officers reported
that L.J.M. smelled of alcohol, and L.J.M. told officers that she had a vodka drink at a
bowling alley. Later, L.J.M. denied that she had been drinking and stated that a drink had
been spilled on her.
In October 2017, L.J.M. called the police and reported that D.M. and N.M. were
missing. L.J.M. provided police officers with photos and the officers searched the area.
The officers also called the school and learned that D.M. and N.M. were at school. L.J.M.
told the officers that she called 911 because her neighbor told her that he saw the children
getting on a different bus. L.J.M. admitted drinking, and stated that she drank because she
was stressed and could not find a job. The officers obtained a PBT from L.J.M., with a test
result of 0.191. The children were again removed from the home.
On October 26, 2017, the county filed a new TPR petition , which alleged that
L.J.M.’s parental rights should be terminated on the following statutory bases: Minn. Stat.
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§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2016) (parent failed to satisfy the duties of the parent-child
relationship); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016) (parent is palpably unfit to be
a party to the parent and child relationship); and Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)
(2016) (reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of -home
placement).2
L.J.M. completed a new chemical-dependency evaluation, which recommended that
she complete inpatient treatment. L.J.M. did not agree with this recommendation, and
completed a second evaluation in November which also recommended inpatient treatment.
L.J.M. entered an inpatient treatment program, and completed the program in December
2017. The discharge summary stated that L.J.M. minimized her drinking problem and
relapses, lacked insight into her chemical use, and remained guarded. L.J.M. also entered
an outpatient program in January 2018 and completed a UA which was positive for ethyl
alcohol.
When the children were removed from L.J.M. in October, they were placed with a
foster family in Anoka County. D.M.’s behavioral issues increased, and he told the county
that he was angry about being removed from his grandmother. D.M. was depressed and
had acted out aggressively. After D.M. moved to another foster home, his behaviors
improved, he developed a good relationship with the new foster parents, and began to do

2 On February 9, 2018, the county filed an amended termination petition. The amended
petition added a statutory basis for termination, asserting that the district court should also
terminate under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8) (2016) (children were neglected and
in foster care).

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better in school. N.M. adjusted well to the first foster home a nd is still in that placement.
N.M. receives daily therapy, and has made “a lot of progress” in her speech and vocabulary.
The children have weekly visits with L.J.M. and these visits have been successful, but D.M.
“really struggle[s]” with the “end of the visits” and has “meltdowns.”
The termination trial took place over several months, beginning in late February
2018. The county provided testimony outlining the facts as described above. L.J.M.
testified that she is an alcoholic and has been sober since October 23, 2017. L.J.M.
explained that she now has the skills and ability to stay sober and she continues to attend
AA meetings and therapy. L.J.M. testified that she did not drink during the trip to
Wisconsin, but told the police that she had been drinking because she thought that was
what the officer wanted to hear. L.J.M. also testified that she has several health conditions,
including diabetes, which have caused her to miss therapy and treatment appointments.
And L.J.M. testified that the positive UA in January 2018 was caused by her diabetes and
high glucose level.
L.J.M.’s medical provider testified that drinking extra water may cause diluted UAs.
The medical provider also explained that, because L.J.M.’s medications can cause dry
mouth, she is encouraged to drink more water to prevent dehydration. Additionally, the
medical provider testified that a positive alcohol test may result “if someone has
uncontrolled diabetes because of glucose that spills in the urine,” and that this could explain
L.J.M.’s positive UA in January 2018.
The district court terminated L.J.M.’s parental rights on May 21, 2018. The district
court did not find L.J.M.’s testimony credible. The court determined that L.J.M. failed to
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acknowledge many of her relapses, did not report them to the chemical-dependency
evaluators, and did not understand the impact that her drinking ha d on the children. The
district court stated that L.J.M.’s “pattern of conduct is well- documented throughout the
CHIPS case. [L.J.M.] complies with her case plan and is able to provide consistent,
negative UAs for a couple of months before relapsing and putting the children’s safety and
well-being in jeopardy.” The district court also found that L.J.M. failed to follow through
with obtaining neces sary services for the children. The district court concluded that the
proceedings had been difficult for the children, and that D.M. needed “certainty and
stability.”
The district court found that county had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and
reunify the family. The district court also concluded that the following statutory grounds
existed to terminate parental rights: L.J.M. failed to comply with the duties imposed by the
parent-child relationship; L.J.M. is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-children
relationship; and reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
out-of-home placement. Finally, the district court concluded that termination was in the
children’s best interests. L.J.M. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
This court will affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when at least
one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and
termination is in the best interests of the child, provided that the county has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008). We “review the district court’s findings to determine whether they
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address the statutory criteria for termination of parental rights and are not clearly
erroneous.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008). “A
finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence
or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. at 660-61 (quotation omitted).
“Nevertheless, [an appellate court] defer[s] to the district court’s decision to terminate
parental rights.” Id. at 661. “[I]f at least one statutory ground alleged in the petition is
supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination of parental rights is in the
child’s best interests, [an appellate court] will affirm.” Id.
L.J.M. does not challenge the district court’s determination that statutory grounds
support the termination of her parental rights or that the county made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate and reunite the family . Rather, she challenges only the district court’s best-
interests determination. This court reviews the district court’s determination that
termination is in the children’s best interest for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of
Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6,
2012).
In every termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, “the best interests of the child
must be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016). Even if a
statutory ground for termination exists, the district court must also make a specific finding
that termination of par ental rights is in the child’s best interests. See In re Children of
T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005). To determine the child’s best interests, the
district court “ shall analyze: (i) the child’ s interests in preserving the parent-child
relationship; (ii) the parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship; and
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(iii) any competing interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3);
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. “Competing interests include such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of J.L.L.,
801 N.W.2d 405, 414 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. July 28, 2011).
Here, the district court explicitly applied each of the three best-interest factors and
specifically found that termination is in the best interests of both children. First, the district
court found that both children and L.J.M. have an interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship. The court found that there is “a bond and love betwe en [L.J.M.] and the
children.” The court also found, however, that the children have competing interests in
“being safe, being cared for in a stable environment, and having their mental, emotional,
physical, and medical needs met. These interests will not be met should the children remain
in [L.J.M.’s] care.” Finally, the district court concluded that county workers who provided
services to the family “credibly testified” that termination is in the children’s best interests.
L.J.M. does not challenge the district court’s best-interests determination for N.M.
Instead, L.J.M. narrowly argues that the district court did not acknowledge D.M.’s
preference when it weighed the best-interest factors. L.J.M. points to testimony from
several witnesses that D.M. wanted to return to L.J.M’s care. For example, D.M.’s therapist
testified that D.M. has struggled behaviorally and emotionally since being separated from
L.J.M., and the lack of stability has been difficult for D.M. D.M.’s therapist also testified
that D.M. wanted “to return to his grandma and go back home.” D.M.’s teachers testified
that D.M. identified L.J.M. as a very important person in his life and that D.M. worried
that he would not be able to “go back with Grandma.” The guardian ad litem testified that
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D.M. would like to live with L.J.M., and that the children have a strong relationship with
L.J.M. L.J.M. argues that D.M.’s desire to return to L.J.M. is not reflected in the district
court’s findings, and therefore, the court did not correctly weigh the best-interest factors.
We conclude that the district court adequately considered D.M.’s preferences for
three reasons. First, the district court considered D.M.’s desire to return to L.J.M. because
its order acknowledged that D.M. has a strong bond with L.J.M., it has been difficult for
D.M. to wait while the trial is pending, and D.M. worries “a lot about his grandmother and
his sister.” In fact, the district court explicitly found that D.M. has a strong interest and
desire to preserve the parent-child relationship.
Second, in considering the competing interests of a child, the district court must
consider not only the child’s preference s, but also the parent’s ability to provide a stable
environment. J.L.L., 801 N.W.2d at 414. Here, the district court found that L.J.M. was not
able to provide a stable environment for either child. Specifically, the district court found
that both children were in need of mental-health and medical services and that L.J.M. failed
to arrange and follow through with the necessary services. The court also found that the
children needed “certainty and stability” in their home life, which L.J.M. was not able to
provide. The district court weighed the competing interests, including D.M.’s desire to
return to L.J.M., and determined that termination is in the children’s best interests.
Finally, children involved in juvenile protection proceedings are entitled to effective
assistance of counsel. 3 See Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3(b) (Supp. 2017). If the child

3 We note that Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3, has an exception that is not at issue in this
case.
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“desires counsel but is unable to employ it, the court shall appoint counsel.” Id. Here, the
district court appointed an attorney for the children, and the attorney was present at the
termination trial. The children’s attorney had the opportunity to examine witnesses, present
evidence, and argue D.M.’s interests to the court. Thus, we are not persuaded by L.J.M.’s
argument that the district court did not sufficiently consider D.M.’s wishes.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court followed the
statute’s requirements, applied the law correctly, and sufficiently considered D.M.’s
preferences. Because the record supports the district court’s best -interests determination,
we affirm.
Affirmed.