State of Minnesota, Commissioner of Human Services, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0972

State of Minnesota,
Commissioner of Human Services, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

A. A. F.,
Respondent.

Filed March 4, 2019
Reversed
Bjorkman, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-K4-94-000712

Keith Ellison , Attorney General, R.J. Detrick, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellants)

Brian A. Dillon, Amy E. Erickson, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant-commissioners challeng e the expungement of respondent’s criminal
records held in the executive branch, arguing that the dis trict court exceeded the scope o f
its inherent judicial authority. We reverse.

2
FACTS
Respondent A.A.F. pleaded guilty to promoting prostitution in 1994, s hortly after
she turned 18. She received a stay of imposition of sentence and successfully completed a
three-year probationary term.
A.A.F. received training and worked in the home healthcare field from 2002 until
2005, when respondent Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) determined that
she is permanently disqualified from employment in that field based on the 1994
conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 1(a) (2018) (providing that anyone convicted
of promoting prostitution is permanently disqualified from direct -contact healthcare
work).1 Her employer assisted her in appealing the disqualification , but A.A.F. was
unsuccessful in having the disqualification set aside. See Minn. Stat. § 245C.24, subd. 2(a)
(2018) (providing that permanent disqualification cannot be set aside).
In 2013 , A.A.F. petitioned to expunge her “criminal record ,” emphasizing her
successful rehabilitation and the barrier the conviction poses to gainful employment. The
Minnesota Bureau of C riminal Apprehension (BCA) objected to expungement, but the
prosecutor did not. The district court granted the petition, ordering expungement of judicial
branch records; the order expressly excluded BCA records from its reach.
A.A.F. thereafter pursued ad ditional healthcare training and ap plied for healthcare
employment. She was once again notified of her disqualification.

1 We cite current law, but note that t he relevant disqualification provisions remain
substantially unchanged since A.A.F.’s conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 245A.04, subds. 3(j),
3b(c)(2) (1994).

3
In January 2018, A.A.F. petitioned the district court to expunge the records of her
conviction held by the BCA, DHS, and the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH). She
argued that expungement is necessary to prevent unfairness since the records are no longer
public data under Minn. Stat. § 13.87 (2018) but are still being used to disqualify her from
employment. And she asserted expungement is necessary to prevent an infringement of
her constitutional right to equal protection since she would have been entitled to statutory
expungement had she received a stay of adjudication rather than a stay of imposition of
sentence. All three agencies objected.
The district court ordered expungement on constitutional grounds , reasoning that
the permanent-disqualification rule “fundamentally disenfranchises [A.A.F.] in violation
of her equal protection rights” because no “meaningful connection between the permanent
disqualification and [A.A.F.’s] criminal conviction” justifies treating her differently than
those with no criminal past. The DHS and MDH commissioners appeal.
D E C I S I O N
There are two bases for expungement of criminal records in Minnesota—Minn. Stat.
§§ 609A.01-.04 (2018) and the judiciary’s inherent authority. State v. C.W.N., 906 N.W.2d
549, 552 (Minn. App. 2018). It is undisputed that A.A.F. is not entitled to statuto ry
expungement, so this case concerns the limits of a court’s inherent authority. Whether the
district court exceeded the scope of its inherent authority to expunge criminal records is a
question of law, which we review de novo. State v. A.S.E., 835 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Minn.
App. 2013).

4
A court may use its inherent authority to expunge criminal records when (1) “the
petitioner’s constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by retention of [the] records”
or (2) “when expungement is necessary to the performance of judicial functions.” State v.
M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 280 -81 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted). DHS and MDH
argue that the district court exceeded its authority by expunging agency records of A.A.F.’s
conviction. We agree for two reasons.
First, no caselaw supports expunge ment of records held by the executive branch
under either basis for exercising inherent judicial authority. Our supreme court has “never
held that the judiciary’s inherent authority to order expungement extends to records held
in the executive branch, ” even in the extraordinary circumstance where the underlying
conviction was set aside. Id. at 281 (citing State v. C.A. , 304 N.W.2d 353, 361 (Minn.
1981)). And its reasoning in M.D.T. cautions against such an exercis e. There, the court
explained that the authority of the judicial branch to control its own records does not permit
it “to reach into the executive branch to control what the executive branch does with records
held in that branch, even when those records w ere created in the judiciary.” Id. at 282.
This restraint respects “the equally unique authority” of the other branches of government
and the need to accommodate “clear legislative expressions of policy” mandating that an
executive-branch agency use the records in question. Id. (quotation omitted). In short,
M.D.T. instructs that “[t]he judiciary’s inherent authority only allows a court to seal those
records kept by the judicial branch and does not extend to records held by executive-branch
agencies.” C.W.N., 906 N.W.2d at 552 (citing M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 282-83).

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Second, even if inherent judicial authority encompasses expungement of executive-
branch records, the district court had no basis to exercise such authority in this case. A.A.F.
contends that retention of her criminal records in the executive branch infringes on her
right to equal protection. An equal -protection violation occurs when the law treats an
individual differently from others who are “similarly situated in all relevant respects.”
State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2012). We discern no such disparate treatment
here.
A.A.F. pleaded guilty to and was convicted of promoting prostitution. Retention of
the records of that conviction in the executive agencies leaves A.A.F. in the same position
as all others who commit that crime or any of the other serious crimes enumerated in Minn.
Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 1(a) —permanently disqualified from direct -contact healthcare
work. The policy determination that those who commit such crimes are no longer suitable
for such work is the type of rational distinction that the constitution permits, see Johnson,
813 N.W.2d at 12, and consistent with the purpose of “ protect[ing] the children and
vulnerable adults who are served by [DHS] licensed facilities,” Murphy v. Comm’ r of
Human Servs. , 765 N.W.2d 100, 106 (Minn. App. 2009) . And it is a legislative
determination regarding the use of criminal records that inherent judicial authority must
accommodate. See M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 283 . Because permanently disqualifying
A.A.F. from direct -contact healthcare work treats her the same as similarly situated
individuals, t he district court erred by determining that expungement of her executive-
branch records is necessary to prevent infringement of her right to equal protection.

6
On appeal, A.A.F. urges two additional equal-protection arguments as alternative
bases for affirming the expungement order . First, A.A.F. argues that expungement is
necessary because she would have been entitled to statutory expungement had she received
a stay of adjudication rather than a stay of imposition of sentence. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(2). But A.A.F. is not similarly situated in all relevant respects to an
individual who received a stay of adjudication for the same offense. A stay of adjudication
permits a defendant to avoid a conviction upon successful completion of probation . Such
a stay is justified only in those “limited circumstances” where the prosecutor agrees to the
disposition or the district court determines it is necessary to remedy an abuse of
prosecutorial discretion. State v. Martin, 849 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 2014), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2014). The record does not indicate a basis for A.A.F. to have
received such an extraordinary disposition, and A.A.F. stands convicted of promoting
prostitution. Accordingly, this alternate equal-protection argument fails.
Second, A.A.F. asserts that she is being treated differently than similarly situated
individuals who se BCA records were expunged before DHS conducted a background
study, resulting in what she characterizes as an “arbitrary timing distinction.” This
argument is misplaced. A.A.F . presupposes that she has successfully petitioned for
expungement of BCA records now, after a DHS background study , simply because the
BCA did not join the other commissioners in this appeal. But all three executive-branch
expungements are based on the same reasoning and are equally valid or invalid, regardless
of the BCA’s decision not to challenge the expungement order. And, as a factual matter,
A.A.F. did not seek expungement of any records until DHS had disqualified her because

7
of them. Because there is no basis for expunging the BCA records without also expunging
those held by MDH and DHS, A.A.F.’s second equal-protection argument fails.
Finally, A.A.F. argues that expungement is necessary to the core judicial function
of controlling judicially cre ated records to prevent unfairness. See C.A., 304 N.W.2d at
358 (stating that part of a court’s function “is to control court records . . . to reduce or
eliminate unfairness”). She claim s unfairness in her disqualification from healthcare
employment based on criminal records that are no longer available to the public. See Minn.
Stat. § 13.87, subd. 1(b). But “helping individuals achieve employment goals” is not a core
judicial function. State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 277 -78 (Minn. 2008). And while the
legislature deems A.A.F.’s conviction to no longer be public data, the legislature also
permits executive agencies to maintain private data of convictions, Minn. Stat. § 13.87,
subd. 1(b), and requires them to check the criminal history of current and prospective
healthcare employees, Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.03, subd. 1(a)(3), .08, subd. 1 (2018), and
permanently disqualify from direct -contact healthcare work anyone with certain
convictions, Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 1(a).
In sum, we acknowledge A.A.F.’s diligent and successful rehabilitation efforts and
the impediment her 1994 conviction places on her career path. But the circumstances here
simply do not permit exercise of the judiciary’s inherent authority to expunge her criminal
records held in the executive branch.
Reversed.