State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0978

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Titus Triston Miguel Mangun,
Appellant.

Filed November 5, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-15-1423

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Kristen E. Swanson, A ssistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. E uteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Titus Triston Miguel Mangun challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion to correct sentence, arguing that the 2016 Drug Sentenci ng Reform Act (DSRA)

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required the court to reduce the mitigated sentence he had received under a pre-DSRA plea
agreement. Because the district court, applying the DSRA, had discretion not to disturb the
mitigated sentence that Mangun had specifically negotiated with the state, we affirm.
FACTS
In May 2015, Mangun was charged with one count each of first- and third-degree
controlled-substance crime. He re ached a plea agreement with th e state under which he
pleaded guilty to the amended charge of aiding and abetting fir st-degree controlled-
substance crime in exchange for dismissal of the third-degree controlled-substance crime.
The plea agreement noted that Mangun would “argue for a departure to 80 months.” Under
the sentencing guidelines in effe ct at the time, the presumptiv e sentencing range, given
Mangun’s criminal history score, was 104-146 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A
(2014).
Before sentencing, Mangun moved to withdraw his guilty plea, w hich the district
court denied. At sentencing, Mangun moved for a downward durati onal departure to 80
months according to the plea agreement and the state did not ob ject. The district court
granted the departure and sentenced Mangun to 80 months’ imprisonment on the basis that
the crime was less onerous than usual and his role in it was mi nor or passive. Mangun
appealed his conviction, and we affirmed. The supreme court denied further review.
While Mangun’s direct appeal was pending, the DSRA was passed. See 2016 Minn.
Laws ch. 160, at 576, 592. Section 18 of “the DSRA reduced the presumptive sentencing
ranges for first-degree controlled-substance crimes.” State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485, 488
(Minn. 2017). That section became effective on May 23, 2016, s ee 2016 Minn. Laws ch.

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160, § 18, at 591, and reduced the presumptive sentencing range for Mangun’s offense
from 104-146 months to 81-114 months, see id.; Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C (2016).
Mangun moved to correct his s entence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 2 7.03, subd. 9,
asking the district court to red uce his sentence from 80 months to 62 months. Mangun
argued that, because his 80-month sentence was a 23% departure from the bottom of the
pre-DSRA sentencing range, see Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2014), he was entitled to be
resentenced to a term (62 months) that would be a 23% departure from the bottom of the
DSRA-amended sentencing range, see M i n n . S e n t . G u i d e l i n e s 4 . C ( 2 0 1 6 ) . T h e d i s t r i c t
court denied the motion.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The state forfeited its procedural argument.

As a preliminary matter, the state argues that a motion to cor rect sentence was not
the proper procedural vehicle for Mangun’s challenge because Ma ngun’s motion
implicates his plea agreement. See State v. Coles , 862 N.W.2d 477, 477 (Minn. 2015)
(holding that, when a defendant’s “motion to correct his senten c e i m p l i c a t e s h i s p l e a
agreement, [the defendant’s] exclusive remedy is a petition for postconviction relief”). We
need not decide whether Mangun’s challenge implicates the plea agreement in this case.
Because the state failed to raise the issue in the district cou rt, it forfeited its procedural
challenge to Mangun’s motion. See Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996)
(“[Appellate courts] generally will not decide issues which wer e not raised before the
district court.”).

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mangun’s motion to
correct sentence.

Mangun argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to reduce the 80-
month sentence to 62 months, in proportion to the reduction in the sentencing range under
the DSRA. Appellate courts “afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of
sentences,” State v. Spain , 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. 1999), and review “the district
court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse o f discretion,” Townsend v.
State, 834 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 2013). “A court abuses its discretion when it reaches a
clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record.” State v. Vasquez,
912 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted).
A “court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 9. Because Mangun filed “a motion . . . to correct a sentence after the time
for direct appeal has passed,” he “bears the burden of proving that the sentence was not
authorized by law.” Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Minn. 2018).
There is no dispute that the DSRA applies to Mangun’s case. Al though the DSRA
amendments came into effect after Mangun committed his crime, t he supreme court in
Kirby held that the amelioration doctri ne requires application of the DSRA to pre-DSRA
crimes provided certain requirements are met. See Kirby, 899 N.W.2d at 490 (identifying
three-part test). Those requirements are met here. The district court held that the DSRA
applies to Mangun’s case, and the state does not challenge that ruling.
The question, however, is whether the district court—applying the DSRA—was
required to reduce Mangun’s sentence. Mangun makes two arguments.

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First, Mangun relies on the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines fo r a reduction in his
sentence proportional to the DSRA’s ameliorative effect. He points to different sections of
the sentencing guidelines to show how the guidelines, in genera l , a i m t o e n s u r e
proportionality. For instance, Man gun quotes Minn. Sent. Guidel ines 1.A. (2016), which
states that “[t]he purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is to . . . ensure that the sanctions
imposed for felony convictions are proportional to the severity of the conviction offense
and the offender’s criminal history.”
Mangun’s reliance on the guidel ines’ proportionality principle is misplaced. As the
district court explained, Mangun’s plea agreement noted specifi cally that he could argue
for a departure to 80 months—the 80-month sentence was not comp uted through a
proportional calculation in reference to the presumptive senten cing range. In addition,
Mangun’s sentence is a downward departure from both the pre-DSRA and DSRA-amended
sentencing ranges. Mangun cannot challenge his sentence based o n the general principle
of proportionality under the sentencing guidelines when his sen tence is, by definition, an
exception to the guidelines. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1.d. (2016).
Second, Mangun contends that our decision in State v. Provost mandates that his
sentence be reduced. 901 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. App. 2017). In Provost, the defendant moved
to correct his sentence on the ground that his sentence was based on an incorrect criminal
history score. Id. at 201. The district court deni ed the motion because Provost’s sentence
was still within the presumptive sentencing range when calculated with the correct criminal
history score. Id. Reviewing the district court’s decision, we held that “a sentence based on
an incorrect criminal history score is an unauthorized sentence subject to correction under

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Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, even if the sentence would still be within the presumptive
sentencing guidelines range when calculated with the correct criminal history score.” Id. at
202. We concluded that Provost had to be resentenced. Id.
We are not persuaded that Provost requires the outcome Mangun seeks. In Provost,
the district court dismissed the motion to correct sentence wit hout considering the merits.
Id. at 201. The court believed it “did not have authority to modif y [his] sentence.” Id. We
held that such a conclusion was an abuse of discretion because the Minnesota Supreme
Court had held that a sentence based on an incorrect criminal history score is not authorized
by law. Id. at 202 (citing State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007)).
Unlike in Provost, here, the district court actua lly considered Mangun’s argumen t
for a reduced sentence based on a lower range. The district court denied Mangun’s motion,
not because it believed it could not alter his sentence, but because it chose not to do so. The
court chose not to reduce Mangun’s sentence to 62 months because the 80-month sentence
was specifically agreed to by the parties and is still a downward departure from the DSRA-
amended range of 81-114 months.
Mangun points out that, in Provost, we recognized that “when a guidelines range
moves up or down, offenders’ sentences tend to move with it.” Id. at 202 (quoting Molina-
Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016)). He argues that, consistent wit h
that principle, his sentence must be reduced because the sentencing range went down. But
in Provost we did not direct that the defendant’s sentence be reduced. On the contrary, we
recognized that, based on the district court’s broad discretion in sentencing, “not every
defendant who receives a sentence at the top or bottom end of the presumptive range when

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sentenced with an incorrect criminal history score need necessa rily receive a similarly
situated sentence within the presumptive range when resentenced with a correct criminal
history score.” Id.
The district court here acknowl edged that the DSRA applies to Mangun,
reconsidered Mangun’s sentence in light of the DSRA, and reached the conclusion that the
80-month sentence should not be disturbed. We do not discern in the district court’s
decision a “clearly erroneous conc lusion that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d at 648. The distric t court did not abuse its discr etion in denying
Mangun’s motion to correct sentence.
Affirmed.