A18-1024

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1012
A18-1024

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
D. H. and W. H., Sr., Parents (A18-1012)
and
In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
D. H., Mother (A18-1024)

Filed December 17, 2018
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-JV-17-2588 and 62-JV-17-2520

Patrick D. McGee, Forest Lake, Minnesota (for appellant D.H.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kayla M. Rodriguez, Alexa ndra Holznecht,
Assistant Ramsey County Attorneys, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County
Social Services Department)

Lu Nhia Yang, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent father D.F.)

Ariana Guerra, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chi ef Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant-mother challenges the termination of her
parental rights to Child Three and the transfer of legal and ph ysical custody of Child One

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and Child Two from mother to their father. On appeal, she argu es that: (1) respondent
Ramsey County Social Services D epartment failed to make reasona ble reunification
efforts; (2) termination is not in the best interests of Child Three; and (3) transfer of legal
and physical custody is not in the best interests of Child One and Child Two. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother D.H. has five children, three of whom are the subjects of this
consolidated action: Child One, born in 2011; Child Two, born in 2013; and Child Three,
born in 2016. Mother’s husband, W.H. Sr., is the presumed father of Child Three, and D.F.
is the adjudicated father of Child One and Child Two.
Respondent Ramsey County Social Se rvices Department (RCSSD) bec ame
involved with the family in September 2016, after Child Three’s meconium tested positive
for cocaine and buprenorphine at birth. Less than one month la ter, RCSSD filed a child-
in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition for Child One, Child Two, Child Three,
and mother’s older son. 1 In February 2017, mother ad mitted to an amended CHIPS
petition, and the children were adjudicated in need of protection or services.
RCSSD implemented an out-of-home placement plan that identified tasks mother
needed to complete in order for the children to return to her care. The district court found
that mother agreed to “follow recommendations of Rule 25 examinations and demonstrate
sobriety, submit random UAs, address individual mental health n eeds, attend regular

1 At the time of trial, the permanency plan for mother’s older son was for him to remain in
foster care and enter extended foster care upon his eighteenth birthday. He is not subject
to this appeal.

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visitations with the children, find safe and stable housing fre e of domestic violence and
police involvement, attend chemical-dependency support groups a nd provide
documentation of attendance.” RCSSD social workers testified t hat the most important
aspects of mother’s case plan were chemical-dependency treatment and housing.
Before Child Three was born, mother completed a Rule 25 chemica l-health
assessment with Mothers First, a Ramsey County program that hel ps mothers with
chemical dependency issues. Mothers First diagnosed mother with opioid use disorder and
recommended that she complete high-intensity outpatient treatme nt. In September 2016,
January 2017, and October 2017, mother completed updated Rule 2 5 assessments and
received recommendations for sim ilar outpatient treatment progr ams and medication-
assisted therapy (MAT) to assist with opioid cravings. Mother participated in an MAT
program and attended six weeks of outpatient treatment in 2016, but never completed a
recommended outpatient treatment program.
At the start of the CHIPS case, mother was living with W.H. Sr. in St. Paul. In
December 2016, police were called to mother’s home on a report that mother stabbed W.H.
Sr. By March 2017, mother and W. H. Sr. were asked to leave the ir house in St. Paul
because of police contacts and domestic violence. Mother and W .H. Sr. subsequently
moved to Glencoe, and RCSSD pr ovided them with their first mont h of rent and security
deposit. Mother and W.H. Sr. lived in Glencoe until July 2017 when their landlord asked
them to leave due to repeated police contacts and domestic violence.
Mother and W.H. Sr. moved back t o the Twin Cities and entered P eople Serving
People, an emergency shelter in Minneapolis. They lived at the shelter for approximately

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one month. While there, mother and W.H. Sr. violated the shelt er’s drug policy. After
leaving the shelter, mother was homeless and using drugs. Moth er entered a sober living
facility in October 2017, but only lived at the facility for a few weeks before continuing to
be homeless and using drugs “off and on.”
On October 30, 2017, RCSSD filed a petition to transfer permane nt sole legal and
physical custody of Child One and Child Two from mother to D.F. pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.515, subd. 4 (2018). On November 9, 2017, RCSSD also fi led a petition to
terminate mother’s parental rights to Child Three. RCSSD alleged three statutory grounds
for termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4 ), (5) (2018). The district
court consolidated both of mother’s cases for trial.
RCSSD did not know mother’s whereabouts until December 2017 when mother and
W.H. Sr. moved into Catholic Charities Higher Ground Shelter (H igher Ground) in
St. Paul. The next month, mother was charged with first-degree aggravated robbery and
was incarcerated for approximately one month. After she was re leased and returned to
Higher Ground, police responded to the shelter on a report of domestic assault and arrested
W.H. Sr. for assaulting mother. Mother and W.H. Sr. were asked to leave Higher Ground,
and mother stayed with friends or family members. In March 201 8, mother was again
incarcerated for a conditional-release violation. Upon her rel ease nearly one month later,
she was admitted to an outpatient treatment program. When mother entered the program,
she tested positive for cocaine.
Following a two-day court trial in May 2018, the district court terminated mother’s
parental rights to Child Three and transferred permanent sole legal and physical custody of

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C h i l d O n e a n d C h i l d T w o t o D . F . The district court considered the testimony and
recommendations of RCSSD, the guardian ad litem, mother’s servi ce providers, and
mother. The district court found that RCSSD proved by clear an d convincing evidence
each of the statutory bases for termination and that terminatio n is in Child Three’s best
interests. Additionally, the district court determined that it is in the best interests of Child
One and Child Two to transfer permanent custody from mother to D.F. The district court
further found that RCSSD made re asonable efforts to reunite the family, but that these
efforts were “ultimately unsuccessful.”
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, mother does not challenge the statutory grounds for termination of her
parental rights to Child Three. Instead, mother argues that RC SSD failed to make
reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Mother further asser ts that termination of her
parental rights is not in the best interests of Child Three and transfer of custody is not in
the best interests of Child One and Child Two.
I. The record supports the distri ct court’s determination that the county
made reasonable reunification efforts.

The district court is vested with broad discretion in deciding child protection cases.
In re Booth, 91 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. 1958 ). A district court may termin ate parental
rights if clear and convincing evidence establishes that: (1) at least one statutory basis
supports termination; (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, unless
reasonable efforts were not required; and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests. In
re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008); Minn. Stat. § 260.012

6
(2018) (providing exceptions to the requirement that a county m ake reasonable
reunification efforts in a termination proceeding). We review a district court’s factual
findings for clear error and will not disturb a finding that th e county made reasonable
efforts if it is supported by substantial evidence. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d 895, 901, 904 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).
Once a child alleged to be CHIPS is under court jurisdiction, g enerally, the county
must make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a). In
a termination proceeding, if reunification efforts are required, the district court “shall make
findings and conclusions as to the provision of reasonable effo rts.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h). Specifically, the district court must consider w hether a county’s
reunification efforts were “(1) relevant to the safety and prot ection of the child;
( 2 ) a d e q u a t e t o m e e t t h e n e e d s of the child and family; (3) cul turally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6 ) realistic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)(1 )-(6). Additionally , the district court must
make specific findings “that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify
the child and the parent were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding
the nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2 018). Finally, the district
court must consider “the length of the time the county was invo lved and the quality of
effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K. , 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review
denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).

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Here, the district court found th at RCSSD provided services and made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family, but the services and reunificati on efforts were “ultimately
unsuccessful.” The district court outlined the services offere d to mother, including Rule
25 chemical-dependency assessmen ts, outpatient chemical-depende ncy treatment
programming, random UAs, housing programming with the Wilder Am herst Foundation,
Mothers First programming, marriage counseling, Narcotics Anony mous and Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, and Project Harmony programming while in Glencoe. The district
court also found that RCSSD provided the family with financial assistance in the form of
bus cards, gas cards, housing re nt, and damage deposits. Addit ionally, the district court
noted that mother “is resourceful and has engaged in services of her own initiative.” The
district court found that the s ervices were “reasonable, approp riate, and relevant to the
safety and protection of the children, adequate to meet the needs of the children and family,
and realistic under the circumstances.”
Mother argues that RCSSD was required to offer additional services, other than drug
testing and transportation costs, to address her chemical-dependency issues. Mother cites
In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2008) in support of her
argument. In T.R., the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the termination of a
noncustodial parent’s rights. Id. at 658. On appeal, the noncustodial parent argued that
“merely testing a parent for che mical use” is not a reasonable effort. Id. at 664-65. In
response, the county asserted that because the noncustodial par ent never demonstrated
sobriety, he could not progress with the remainder of his case plan. Id. at 665. In
determining that the county failed to make reasonable efforts t o reunite the child and the

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noncustodial parent, the court c onsidered the disparity in serv ices offered to the
noncustodial parent in comparis on to the services offered to th e custodial parent. Id. at
666. The court concluded that “[e ]ven in the absence of the co mparison to the services
provided to [the custodial parent], the services provided to the [noncustodial parent] were
not reasonable because no services were offered to address [his ] lack of verbal skills and
acknowledged difficulty in understanding the proceedings.” Id.
In this case, RCSSD targeted their reunification efforts towards mother’s chemical-
dependency issues given her long history of drug addiction. Un like the county in T.R.,
RCSSD provided more than simply drug tests and transportation costs to assist mother in
meeting her chemical-dependency goals. Mother’s Rule 25 assess ments resulted in
recommendations and referrals for MAT and outpatient treatment programs. Despite these
recommendations, mother never completed an outpatient treatment p r o g r a m . R C S S D
supported mother’s continued work with Mothers First, a Ramsey County organization,
throughout her involvement with c hild protection. RCSSD also c ontinued to arrange
chemical-dependency services through Project Harmony following m o t h e r ’ s m o v e t o
Glencoe, but mother failed to mai ntain her sobriety. RCSSD bel ieved that mother first
needed to address her chemical-d ependency issues before she wou l d ha ve been able to
progress on other aspects of her case plan. The district court found that this “approach to
prioritizing services was reasonable.”
Mother also argues that RCSSD offered no services to address he r mental-health,
domestic-violence, or housing issues. In regard to mental health, mother’s November 2017
case plan required her to complete a mental-health assessment and to continue to work with

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her psychiatrist and take her prescribed medications. Mother had been seeing a psychiatrist
before her involvement with child protection and testified that s h e c o n t i n u e d t o s e e a
therapist and take her medication “off and on” throughout the c ase. To address domestic
violence issues, RCSSD required that mother attend marriage counseling with a minister,
and although mother began counseling, she did not complete it. RCSSD also assisted
mother with housing by providing rent and damage deposits and working alongside mother
and the Amherst Wilder Founda tion to locate housing. But the p eriods of time when
mother was able to secure housing were interrupted by incidents arising from drug use,
domestic violence, and police contacts that resulted in an overall pattern of homelessness.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record, and the district court did not err
in determining that the county made reasonable reunification efforts.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determin ing that
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of Child Three.

“The paramount consideration in a ll juvenile protection proceed ings is the health,
safety, and best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.0 01, subd. 2(a) (2018). “In
analyzing the best interests of the child, the court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the p arent’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest o f the child.” In re Welfare
of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd.
3(b)(3). The district court “must consider a child’s best inte rests and explain its rationale
in its findings and conclusions.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003).
“[C]onflicts between the rights of the child and rights of the parents are resolved in favor

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of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
The “determination of a child’s b est interests ‘is generally no t susceptible to an appellate
court’s global review of a record,’ and . . . ‘an appellate court’s combing through the record
to determine best interests is inappropriate because it involves credibility determinations.’”
In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting In re
Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d at 625). This court applies an abuse-of-discretio n standard to a
district court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests.
In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008).
Mother argues that the three best-interests factors do not weig h in favor of
termination. Mother asserts th at the first factor, Child Three ’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship, weighs in her favor because Child Th ree recognizes her when
she visits, and RCSSD and the guardian ad litem encouraged an ongoing relationship with
mother. Next, mother contends that the second factor, her interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship, does not weigh in favor of termination. Sh e states that she “has gone
far beyond the typical child protection mother in terms of following a case plan,” but also
admits that she “has a substance abuse problem that can get in the way of parenting
children.” Finally, mother argues that the third factor, any competing interest of the child,
weighs in her favor because she has consistently wanted the chi ldren returned to her care
and custody.
The district court found that Child Three has been out of mother’s care for most of
his life and has bonded to his relative foster parent. The district court also found that Child
Three’s foster parent provides him with security and stability. While Child Three has been

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developing normally, he is slow to speak. Because of this, the district court found that he
needs a parent who will be able to ensure that he attends thera py. The district court
considered the testimony of the guardian ad litem, who testified that mother has no insight
into her child’s needs, and is not able to put the child’s needs before her own. The district
court found that Child Three is “ overdue for permanency” and it is contrary to his best
interests “to give [mother] additional time to participate in services, work her case plan, or
attempt to make the changes necessary to correct her parenting deficiencies.” The district
court’s findings and conclusions are supported by clear and con vincing evidence in the
observations and recommendations contained in the record. The district court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that termination is in Child Three’s best interests.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determi ning that
transfer of legal and physical custody is in the best interests of Child One
and Child Two.

On appeal from a permanent-placement order transferring legal c ustody, this court
applies a two-part standard of review. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d
315, 321-22 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied ( M i n n . J u l y 2 1 , 2 0 1 5 ) . F i r s t , f a c t u a l
findings are reviewed to determine whether they address the sta tutory criteria and are
supported by “substantial evidence,” or whether they are clearly erroneous. In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A finding is clearly erroneous only if there
is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an appellate court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred. D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 322
(quotations omitted). Second, the ultimate decision that there is a statutory basis for a
permanency disposition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 321. “A district court

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abuses its discretion if it improperly applies the law.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814
N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012).
The district court “may order permanent legal and physical cust ody to a fit and
willing relative in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4 (2018).
A n o r d e r p e r m a n e n t l y t r a n s f e r r i n g l e g a l a n d p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d m u s t a d d r e s s :
(1) how the child’s best interest s are served by the order; (2) the nature and extent of the
responsible social services agency’s reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent;
(3) the parent’s efforts and ability to use services to correct the conditions which led to the
out-of-home placement; and (4) the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement have
not been corrected to permit the child to safely return home. Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)
(2018). Each of these four statutory findings must be proved b y clear and convincing
evidence. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.04, subd. 1.
Mother challenges the first of these four requirements—assertin g that it is in the
best interests of Child One and Child Two to remain in her care and custody. In the case
of a permanency disposition, “the court must be governed by the best interests of the child,
including a review of the relati onship between the child and re latives and the child and
other important persons with whom the child has resided or had significant contact.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.511(b) (2018).
In this case, the district court reviewed the relationships bet ween the children,
mother, and D.F. The district c ourt found that it is in the be st interests of the children to
have ongoing contact with mother, at the discretion of D.F., and that D.F. will continue to
facilitate contact between the c hildren and mother. Although o ne of mother’s service

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providers testified that mother is a dedicated parent, the district court “gave her testimony
little weight” due to her limited observations and knowledge re garding mother’s
involvement with child protection. The district court found that transfer of custody of Child
One and Child Two is in their bes t interests because D.F. “has demonstrated that he can
meet [their] basic needs, he offe rs consistency and structure n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e i r
development, and their behavior has improved in [D.F.]’s care.” In addition, the district
court found that Child One and Child Two would maintain a familial bond with their half-
sibling also living in D.F.’s home. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the transfer of legal and physical custody is in the best interests of Child
One and Child Two.
Affirmed.