State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1019

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jared Phillip Renner,
Appellant.

Filed April 22, 2019
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-16-1751

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, First Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appell ate Public Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of threats of violence and third-degree criminal
sexual conduct, arguing that they are not supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant also

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argues that the district court erred in sentencing him for third-degree criminal sexual
conduct and fel ony pattern -of-stalking conduct because the court sentenced him in the
wrong chronological order and his convictions arose out of the same behavioral incident.
We affirm.
FACTS
D.J., appellant Jared Renner’s wife, told police that Renner threw her onto a car,
choked her, beat her, threatened to kill her, and took her keys and cellphone from her; that
the next day, Renner again threatened to kill her, bit her neck, choked her, “threw her
around for hours,” told her to have sex with him or “he would stick it in her ass,” then had
sex with her multiple times between fits of more violence , and again took her keys and
cellphone from her. D.J. reported that t he next day Renner prevented her from going to
work and, using her cellphone, sent a text message to her co-workers, saying that she was
“sick of that place.” The following day, when Renner and D.J. went to a bar, D.J. revealed
her injuries to a friend . When Renner tried to leave the bar with D.J., she refused. After
causing “a scene,” Renner left without D.J., and law enforcement later arrested him.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Renner with two counts of domestic
assault-strangulation, one count of threats of violence, one count of third -degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC), one count of felony patter n-of-stalking conduct, and one count of
interfering with an emergency call. Following multiple pretrial hearings and the state’s
receipt of multiple letters from D.J., saying that she wished to recant her statements, the
district court granted the state’s request for a material-witness warrant for D.J. and law
enforcement arrested her.

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At a bench trial, t he district court heard testimony from D.J.; Investigating Officer
Heath Hanson; D.M., a manager of the bar visited by Renner and D.J.; K.B., a waitress at
the bar; M.A., a bar patron; R.O., D.J.’s ex-boyfriend; and T.C., K.K., and S.R., friends of
D.J.’s. Renner did not testify and presented no evidence. The court found Renner guilty of
two counts of domestic assault -strangulation, one co unt of threats of violence, one count
of third -degree CSC, and one count of felony pattern -of-stalking conduct . Before
sentencing, the state made a global settlement offer to Renner that he be sentenced to a
presumptive sentence of 23 months for felony pattern-of-stalking conduct and 90 months
concurrent for third-degree CSC, and that he plead guilty to a pending charge of burglary
and be sentenced to 90 months concurrent in exchange for the dismissal of all other pending
charges. Renner accepted the state’s offer.
Renner entered a Norgaard plea to the burglary charge, and his attorney asked the
district court multiple times to follow the plea agreement. 1 The court entered convictions
on two counts of domestic assault-strangulation, one count of threats of violence, one count
of third-degree CSC, and one count of felony pattern-of-stalking conduct. Consistent with
the terms of the plea agreement, t he court sentenced Renner first to 23 months ’
imprisonment for felony pattern-of-stalking conduct and then to a concurrent sentence of
90 months’ imprisonment for third-degree CSC.

1 A Norgaard plea refers to a plea where the defendant enters a plea but “claims a loss of
memory, through amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances of the offense but
the record establishes that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crim e
charged.” State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).

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This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Sufficiency of evidence
Renner argues that his convictions of third-degree CSC and terroristic threats are
not supported by sufficient evidence . An appellate court examining a sufficiency -of-the-
evidence challenge determines whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict, was sufficient to allow the factfinder to reach a guilty verdict. Loving v. State,
891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). The district court here based its verdicts on the direct
evidence of D.J.’s testimony. See State v. Hokanson , 821 N.W.2d 340, 353 n.1 (Minn.
2012) (stating that a “witness’s testimony is direct evidence when it is based on the
witness’s own knowledge of the facts”). Direct evidence is “sufficient to sustain a criminal
conviction,” if “when so viewed, [it] would permit the [factfinder] to reasonably conclude
that the State has proven the fact in que stion beyond a reasonable doubt .” Id. at 353. An
appellate court assumes that “the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with
th[e] verdict.” State v. Peterson, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
A. Third-degree CSC conviction
To convict Renner of third -degree CSC, the state had to prove that he engaged in
sexual penetration with D.J. and that he used “force or coercion to accomplish the
penetration.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2016) (listing elements of offense).
“Force” means
the infliction, attempted infliction , or threatened infliction by
the actor of bodily harm or commission or threat of any other
crime by the actor committed against the complainant or

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another, which (a) causes the complainant to reasonably
believe that the actor has the present ability to ex ecute the
threat and (b) if the actor does not have a significant
relationship to the complainant, also causes the complainant to
submit.

Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3 (2016). And “coercion” means
the use by the actor of words or circumstances that caus e the
complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will inflict bodily
harm upon the complainant or another, or the use by the actor
of confinement, or superior size or strength, against the
complainant that cause the complainant to submit to sexual
penetration or contact against the complainant’s will. Proof of
coercion does not require proof of a specific act of threat.

Id., subd. 14 (2016).
The district court concluded that the state proved “that [Renner] sexually penetrated
[D.J.’s] vagina with his penis, and that [D.J.] did not consent to the act and made it clear to
[Renner] that she did not want to have sex.” The record supports this conclusion. D.J.
testified that, on September 16, Renner “all of a sudden got angry” and ”started getting
violent and throwing me around and choking me, ” and then he “bit” her “[o]n the neck”;
that Renner had taken her phone away and continued to strangle her ; that Renner told her
“[y]ou’re going to get it” ; that if she would not let him have sex with her, he would
“penetrate [her] anally”; that Renner “forced himself ” on her, and “had sex” with her by
putting “it inside [her] vagina” ; that this occurred without her consent; and that she was
afraid and “crying” and pleading with him, “[p]lease don’t.” This testimony supports the
court’s conclusion that Renner threatened to penetrate D.J. anally and threatened to kill
her.

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Renner challenges the reliability of D.J.’s testimony, based on her prior recantations
and her inconsistent timeline of events, arguing that the evidence was “unclear what exactly
happened those nights.” But the district court found D.J.’s testimony credible, and we will
not reweigh this determination. See State v. Fleck , 777 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010)
(stating that the factfinder “is in the best position to weigh credibility and thus determines
which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their testimony”). Renner cites to
no authority for the proposition that the court erred by finding D.J. credible despite her
recantations, and he admits in his brief that D.J. testified that she “was manipulated” into
recanting her testimony because he “asked her to do so.”
Renner also argues that the state failed to provide corroborating evidence of the
offense. But in a prosecution for third-degree CSC, “the testimony of a victim need not be
corroborated.” Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2016); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd.
4(c) (2016) (“Corroboration of the victim’s testimony is not required to show lack of
consent.”). Moreover, Renner’s argument ignores the corroborating evidence in the record,
including the testimony of a witness who took Renner’s phonecall prior to his arrest, during
which he told her that he had “put his hands on [D.J. ] and tried to strangle her,” “had hurt
[D.J.] in the past few days,” an d had “forced her to have sex .” And Renner’s recorded
statement reveals his admission to choking D.J. When viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to allow the district court to reach a guilty verdict.
We therefore affirm Renner’s third-degree CSC conviction.

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B. Threats-of-violence conviction
To convict Renner of threats of violence, the state had to prove that he “threaten[ed],
directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016) (listing elements of offense). “Crime of violence”
includes murder and CSC. Id. (defining “crime of violence” as “violent crimes ”); Minn.
Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d) (2016) (listing murder and CSC as “violent crime”). Here, D.J.
testified that Renner threatened to “kill her” and to anally penetrate her multiple times, and
that she “gave in” to Renner’s demands because she was scare d. Multiples witnesses
testified that D.J. told them about her injuries and that she was scared to go home to Renner.
Renner argues that the district court made improper credibility determinations
regarding the testifying witnesses. We will not reweigh the court’s credibility
determinations. Fleck, 777 N.W.2d at 236. When viewed in the light most favorable to the
factfinder, the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s finding of guilt as to the threats-
of-violence offense. We therefore affirm Renner’s threats-of-violence conviction.
I. Order of sentencing
Renner challenges the order in which the district court sentenced him for his
convictions of felony pattern -of-stalking conduct and third-degree CSC, arguing that we
should vacate his sentences and remand for resentencing. We disagree.
As an initial matter, the parties dispute the standard of review for this issue. Renner
argues that this issue requires an interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, which this
court reviews de novo . See State v. Williams , 771 N.W.2d 514, 5 20 (Minn. 2009)
(interpreting sentencing guidelines de novo). The state argues that this issue involves a

8
review of the district court’s calculation of a criminal-history score, which we review for
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307–08 (Minn. 2014) (analyzing
calculation of criminal-history score for an abuse of discretion). Because we conclude that
the district court did not err in the order in which it sentenced Renner, and we therefore
need not interpret the sentencing guidelines, we review Renner’s sentence for an abuse of
discretion. See id. (stating that district courts have “great discretion in the imposition of
sentences” and that appellate courts reverse a sentence “only for an ab use of that
discretion”).
Minnesota courts “follow the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines unless the
applicable provision is contrary to statute.” State v. Jones , 848 N.W.2d 528, 537 (Minn.
2014). The sentencing guidelines require the imposition of sentences in the order in which
they occurred. Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.B.107 (2016). “[F]or prior convictions to be
used in computing the criminal history score, the felony sentence for the prior offense must
have been stayed or imposed before sentencing for the current offense.” Id.
Here, the district court first sentenced Renner to 23 months’ imprisonment for
felony pattern-of-stalking conduct, and then sentenced him to 90 months ’ imprisonment
for third -degree CSC . See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B (listing 76-month sentence with
range of 65-91 months as presumptive sentence with two criminal-history points).2

2 Prior to sentencing, Renner had one criminal-history point; he received another criminal-
history point upon pronouncement of th e district court’s sentence for felony pattern -of-
stalking conduct. See Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 521 (“Under the Hernandez method, when
a defendant is sentenced for multiple offenses on the same day, a conviction for which the
defendant is first sentenced is added to his or criminal-history score for another offense for
which he or she is also sentenced.”).

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Renner argues that the district court erred by sentencing him first for felony pattern-
of-stalking conduct and then for third -degree CSC. He argues that the court s hould have
sentenced him first to a 62 -month sentence for third -degree CSC, see Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.B (listing 62 -month sentence with range of 53 -74 months as presumptive
sentence for third -degree CSC with one criminal -history point), and then to a stayed 28-
month sentence for felony pattern -of-stalking conduct, see Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A
(listing 28-month stayed sentence as presumptive sentence for felony pa ttern-of-stalking
conduct with two criminal-history points). We conclude that the court correctly sentenced
Renner in the order in which he committed the crimes.
In determining the order in which offenses occurred, this court looks to the elements
of the offenses. State v. Patterson , 796 N.W.2d 516, 532 (Min n. App. 2011), aff’d, 812
N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 2012). A conviction of felony pattern-of-stalking conduct requires that
(1) an actor engages in “a pattern of stal king conduct,” (2) where the actor “knows or has
reason to know would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel terrorized or to fear
bodily harm,” and (3) “cause[s] this reaction.” Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a) (2016). A
“pattern of stalking conduct” includes “two or more acts within a five -year period” of
threats of violence, domestic assault, or third-degree CSC. Id., subd . 5(b)(3), ( 5), (15)
(2016).
Here, when Renner committed third -degree CSC, he already had committed two
prior domestic-assault crimes to satisfy the requirement of “two or more” qualif ying acts
for the commission of felony pattern -of-stalking. Renner’s felony pattern -of-stalking
conduct was not dependent on his commission of the third-degree CSC crime. The district

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court therefore did not err in sentencing Renner first for felony pattern-of-stalking conduct
and then to third -degree CSC. And regardless, no manifest injustice occurs when a plea
agreement includes nonchronological sentencing. Carey v. State , 765 N.W.2d 396, 401
(Minn. App. 2009) (concluding no manifest injustice where plea included
nonchronological sentencing).
II. Multiple convictions from the same behavioral incident
Renner argues that the district court erred in sentencing him for both felony pattern-
of-stalking conduct and third-degree CSC because the offenses arose out of t he same
behavioral incident. The state argues that Renner forfeited this argument because he failed
to raise this issue below. But as the state acknowledges, “the Minnesota Supreme Court
has held that this issue generally is not waived or forfeited by fail ing to raise it before the
district court.” See State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 441 n.3 (Minn. 2006) (stating that
“the statutory protection against multiple sentencing” under section 609.035 “is not
forfeited by failing to raise the issue in the district court”). And we are “bound by supreme
court precedent.” State v. Curtis , 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018). We therefore
conclude that Renner did not forfeit this issue.
“[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this
state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal
of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.” Minn. Stat. § 609.035,
subd. 1 (2016). “Whether a defendant’s offenses occurred as part of a single course of
conduct is a mixed question of law and fact.” Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 533. We review a

11
district court’s factual findings for clear error and whether offenses occurred as part of a
single course of conduct de novo. Id.
Minnesota law contains exceptions to the bar of multiple sentences for offenses
occurring during the same course of conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2016)
(establishing exceptions to bar for multiple punishments). One such offense that does not
preclude “conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as
part of the same conduct” is third -degree CSC. Id., subd. 6. To meet this exception, the
CSC offense must be committed “with force or violence.” Id. In other words, the “plain
language of Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 6, allows for the conviction of and sentence for
‘any other crime,’ including a crim e committed during the same behavioral incident as a
[CSC] offense involving force or violence.” State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 810 (Minn.
App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). Here, the district court concluded that
Renner “used force or coe rcion to have sex with [D.J.] by threatening to penetrate her
anally or to kill her if she did not submit to sex.” Renner argues that this exception does
not apply because the court did not specifically find that he committed third-degree CSC
with force, and that his conduct falls only under the definition of “coercion.” We disagree.
“The plain language of the elements of the offense indicates that third-degree [CSC]
can be committed by coercion alone, force alone, or both force and coercion.” State v.
Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 323–24 (Minn. 2005). To determine whether the exception to the
bar for multiple punishments for offenses arising from the same behavioral incident
applies, we must determine if the record evidence shows that Renner committed third -
degree CSC with force or violence and not with coercion alone. See id. at 321 (stating that

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to determine if third-degree CSC fulfilled the requirement of using “force or violence,” the
court must determine if the offense was “committed with force or violence —and not
coercion alone”).
In Leake, using the definition of “force” under Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3, the
supreme court concluded that the defendant committed third-degree CSC with force when
he admitted to “physically pu ll[ing] [the victim] back and forc [ing] her to have sex” with
him. Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 324–25 (emphasis omitted). Conducting an analysis similar to
the analysis used by the supreme court in Leake, we conclude that Renner committed third-
degree CSC with force because the district court’s findings meet the definition of “force.”
The court found that Renner threatened to “penetrate [D.J.] anally,” and that “he would kill
her” if she did not have sex with him. Following these threats, D.J. “was scared and gave
in to [Renner]’s demand for sex.” D.J.’s testimony supports these findings. Renner’s threats
to anally penetrate and kill D.J. amount to a “threatened infliction by [Renner]” that caused
D.J. to “reasonably believe” that Renner had “the present ability to execute the threat,” and
“to submit” to Renner’s demand, which fall squarely within the definition of “force.” See
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3 (defining “force” in part as “threat of any other crime by the
actor against the complainant,” that “causes the complainant to reasonably believe that the
actor has the present ability to execute the threat”).
We conclude that the district court did not err in sentencing Renner for both felony
pattern-of-stalking conduct and third-degree CSC. Even if the offenses arose from a single
behavioral incident, the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 6, allowed for the
conviction of, and sentence for, both crimes. See Patzold, 917 N.W.2d at 810 (stating that

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Minn. Stat § 6 09.035, subd. 6 “allows for the conviction of and sentence for ‘any other
crime,’ including a crime committed during the same behavioral incident as a criminal -
sexual-conduct offense involving force of violence” (footnote omitted)).
Affirmed.