State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1020

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Darrell Reynolds,
Appellant.

Filed May 6, 2019
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-4308

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael B. Padden, Padden Law Firm P.L.L.C., Lake Elmo, Minnesota; and

Karlowba R. Adams Powell, Powell Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that the district
court erred by (1) submit ting the charge to the jury under an aiding-and-abetting theory ,
(2) denying his request to offer alternative-perpetrator-defense evidence, (3) admitting
Spreigl evidence, and (4) permitting the jury to use a magnifying glass. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 10, 2017, C.R. went to a bar with friends and his fiancée, S.M. Near closing
time, C.R. exited the bar. Around the same time, appellant Justin Darrell Reynolds and
Charles Frye walked up to the bar. As several people stood outside of the bar, fights broke
out and a gun was fired. C.R. was shot and pronounced dead at the scene.
The shooting was captured on surveillance video, al though the picture is not clear
and activity surrounding the shooting is partially obstructed by an awning. Before C.R.
was shot, he was interacting with Reynolds and Frye. Reynolds is taller than Frye and had
longer dreadlocks. Following the shooting, Reynolds immediately fled, and Frye followed.
Reynolds and Frye were each charged with aiding and abetting second-degree intentional
murder.
Police interviewed S.M. hours after the shooting, and she reported that she did not
see anything. However, during a follow-up interview months later, S.M. stated that “the
bigger guy with the longer dreads had the gun.” The charge against Frye was dismissed.
Reynolds filed notice of an alternative-perpetrator defense, claiming that Frye was the
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shooter. Reynolds stipulated, however, that he would not seek to admit evidence of “bad
blood” or prior incidents between C.R. and Frye.
Before trial, the state moved to admit Spreigl evidence. The state asserted that
Reynolds’s ex-girlfriend, T.B., would testify that days before the shooting, Reynolds
arrived at her apartment with two other men and pointed a gun at her fiancé. The district
court ruled that the evidence was admissible.
At Reynolds’s jury trial, S.M. testified that she did not immediately report to police
that she saw Reynolds with the gun because she “was in shock” after the shooting. S.M.
testified that the “bigger guy” “had the gun and put it in his pants.” S.M. testified that she
was sure that she did not see Frye with the gun and that she was sure that she saw Reynolds
with the gun.
Sergeant Shanley testified that he has conducted hundreds of interviews and does
not always get all of the information immediately because witnesses have experienced a
traumatic event and do not remember everyth ing. He stated that it is “very common” to
receive additional information during follow-up interviews.
The surveillance video and photographs pulled from the video were admitted into
evidence. The state asserted that one photograph shows Reynolds lean forward, extend his
arm toward C.R. and over Frye, who was leaning down on the hood of a vehicle, and fire
the gun. The state asserted that a bright white spot on the photograph is the muzzle flash.
The state claimed that subsequent photographs in the series show C.R. fall, Reynolds move
back, and Frye stand up and turn around holding nothing in his hand.
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After the state rested, Reynolds moved to dismiss charges pertaining to aiding and
abetting. The district court denied Reynolds’s motion.
During deliberations, the jury requested a magnifying glass. Reynol ds’s attorney
objected, arguing that it would be unfair because the state had the opportunity to enhance
the images on the video, but declined to do so. The district court allowed the jury to have
a magnifying glass.
The jury found Reynolds guilty of aiding and abetting second- degree intentional
murder, and the district court sentenced him to 386 months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Aiding-and-abetting instruction
Reynolds argues that aiding and abetting “should not have been part of this case”
because it is not supported with evidence. He claims that a district court is permitted to
give an aiding-and-abetting instruction only when “substantial rights are not prejudiced,”
which is not the case here. A district court has “considerable latitude” in selecting the
language for jury instructions. State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 147 (Minn. 2011). Jury
instructions must fairly and adequatel y describe the law of the case. State v. Flores, 41 8
N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. 1988). If no abuse of discretion is shown, there is no reversible
error. State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 2001).
Reynolds relies on State v. Milton to support his argument, but in that case the
district court failed to properly instruct the jury on the element of “intentionally aiding.”
821 N.W.2d 789, 806 (Minn. 2012). And even then, the supreme court decided that the
appellant was not entitled to a new trial. Id. at 810.
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Here, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of second-degree murder:
(1) Reynolds caused the death of C.R. (2) with the intent to effect his death. The district
court gave the following aiding-and -abetting instruction: “The def endant is guilty of a
crime committed by another person when the defendant has played an intentional role in
aiding the commission of the crime and made no reasonable effort to prevent the crime
before it was committed.” The district court explained that “[i]ntentional role” included
“aiding, advising, hiring, counseling, conspiring with, or procur ing another to commit the
crime,” a nd stated that Reynolds’s “presence or actions” intentionally aided in the
commission of a crime if he knew that another person was going to commit or was
committing a crime and if his presence or actions aided the commission of the crime. The
court in Milton identified this instruction as the one that should have been given to the jury.
See 821 N.W.2d at 806. Thus, there is not even error here, much less prejudicial error.
Reynolds also cites Smith v. Groose, but in that case the issue was “whether the Due
Process Clause forbids a state from using inconsistent, irreconcilable theories to secure
convictions against two or more defendants in prosecutions for the same offenses arising
out of the same event.” 205 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2000). In Smith, the state claimed
one thing to be true in prosecuting Smith, but rejected it in prosecuting a different
defendant. Id. at 1050. The court determined that the state’s “manipulation of the
evidence” to benefit its theory of each case deprived the defendant of due process and
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Id. at 1051.
Here, there is no similar manipulation of evidence by the state in different, but
related, proceedings. Reynolds was charged with aiding and abetting second-degree
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murder, and the district court continually made reference to the charge as such. For
example, when the district court denied Reynolds’s motion to dismiss for lack of probable
cause, it noted that Reynolds was charged with aiding and abetting second-degree murder.
In discussing the admissibility of alternative- perpetrator evidence, the district court noted
that the defense might seek to admit such evidence because Reynolds was charged under
the aiding-and-abetting statute.
Finally, we note that at oral argument, the state conceded that there was not enough
evidence for aiding and abetting to go to the jury, and that it would have been better if the
district court had not instructed the jury on aiding and abetting. But we disagree, and are
not bound by the state’s concession. See State v. Werner, 725 N.W.2d 767, 770 n.1 (Minn.
App. 2007). Rather, we m ust “decide case s in accordance with [the] law.” State v.
Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990).
The record shows sufficient evidence to support the aiding-and-abetting theory.
First, the most persuasive evidence that Reynolds shot the gun is the surveillance video and
photographs. However, the images are not clear, and Reynolds and Frye are standing so
close to each other, making it somewhat difficult to distinguish between their movements.
Additionally, S.M. testified that she saw Reynolds with a gun, but she did not testify that
she saw him shoot the gun.
Because the record shows that Reynolds was always aware of the aiding-and-
abetting charge, the evidence supports the charge, and because the district court properly
instructed the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the aiding-
and-abetting charge to the jury.
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Alternative-perpetrator-defense evidence
Reynolds next argues that the district court should have admitted evidence “through
witnesses, such as the victim’s mother and the victim’s girlfriend” of the history between
C.R. and Frye. This court reviews rulings on the admission of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). “The burden is on the
[appellant] to show that the district court abused its discretion and that the [appellant] was
prejudiced thereby.” State v. Ahmed, 782 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Minn. App. 2010).
Reynolds fails to support his claim wit h legal argument or authority, failing to cite
even a single case to support his claim. As such, this claim is arguably forfeited for lack
of briefing. See State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006) (stating that
assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by argument or authority is
“waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection”), aff’d, 728 N.W.2d 243
(Minn. 2007); see also State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 806 (Minn. 2016) (declining to
address issues raised in a brief but not adequately argued or explained).
But even if we considered Reynolds’s claim , it would fail because he agreed
throughout the proceedings that evidence of C.R. and Frye’s relati onship would not be
admitted. At a pretrial hearing, Reynolds’s attorney agreed that there would be no extrinsic
evidence of an alternative-perpetrator defense. Immediately before Reynolds’s jury trial,
the prosecutor sought to confirm that the defense would not seek to admit evidence of C.R.
and Frye’s relationship. Reynolds’s attorney stated: “[W]e’re not going to be offering any
testimony regarding this [alleged] bad blood.”
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In addressing defense motions before trial, the district court reminded Reynolds that
the parties stipulated that evidence regarding C.R. and Frye’s relati onship would not be
admitted. The district court explained that the issue was raised “specifically in the
discussion about the alternative perpetrator where there was an agreement not to have
extrinsic evidence admitted, only evidence of what occurred that night.” Thus, Reynolds
was aware that extrinsic evidence relevant to the relationship between C.R. and Frye would
not be admitted. Further, Reynolds made no offer of proof regarding evidence of the
relationship between C.R. and Frye.
Finally, Reynolds cannot show prejudice. S.M. testified that she did not know
Reynolds, but was familiar with Frye. C.R.’s friend, who was out with him the night of
the shooting, testified that she had known Frye for over ten years, but had never seen
Reynolds before. This witness testified that she reported to police that Frye and C.R. were
fighting on the night of the shooting. Reynolds was convicted of aiding and abetting
second-degree murder. Based on this evidence, the jury could have determined that
Reynolds aided Frye in the shooting of C.R., someone Frye likely knew and with whom he
fought that night.
Spreigl hearing
Reynolds also argues that he was denied a fair trial with the admission of the Spreigl
evidence. Reynolds claims that T.B. was not credible and that a “record should have been
made outside of the presence of the jury to assess the validity of the offer of proof.” “A
district court’s decision to admit Spreigl evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
A defendant who claims the [district] court erred in admitting evidence bears the burden of
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showing an error occurred and any resulting prejudice.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257,
261 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted). If this court “determines that the district court
erroneously admitted Spreigl evidence, the court must then determine whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
verdict.” Id. at 262.
At a pretrial hearing, the state argued that because Reynolds claimed an alternative-
perpetrator defense, the Spreigl evidence was important to prove identity and intent. The
district court ruled that the Spreigl evidence was admissible because the incident was close
in time and proximity to the shooting, and both involved Reynolds being accompanied by
other people and using a handgun for an assault. The district court stated that the evidence
could show modus operandi, identity, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident.
Before admitting the Spreigl evidence at Reynolds’s jury trial, the district court
allowed the parties to reargue their positions on the admissibility of the evidence. Reynolds
argued that there were no charges, arrest, or conviction related to the incident, but t he
district court ruled that the evidence was admissible. Thus, the district court carefully
considered the admissibility of the Spreigl evidence on more than one occasion.
Additionally, Reynolds had an opportunity to challenge T.B.’s credibility on cross-
examination. T.B. testified that on June 5, 2017, Reynolds and two other men came to her
apartment. While in the apartment someone held a gun to T.B.’s fiancé’s head, though
T.B. could not recall who held the gun. On cross-examination, T.B. was asked: “[Y]ou
had given some false information to the police, correct?” She replied: “I probably did. I
don’t remember. It was a long time ago.” T.B. then stated that she did not give false
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information to the police, rather, the police “actually wrote wrong things down.” She later
admitted that a police officer accused her of misstating the truth. Therefore, Reynolds
sufficiently challenged T.B.’s credibility.
Further, any issue with T.B.’s credibility does not make the evidence inadmissible.
The jury is tasked with weighing witness credibility. See State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,
600 (Minn. 2017) (stating that the jury is in the best position to determine witness
credibility and may accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony). Further, Reynolds
claimed an al ternative-perpetrator defense. The Spreigl evidence showed that Reynolds
had access to a gun only days before the shooting and he (or a person with him) held a gun
to a man’s head. As the district court determined, this evidence could assist the jury in
determining identity.
Finally, before T.B. testified, the district court gave the jury a cautionary instruction.
The district court stated, among other things, that Reynolds could not be convicted of any
offense other than that charged. We presume that the jury followed the district court’s
instructions. See State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 675 (Minn. 1998). Based on the record,
Reynolds has failed to show that the admission of the Spreigl evidence was an abuse of
discretion or prejudicial.
Magnifying glass
Finally, Reynolds argues that the district court erred by permitting the jury to use a
magnifying glass during deliberations. The decision to grant a jury’s request is within the
discretion of the district court, and this court will not overturn it absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 586 (Minn. 2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion
11
standard to jury request to review evidence); State v. Larson, No. A06-1036, 2007 WL
4234246, at *6 (Minn. App. Dec. 4, 2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to district
court’s denial of jury request for a dictionary), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008).
Reynolds objected to the jury’s request for a magnifying glass, arguing that the state
could have enhanced the images on the video, but decided not to. Again, because Reynolds
fails to off er legal argument and authority, we could deem this argument forfeited. But
even if we consider Reynolds’s claim, the record does not support his argument.
On cross-examination, Sergeant Shanley agreed that someone in his position had
“the ability to retain an expert to enhance the clarity of images on video.” But he testified
that, in this particular case, “[t]he quality becomes less and it’s not as sharp of an image
[when you zoom in].” Further, Reynolds did not object to the stills or video; in fact, in
closing argument, Reynolds’s attorney stated: “T he defense embraces the video.”
Therefore, if Reynolds embraced the video and believed that it showed Frye shooting C.R.,
he would have benefitted from the jury having access to a magnifying glass.
Finally, as the district court stated, a district court may allow a jury to use a
magnifying glass because it is not “extrinsic or new evidence.” See Evans v. United States,
883 A.2d 146, 152 (D.C. 2005) (stating that “the use of a magnifying glass by jurors for
exhibits properly introduced at trial is within the [district] court’s discretion”); see also
State v. Jackson, 596 N.W.2d 262, 265- 66 (Minn. App. 1999) (holding that jury did not
commit misconduct by using a magnifying glass and their own fingerprints to analyze
accuracy of fingerprint evidence), review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 1999).
Affirmed.