, A18-1041

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1038, A18-1041

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
A. R. H., R. W. G., and M. L. R., Parents.

Filed November 13, 2018
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-JV-17-136

Samuel V. Johnson, Johnson Brothers Law, LLP, Lindstrom, Minnesota (for appellant
M.L.R.)

MakKenzie Guptil, Pine City, Minnesota (for appellant A.R.H.)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Maureen F. Caturia, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In an appeal from the termination of their parental rights, appellants argue that the
district court abused its discretion in finding that statutory grounds were met and that
termination was in the best interests of the children. We affirm.

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FACTS
Minor children, L.G. and T.R., are the subject of this appeal. Appellant -mother,
A.R.H., and appellant -father, M.L.R., are the parents of T.R., born in 2016. A.R.H. and
R.W.G. are the parents of L.G., born in 2011. R.W.G. has not appealed the termination of
his parental rights.
A.R.H. began using methamphetamine as a teenager. During her pregnancy with
T.R., she used amphetamine s and methamphetamine. On March 23 and 24 of 2016, just
prior to T.R. ’s birth, A.R.H. tested positive for amphetamines and me thamphetamine.
When T.R. was born , he was not medically stable, was not breathing well, and tested
positive for amphetamines. After the county filed a petition for emergency protective care
at the end of March of 2016, the district court ordered that L.G. and T.R. were to be placed
outside of the home. In April of 2017, the county filed an initial petition to terminate both
appellants’ parental rights (TPR petition) , and in October of that same year the county
amended the petition. Late in 2017, the dis trict court issued an order granting the TPR
petition.
In reviewing that decision, this court remanded on the grounds that the facts
supporting the district court’s decision were not set forth with particularity. In re Welfare
of Children of A.R.H., R.W.G., and M.L.R. , No. A17 -1946 (Minn. App. May 16, 2018)
(order op.). On remand, the district court issued a new order, granting the TPR petition on
the grounds that both A.R.H. and M.L.R.: (1) “substantially, continuously, and repeatedly
neglected to comply with the duties” imposed by the parent-child relationship under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2016); (2) are “palpably unfit to be a party to the parent

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and child relationship ” under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b )(4) (2016); and (3) that
reasonable efforts by the county have failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-
home placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2016 ). After finding that
these statutory grounds were satisfied, the district court analyzed the best interests of the
children, and found that they are best served by terminating appellants’ parental rights.
A.R.H. and M.L.R. each filed a separate appeal, and this court consolidated those appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Under Minnesota law, courts presume “that a natural parent is a fit and suitable
person to be entrusted with the care of a child, ” In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766,
769 (Minn. 1980), and “custody of their children should not be taken from them but f or
grave and weighty reasons, ” In re Welfare of P.J.K., 369 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn. 1985)
(quotation omitted). But “the law secures parents ’ right to custody only so long as they
shall promptly recognize and discharge their corresponding obligations.” In re P.J.K., 369
N.W.2d at 290 (quotation omitted). Therefore, a district court may only involuntarily
terminate parental rights if at least one statutory basis exists and it finds that termination is
in the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C. 301, subds. 1(b), 7 (2016 ). If a
statutory basis exists, “the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration.”
Id., subd. 7.
“[Appellate courts] affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when at
least one statutory groun d for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence
and termination is in the best interests of the child, provided that the county has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d

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381, 385 (M inn. 2008) (citation omitted). Appellate courts exercise “great caution in
termination proceedings, finding such action proper only when the evidence clearly
mandates such a result.” In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996). But,
“[c]onsiderable deference is due to the district court ’s decision because a district court is
in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses. ” In re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554
N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that reasonable
efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s placement.

A statutory basis to terminate parental rights exists under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5), if, “following the child ’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts,
under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child ’s
placement.” The statute creates a presumption that reasonable efforts have failed on a
showing that: (1) the children have lived outside the parent ’s home, by court order, for at
least “a cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding 22 months ”; (2) “the court
has approved the out-of-home placement plan”; (3) the conditions which led to “placement
have not been corrected”; and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the social services
agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id.
A.R.H. challenges only the district court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made
to reunite the family. 1 First, she argues that respondent unreasonably delayed visitation

1 M.L.R. does not challenge this statutory ground for terminating his parental rights, but
did contest whether termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of his child.
And because a single statutory ground is sufficient to uphold the dist rict court’s
determination, we need not address appellants’ challenge to the district court’s
determination that the statutory grounds of palpable unfitness or parental neglect were met.

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with L.G. She relies on her therapist’s testimony that the separation from L.G. triggers her
drug use and is traumatic for her. Second, A.R.H. argues that because she did not rely on
respondent’s referrals for either her therapy or her housing, the district court’s finding that
respondent made appropriate referrals was erroneous.
A.R.H.’s first argument is contradicted by the record. A.R.H. claims that the dela y
in visitation with L.G. was “unjustified.” But A.R.H.’s case manager testified that her
cooperation was “minimal” and that she would not answer or return her calls or speak with
her. The case manager further testified that A.R.H. failed to m aintain consistent contact
and was unwilling to sign, or would redact, the requested releases that would allow her to
communicate with A.R.H.’s providers. The case manager also testified that the visits with
L.G. were suspended because A.R.H. missed visit s with no warning, and that after
consulting with L.G. ’s therapist, they determined that it was more harmful to L.G. to set
up for a visit and have her mother not show up than to not have the visit at all. Finally, the
district court expressly found that the case manager was credible, and was in a “reliable
position to address the child protection history” in this case. We therefore reject appellant’s
first argument.
Appellant’s second argument also fails under our standard of review. Because we
review f actual findings for clear error, we will not reverse a finding when there is
substantial support for it in the record. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385; see also Vangsness
v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (“That the record might support
findings other than those made by the trial court does not show that the court’s findings are
defective.”). Here, regardless of whether A.R.H.’s self-referrals could support the opposite

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finding, the district court ’s determination that respondent made reasonable efforts to
reunify A.R.H. with her children is supported by the record. The case manager testified
about her training and experience. She testified about providing referrals to chemical -
dependency and mental -health services, coordinating with service providers, providing
transportation for parental visits , and paying for a storage unit for A.R.H.’s belongings
while she was in treatment. A.R.H. provides no legal authority and points to no factual
circumstances that would lend credence to her argument that this support is somehow
inadequate. We therefore reject A.R.H’s second argument and affirm the district court’s
determination that the criteria in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) are met.
II. The district c ourt did not abuse its discretion in concluding that terminating
A.R.H. and M.L.R.’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

Both A.R.H. and M.L.R. argue that the district court abused its discretion in finding
that terminating their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. District courts
must consider three factors in analyzing the best interests of children in these
circumstances: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the
parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest
of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also Minn.
R. Juv . P. 39.05, subd. 3 (b)(3) (requiring consideration of the same factors ).
“[D]etermination of a child ’s best interests ‘is generally not susceptible to an appellate
court’s global review of a record,’ and . . . ‘an appellate court’s combing through the record
to determine best interests is inappropriate because it involves credibility determinations.’”

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In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting In re
Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003)).
A.R.H. argues that the district court erred : first, in weighing the best -interests
factors; and second , in allowing hearsay testimony under what she calls “the effect on
listener” exception. M.L.R. argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
analyze the best-interests factors regarding his relationship with T.R.
In support of her argument that the district court erred in weighing the best-interests
factors, A.R.H. makes four assignments of error in the district court’s analysis. She argues
that the court erred by failing to: (a) give sufficient weight to the family th erapist’s
testimony; (b) give sufficient weight to A.R.H. ’s interest in continuing the relationship;
(c) properly discount the parenting assessor’s testimony that there was not a strong bond;
and (d) give sufficient weight to A.R.H.’s therapist’s testimony about the existence of a
bond between A.R.H. and L.G.
Under our standard of review, a ll of these a ssignments of error fail as a matter of
law. See Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d at 625 (noting that “‘much must be left to the discretion of
the trial court’ in applying a b est-interests analysis”) (quoting Maxfield v. Maxfield , 452
N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990)). A.R.H. does not argue that the district court’s analysis is
unsupported by the record. Instead, she essentially argues that the record would have
supported the district court had it come to the opposite conclusion. But even if A.R.H.
were correct, we review for an abuse of discretion . Therefore, even if appellant were
correct on this point that would not be grounds to reverse the district court’s decision. This
court does not conduct a “global review of a record ” because weighing the testimony of

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witnesses requires making credibility determinations, which this court is not equipped to
do. Id. The district court made credibility determinations, weighed the proper factors, and
came to a reasonable conclusion regarding A.R.H. ’s relationship with her children. We
therefore reject A.R.H ’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in its
weighing of the best-interests factors.
A.R.H.’s second argument is that the district court erred by allowing L.G.’s paternal
grandmother to testify about L.G.’s threat of self-harm. She argues that the district court
admitted the statement for its effect on the listener (making it not hearsay by definition),
but then relied on the statement as substantive evidence (rendering the statement hearsay).
See Minn. R. Evid. 801 (c) (defining hearsay as a statement “offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted”). But while the statement was objected to at trial, appellant
did not file a post-trial motion to reconside r the ruling on this testimony or a post -trial
motion for a new trial assigning the admission of this testimony as error. And those are
required steps to properly bring an issue before this court. See Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389
N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. 1986) (“[T]he general rule [is] that matters such as trial procedure,
evidentiary rulings and jury instructions are subject to appellate review only if there has
been a motion for a new trial in which such matters have been assigned as error. ”). We
therefore reject appellant’s second argument as not being properly before the court. 2

2 Furthermore, while admitting the statement for its substance might have been error, the
district court did not rely on the statement substantively and so A.R.H. cannot establish
prejudice from any error —as she would have to do in order to merit reversal. See Minn.
R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored). The district court never refers to the
statement regarding self-harm in its “reasonable-efforts” analysis. Even if this a rgument
were properly before this court, we would still reject appellant’s second argument on the

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M.L.R. argues that the district court did not make sufficient findings to support its
conclusion that terminating his parental rights was in the best interest s of the child. He
argues that the “only findings regarding the child or M.L.R. ’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship was that his visits were inconsistent. ” But the district court also
credited the guardian ad litem ’s testimony that terminating parental rights was in the best
interests of the children due to the length of time that they have been out of the home ,
noting specifically M.L.R.’s inability to parent T.R. because of his involvement in criminal
matters. And, as the statute requires, t he district court also consider ed the interests of
M.L.R. and T.R. in maintaining the father-child relationship. While the district court ’s
analysis may have been brief, it is not deficient. The district court, by weighing the facts
and c onsidering the statutory factors , did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
termination of the parental rights of both A.R.H. and M.L.R. was in the minor children ’s
best interest.
Affirmed.

grounds that if there were an error in admitting the statement, A.R.H. could not establish
prejudice.