Eddie Niles Hubbard, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1052

Eddie Niles Hubbard, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 25, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-14966

Eddie N. Hubbard, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant, in a pro se appeal, challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his
petition for postconvic tion relief for his conviction of first -degree manslaughter and
second-degree assault. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Appellant Eddie Hubbard was convicted of first -degree manslaughter for shooting
and killing a man with a shotgun and second -degree assault for threatening the man’s
girlfriend with the shotgun. State v. Hubbard, No. A14-1259, 2015 WL 4714802, at *1 –
3 (Minn. App. Aug. 15, 2015), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2015). The man, J.C., had
been living in Hubbard’s house along with his girlfriend, K.S., and her four children. Id.
at *1. An argument broke out between Hubbard and J.C. because Hubbard wanted the
couple and the children to move out. Id. at *1–2. Hubbard came into the room where J.C.,
K.S., and the children were packing up their belongings, pointed a shotgun at K.S., and
then shot J.C. in the abdomen. Id. at *2. A jury found Hubbard guilty of the two charges,
and he was sentenced to prison. Id. at *3.
Hubbard appealed his conviction to this court. Id. at *1. He argued that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of either charge, he was denied a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense, the district erred in i ts jury instructions, and
Spreigl evidence1 should have been excluded at trial. Id. This court affirmed. Id. Hubbard
filed a petition for postconviction relief which was denied. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Hubbard appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. We review such
denials for an abuse of discretion. Greer v. State , 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn. 2013).

1 Spreigl evidence is evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts. State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d
834, 839 (Minn. 2016); see also State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965).

3
This involves reviewing the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. Id.
Hubbard makes three principal arguments. First, he argues that he was denied the
right to a speedy trial. “The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Minn esota Constitution.”
State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). The question
of whether an appellant was denied his or her speedy-trial rights is reviewed de novo. Id.
“A petition for postconviction relief after a di rect appeal has been completed may
not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or
sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2018); see also State v. Knaffla , 243 N.W.2d
737, 741 (Minn. 1976). Hubbard could have raised this issue on his direct appeal , but
failed to do so. Hubbard essentially concedes that he was aware of the speedy -trial issue
before his direct appeal when he states in his brief: “A ‘Speedy Trial’ was never
rescheduled, despite written request to the court and to my attorney.” This argument is
barred by Knaffla.
As part of his speedy -trial argument, Hubbard also seems to argue that he was
denied the right to be at an essential hearing when he was not allowed to be present at a
July 15, 2013 hearing. “A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a Fourteenth Amendment
due process right to be present at all critical stages of trial.” State v. Rodriguez, 889 N.W.2d
332, 336 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). Hubbard contends that he has a letter
from a court reporter indicating that a hearing was held “without being monitored or
transcripts made,” but he also claimed that he has newly discovered evidence in the form

4
of transcripts from that day. But neither the court reporter’s letter nor the newly discovered
transcripts are a part of the record on appeal, and Hubbard fails to explain what was done
during this supposed hearing or show that it was a “critical stage of trial.” Based on this
record, Hubbard has failed to show t hat he was deprived of his right to be present at an
essential hearing.
The second principal argument that Hubbard makes is that his trial c ounsel was
ineffective. The postconviction court ruled that Hubbard “provided no proof” that his trial
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. We agree.
Hubbard makes allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, but he did not develop the
record to support those allegations. And he does not assert that he was wrongfully denie d
a postconviction hearing. Accordingly, we conclude that his ineffective -assistance-of-
counsel claim fails.
And his third principal argument is that the district court denied his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by not allowing him to discharge his at torney and obtain a
different one without inquiring into the basis for the request. But Hubbard fails to explain
why he could not have made this argument on direct appeal. Accordingly, it is Knaffla-
barred.
Within his third argument, Hubbard also states that the district court erred when it
gave him an “aggravated sentence for children when I . . . had been acquitted of charges of
assaulting them.” To the extent that this is an argument for the correction of an illegal
sentence, Hubbard does not support his argument with any legal authority and therefore
forfeits it. See State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn. App. 2017) (“Arguments are

5
forfeited if they are presented in a summary and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable
law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming that errors of law occurred.”).
But, even if th is argument were not forfeited, it would fail on its merits. Hubbard
was charged with three counts of second -degree assault related to the children who were
present when he shot J.C. Hubbard was acquitted on all three of those assault charges.
But, when the jury found Hubbard guilty of first -degree manslaughter, it also found that
“the defendant’s act was committed in the presence of a child.” “[C]ommission of an
offense in the p resence of a child may be a valid reason to depart from the presumptive
sentence.” State v. Robideau, 796 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn. 2011). Hubbard appears to be
operating under the misunderstanding that he would have to be found guilty of child-related
assaults in order for this aggravating factor to apply, but the jury clearly found that the first-
degree manslaughter occurred in the presence of the children and Hubbard does not
challenge this finding. This last argument also fails.
Affirmed.