State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1073

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cornelius Palmer,
Appellant.

Filed May 13, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-9744

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jodi L. Proulx, Stillwater, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesot a Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm by a prohibited
person, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm
as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Cornelius Palmer with possession
of a firearm by a prohibited person. Palmer moved to suppress the evidence supporting the
charge, arguing that it was obtained during an unlawful search and seizure. The district
court held a hearing on Palmer’s motion over the course of two days. Minneapolis Police
Officers Hilary Glasrud, Jason Schmitt, and Jeffrey Werner testified at the hearing, as did
Palmer. Squad and body -cam videos of the search and seizure were also received as
evidence. The district court found the relevant facts to be as follows.
On April 18, 2017, a confidential reliable informant (CRI) contacted Officer Werner
by cell phone and told him that earlier that day, the CRI had been inside a vehicle from
which drugs were being sold in the area of Chicago and Franklin Avenues in Minneapolis.
That is a high-crime area with a significant gang presence and a high level of drug dealing.
The CRI described the vehicle as a black four -door Chevy with license plate number
366MDC. The CRI reported that “the driver was a black man, about 30 years old with
long-dreadlocks wearing a baseball cap; the front seat passenger was a black woman; and
the back seat passenger was a black man, about 40 years old with a medium afro.” The

3

CRI saw semi-automatic firearms in the waistbands of the two men in the vehicle , as well
as prescription pills and either crack cocaine or cocaine in the vehicle.
Information from the CRI had led to arrests and charges in the past. Before working
with Officer Werner, the CRI successfully conducted controlled buys for other police units.
Officer Werner had been working with the CRI for less than a year when the CRI gave him
the tip on April 18, 2017. Officer Werner had met with the CRI multiple times fac e-to-
face in the time they had been working together. Prior to providing the tip in this case, the
CRI had provided Officer Werner with information that had led to the recovery of a firearm
and illegal drugs. The CRI was not under any obligation to contact Officer Werner on a
regular basis. Officer Werner testified that the CRI was not cooperating with the police to
“work[] off any sort of potential charges or arrests or sentences.” The CRI was paid $600
for the information provided in this case.
After receiving the information from the CRI, Officer Werner and other officers
went to the area of Chicago and Franklin Avenues in unmarked police vehicles looking for
the vehicle described by the CRI . Officers observed a bl ack Chevy with license plate
366MDC at Franklin and Elliot Avenues, a block away from Chicago and Franklin
Avenues. The driver matched the CRI’s description, as did the other two occupants of the
vehicle.
Officer Schmitt first observed the vehicle in a parking lot near a grocery store
located on Franklin Avenue. He saw an individual, later identified as Palmer, exit the
vehicle, speak with another person for a few minutes, return to the vehicle, and drive out
of the parking lot. Officer Schmitt and ot her officers in unmarked cars followed the

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vehicle. O fficers observed the vehicle make a quick lane change without signaling and
then head down Fourth Avenue at a high rate of speed. After learning that officers had
observed those traffic violations, Off icer Werner requested that a marked squad car stop
the vehicle. Officer Glasrud responded to Officer Werner’s request and located the vehicle
as it was traveling w est on 32nd Street East near Fourth Avenue. Officer Glasrud pulled
in behind the vehicle an d activated her squad car’s emergency lights , but the vehicle did
not stop. Instead, the vehicle continued west on 32nd Street and then turned south onto
Clinton Avenue. An unmarked police car traveling in the opposite direction pulled in front
of the suspect vehicle and blocked its path, causing it to stop.
Officer Glasrud exited her squad car with her gun drawn and went to the driver’s
side of the vehicle. Three additional officers approached the vehicle with guns drawn and
directed its occupants to keep their hands up. Another officer approached the vehicle with
his gun drawn shortly afterward. Officer Glasrud pulled Palmer out of the driver’s seat
with the help of Officer Scott Watry and a plain-clothed officer. The three officers brought
Palmer to the ground , and Officer Glasrud handcuffed him. Officer Watry began to pat
frisk Palmer and turned him on his side. After Officer Watry did so , Palmer stated,
“There’s a gun right here,” and Officer Watry pulled a gun from Palmer’s waist band.
Officers pulled Palmer up off the ground, completed his pat frisk , and placed him in the
backseat of Officer Glasrud’s squad car. Officers searched the suspect vehicle and found
a handgun in a glove compartment and a second firearm inside a bag on the backseat.
The district court denied Palmer’s motion to suppress. The parties agreed to a
stipulated-facts trial, and the district court found Palmer guilty of possession of a firearm

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by a prohibited person. The district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced
Palmer to an executed 60-month prison term. Palmer appeals, challenging the
constitutionality of his search and seizure.
D E C I S I O N
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against “unrea sonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is r easonableness.” State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). Generally, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 33 (Minn. 2016). However, police “may stop and frisk a
person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be
engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be
armed and dangerous.” State v. Dickerson , 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)).
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the
totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enfo rcement officers are
permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an
untrained per son.” State v. Richardson , 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001). The
reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more
than an unarticulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008).
“[E]ach incremental intrusion during [an investigative] stop must be ‘strictly tied to
and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initia tion of the stop permissible.’”

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State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88
S. Ct. at 1878) (other quotation omitted). Under the Minnesota Constitution, “an intrusion
not strictly tied to the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the stop permissible
must be supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of additional illegal activity.” State
v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to supp ress evidence,
we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal d eterminations
de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). This court reviews a district
court’s determination of reasonable suspicion de novo. Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 350.
Palmer challenges the constitutionality of his search and seizure on two grounds .
First, Palmer argues that the officers “lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop [his]
vehicle or expand the scope of the stop based upo n the informant’s tip.” Second, Palmer
argues that “[his] seizure was not an investigatory seizure, but rather an arrest lacking
probable cause.” We address each argument in turn.
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion to Stop and Frisk Palmer
Palmer concedes that there was reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle based on
the officers’ observations of traffic violations. See State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578
(Minn. 1997) (“Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however
insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.”). But Palmer
contends that “[b]ecause the state failed to prove that the informant’s tip was reliable, it
did not contribute to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity just ifying the
stop of the vehicle or provide an independent basis to expand the scope of the stop.”

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“The reasonable suspicion standard can . . . be met based on information provided
by a reliable informant.” Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393. “But information given by an
informant must bear indicia of reliability that make the alleged criminal conduct
sufficiently likely to justify an investigatory stop by police.” Id. at 393-94. This court has
articulated six factors that are relevant when assessing the reliability of a confidential, but
not anonymous, informant:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be es tablished if the police can corroborate the infor mation;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.

State v. Ross , 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. June 15,
2004).
“The second factor is fulfilled by a simple statement t hat the informan t has been
reliable in the past . . . . ” Id. It is not necessary for officers to provide details regarding
the informant’s past veracity. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999); Ross,
676 N.W.2d at 304. As to that factor, Palmer argues that the following testimony of Officer
Werner “greatly diminished the current reliability of the informant”: (1) he had met with
the informant less than a dozen times and could not recall the first time he met the
informant, (2) the informant had not provide d information resulting in a criminal
conviction, and (3) only once did Officer Werner recover a firearm and illegal drugs
through use of the informant. Palmer cites State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 303, State v. Wiley,

8

366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985), and State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136, as support.
However, none of those cases supports his position.
In Ross, this court reasoned that because supreme court precedent does not “require
that specific details [regarding] the past veracity of the CRI be alleged,” the district court’s
conclusion “that more information was necessary was incorrect.” 676 N.W.2d at 304. The
CRI in Ross had “previously provided accurate information resulting in successful arrests.”
Id. at 303. Similarly, Officer Werner testified that the CRI’s information had led to the
recovery of narcotics and a firearm in the past, as well as arrests and charges.
In Wiley, the supreme court reasoned that an officer’s sworn statement that an
informant had “been used over several years successfully” provided reason to believe that
the informant had provided reliable information in the past. 366 N.W.2d at 269. Similarly,
Officer Werner’s testimony that the CRI had provided information that led to the recovery
of narcotics and a firearm, arrests, and charges established the CRI’s past reliability.
And in Munson, an officer testified that “by definition, a CRI was someone who had
previously provided the police with information that led to an arrest and that the particular
CRI who provided the information about [the defendant ] had given the police reliable
information in the past.” 594 N.W.2d at 136. The supreme court noted that “the record
does not contain specific details of the CRI’s record,” but reasoned that “further elaboration
concerning the specifics of the CRI’s veracity is not typically required.” Id. Like the
officer in Munson, Officer Werner generally testified that the CRI had provided police with
information that had led to arrests and charges.

9

In sum, Officer Werner’s testimony regarding the informant’s provision of reliable
information in the past shows that the informant was currently reliable.
As to the third reliability factor, police corroboration of a CRI’s information, Palmer
relies on State v. Cook, in which this court held that a CRI’s information did not establish
probable cause to conduct a warrantless felony arrest “because the informant never claimed
he observed the suspect committing a crime and the informant provided non-incriminating
details easily obtainable by the general public.” 610 N.W.2d 664, 665 (Minn. App. 2000),
review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Palmer argues that, like in Cook, “the details
corroborated here were easily obtained and insufficient to establish reliability.”
The CRI in Cook told police that the defendant in that case had been selling crack
cocaine at a YMCA in Minneapolis and that the defendant had the c rack cocaine in the
waistband of his pants. Id. at 666. The CRI described the defendant’s physical appearance,
stated that the defendant was driving a blue Lincoln, and provided a license-plate number.
Id. Officers located a blue Lincoln with that license -plate number at the YMCA and
observed the defendant, who matched the CRI’s description, entering the driver’s side of
the vehicle. Id. Officers approached the vehicle and placed the defendant under arrest. Id.
During a subsequent search, officers found crack cocaine in the waistband of the
defendant’s pants. Id. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the
drugs, concluding that police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant based on the
CRI’s tip. Id.
On appeal, t his court found that the CRI was “undeniably credible” based on his
track record. Id. at 667. But this court stated that “[r]ecitation of facts establishing a CRI’s

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reliability by his proven ‘track record’ . . . does not by itself establish probable cause.” Id.
at 668. “ The information obtained from the CRI must still show a basis of knowledge .”
Id. This court reasoned that although “the CRI’s tip included a description of [the
defendant’s] clothing, physical appearance, vehicle, and present location,” those details
“fail[ed] to offer any explanation for the basis of the CRI’s claim that [the defendant] was
selling drugs.” Id. For example, the “CRI never claimed that he had purchased drugs from
[the defendant] or that he had seen [the defendant] selling drugs.” Id. This court further
reasoned that the details of the CRI’s tip “were entirely innocuous and lacked any
incriminating aspects that might corroborate the CRI’s claim that [the defendant] was
selling drugs at the YMCA” and that “any link between [the defendant] and illegal activity
was nonexistent.” Id. This court concluded that although police may have had reasonable
suspicion to legally stop and question the defendant to ascertain his identity, they did not
have probable cause to arrest him at that time. Id. at 669.
This case is distinguishable from Cook for two reasons. First, the issue in Cook was
whether the CRI’s tip provided probable cause to arrest. Id. The issue in this case is
whether the CRI’s tip provided reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying an investigative
seizure. The reasonable-suspicion standard is “obviously less demanding than . . . probable
cause.” Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990) (quotation
omitted). And although factors regarding whether an informant’s tip establishes probable
cause “are also relevant in the reasonable -suspicion context, allowance must be made in
applying them for the lesser showing required to meet that standard .” Id. at 328-29, 110
S. Ct. at 2415. As we recognized in Cook, “police may have had ‘reasonable suspicion’ to

11

legally stop and question [the defendant] to ascertain his identity,” but the facts did not
“support finding that police had ‘probable cause’ to arrest [the defendant] at that time.”
610 N.W.2d at 669; see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1972)
(stating that although the informant’s tip “may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest
or search warrant,” it had “enough indicia of reliability to justify [a] forcible stop”).
Second, unlike Cook, the record in this case establishes the CRI’s basis of
knowledge: the CRI had been in the suspect vehicle on the day he provided the tip and had
seen firearms and drugs in the vehicle. “Recent personal observation of incriminating
conduct has traditionally been the preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.” Wiley,
366 N.W.2d at 269. In sum, unlike the circumstances in Cook, the CRI’s tip in this case
was based on recent personal observations of incriminating conduct.
Moreover, in addition to corroborating the innocuous details of the CRI’s tip, the
officers observed conduct that corroborated the CRI’s report of illegal activity .
“[E]vidence of flight suggests consciousness of guilt.” State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 485
(Minn. 1988). Officer Glasrud testified, and the relevant squad video shows, that the
suspect vehicle did not immediately stop when Officer Glasrud pulled in behind it and
turned on her squad car’s emergency lights and that it did not stop until an unmarked police
vehicle pulled in front of it and blocked its path. The vehicle’s failure to stop when Officer
Glasrud activated her squad car’s emergency lights corroborated the CRI’s tip in that it
suggested that the occupants of the vehicle were involved in illegal conduct.
As to the fourth reliability factor, that an informant is presumably more reliable if
the informant voluntarily comes forward, Palmer argues that because the CRI was paid

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$600 for the tip, the CRI’s “reliability was sig nificantly diminis hed.” Palmer relies on
State v. Ward , 580 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Minn. App. 1998), asserting that the payment
“effectively branded the informant a ‘stool pigeon.’” Ward states that “courts remain
reluctant to believe the typical ‘stool pigeon’ who is arrested and who, at the suggestion of
the police, agrees to cooperate and name names in order to curry favor with t he police.”
580 N.W.2d at 71-72. But Officer Werner testified that the CRI was not “working off any
sort of potential charges or arrests or sentences” when the CRI provided the tip in this case.
The CRI therefore was not a “stool pigeon” as described in Ward.
In sum, the record establishes that (1) the CRI had given reliable information in the
past and was likely also currently reliable , (2) the CRI ’s report of criminal activity was
based on recent, personal observation of that activity and was corroborated by police
observations and Palmer’s own actions in response to Officer Glasrud’s attempt to stop his
vehicle, and (3) the CRI voluntarily came forward . Under the circumstances, the CRI’s
reliability was adequately established, and the CRI’s report provided reasonable suspicion
to stop Palmer for investigative purposes.
“So long as [an] officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe
that the suspect is armed and dangerous, [the officer] may conduct a weapons search
limited in scope to this protective purpose.” Williams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S. Ct. at 1923.
If both of those requirements are satisfied, “police may ‘conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such [a] person[] in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault [the officer].’” Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843 (alteration in original)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884).

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Again, the CRI’s report provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying
Palmer’s investigative seizure. The CRI’s report that the two men in the suspect vehicle
had semi -automatic firearms in their waistbands also provided reason to believe that
Palmer may be arm ed and dangerous. Palmer’s failure to immediately stop the vehicle
when Officer Glasrud pulled in behind the vehicle and activated her marked sq uad car’s
emergency lights exacerbated that concern. See Williams, 407 U.S. at 148, 92 S. Ct. at
1924 (“ When [the defendant] rolled down his window, rather th an complying with the
policeman’s request to step out of the car so that his movements could more easily be seen,
the revolver allegedly at [the defendant’s] waist became an even greater threat.”). Because
both stop-and-frisk requirements were satisfied in this case, the officers were authorized to
conduct a limited search of Palmer’s outer clothing for officer safety. We therefore reject
Palmer’s argument that “officers impermissibly expanded the scope of the [traffic] stop
when they approached [his] vehicle with guns drawn, directed him to show his hands,
physically seized and handcuffed him, then proceeded to conduct a pat-search.”
Probable Cause to Arrest
Palmer contends that “[e]ven if officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion of
criminal activity to conduct an investigatory seizure . . . , the overly intrusive actions of
officers constituted an arrest, as opposed to an investigatory seizure, which required
probable cause.”
“The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is
whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was
under arrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman , 354 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 1984)

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(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)). But as explained below,
courts also consider office r safety when determining whether police conduct turned an
investigative seizure into an arrest requiring probable cause.
To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, an
investigative stop must be limited in scope and duratio n to its
initial justification . In determining the propriety of a stop's
scope and duration, courts must balance the nature and degree
of the intrusion on an individual’ s Fourth Amendment rights
against the governmental interest in crime prevention and
legitimate concerns about the sa fety of law -enforcement
officers. The courts must also consider the totality of the
circumstances and judge the facts against an objective
standard, namely, whether the facts available to the officer at
the moment of the stop would cause a person of reaso nable
caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate.

There is no bright -line test separating a legitimate
investigative stop from an unlawful arrest. Instead, “common
sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid
criteria.” In de termining whether a police officer’s conduct
turned an investigative stop into an unlawful arrest, courts
must specifically consider the aggressiveness of the police
methods and the intrusiveness of the stop against the
justification for the use of such tactics, i.e., whether the officer
had a sufficient basis to fear for his or her safety.

State v. Balenger, 667 N.W.2d 133, 139 (Minn. App. 2003) (emphasis added) (quotation
and citations omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003).
“Unduly intrusive police conduct may, but does not automatically, transform an
otherwise legitimate investigative stop into an unlawful arrest.” Id. “[T]he trend has been
to grant officers greater latitude in using force in order to ‘neutralize’ potentially dangerous
suspects during an investigatory stop.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Thus, the use of force
reasonable under the circumstances will be permitted without a showing of probable cause

15

when force is necessary for the protection of the investigatin g officers and the degree of
force used is reasonable.” Id.; see State v. Nading , 320 N.W.2d 82, 84 (Minn. 1982)
(holding that under totality of circumstances, fact that police ordered suspected burglars
thought to be armed and dangerous to get out of car and lie on the ground did not convert
a temporary detention into an arrest); State v. O’Neill, 216 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Minn. 1974)
(holding that where “officers [knew] from [a] radio report that the occupants of [a] car were
armed, the officers were justified for their own protection in holding the occupants at
gunpoint until they were frisked for weapons ”). The use of reasonable force is normally
justified in cases involving armed suspects. Balenger, 667 N.W.2d at 140. In sum,
there is a fine line between an arrest and an investigatory
detention. It is not always apparent at what precise moment an
arrest occurs. The action of the police officers must be judged
according to the circumstances existing at the time. But the
determination whether an a rrest occurs at the initial stop
should not be decided solely by the conduct of the arresting
officers or the amount of force they exhibit at the time. If an
officer making a reasonable investigatory stop has cause to
believe that the individual is armed, he is justified in
proceeding cautiously with weapons ready.

O’Neill, 216 N.W.2d at 827-28 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Palmer argues that “the actions of law enforcement in this case, did not amount to a
reasonable pre-arrest detention to fur ther investigate the ‘tip’ of the informant, but rather
constituted an arrest.” Specifically, Palmer argues that the following actions transformed
his seizure into a de facto arrest: (1) officers blocked in his vehicle; (2) several officers
approached the vehicle with guns drawn and pointed; (3) officers directed him to show his
hands and then physically removed him from his vehicle, put him on the ground,

16

handcuffed him, and searched him; and (4) at no time during the initial seizure did officers
advise him that he was not under arrest. Palmer relies on State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d
842 (Minn. 1993), and State v. Carver, 577 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. App. 1998).
In Blacksten, police stopped the defendant’s vehicle because of safety concerns
related to an anticipated search of the defendant’s residence. 507 N.W.2d at 845. After
stopping the defendant’s vehicle, an officer pointed a shotgun at him, ordered him to get
out of the car and lie on the ground, and searched him. Id. Next, the officer handcuffe d
the defendant and placed him in the back of a squad car. Id. Approximately an hour and
15 minutes later, police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s residence. Id. Shortly
after searching the residence, officers informed the defendant that he was under arrest. Id.
The supreme court stated that the defendant was “de facto under arrest from the time he
was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuff ed, and placed in the squad car, ” noting
that the officer who stopped the defendant “had no inte ntion of conducting any
investigation while detaining him” and that the defendant was seized “two miles from his
residence at least an hour and fifteen minutes prior to the issuance of the search warrant for
that residence.” Id. at 846 -47. The supreme co urt held that “the detention of [the
defendant] two miles from his residence for well over an hour while the search warrant was
being sought was not a reasonable pre-arrest investigatory stop.” Id. at 847.
In Carver, an officer stopped the defendant’s ve hicle after observing it speeding.
577 N.W.2d at 247. The officer ordered the defendant to get out of his vehicle and assume
the prone position on the road. Id. The officer then approached the defendant, handcuffed
him, and escorted him back to the officer’s patrol car. Id. The officer testified that he took

17

those precautions because of the way the vehicle sped past his patrol car without slowing
down, because it was not clear to the officer why the defendant was speeding, and because
the officer did not know whether additional officers were available to assist . Id. The
district court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after the
defendant had been handcuffed and placed in the squad car. Id. On appeal, the state argued
that the defendant was not under arrest when he was ordered to assume the prone position
on the roadway and handcuffed. Id. This court reasoned that although ordering the
defendant to lie on the ground did not constitute an arrest, the officer’s additional action of
handcuffing the defendant “sufficiently restrained freedom of movement so as to give a
reasonable person the belief that he was not free to go.” Id. at 248.
Palmer’s reliance on Blacksten and Carver is unavailing because the officer safety
concerns in those cases do not compare to the safety concern in this case. Instead, the
circumstances of this case are more like those in Munson. 594 N.W.2d at 128. In that case,
a CRI described a rented vehicle and told police it wo uld arrive at an add ress in St. Paul
carrying a large amount of crack cocaine. Id. at 132. The CRI further reported that the
occupants of the vehicle would be three African American males, t wo of whom the CRI
identified. Id. The CRI “said that the three occupants may be armed, but had no direct
knowledge on that point.” Id. Officers located the vehicle at the St. Paul address, activated
the lights on their squad car, and pulled up behind it. Id. at 132-33. The officers
approached the vehicle with their guns drawn and ordered the occupants to raise their
hands. Id. at 133. Other officers arrived on the scene, and the police ordered the occupants
out of the vehicle. Id. Police handcuffed the vehicle’s occupants, frisked t hem for

18

weapons, removed the handcuffs after determining that they were not armed, and placed
them in separate squad cars. Id. Police searched the vehicle and discovered drug evidence.
Id.
On appeal, the Munson defendant argued , in part , that his deten tion was
unreasonable. Id. at 135. The supreme court concluded that the detention was reasonable,
explaining:
We have recognized in the past that if an officer making
a reasonable investigatory stop has cause to believe that the
individual is armed, he is justified in proceeding cautiously
with weapons ready. Moreover, once a person is permissibly
stopped, an officer may frisk that person for weapons if the
officer is justified in believing tha t the suspect is armed and
dangerous. We have also held that briefly handcuffing a
suspect while the police sort out the scene of an investigation
does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an
arrest, nor does placing the suspect in the bac k of a squad car
while the investigation proceeds. Here, the record indicate s
that the stop of the [vehicle’s] occupants occurred late at night
and that it involved multiple suspects. The record also shows
that the officers were acting on information that the occupants
may be armed and that the [vehicle] was carrying a large
amount of illegal drugs. Under these circumstances,
approaching the [vehicle] with weapons drawn, removing the
occupants from the [vehicle], frisking them, placing them in
the back seat of squad cars and even handcuffing them briefly
until it was determined they were not armed, were reasonable
steps taken by the officers to safely conduct their investigation.

Id. at 137 (emphasis added) (quotation and citations omitted); see Williams, 407 U.S. at
146, 92 S. Ct. at 1923 (“[T]he policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop should
not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect.”).
Similar to Munson, the stop in this case involved multiple suspects and two of them
reportedly were armed. Also like Munson, the officers were acting on information that the

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suspects were transporting narcotics in their vehicle. In fact, the circumstances here
provide greater support for the officers’ safety-based use of force because the CRI had been
in the vehicle earlier that day and had observed that two men in the vehicle were armed .
In addition, Palmer did not stop the vehicle when the police indicated that he should do so.
See Williams, 407 U.S. at 148, 92 S. Ct. at 1924 (“When [the defendant] rolled down his
window, rather than complying with the policeman’ s request to step out of the car so that
his movements could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at [the defendant’s] waist
became an even greater threat.”).
Again, when determining whether the use of force by the police turned an
investigative stop into an arrest, we must balance “the aggressiveness of the police methods
and the intrusiveness of the stop against the justification for the use of such t actics, i.e.,
whether the officer had a sufficient basis to fear for his or her safety .” Balenger, 667
N.W.2d at 139. Although the officers’ use of force in this case was aggressive, it was
justified given the officers’ reasonable belief that two men in the suspect vehicle recently
had been selling drugs and were armed. Thus, the officers’ actions did not transform an
otherwise legitimate investigative stop into an arrest requiring probable cause.
Conclusion
Because the officers had a lawful basis to stop and frisk Palmer, and because the
totality of the circumstances justified the level of force used in doing so, we affirm.
Affirmed.