In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: E. T.-P., Mother.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1075

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: E. T.-P., Mother.

Filed January 7, 2019
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-JV-17-1975; 27-JV-15-5735; 27-JV-16-1504;
27-JV-16-4936; 27-JV-17-4506; 27-JV-18-302

Kathleen Korniyenko, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, Minnesota ( for appellant E. T.-
P.)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services)

Deaundres Wilson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for father A.L.R.)

Thomas J. Nolan, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, J udge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, appellant mother argues that
(1) the county failed to make re asonable efforts to reunite the family; (2) the record does
not establish that she failed to satisfy the duties of the parent-child relationship; and (3) she
is not a palpably unfit parent. We affirm.

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FACTS
E.T.-P. is the birth mother of eight children, five of whom ar e under the jurisdiction
of Hennepin County District C ourt, Juvenile Division. Because these five children have
similar names and initials, we will refer to them as “Child 1,” “Child 2,” “Child 3,” “Child
4,” and “Child 5,” according to their chronological birth order (i.e., Child 1 is the eldest).
This appeal concerns the termina tion of mother’s parental right s to three of her children:
Child 1 (d.o.b. 8/26/2008), and infant twins Child 4 and Child 5 (d.o.b. 9/19/2017).1
Child 1’s biological father is S .G.R. Mother and S.G.R.’s rel ationship began in
2006. He is 25 years mother’s senior, and mother reported that their relationship was
plagued with conflict and several breakups. During one of the breakups, mother met
A. L. R. t hr ou g h wor k. A. L. R. i s t he bi ol o g i c a l fa t he r of Chi l d 4 and Child 5. Mother
reported that, initially, A.L.R. took care of her and allowed her to stay with him when she
experienced difficult times with S.G.R. Eventually, A.L.R. became abusive to mother and
repeatedly threatened her with violence. Mother obtained a first order for protection (OFP)
against A.L.R. on or about June 2014, and a second OFP in April 2017.
Mother and her children first became known to Hennepin County C hild Protection
Services (the county) in June 2015. The county received a report that mother routinely left
her children in the care of S.G.R. The county became concerned because S.G.R. suffered
from vascular dementia, had difficulty remembering where the ch ildren were, and would
sometimes forget that he had ch ildren to care for. The county conducted a family

1 C h i l d 2 a n d C h i l d 3 a r e u n d e r t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c t court for termination
proceedings in separate files.

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assessment and discovered that S. G.R. required 24-hour care wit h daily activities. The
county assigned mother an ongoing family assessment social worker to offer services and
to support a safety plan regarding the care of Child 1.
The county received several subs equent reports of abuse and neglect of the children,
including reports that neighbors were woken up by S.G.R. yelling at Child 1 and Child 2,
threatening to kill them, that S.G .R. locked Child 1 in a car o n a hot day, refusing to let
him out, and that S.G.R. had been overheard telling Child 1 to rape people. The county
filed a child in need of protection and services (CHIPS) petition and Order to Show Cause
for Child 1 and Child 2. The district court held a hearing on the Order to Show Cause and
ordered Child 1 and Child 2 to remain in mother’s care on the c ondition that the children
not be left alone with S.G.R.
The county subsequently received another report that mother ha d again left the
children alone with S.G.R. all day, who allegedly hit Child 1 on the hand, leaving a mark.
The report also indicated that S.G.R. had been driving with the children, which he had been
directed by his doctor not to do. The next day, the county filed an amended CHIPS petition
with an accompanying ex parte motion for immediate custody, and Child 1 and Child 2
were removed from mother’s care. Child 1 was placed in non-rel ative foster care, and
Child 2 was placed in A.L.R.’s care.
Mother admitted to the CHIPS p etition, and the district court ordered compliance
with a case plan. Two days later, the county received a phone call from mother, who stated
that she was suicidal and wanted to “say goodbye to her boys on e last time.” The county
discovered that mother had been “wandering the streets, refusing to return home, [and] was

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unable to make a contract for her own safety with the [child pr otection social worker].
[Mother] was disassociating, confused, and began having hallucinations that both children
were dying. She continued to make comments regarding the end of her own life.” Mother
eventually agreed to go to her local clinic, and the next day she was put on a medical health-
and-welfare hold.
Child 1 was gradually reunited with mother under a Trial Home Visit (THV), on the
condition that S.G.R. was not all owed to drive with the childre n in the car. In December
2016, the THV for Child 1 was converted to protective supervisi on, and the child was
transitioned back to mother’s care.
On January 20, 2017, mother allowed S.G.R. to drive her to work , with Child 2 in
the car, and they got into a car accident. Mother broke her pelvis, and both she and S.G.R.
were taken to the hospital immediately. As a result, the district court ordered Child 1 and
Child 2 into out-of-home placement. Child 1 was placed in rela tive foster care, where he
remains to this day.
In April 2017, the county file d a petition for Termination of Parental Rights (TPR)
for Child 1. The district court held an admit-deny hearing to adjudicate, with respect to
Child 1, the TPR petition and a dispositional review of the CHI PS petition. The district
court also adjudicated separate matters for Child 2 and Child 3 at the hearing, including a
pretrial hearing on a Transfer of Legal Custody (TLC) petition. Mother and S.G.R. entered
denials. The district court bifurcated the TPR and TLC matters and set trials for different
dates.

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When the twins Child 4 and Child 5 were born on September 19, 2017, the county
filed a new TPR petition on their behalf. The district court ordered the twins into ongoing
out-of-home placement and held an admit-deny hearing for them o n October 2, 2017.
Pursuant to a motion by the county, the district court combined the two termination
petitions for Child 1, Child 4, an d Child 5, over mother’s obje ctions. On March 2, 2018,
S.G.R. died. A court trial as to mother’s parental rights to C hild 1, Child 4, and Child 5,
took place on April 17-18 and May 15-16, 2018. On May 1, 2018, mother petitioned the
district court to amend or vaca te the second OFP against A.L.R. Mother alleged that she
now felt safe with A.L.R., had a renewed confidence in his pare nting abilities, and no
longer needed the OFP. The district court vacated the OFP against A.L.R.
After multiple days of testimony and the receipt of numerous ex hibits, the district
court terminated mother’s parental rights to Child 1, Child 4, and Child 5 on three statutory
grounds: neglecting to comply w ith the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child
relationship, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2018); that she is palpably unfit to be
a party to the parent-child relationship, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018); and,
following the children’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction
of the court, have failed to co rrect the conditions leading to the placement. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2018). The district court declined to terminate mother’s
parental rights on two additional bases as requested by the county. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of review
We review a district court’s factual findings in a TPR case for clear err or and its
determination of the statutory bases for an abuse of discretion . In re Welfare of Children
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence
or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T.,
814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Min n. App. 2012) (quoting In re Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656,
660-61 (Minn. 2008)). Reviewing courts give considerable deference to the district court’s
decision because it is in a superior position to assess the cre dibility of witnesses. In re
Welfare of Children of B.M., 845 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. App. 2014). We will affirm the
district court’s determination if at least one statutory ground for termination exists, it is in
the best interests of the child, and there is clear and convinc ing evidence that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744
N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). Mother only challenges the three statutory grounds for
termination.
II. Reasonable efforts under § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the county
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it undertook reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
and reunite the family because the county failed to offer services to establish a co-parenting
relationship with A.L.R. Mother’s argument lacks merit.

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A mother’s parental rights may be terminated under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5), if there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts, under the direction
of the district court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home
placement. For a court to presume that reasonable efforts have f a i l e d , t h e f o l l o w i n g
elements must be met: (1) the child has resided out of the home , under court order, for a
cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding 22 months; (2) there exists a court-
approved out-of-home placement plan; (3) the conditions that le d to the out-of-home
placement persist; and (4) the county has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv). Mother disputes only
element (4).
In determining whether the re sponsible county or agency has ma de reasonable
efforts, reviewing courts must consider whether the services pr ovided to the child and
family were (1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the
n e e d s o f t h e c h i l d a n d f a m i l y ; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible;
( 5 ) c o n s i s t e n t a n d t i m e l y ; a n d ( 6 ) r e a l i s t i c u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s tances. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h) (2018). The efforts must be aimed at correcting t he conditions which led to
out-of-home placement. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 88. Additionally, courts must consider the
length of time a county was involved with the family and the quality of the county’s effort.
Id. In determining which reasonable efforts are appropriate, “the child’s best interests,
health, and safety must be of paramount concern.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018).
On the first factor, the county worked with mother to implemen t the first court-
ordered case plan, which set forth specific tasks aimed at the conditions that led to out-of-

8
home placement. The county then modified mother’s case plan on several occasions as
new circumstances became known to the county. For example, when the county discovered
that mother continued to leave the children in the care of S.G.R, in spite of the county and
S.G.R.’s medical team warning mo ther not to do so, mother’s cas e plan was modified to
include a task to not leave the children unsupervised with S.G. R. This adjustment was
relevant, under the circumstances at the time, to the safety and protection of the children.
With respect to the second facto r, the record reflects that the county adequately met
the needs of mother and her children. In the beginning of the case, the county provided
mother with resources about how to obtain daycare assistance so that she did not have to
leave her children with S.G.R. Mother did not follow through on the advice, so the county
assisted her with completing each step of the daycare-application process. In addition, the
county arranged for mother to work with numerous mental-health providers to understand
and address mental-health barriers that related to her inabilit y to safely and appropriately
parent her children.
As to factors three, four, and five, it is clear from the reco rd that the county
endeavored to provide mother services that were culturally appr opriate, available and
accessible, and consistent and timely. The county selected agencies that had a history or a
practitioner familiar with Hispani c families and sought agencie s that did not require co-
pays or insurance, as mother did not have the financial or insurance resources to make those
payments. Mother also had Spanish-language translators from th e county during all
conferences in which her case plan was discussed. With respect to the final factor, the case
plan was realistic, and the county took efforts to modify it to address mother’s needs.

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Additionally, the county has been involved with the family sin ce the summer of
2015, shortly after it received the first report about the safe ty of the children. Since then,
the county has evidenced a genuine commitment to helping mother through its offering of
numerous, individually tailored services. The specific choice o f services and service
providers also reflected consideration, by the county, as to the children’s health, safety, and
overall best interests.
Despite this record, mother argues that the county failed to un dertake reasonable
efforts because no services were offered regarding a co-parenting relationship with A.L.R.
However, it was only on May 1, 2018, two weeks before the end o f the court trial, that
mother requested vacation of the most recent OFP against A.L.R. and testified that she
wished to engage in a co-parenting relationship with him. Prio r to that, mother had
consistently maintained that she was afraid of A.L.R. and that he was a “dangerous man.”
During her interactions with the county, she repeatedly alleged that A.L.R. made threats of
violence towards her and that he had raped her on numerous occasions, resulting in several
of her pregnancies. Mother also had two OFPs against A.L.R. du ring this case.
Nevertheless, the record indicates that, while the June 2014 OF P was in place, the county
worked with mother and A.L.R. to coordinate drop off and pick up at supervised visits to
not violate the OFP. Mother cannot have it both ways; A.L.R. cannot be both a viable co-
parent option and a threat to her safety and the safety of her children.
Throughout this entire case, mother had maintained that her children were not safe
in A.L.R.’s care due to his verbal, physical, and sexual abuse, until just two weeks before

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the end of the court trial. Given these facts, it was neither reasonable nor realistic for the
county to attempt to provide mother and A.L.R. with co-parenting resources.
Mother’s argument is further weakened by her disingenuousness throughout the
proceedings. Testimony from the county and photographic exhibi ts indicate that mother
intentionally lied to the court, her domestic-violence advocate , and the child-protection
social worker about maintaining regular and possibly intimate c ontact with A.L.R. at his
residence while an OFP was in p lace. Mother initially reported to the county that a
neighbor in her apartment complex looked after the children and that she had been bringing
the children to work with her every day, but later conceded tha t she had been leaving the
children alone with S.G.R. Also, mother provided reports to the county regarding the car
accident in January 2017, which w ere later discredited by eyewi tness accounts. At trial,
mother changed her report of the accident to be consistent with the eyewitness statements.
The district court noted, and we agree, that mother’s own dupli city has limited the
effectiveness of the services offered and has hindered her progress in making the changes
necessary to have her children returned to her care. Because clear and convincing evidence
establishes that the county provided mother with a variety of mental-health, parenting, and
medical services for the duration of mother’s case, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the county made reason able efforts to rehabilitate
the parent and reunite the family. Because at least one statutory ground supports the TPR,
we need not consider the other two bases. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
Affirmed.