State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1086

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rani Lee Carpenter,
Appellant.

Filed October 28, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-17-1183

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, David P. Frank, Assistant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam S. Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgment, which was stayed to permit appellant to
pursue postconviction p roceedings, appellant argues that his convictions for fifth -degree
controlled-substance crime and fourth -degree driving while impaired must be reversed

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because his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge an illegal search, which
would have resulted in suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the charges. Because
we determine that trial counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant Rani Lee Carpenter argues his convictions must be reversed be cause he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, appellant argues his trial counsel
was ineffective because counsel failed to seek suppression of evidence against appellant ,
contending that the deputy performed an illegal trespassory search by physically intruding
onto appellant’s truck to perform his investigation. The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantee criminal
defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. To succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the claimant must affirmatively prove that his counsel’s
representation (1) “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “tha t there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987)
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)).
When reviewing a postconviction court’s denial of relief on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we consider the “ court’s factual findings that are supported in the
record, conduct a de novo review of the legal implication of th ose facts on the ineffective
assistance claim, and either affirm the court’s decision or conclude that the court abused
its discretion because postconviction relief is warranted.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493,
503-04 (Minn. 2013) . A postconviction cour t “abuses its discretion if it exercised its

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discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of
the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Reed v. State , 925 N.W.2d 11, 18
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must first
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003). Appellant asserts
that trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable given the clarity of the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012).
In Jones, Antoine Jones was suspected of trafficking narcotics. Id. at 402, 132
S. Ct. at 948. The government obtained a search warr ant to install a GPS device on the
vehicle he drove. Id. Specifically, the warrant authorized the government to install the
GPS on the vehicle registered to Jones’s wife in the District of Columbia within 10 days.
Id. at 402-03, 132 S. Ct. at 948. However, agents installed the GPS on the vehicle while
it was parked in a public lot in Maryland on the 11th day. Id. at 403, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
Using the GPS, the government was able to track the vehicle’s movements for 28 days.
Id. Jones and several alleged co-conspirators were subsequently charged with controlled
substance crimes. Id. at 403, S. Ct. at 948. The court determined that the “[g]overnment
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information” and that
the physical intrusion amounted to an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
404-05, 132 S. Ct. at 949.

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The case at hand is factually distinct from Jones. Here, a woman called 911 to
report that a purple semi -truck was swerving on Highway 2 and had nearly run her off
the road. A Beltrami County Sheriff’s deputy received this information from the
dispatcher. The deputy noticed a truck matching the caller’s description and pursued the
vehicle. After verifying that the truck’s license plate matched the one identified by the
caller, the deputy activated his lig hts to initiate a traffic stop. Once the driver pulled
over, the deputy approached the semi and immediately climbed up onto the steps leading
to the cab door of the truck to speak with the driver. From his position on the truck steps,
the deputy was able to see inside the semi-truck.
The deputy identified the truck driver as appellant, Rani Lee Carpenter. During
his conversation with appellant, the deputy noticed that several of appellant’s teeth were
missing or decayed, which suggested to the deputy that appellant used
methamphetamine. The deputy also noticed a butane torch on the passenger seat, which
he recognized as a device methamphetamine users use to smoke the drug. Finally, the
deputy noticed that appellant’s hands were “continually shaking” as he looked for his
insurance paperwork. The deputy’s observations led him to believe appellant was under
the influence of a controlled substance. The deputy asked appellant to exit the truck to
perform field sobriety tests. Based on the results of the field sobriety test, the deputy
placed appellant under arrest. Appellant was charged with and subsequently convicted
of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance and fourth -degree driving while
impaired.

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As noted previously, appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to raise a Fourth Amendment claim under Jones. It is not plain to us
that Jones so clearly applies to the facts of this case. And appellant concedes there is no
caselaw applying Jones to the factual situation presented here (i.e. officer climbing up
onto the running boards of a tall truck to speak to a driver). Under the standard articulated
in Strickland, trial counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. We fail to see how trial counsel’s performance can be objectively
unreasonable when no clearly applicable caselaw exists to support such a claim. As such,
we determine that appellant did not affirmatively prove that trial counsel’s performance
was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland test.
Moreover, this is not a case where trial counsel failed to file any motions. Trial
counsel filed suppression motions on behalf of appellant. Specifically, trial counsel
argued that the officer did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
to justify the stop and that the officer unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop by
conducting field -sobriety testing. Appellant argues that trial counsel took the
“conventional approach.” We determine that trial counsel raised suppression issues that
were supported by Minnesota caselaw. Trial counsel’s performance was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances of this case. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying a ppellant’s petition for postconviction relief based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.