State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1096

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Lewis-Williams,
Appellant.

Filed May 20, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-9223

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lyndsey Olson, Saint Paul City Attorney, Steven E. Heng, Assistant City Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court misstated
the law when it gave the self-defense instructions to the jury. Because we determine that

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the district court erred, and that the error is not harmless beyond a reason able doubt, we
reverse and remand.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant John Lewis -Williams with one
count of misdemeanor domestic assault ( harm) in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.2242, subdivision 1(2) (2016), in response to D.B.’s report that, on November 2, 2017,
her boyfriend, Lewis-Williams, bit her after she refused to let him read her journal.1 Before
trial, Lewis-Williams filed a notice of his intent to assert self-defense. A jury trial was held
on April 5 through 9, 2018. The state called four witnesses . Lewis-Williams testified in
his defense.
According to Lewis -Williams, on November 2, he asked D.B. to give him their
shared journal so he could read what D.B. wrote a bout their relationship issues . D.B.
attempted to hand Lewis-Williams the journal, but when he reached for it, she pulled it
back causing him to fall on top of her . At that point, D.B. grabbed Lewis-Williams and
put him in a “half-nelson.” Lewis-Williams testified that he was scared, he felt like he was
in danger, and he felt like he could not breathe. Lewis-Williams bit D.B. so that she would
let him go.

1 Approximately two months later, the state charged two additional count s: misdemeanor
domestic assault (fear) and disorderly conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes sections
609.2242, subdivision 1(1), 609.72, subdivision 1(3) (2016).

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Because the district court determined that Lewis -Williams had met his burden of
production, the district court read a self-defense i nstruction to the jury before their
deliberations. Ultimately, the jury found Lewis-Williams guilty of domestic assault.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Lewis-Williams argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court
erred in its jury instruction and that error is not harml ess beyond a reasonable doubt. The
state concedes that an error occurred and that it is unable to show that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even with the state’s concession, this court must
decide cases in accordance with the law. State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7
(Minn. 1990).
This court reviews a district court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016). Upon review, we co nsider whether
the instructions, when taken as a whole, fairly and adequately explain the law. State v.
Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 1 78 (Minn. App. 2017). An instruction must not materially
misstate the law, or confuse or mislead the jury on fundamental points of law. Id. Further,
“if the court erred in its instructions, we review the error to determine whether it was
harmless.” State v. Larson , 787 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2010). An erroneous jury
instruction does not merit a new trial if the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Pollard, 900 N.W.2d at 181 (quoting State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 683 (Minn. 2007)).
Minnesota law distinguishes between two different fo rms of self -defense.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.06 provides that reasonable force may be used upon another

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without the other’s consent “when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist
an offense against the person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2018). The elements of
self-defense under section 609.06, subdivision 1(3), are
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of
the defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief
that he or she was in imminent danger of ... bodily harm;
(3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and
(4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to
avoid the danger.

State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014). A claim of self-defense arising under
section 609.06, subdivision 1(3), is reflected in the jury instruction in CRIMJIG 7.06,
entitled “Self-Defense—Generally.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.06 (6th ed. 2018).
Alternatively, Minnesota statutes section 609.065 provides that a person may
intentionally take a life when it is “necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which
the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.065 (2018). The use of deadly force in self -defense is justified under
sections 609.06 and 609.065, if the following factors are satisfied:
(1) The killing must have been done in the belief that it was
necessary to avert death or grievou s bodily harm. (2) The
judgment of the defendant as to the gravity of the peril to which
he was exposed must have been reasonable under the
circumstances. (3) The defendant’s election to kill must have
been such as a reasonable man would have made in light of the
danger to be apprehended.2

2 If the events oc cur outside of the defendant’s home, there is also a “duty to retreat and
avoid danger if reasonably possible.” Edwards, 717 N.W.2d at 413.

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State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 413 (Minn. 2006). A claim arising under this statutory
section corresponds with the jury instruction in CRIMJIG 7.05, entitled “Self -Defense—
Justifiable Taking of Life.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.05 (6th ed. 2018).
At trial, the district court determined that Lewis -Williams had met his burden of
production and was entitled to a self -defense instruction. Because deadly force is not at
issue in this case, the district court read instructions that mirrored those provided in
CRIMJIG 7.06 . However, the district court concluded—over Lewis -Williams’s
objection—that the law required proof that Lewis-Williams feared “great bodily harm” and
read the following instruction:
The four elements of self-defense are:
One, an absence of aggression or provocation.
Two, an actual and honest belief that imminent death or great
bodily harm would result.
Three, a reasonable basis existed for this belief.
Four, an absence of reasonable means to re treat or otherwise
avoid the physical conflict.
The State, rather, can demonstrate that the defendant did not
act in self-defense by negating any one of the four elements by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

(emphasis added). Lewis-Williams argues that the instruction materially misstates the law
by indicating that his use of force could only be justified if he reasonably feared great
bodily harm, rather than simply bodily harm.
This court has addressed a similar issue in Pollard, 900 N.W.2d at 177. Pollard was
charged with intentional second-degree murder and second -degree felony murder , but

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claimed that the resulting death was accidental rather than intentional. 3 Id. The district
court read CRIMJIG 7.06, instructing the jury that appellant had to have acted “in the belief
that it was necessary to avert death or great bodily harm.” Id. at 178. This court explained
that the justifiable -taking-of-life instruction was inappropriate —and misstated the law —
because it required the jury to find a greater fear-of-harm requirement than that requirement
under the law. Id. at 180. Though the facts in Pollard are distinguishable, the underlying
principle remains persuasive. Accordingly, we determine that the jury i nstruction in this
case was erroneous.
We next turn to the question of whether the jury instructions were harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Here, as the state concedes, it is possible that the jury may have reached
a different verdict if the jury had be en properly instructed on self -defense. We note that
the definitions for bodily harm and great bodily harm differ significantly. Minnesota law
defines “bodily harm” as “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical
condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2018). Whereas “great bodily harm” is “bodily
injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Id., subd. 8 (2018).

3 The jury instructions note that when a death is accidental the more general CRIMJIG 7.06
should be used rather than CRIMJIG 7.05. The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that it is error to provide the justifiable -taking-of-life instruction, instead of the
general self-defense instruction, when the defendant asserts self-defense but claims that the
death was not the intended result. See e.g. State v. Carridine , 812 N.W.2d 130, 143 -44
(Minn. 2012) (concluding that the justifiable -taking-of-life instruction was given i n error
where the defendant's defense was that the death was unintended).

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Because the error in the jury instructions went directly to the fear-of-harm requirement for
Lewis-Williams’s defense , it is possible on these facts that the jury convicted Lewis -
Williams even if it believed his version of events. See State v. Huber , 877 N.W.2d 519,
527 (Minn. 2016) (providing that an error in jury instructions affected appellant’s
substantial rights where the jury “could have believed [appellant’s] version of events and
yet still convicted him because of these errors ”). More specifically, the jury could have
believed that Lewis-Williams bit D.B. because he could not breathe—constituting physical
pain or an impairment of physical condition —but still convicted Lewis-Williams because
it found that he did not have a sufficient basis to fear “great bodily harm.” Because the
error in this case prevented the jury from fully considering Lewis -Williams’s defense that
he bit D.B. because he feared bodily harm , we cannot conclude that the erroneous jury
instruction is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4
Reversed and remanded.

4 Lewis-Williams also raises additional arguments regarding the admissibility of two
witnesses’ trial testimony. We decline to address these arguments for three reasons. First,
because we reverse and remand based on the district court’s erroneous jury instructions,
we need not reach the question of whether the district court erred in its evidentiary rulings.
Second, we note that when the evidence was admitted at trial, the defense did not object on
hearsay grounds. The supreme court has previously held that given “[t]he number and
variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion ... objections to such testimony [are]
particularly important to the creation of a record of the [district] court’s decision-making
process in either admitting or excluding a given statement.” State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d
498, 504 (Minn. 2006). Third, the admissibility of the r elationship evidence may be
relitigated by the parties on remand. Therefore an opinion issued by this court regarding
the admissibility of the relationship evidence would be advisory in nature. See State v.
Her, 781 N.W.2d 869, 876 (Minn. 2010) (noting that appellate courts avoid advisory
opinions).