Lawrence Paul St. Marie, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1132

Lawrence Paul St. Marie,
Appellant,

vs.

Leslie Boedigheimer,
dba Tony B’s Car Care Center LLC,
Respondent,

Ryan Bridge,
dba Bridges Custom,
Respondent.

Filed April 29, 2019
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-16-1115

John H. Bray, Dryer & Overom, Ltd., Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Leslie Boedigheimer, Cloquet, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Ryan Bridge, Cloquet, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his request for attorney fees
under Minnesota’s Truth in Repairs Act (the Act), Minn. Stat. §§ 325F.56-.65 (2018), and
in finding that his damage estimates were speculative and conjectural. We affirm.
FACTS
Beginning in 2015, appellant Lawrence Paul St. Marie entered into several informal
transactions with respondents Leslie Boedigheimer and Ryan Bridge. Boedigheimer
operates Tony B’s Car Care Center, and Bridge operates Bridges Custom. Boedigheimer
and Bridge performed repair work on St. Marie’s automobiles. Boedigheimer and Bridge
would provide St. Marie with an oral estimate of the cost of their services prior to
performing the work, but St. Marie never requested or received a written estimate.
In June 2016, St. Marie sued Boedigheimer and Bridge seeking the return of
numerous items of his personal property, including vehicles, tools, and related items.
Boedigheimer counterclaimed for unpaid storage fees. Bridge counterclaimed for unpaid
invoices for repairs to three of St. Marie’s vehicles. In his answer to Boedigheimer’s and
Bridge’s counterclaims, St. Marie asserted a claim for attorney fees under the Act.
At the court trial held on October 20, 2017, St. Marie testified that Boedigheimer
was responsible for $5,410.28 in damages for unsatisfactory pai nt and repair work,
including $904.15 in damage to a Camaro, $4,322.13 in damages to a Nova, and $92 per
vehicle for unreturned paint. Because St. Marie’s claims against Boedigheimer relied on
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preliminary estimates for unperformed repairs, the district court found that the claimed
damages were speculative and conjectural, and denied the claims.
St. Marie claimed that Bridge was responsible for $1,556.72 in damages for
automotive parts that were either unreturned or poorly installed. The district court denied
St. Marie’s claims for unreturned items because he submitted no supporting evidence
regarding their value. The district court also found that the evidence supporting St. Marie’s
claims that Bridge failed to properly install two carburetors and fabricate an instrument
bezel consisted only of Ebay listings, without any further evidence that he purchased the
items or had them installed. The district court therefore denied these claims as speculative
and conjectural as well.
The district court found Boedigheimer failed to prove the existence of an agreement
regarding storage fees, and denied his counterclaim . The district court awarded the full
amount Bridge sought on his counterclaim, finding that the invoices owed by St. Marie
remained unpaid. The district court denied St. Marie’s claims for attorney fees. The
district court held that because the dispute with Boedigheimer only involved fees for
storage, the Act did not apply. The district court held that because Bridge prevailed on his
counterclaim, St. Marie could not recover attorney fees against him.
On June 5, 2018, the district court amended its finding regarding St. Marie’s claims
against Bridge, finding that St. Marie substantiated his claim for a Holley four-barrel
carburetor in the amount of $260, and for gauges in the amount of $210.96. The district
court accordingly amended its order for judgment, awarding St. Marie $470.96 in damages
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against Bridge, reducing Bridge’s judgment against St. Marie to $7,075.30. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
Attorney fees
St. Marie argues that the district court erred in denying his claim for attorney fees
against Boedighei mer when it determined that the Act did not apply to a dispute over
storage fees. “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.”
Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). “If the meaning of a statute
is unambiguous, we interpret the statute’s text according to its plain language.” Brua v.
Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010).
St. Marie alleged that Boedigheimer violated the Act when he refused to return
St. Marie’s vehicle because of an unpaid storage fee. The Act authorizes an award of
attorney fees for a violation of section 325F.61. Minn. Stat. § 325F.63, subd. 1. That
section mandates the return of a customer’s repaired vehicle when the customer has paid
their bill, except for the portion that represents “repairs, service calls, or estimates which
were performed but not authorized.” Minn. Stat. § 325F.61(a).
In denying St. Marie’s claim for attorney fees against Boedigheimer, the district
court relied on section 325F.56, subdivision 2, which defines the meaning of the word
“[r]epairs” for the purpose of the Act. A storage fee is not included in the Act’s definition
of “repair.” See Minn. Stat. § 325F.56, subd. 2 (defining “[r]epairs” to mean work
performed, including price of parts and materials, to restore a malfunction or worn vehicle).
St. Marie does not assert that the storage fee constituted a service call or estimate.
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Therefore, an unauthorized storage fee is not a violation of section 325F.61, and thus does
not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees on that statutory basis.
St. Marie relies instead on section 325F.60, subdivision 1, which requires a shop to
provide a customer with a written invoice upon completion of repairs. The invoice must
include “a statement o f any charge for storage.” Minn. Stat. § 325F.60, subd. 1(f). An
invoice1 for storage was filed with the district court, of which the district court took judicial
notice. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record of any violation, and the district court
did not err in denying St. Marie’s request for attorney fees under the Act.
Damages
St. Marie argues that the district court erred in finding that his claims for dam ages
against Boedigheimer and Bridge were speculative and conjectural, and therefore
unrecoverable. “[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error.”
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). “[W]hen
determining whether a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict. To conclude that findings of fact are clearly erroneous
we must be left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id .
(citation and quotations omitted). “We review a district court’s application of the law de
novo.” Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Human Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016).

1 Although an invoice was provided after repairs, and in compliance with the statute, the
record shows no pre-repair agreement as to storage fees, resulting in the district court’s
determination that Boedigheimer could not prevail on his counterclaim.
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“[D]amages which are speculative, remote, or conjectural are not recoverable. The
law does not require mathematical precision . . . but only proof to a reasonable, although
not necessarily absolute, certainty . . . .” Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn.
1977) (quotations and citation omitted).
St. Marie testified that the damages to the Nova were to repair “[t]he glass, the paint
that’s been splashed on the fenders on the hood, and to . . . put a cover on [the foam installed
under the hood] so it wouldn’t be coming out like that any more.” These repair costs were
substantiated by an invoice. St. Marie testified that the damages to the Camaro were to fix
“[t]he body work to be . . . redone where the quarter panel on the Camaro to be made whole
again or fixed right, and then the mirrors to be repainted, taken . . . his green flames off.”
These repair costs were also substantiated by an invoice.
St. Marie sought the r eturn of certain vehicles and other personal property held by
Boedigheimer and Bridge. As such, he alleged an action for replevin. See Widgren v.
Massie, 352 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Minn. App. 1984) (“Since respondent seeks recovery of the
truck, her action is a replevin, not conversion action.”). In an action for replevin, damages
“may be for the possession or the value thereof in case possession cannot be obtained, and
damages for the detention, or the taking and withholding.” Minn. Stat. § 548.04 (2018).
St. Marie did not testify to or claim damages he suffered as a result of
Boedigheimer’s improper detention of the vehicles. Rather, he testified to repairs that were
poorly performed and needed to be redone, the value of which he substantiated with
estimates from a repair shop. These damages all sound in breach of contract, a claim
neither pleaded by St. Marie nor addressed in the district court’s findings. A party who
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fails to amend pleadings is bound by the pleadings unless the issue outside the pleadings is
litigated by consent. Rios v. Jennie- O Turkey Store, Inc., 793 N.W .2d 309, 317 (Minn.
App. 2011). The record does not show that either Boedigheimer or Bridge consented to
litigate claims for breach of contract. Therefore, there is no basis upon which to award
St. Marie damages for unpleaded claims, regardless of whether the claimed damages were
speculative.
In contrast to the unpleaded damage claims for repair/repainting of the Camaro and
the Nova, the $184 in damages asserted by St. Marie for unreturned paint do sound in
replevin, even though unused paint was not listed in the amended complaint. St. Marie
testified that the value of the unreturned paint was $92 each for the two vehicles, but did
not provide any evidence that he purchased the paint, or of its value. The district court did
not find St. Marie’s testimony as to value credible. “Assessment of witnesses’ credibility
is the unique function of the trier of fact.” Even v. Kraft, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 831, 835 (Minn.
1989). The district court did not err in denying St. Marie’s claim for damages against
Boedigheimer.
The district court denied St. Marie’s claimed damages against Bridge that lacked
evidentiary support. St. Marie testified that because Bridge never returned the keys for a
Pontiac Chieftain, he had to buy a new lock assembly f or $2 50. He testified that he
provided Bridge with a piece of fiberboard to construct a backseat for one of the vehicles
with a value of $25, which was never returned. Finally, St. Marie testified that he paid $45
for oil and a filter, but did not state wheth er those items were installed or returned.
St. Marie has not directed us to any evidence in the record supporting these claims.
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Therefore, the district court’s finding that they lacked evidentiary support was not clearly
erroneous.
The district court denied St. Marie’s claim for a carburetor rebuilding kit with an
asserted value of $52 because it found that Bridge installed the kit in a 1972 Nova.
St. Marie testified:
the first time [Bridge] rebuilt the carburetor on the Nova . . . it
ran so bad that he said, “You know what . . . Go buy another
kit and I’ll put it in there.” So I went and bought another kit
and brought that to him and he never installed it.

The district court found that Bridge’s work on the Nova included rebuilding a carburetor
with a rebuilding kit provided by St. Marie. This finding implicitly discredits St. Marie’s
testimony and is not clearly erroneous.
The final two items that St. Marie argues that the district court improperly found to
be speculative and conjectural were $299 for an instrument bezel and $423.75 for a racing
carburetor. St. Marie supplied Ebay listings showing the price s of both items, but did not
provide evidence showing that he purchased either. St. Marie testified that “what I ended
up having to do is . . . buy one of these bezels that was already . . . done . . . and that’s the
replacement cost because Mr. Bridge did not” fabricate a bezel as agreed. St. Marie further
testified, “[t]hat was the price I paid for the carburetor for the yellow Camaro. They rebuilt
that one as well, and it never ran. . . . so I bought another carburetor.” Absent any evidence
supporting St. Marie’s claims that he actually purchased both items, the district court did
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not find this testimony credible. The district court did not err in denying St. Marie’s
claimed damages against Bridge.
Affirmed.