State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1144

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Deandre Darnell Bradley,
Appellant.

Filed June 24, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-18-20

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Atto rney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brandi Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Sche llhas, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction and sentence for felony
domestic assault, appellant Deandre Bradley challenges the dist rict court’s admission at
trial of evidence regarding three prior bad acts—one involving the current victim, and two

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involving a previous girlfriend. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the evidence as relationship evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2018, Bradley was charged with committing felony do mestic assault
(harm) and felony domestic assault (fear) against his girlfriend, A.Z. At trial, A.Z. testified
that, on January 6, 2018, Bradley grabbed the hair on the back of her head, yanked her head
down, and threatened to “f--- [h er] up more if [she] called any body.” In his testimony,
Bradley denied assaulting A.Z. and indicated that A.Z. was “us[ing] the judicial system as
a way to get [him] in trouble” because she was angry at him.
Over Bradley’s objection, evide nce of three previous incidents of domestic conduct
was admitted under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2018). First, A.Z. testified about what happened
on the day that an earlier relationship she had with Bradley en ded. She testified that, in
2012, Bradley pushed her head into a bathroom cabinet and grabbed her by the neck after
they had an argument because she believed he was cheating on he r. Second, E.U., who
dated Bradley in 2014, testified that, on April 10, 2014, Bradl ey got mad because E.U.’s
then-five-year-old daughter talked loudly with someone on the phone and that Bradley then
grabbed E.U. by the arms, threw her up against the wall, and trashed her apartment. Third,
E.U. testified to another incident on June 10, 2014, in which B radley punched her in the
back of the head, grabbed her, and slapped her in the face duri ng an argument about their
relationship. The district court gave the jury a cautionary ins truction immediately before
A.Z.’s and E.U.’s testimony was introduced.
Bradley was found guilty of both offenses, convicted of felony domestic assault
(harm) as the greater offense, and sentenced to 24 months in prison.

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This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
A district court’s decision to admit evidence under Minn. Stat . § 634.20 is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004). To obtain
reversal based on such an abuse of discretion, an appellant must also establish that the error
prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See State v. Benton , 858 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn.
2015).
Section 634.20 provides for the admission of what is known as “relationship
evidence.” State v. Mathews , 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). Under the statute,
“[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or
against other family or household members, is admissible unless the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Bradley
does not dispute that A.Z.’s and E.U.’s testimony is relationsh ip evidence; instead, he
argues that the evidence is inadm issible because “the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id.
Probative value of the evidence
Bradley argues that the evidenc e regarding previous domestic conduct against E.U.
was irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, because it only illuminates his relationship with
E.U., not with A.Z., the alleged victim of the charged crimes. This argument is
unconvincing. As an initial matter, the supreme court has interpreted Minn. Stat. § 634.20
to mean that “evidence of similar conduct in domestic abuse tri als is relevant and
admissible unless it should be excluded for the reasons listed [in the statute].” McCoy, 682
N.W.2d at 159 (emphasis added). Thus, the relationship evidence is relevant. The question

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under section 634.20 is whether the risk of prejudice substantially outweighs its probative
value. The probative value of r elationship evidence depends on the extent to which the
evidence “helps to establish the relationship between the victi m and the defendant” or
“places the [charged offense] in context.” State v. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn.
App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010). “[E]vidence showing how a defendant
treats his family or household members, such as his former spou ses or other girlfriends,
sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests
how the defendant may interact with the victim.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637
(Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). E.U.’s
testimony illuminates Bradley’s relationship with A.Z. and, therefore, has probative value.
Bradley also challenges the relevance, or, more appropriately, the probative value,
of the evidence of the prior assault against A.Z. He suggests t hat the probative value was
minimal because A.Z. was not a recanting victim and therefore t he state did not need to
show the “full picture of the relationship” so the jury could u nderstand how his control
over her “might affect [her] willingness to testify.” Bradley relies on McCoy, 682 N.W.2d
153. In McCoy, the victim sent a letter to the court before the trial, stati ng that she had
given false information to the police out of anger because she had learned that her husband
was cheating on her. 682 N.W.2d at 156. During trial, she testi fied that she did not
remember what she had previously told the police. Id. Recognizing that an abuser’s control
over a victim and the absence of other witnesses are “difficult i e s t h a t c a n a r i s e i n
prosecuting domestic abuse crimes ,” the supreme court held that the admission of prior
domestic conduct under section 63 4.20 could provide the jury “a context with which it
could better judge the credibility of the principals in the relationship.” Id. at 161.

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However, McCoy did not hold that the abuser’s control over the victim is requ ired
for the evidence of prior domestic conduct to have probative value. And this court has held
evidence of prior domestic conduct to be sufficiently probative in many cases in which the
victim did not recant her allegations. See, e.g., State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 802-03
(Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018); State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d
438, 440 (Minn. App. 2017); Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d at 649. Alth ough A.Z.’s testimony
might have had different or additional probative value had the facts of this case been akin
to McCoy, it nevertheless had probative value here to place the charged o f f e n s e i n t h e
context of their relationship.
Danger of unfair prejudice
Next, Bradley argues that there was a significant danger of un fair prejudice because
the risk of the jury using the relationship evidence as propensity evidence was too high. It
is certainly true that evidence regarding a defendant’s prior conduct can, in some situations,
pose “the risk of leading the ju ry to improperly conclude that [the defendant] has a
propensity to behave criminally and should now be convicted, an d punished, for the
charged offense[].” State v. Hormann , 805 N.W.2d 883, 891 (Minn. App. 2011), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). However, Bradley has not shown that his case presents such
a situation. Cf. id. (holding that “open-ended and narrative testimony” covering 20 years
of marriage “without temporal specificity” was not admissible as relationship evidence).
Rather, the circumstances here are much more similar to those in Andersen, where
the defendant punched his girlfriend in the face, and the victim testified that the defendant
had hit her face on a different occasion in the previous year. 900 N.W.2d at 439-40. The
defendant in Andersen argued, as Bradley does in this case, that “‘it was nearly impossible’

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for the jury to fairly evaluate the charges after it heard the relationship evidence.” Id. at
442. This court rejected the argument, holding that, given the district court’s cautionary
instruction, the unfair prejudice was not so substantial. Id. at 441-42.
“When balancing the probative value against the potential prej udice, unfair
prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damagi ng evidence; rather,
unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair
advantage.” State v. Bell , 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). “A
district court’s limiting instruction lessens the probability of undue weight being given by
the jury to the evidence.” State v. Ware , 856 N.W.2d 719, 729 (Minn. App. 2014)
(quotation omitted). Here, the district court carefully prefaced each introduction of A.Z.’s
a n d E . U . ’ s t e s t i m o n y w i t h a c a utionary instruction, and it is u ndisputed that these
instructions were adequate. The probative value of A.Z.’s and E . U . ’ s t e s t i m o n y i s n o t
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in admi tting the relationship
evidence under section 634.20, we need not address whether the outcome of the trial was
prejudiced by its admission.
Affirmed.