State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1145

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Paul Mattson,
Appellant.

Filed May 13, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cleary, Chief Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-16-861

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attor ney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H . Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Clear y, Chief Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In this direct appeal from th e judgment of conviction, appella nt Christopher Paul
Mattson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting h is conviction for fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance. Mattson also argu es, for the first time on

2
appeal, that the condition of his pretrial release that subject ed him to searches of his
residence predicated upon reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional. In the alternative, he
asserts that officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to search his residence.
Because the evidence was suffici ent to prove that Mattson const ructively possessed
methamphetamine, we affirm in part. But because the district c ourt erred in relying on
e v i d e n c e n o t i n t h e r e c o r d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t o f f i c e r s h a d a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that Mattson violated a condition of his release, we reverse in part and remand.
FACTS
On May 17, 2016, the Crookston Police Department received a re port of
“concerning activity” at Mattson’s residence. Mattson’s neighbor informed the police that
she observed two women approach Mattson’s house and knock on the doors and windows
for about 15 minutes. Mattson then arrived home on a bicycle and briefly went inside with
one of the women before they left. Crookston police relayed th is information to the drug
task force.
Upon receiving this information, the drug task force developed a plan to conduct
surveillance on Mattson’s residen ce. The officers reviewed Mat tson’s conditions of
pretrial release in two pending cases for fifth-degree controlled substance crimes, including
the condition that he is subject to “random searches of his/her person, possessions,
residence(s), and/or motor vehicle(s) by a peace officer or pro bation officer, with or
without probable cause reasonable suspicion, to ensure compliance with these conditions

3
of release.”1 The officers received reports from other drug-task-force officers that Mattson
had approached a house in an area frequented by two people with histories of drug use,
reached into the mailbox, took som ething, and left. Another of ficer also informed the
surveillance team that Mattson had been linked to a check-forgery case.
While drug-task-force officers w atched Mattson’s residence the next day, an officer
observed Mattson smoking on the front porch. The officers decided to approach the house
to speak with Mattson. After Mattson went back inside the house, Officer Nathan Nelson
knocked on the door for a few minutes and testified that he cou ld hear someone inside.
After several minutes lapsed, Officer Nelson drew his weapon, h iding it behind the back
of his leg. Officer Aessio Schrage testified that because “[n]o one was answering, we hear
movement, we’re investigating me th, and people who are using me t h c a n b e
unpredictable,” he ran back to his vehicle to get his bulletproof vest.
Mattson came to the front door and opened the curtains to spea k with the officers
through a window. Officer Nelson told Mattson that he wanted to visit with him, and that
the drug task force was going to search his residence. Mattson refused to open the door.
Officer Schrage testified that Mattson became increasingly agit ated throughout the
encounter and screamed at the officers for trespassing. After moving in front of Officer
Nelson, Officer Schrage drew his gun, pointed it at Mattson, an d instructed him to open
the door and show his hands. Mattson moved to a picture window and ripped open the

1 The issuing judge who set Mattson’s conditions of release removed the stricken language
and replaced it with the italicized language.

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curtains so that the officers could see that he did not have an y weapons. Officer Schrage
holstered his weapon.
Following a disagreement about his conditions of release, Mattson permitted Officer
Schrage to enter the house. Officers conducted a search of Mat tson’s residence and
discovered a pink straw containing a white, powdery residue, a broken pen tube with white,
powdery residue, a piece of tinfoil with burnt, black residue, and two yellow pills in the
garbage pile in his garage. The residue on the pink straw test ed positive for
methamphetamine; the residue on the broken pen tube tested inconclusive for the presence
of methamphetamine. Mattson cons e n t e d t o a u r i n e t e s t , a n d i t was positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC.
The state charged Mattson with fifth-degree possession of a co ntrolled substance in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014). Matt son moved to suppress the
evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his residence, contending that the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that he violated a condi t i o n of hi s r e le a s e . The
district court denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion that
Mattson violated the term of his conditional release that prohi bited him from the use or
possession of controlled substances.
At trial, the parties stipulated that law enforcement had a va lid basis to search
Mattson’s residence. A jury found Mattson guilty of fifth-degr ee possession of
methamphetamine, and the district court sentenced him to a 15-m onth term of
imprisonment, staying execution of that sentence for 5 years. This appeal follows.

5
D E C I S I O N
I. The evidence was sufficient to support Mattson’s conviction for fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance.

Mattson argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to prove that he
committed fifth-degree possessi on of a controlled substance. W hen reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, this court conducts “a painstaking analysis of the record to
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction,
was sufficient” to support the verdict. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). We assume that “the jury believed the sta te’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted). “[W]e will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due
regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, could reasonabl y conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.”
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
The fifth-degree possession statute under which Mattson was tried required the state
to prove that he unlawfully possessed a “controlled substance c lassified in Schedule I, II,
III, or IV, except a small amount of marijuana.” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1).
Possession may be proved through actual or constructive possession. State v. Salyers, 858
N . W . 2 d 1 5 6 , 1 5 9 ( M i n n . 2 0 1 5 ) . “ A c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n , a l s o r e f e r r ed to as physical
possession, involves ‘direct physical control.’” State v. Barker , 888 N.W.2d 348, 353
(Minn. App. 2016) (quoting Jacobson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 46 N.W.2d 868, 871

6
(Minn. 1951)). The purpose of the constructive-possession doct rine is to establish
possession in
those cases where the state cannot prove actual or physical
possession at the time of arrest but where the inference is
strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the
[item] and did not abandon his possessory interest in the [item]
but rather continued to exercis e dominion and control over it
up to the time of the arrest.

State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975).
Mattson contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he constructively
possessed the methamphetamine found in his garage because two r eceipts belonging to
K.B. were found near the metham phetamine and drug paraphernalia . To establish
constructive possession, the state must show either (1) the prohibited item was found “in a
place under [the] defendant’s exc lusive control to which other people did not normally
have access” or (2) if police fo und the prohibited item “in a p lace to which others had
access, there is a strong probability (inferable from other evi dence) that [the] defendant
was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. at 611.
When the conviction is based on an inference, the circumstantial-evidence standard
applies, and this court conducts a two-step analysis. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601
(Minn. 2017). First, the court identifies the circumstances pr oved at trial, disregarding
evidence that is not consistent with the jury’s verdict. Id. Second, the court considers the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved. Id. The court
gives no deference to the jury’s determination of guilt at this second step. Id. The evidence
i s s u f f i c i e n t i f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r o v e d , v i e w e d a s a w h o l e , are “consistent with a

7
reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.” Id. But speculation alone is not enough to support a hypothesis
consistent with innocence. State v. Schnagl , 907 N.W.2d 188, 197 (Minn. App. 2017),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018).
Viewing the evidence pertaining to possession in the light mos t favorable to the
conviction, the circumstances pr oved are as follows: (1) Matts on occupied the house
searched by drug-task-force officers; (2) Mattson was alone in the house during the search;
(3) no other person had recently lived or stayed with Mattson i n the house; (4) drug-task-
force officers discovered a pink straw and other items of drug paraphernalia in a trash heap
in Mattson’s garage; (5) the residue on the pink straw tested positive for a trace amount of
methamphetamine; and (6) Mattson consented to a urine test, whi ch tested positive for
methamphetamine.
The second step of our analysis is to determine whether the ci rcumstances proved
are “consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Mattson argues
that it is “reasonable to conclude on these facts that [K.B.] came to [Mattson’s] home and
disposed of her refuse in [Mattson’s] substantial trash heap wi thout [Mattson] ever
exercising dominion over any of it.” But the circumstances proved preclude any reasonable
inference that K.B. was recently in Mattson’s home and disposed of her methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia, alongside her two receipts, in Mattson’s garbage pile. First, drug-
task-force officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernali a in Mattson’s garbage
area inside his garage. Second, although officers found K.B.’s receipts near the items of

8
drug paraphernalia, the officers testified that no one else was in the residence when they
conducted surveillance and executed the search. Third, Mattson informed the officers that
K.B. was a “friend of a friend,” and that no one else had been living or staying with him
recently. Nothing in the record supports Mattson’s claim that K.B. was previously in his
home or that she ever possessed the methamphetamine in question.
In sum, the circumstances proved do not support a rational inf erence inconsistent
with guilt. The evidence is sufficient to prove that Mattson exercised dominion and control
over, and was therefore in constructive possession of, the meth amphetamine found in the
garbage pile inside his garage.
II. The district court erred in relying on evidence not in the record in
determining that the officers had reasonable, articulable suspi cion that
Mattson violated a condition of his release.

Mattson argues that his conviction must be reversed because th e district court erred
in denying his motion to suppre ss evidence seized in the warran tless search of his
residence. Mattson asserts that the district court’s finding that the officers had reasonable
suspicion that he violated a condition of his release to justif y the search is based on facts
not in the record and is therefore clearly erroneous. Reasonable suspicion requires specific,
articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from the facts, reasonably
warrant the intrusion at issue. State v. Davis , 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007). The
showing required is not high, but it requires “more than an una rticulated hunch” and the
ability of an officer “to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.”
Id. (quotation omitted). In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we weigh the
totality of the circumstances, which may include otherwise inno cent factors. State v.

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Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998). “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial
order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under
a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal det erminations de novo.” State
v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court consid ered motions in Mattson’s two other pending charges
for fifth-degree controlled substa nce crimes before hearing tes timony on his suppression
motion in this case. In determining that the officers had reas onable, articulable suspicion
that Mattson violated a condition of his release justifying the warrantless search, the district
court identified four facts to support its determination: (1) the officers knew that a neighbor
reported short-term traffic at Mattson’s residence; (2) the off icers knew that Mattson had
been seen taking something out of a mailbox “at a location freq uented by others involved
with controlled substances”; (3) t h e o f f i c e r s k n e w t h a t M a t t s o n w a s a l l e g e d l y i n
constructive possession of contro lled-substance paraphernalia and that he tested positive
for methamphetamine; and (4) the officers knew that two weeks b efore this incident,
Mattson allegedly violated his conditions of release when he purchased, tested positive for,
and was capable of selling methamphetamine. The district court found that none of these
facts alone amounted to reasonable suspicion. But taken together, the district court found
that these facts established reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mattson violated the
condition of his release that prohibited him from the use or po ssession of controlled
substances.
Mattson asserts that the latter two facts are not in the recor d, and the former two
facts, taken together, do not support a finding of reasonable s uspicion. A suppression

10
ruling must be made “[u]pon the record of the evidence elicited” at the suppression hearing.
State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 141 N.W.2d 3, 13 (Minn. 1965). The only mention of
Mattson’s two separate charges during this suppression hearing occurred when the state
introduced his conditions of release into evidence. But the pr e-printed-conditions-of-
release forms admitted into evidence do not reveal that Mattson faced two separate charges
for fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, only tha t he was subject to certain
conditions of release. Additionally, none of the officers testified about their knowledge of
Mattson’s other charges. Nothing in the record supports the di strict court’s findings that
the officers knew that Mattson constructively possessed controlled substance paraphernalia
and tested positive for methamphetamine, or that he violated co nditions of his release for
purchasing and using methamphetamine. These findings are clearly erroneous.
Because the district court erre d in relying on evidence not in the record, we remand
for the district court to consid er—“[u]pon the record of the ev idence elicited” at the
suppression hearing—whether officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mattson
violated a condition of his release. Id.
III. Mattson waived the argument t hat a warrantless search of a pretrial
releasee’s residence violates th e Fourth Amendment unless it is
predicated on probable cause.

Lastly, Mattson argues that the condition of his pretrial rele ase that subjected his
residence to warrantless searches based on reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional. While
Mattson admits that he “did not s pecifically challenge at the d istrict court the level of
suspicion required to support a warrantless search of his home under the conditions of his
pretrial release,” he asks this court to consider the merits in the interests of justice.

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Generally, we do not “consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, even when
those issues are constitutional questions.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Minn.
2011). “But we may choose to address constitutional and other issues that were not raised
at the district court, when the interests of justice require their consideration and when doing
so would not work an unfair surprise on a party.” Id. (citing State v. Henderson , 706
N.W.2d 758, 759 (Minn. 2005)); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11. The interests-
of-justice requirement is satisfied if the appellant (a) is rel ying on a “rule of law that was
unknown at the time of trial,” and (b) has identified a “fundam ental unfairness to the
defendant [that] needs to be addressed.” State v. Borg, 806 N.W.2d 535, 547 (Minn. 2011)
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted). For example, in Henderson, the appellant
argued that his sentence imposed under the career-offender stat ute violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct.
2531 (2004). 706 N.W.2d at 759. Because Blakely was decided after the appellant’s case
was submitted to the court of appeals, the supreme court exercised its discretion to address
the issue, reversed, and remanded for sentencing. Id. at 759-60, 763.
Here, unlike Henderson, there is no rule of law that was unknown at the time of
trial. Instead, Mattson urges this court to address the level of suspicion necessary to justify
a search of a pretrial releasee’s residence—an issue of first impression. In the context of a
warrantless probation search, the Minnesota Supreme Court has d etermined that no more
than reasonable suspicion is needed to search a probationer’s residence. State v. Anderson,
733 N.W.2d 128, 140 (Minn. 2007 ). Similarly, this court has de termined that the search
of a parolee’s home requires only reasonable suspicion. State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904,

12
909 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. July 17, 2012). But the privacy and
governmental interests, as outlined in the cases of a probationer and a parolee, may differ
in the context of the search of a pretrial releasee. See, e.g. Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843, 850, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2198 (2006) (“On this continuum [of state-imposed
punishments], parolees have fewe r expectations of privacy than probationers, because
parole is more akin to imprisonment.”). Because there is no “rule of law that was unknown
a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l , ” t h e i n t e r e s t s o f j u s t i c e d o n o t r e q u i r e us to address the issue that
Mattson failed to raise at the district court. Borg, 806 N.W.2d at 547.
Moreover, in Mattson’s letter brief filed in support of his mo tion to suppress at the
district court, Mattson conceded that it was “undisputed that [ Mattson] was subject to
testing and searching if officers possessed reasonable suspicion to suspect he was violating
a condition of his release.” He further stated that “the only two legitimate issues are
whether officers had a reasonable suspicion to subject [Mattson] to a search of his residence
and drug testing, and whether the manner in which they carried this search out was
reasonable.” Not only did Matts on forfeit his Fourth Amendment argument by failing to
raise it below, but he also affirmatively waived it by conceding at the district court that his
residence was subject to search upon reasonable suspicion. 2 Nothing prevented Mattson

2 In State v. Beaulieu, the supreme court distinguished waiver and forfeiture. 859 N.W.2d
275, 278 n.3 (Minn. 2015). The court explained that “waiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” while “forfeiture is the failure to make
the timely assertion of a right.” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733,
113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993) (in volving question of whether pre sence of alternate jurors
during jury deliberations was an error the appellate court was permitted to correct despite
a failure to timely object)).

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from asserting in the district court a claim that the search co ndition of his release violates
the Fourth Amendment. And by fra ming the “two legitimate issue s” presented in his
suppression motion to the district court, Mattson failed to put the state or the district court
on notice that he was challenging the constitutionality of the condition of his release. The
state therefore was unable to present responsive arguments or evidence, a relevant factual
record was not developed, and the district court did not issue any findings or conclusions
on point. Mattson affirmatively waived his argument that the condition of his release that
subjected his residence to searc hes upon reasonable suspicion v iolates the Fourth
Amendment, and we decline to consider it. On remand, the recor d will not be opened to
address Mattson’s claim that he failed to raise at the district court.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.