State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1166

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Melanie Ann Quick,
Appellant.

Filed April 1, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-17-6589

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M. , Judge; and
Randall, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges her sente nce for first -degree controlled -substance sale,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a downward-
durational departure. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Melanie Ann Quick with one
count of first-degree sale of a controlled substance. The complaint alleged that on July 26,
2017, Quick sold a police informant a substance that weighed 28.33 grams and tested
positive for methamphetamine.
Quick pleaded guilty to the charged offense. In exchange for Quick’s guilty plea,
the state agreed to dismiss a similar charge in another case and to limit its sentencing
request to a 107-month prison term. The state assumed that the 107-month cap was the
low end of the presumptive sentencing range under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
The district court ordered a pre sentence investigation (PSI) after accepting Quick’s guilty
plea.
Quick moved for a downward -durational departure and asked the district court to
impose a 75 -month prison sentence . Before hearing the parties’ arguments at the
sentencing hearing, the district court noted that the PSI did not address the possibility of a
downward-durational departure. Nonetheless, Quick agreed to proceed with sentencing
that day.

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Quick’s attorney argued that the following circumstances supported a downward -
durational departure: Quick showed remorse and accept ed responsibility, Quick had a
family support system, Quick’s offense was less serious than the typical first -degree
controlled-substance sale, and Quick sold drugs to support her own drug habit . Quick
spoke on her own behalf and emphasized her remorse, her compliance with programming
while in prison, and her pursuit of a college degree. The state argued for a sentence of 107
months as it had agreed to do. But the state noted that 107 months was already a departure
because it was lower than the presumptive sentencing range for Quick’s offense.1 The state
also argued that Quick’s offense was not less serious than the typical offense because it
involved an amount of methamphetamine “well over” the statutory amount for first-degree
sales and that it was “not a victimless crime.”
After the district court heard the parties’ arguments, it briefly recessed the hearing
before sentencing Quick to serve 107 months in prison, stating, “I can’t find any substantial
and compelling reason that allows me to find that t his is less serious than the normal
offense.” The district court explained,
[I]t’s not a victimless crime, this is drug sales. All of the people
that come before me, the people like you before you were
caught for drug sales, the people who are addicted, you are
hurting them by engaging in drug sales in a very deep way by
participating in that, and that’s the reason the Legislature sets
these the way that they do. And that’s why I feel like there is
no justifiable reason for me to depart.

1 The sentencing worksheet revealed that the low end of the presumptive sentencing range
for Quick’s offense was actually 110 months due to a three-month custody enhancement.

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Quick appeals, arguing that the district court erred by denying her request for a
downward-durational departure to 75 months.
D E C I S I O N
A presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is presumed to
be appropriate. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2016) (“The sentences provided in the Grids
are presumed to be appropriate for the crimes to which they apply.”). The district court
must impose the presumptive guidelines sentence unless there are “substantial and
compelling circumstances” that warrant a downward departure. State v. Kindem , 313
N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). “The general issue that faces a sentencing court in deciding
whether to depart durati onally is whether the defendant’ s conduct was significantly more
or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.”
State v. Cox, 343 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. 1984).
The decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines rests within the district court’s
discretion. State v. Oberg, 627 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 22, 2001). Ordinarily, this court will not disturb the di strict court’s imposition of a
presumptive guidelines sentence, even if reasons exist for a downward departure. State v.
Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006). Only in a “rare case” will an appellate court
reverse a district court’s refusal to depart. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7. “[A]s long as the
record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information
presented before making a determ ination,” this court will not interfere with the district
court’s decision to impose the presumptive sentence. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255
(Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted); see State v. Witucki, 420 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Minn.

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App. 1988) (“An appellate court will not generally review the [district] court’s exercise of
its discretion in cases where the sentence imposed is within the presumptive range.”
(quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1988).
Quick contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
for a downward-durational departure because “the offense was less serious than a typical
drug sale offense.” Quick argues that her sale to the police informant involved “just $800
and the substance purchased contained only a small portion of methamphetamine.” Quick
also argues that she is not a “drug kingpin,” that she “sold drugs to feed her addiction, and
that the State made no claim that [ she] was a known dr ug dealer or part of a large drug
network.” Quick therefore asks this court to modify her sentence to 75 months.
The state counters that the record shows that the district court acted within its broad
discretion when it refused to grant Quick’s downward-departure request. The state argues
that the district court properly evaluated Quick’s departure motion by considering the
arguments from Quick, her counsel, and the prosecutor before concluding it could not find
“substantial and compelling reasons” to depart. The state also argues that the district court
had valid reasons to deny Quick’s departure request because the 28 grams Quick sold were
“significantly higher than the minimum 17-gram threshold” and “the legislature seemingly
accounted for the fact controlled substances do not exist in ‘pure’ form and thus chose to
base the penalties on the weight of any ‘mixture’ containing the drug —as opposed to the
drug concentration level or the cash amount exchanged.”
The state notes that the supreme court has only once reversed a district court’s
refusal to grant a downward departure. In State v. Hennum, the defendant was convicted

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of second-degree felony murder and was given a presumptive sentence of 102 months. 441
N.W.2d 793, 794, 800 (Minn. 1989). The supreme court reduced the priso n term to 54
months, a downward-durational departure, because the defendant’s husband, who was the
victim, physically abused her the night she killed him and had done so t hroughout their
relationship. Id. at 794, 800-01. In addition, there was expert testimony that the defendant
suffered from “battered woman syndrome,” and t he PSI recommended a downward-
durational departure. Id. at 797, 800-01. The state argues that unlike the circumstances in
Hennum, Quick has not offered justifications “compelling enough to mandate a departure.”
We agree.
This is not a rare case justifying reversal of the district court’s refusal to depart. The
record shows that the district court c arefully evaluated all of the information presented
before concluding that there was no basis for a downward-durational departure beyond 107
months and did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant Quick’s request for a 75-month
prison term. We therefore affirm Quick’s sentence.
Affirmed.