State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1173

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Curtis Allen Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed July 1, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-28221

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his controlled substance related convictions , arguing that
(1) the state failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that he possessed
certain drugs found in his vehicle and (2) the district court abused its discretion by giving
a prejudicial and erroneous permissive-inference-of-possession jury instruction. We
conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s verdicts.
However, because we conclud e that the permissive -inference-of-possession jury
instruction was erroneous and we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant would have been convicted without the instruction, we reverse and remand for a
new trial.
FACTS
In November 2017, appellant Curtis Allen Anderson and his passenger V.S. were
stopped by a police officer on suspicion of committing traffic violations. The officer
became concerned that appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance because
appellant was fidgety and speaking fast. Upon inquiry, appellant admitted to having used
marijuana earlier in the day, to having used methamphetamine sometime within the last
seven days, and told the officer that he had a marijua na pipe in his vehicle. A drug -
detection dog was called and the dog alerted to the passenger side of the vehicle where
V.S. had been sitting.
Appellant’s vehicle was then searched. A cooler was discovered on the passenger-
side floorboard that contained large amounts of marijuana, methamphetamine, and other

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items commonly used in the drug trade. A headphone case containing marijuana was also
discovered inside the vehicle. Appellant denied knowing anything about the cooler or its
contents but admitted to possessing the marijuana found inside the headphone case.
However, a lottery ticket, which was filled out by hand with appellant’s name and address,
was found inside a day planner in a pocket of the cooler. Appellant was subsequently
arrested and charge d with first -degree possession with intent to sell methamphetamine;
first-degree possession of methamphetamine; fifth -degree possession of a mixture
containing a controlled substance (THC Wax) ; and fifth-degree possession with intent to
sell marijuana.
At trial, appellant argued that V.S. solely possessed the drugs found in the cooler,
that he did not know what was in the cooler, and that the police officer’s investigation was
flawed and unfair. Appellant argued that the officer’s testimony was the only evidence
regarding the investigation into who possessed the drugs , pointing out that there was no
squad car or body cam footage and that the officer took no photographs of the drugs to
show their location within the car. Appellant also wanted to impeach the police officer
with a recent court order in an extremely similar case that found “[t]he police officer’s
testimony . . . was not credible,” and that the officer “testified frankly and without
hesitation to material events that a re not consistent with the video evidence.” But the
district court prevented appellant from impeaching the officer with that evidence.
At the close of trial, and over appellant’s objection, the district court instructed the
jury that they could infer appellant knowingly possessed the controlled substances found
inside the vehicle if they found that appellant was the driver of the vehicle and that the

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controlled substances were found in the vehicle. The jury found appellant guilty on a ll
charged counts. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and argues that (1) there was insufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove that he possessed the drugs found inside the cooler, (2) the
district court gave a prejudicial and erroneous permissive -inference-of-possession jury
instruction, which warrants a new trial , and (3) other issues related to sentencing and
evidentiary determinations. Appellant also filed a pro se supplemental brief.
D E C I S I O N
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues that the state’s evidence was in sufficient to prove that he
constructively possessed the contraband found in the cooler. In reviewing the sufficiency
of evidence, an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether a jury could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged given the facts in the record
and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Bernhardt v. State, 684
N.W.2d 465, 476 (Minn. 2004) . This court considers the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict when it reviews a claim for sufficient evidence. Id. at 477.
To prove constructive possession, the state was required to demonstrate either
(1) the contraband was found “in a place under [appellant’s] exclusive control to which
other people [do] not normally have access,” or (2) if found in a place to which others had
access, appellant “was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control” over the
contraband. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). Two people may be in
joint constructive possession of an item. State v. Harris , 895 N.W .2d 592, 601 (Minn.

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2017). “A conviction based on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny, requiring
that the circumstances proved must be inconsistent with a rational hypothesis of
innocence.” State v. Barnes , 618 N.W.2d 805, 812 (Minn. App. 200 0), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). However, we “still must give deference to the jury’s ability to assess
the circumstantial evidence.” Id.
The marijuana and methamphetamine were found in a vehicle operated by appellant.
Moreover, appellant displayed suspicious behavior prior to the search, admitted to using
marijuana earlier in the day and to having a marijuana pipe in the vehicle, and made
incriminating statements. However, arguably the strongest evidence against appellant was
the lottery ticket bearing his name that was found inside the cooler containing the drugs.
Consequently, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
II. Jury Instruction
Appellant contends that even if we find sufficient circumstantial evidence to support
the jury’s verdict, he is still entitled to a new trial because the district cou rt gave a
prejudicial and erroneous permissive-inference-of-possession jury instruction.
The district cour t is given considerable latitude to select the language of jury
instructions. State v. Ihle , 640 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 2002) . This court “review[s] a
district court’s decision to give a requested jury instr uction for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 2012) . Moreover, jury instructions must
“fairly and adequately explain the law of the case.” Ihle, 640 N.W.2d at 916. If an
instruction materially misstates the law it is erroneous. Id. “[I]t is well settled that the

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court’s instructions must define the crime charged and the court should explain the
elements of the offense rather than simply read statutes.” Id.
Over appellant’s objection, t he district court instructed the jury that “the presence
of a controlled substance in a passenger automobile, permits the Fact Finder to infer
knowing possession of a controlled substance by the driver or person in control of the
automobile when the controlled substance was in the automobile.” (Emphasis added.) The
instruction mirrored Minn. Stat. § 152.028, subd. 2 (2016). We agree with appellant that
the district court abused its discretion by giving this instruction.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that co urts should not give permissive
inference instructions, including those based on Minn. Stat. § 152.028. See State v.
LaBatte, 482 N.W.2d 217, 218 (Minn. 1992) (h olding an instruction erroneous that stated
“the law permits you to infer knowing possession of cocaine by the driver or person in
control of the automobile when the cocaine was in the automobile .” (emphasis added)).
The supreme court has indicated that instructions like the one given in this case are clearly
improper because they do not balance the various relevant factors bearing on a jury’s
determination of the disputed possession issue, but rather “single[ ] out and unfairly
emphasize[ ] one factor, one piece of the circumstantial evidence, bearing on that
determination, thereby suggesting to the jury that in the court’s opinion that factor was of
greater importance than other relevant factors.” State v. Olson , 482 N.W.2d 212, 216
(Minn. 1992).
However, even though the jury instruction was erroneous, that does not necessarily
require the grant of a new trial. “Rather, harmless error impact analysis is appropriate.”

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Id. Under this analysis, we ask whether the “record satisfies us beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error in so instructing the jury was not prejudic ial error requiring a new trial.”
LaBatte, 482 N.W.2d at 218.
Applying this standard, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in Olson that “[w]hile
there undoubtedly was more than enough circumstantial evidence here to support the guilty
verdict, we are concerned about the possible impact of the instruction in this case.” Olson,
482 N.W.2d at 216. And that “[a]though defendant probably would have been convicted
in any event, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he would h ave been
convicted in any event.” Id.
Like the supreme court in Olson, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant would have been convicted with out the jury instruction. As we indicated
above, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the convictions. But the
instruction informed the jurors that the y were not required to consider appellant’s
arguments that contradicted many of the circumstances proved. Consequently, although
appellant probably would have been convicted in any event, we cannot say beyond a
reasonable doubt that he would have been.1
Reversed and remanded.

1 Appellant filed a supplemental pro se brief challenging the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress arguing that the expansion of the traffic stop was not supported by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. We have reviewed appellant’s
pro se arguments and conclude that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to
briefly expand the traffic stop to investigate other criminal activity. Because we conclude
that appellant is entitled to a new trial, we decline to address appellant’s remaining
sentencing and evidentiary arguments.