Cited by
- In the Matter of: Michael Patrick Rainville, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Peterson v. Johnson 755 N.W.2d 758
- Kush v. Mathison 683 N.W.2d 841
- Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press 589 N.W.2d 96
- Dunham v. Roer 708 N.W.2d 552
- Witchell v. Witchell 606 N.W.2d 730
- 755 N.W.2d 766 not in our corpus
- Beach v. Jeschke 649 N.W.2d 502
- Kroning v. Kroning 356 N.W.2d 757
- State of Minnesota v. Donald Joseph Hall, Jr. 887 N.W.2d 847
- 755 N.W.2d 765 not in our corpus
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1185
Emily Peterson, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Scott Howard Meyer,
Appellant.
Filed May 20, 2019
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge*
Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-17-6987
James A. McGeeney, Doda & McGeeney, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Zorislav R. Leyderman, The Law Office of Zorislav R. Leyderman, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.
*Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
STAUBER, Judge
Appellant disputes that messages he sent to respondent constitute repeated incidents
of harassment necessary to support the district court’s issuance of a harassment restraining
order under Minnesota Statutes section 609.748, subdivision 5(b)(3) (2018). Appellant
also argues that the harassment restraining order is vague and overbroad. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Scott Howard Meyer and respondent Emily Peterson, who we re never
married, share a son who was born approximately nine years prior to the harassment
restraining order ( HRO) hearing. Since the birth of their son, Meyer and Peterson have
been engaged in a “significantly contentious” battle over their son. Eventually, the parties
resorted to communicating with one another through OurFamilyWizard (OFW), a
messaging app lication which offers web based and mobile phone based solutions for
divorced or separated parents to communicate.
On October 4 and October 5, 2017 , Meyer and Peterson exchanged electronic
correspondence via OFW. The following messages were exchanged between the parties
on October 4, 2017:
SM (9:43 p.m.): If you don’t plan on showing up Friday in
court, please let me know so that you don’t ruin Coli n’s
weekend in Duluth for no reason. He was very much looking
forward to going up there tonight.
EP (10:09 p.m.): Don’t turn this on me, this is all you and your
obnoxious court filings.
3
SM (10:11 p.m.): This is and always has been all you with your
kidnapping of Colin, your constant lies and manipulative
actions, and your vindictive and immature behavior. Right
from the start.
EP (10:12 p.m.): Nine years Scott! Please find something else
in life to enjoy.
SM (10:25 p.m.): No kidding Emily. Get a li fe and leave me
and Colin alone during my parenting time.
Give me a passport and there’d be no reason to go to
court Friday.
But I guarantee you, Martie, 1 I will never forgive or
forget or let go of what you did by stealing Colin from me and
his siblings then continually interfering with our relationship
with him. 9 years is just the beginning. I’ve only just begun
with you.
SM (10:28 p.m.): And the constant lies. Lie after lie after lie.
I have it all laid out perfectly. And when Colin is older, I’ll
show him everything in addition to the public display of all
your behavior. You know I’m not all talk Emily. I will follow
through. You have only seen the tip of the iceberg from me in
your life.
EP (10:29 p.m.): Please don’t threaten me Scott. I don’t
appreciate your tone and hostility.
SM (10:32 p.m.): It’s not a threat Emily. It will happen. I don’t
make idle threats. You already know that. I will ruin you. No
physical violence of course. I will just put on display
everything you’ve done for your son and the entire world to
see. It’s already in the works.
EP (10:32 p.m.): I have nothing to be ashamed of and I pray
some day you will move on from your obsession with me and
your vendetta against me. Life is good and you should learn to
love it and not lead a life of hate and anger. It is not a good
path to follow and Colin should not be exposed to these actions.
1 Martie is Meyer’s ex-wife.
4
SM (10:40 p.m.): Your words are hollow Emily. They have no
meaning just like you. You are a shell. So full of lies you don’t
know whether you’re coming or going.
But thank you for your wishes. I would rather hold you
accountable and pay the consequences for your actions (that
continue to this day) than do anything else in my life. And if
you haven’t already noticed, my childr en are doing very well
under my guidance and parenting. We will see how well yours
do.
You picked the wrong person to screw over Emily. I
thought you would have known that after watching Martie. But
it didn’t matter because you are as sick and patholog ic as she
is. You two are one in the same.
I will do everything in my power legally and publicly to
hold you accountable for your actions until the day I die. I will
never go away Emily. And Colin will eventually know
everything about you. My other three, Colin’s siblings, already
do. You are far from getting away with what you have done
and continue to do.
SM (10:4 3 p.m.): 9 years is only just the beginning. I’m a
patient man and I don’t mind losing. But I will never go away.
And when I’m gone, my children will take up the fight for me.
On October 5, 2017, Meyer wrote Peterson the following message through OFW:
SM (12:14 p.m.): The court has requested some type of new
settlement document. They will not tell me if they want a new
settlement effort or just a refiling of the prior document. The
games you and the court play just to keep me from parenting
my son are truly ludicrous and childish. If you and the court
haven’t figured it out yet, I will just keep coming back
regardless of the illegal ob stacles you put in my way. And in
less than three years, I’ll have Ashlye and Josh fighting for me.
I’ve filed appeals and even a writ to the Supreme Court. I don’t
care about losing or any of your or the corrupt judges’ rhetoric.
I only care about my children. I will fight to the end for them.
5
Just as an FYI, I’m writing a book and naming names.
It’s all documented and I’ve been waiting a long time for this.
And you can disregard what I say but you know I always follow
through. You and everyone involved will be outed.
I want a passport for my son so I can take him where I
want and when I want without you or anyone else interfering.
Show I’m an unfit parent and then you and the court can
interfere all you want. Until then, stay out of my personal life
which included my parenting.
Give me a passport and agree to not interfere in my
parenting and I’ll let this next hearing go. Otherwise, it is
already rescheduled for May 4 2018 at 9:30 am with Ms.
Stevens. If we wait long enough (just a couple more years),
I’ll have plenty of legal representation.
I will also make sure the court gets a copy of all my
correspondences to you including these on this app.
Peterson sought a n ex parte HRO. A hearing was held; Peterson and Meyer both
testified. Following the hearing, the district court determined that Meyer’s messages to
Peterson from October of 2017 constituted repeated incidents of harassment and issued an
HRO.
Meyer appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review
“[T]he issuance of a n HRO is re viewed for abuse of discretion. ” Peterson v.
Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). This court will reverse the issuance of
an HRO only if the issuance is not supported by sufficient evidence. Kush v. Mathison ,
683 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). “A district
court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard is
6
given to the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 843-
44. “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer
Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). We review questions of law
de novo. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761.
II. The HRO is supported by sufficient evidence of harassment.
Minnesota law allows the district court to issue a n HRO upon a finding that “there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3). The term harassment includes “repeated incidents of
intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are
intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another,
regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended target.2 Id., subd. 1(a)(1).
In order to prov e that harassment has occurred, Minnesota law requires b oth:
(1) objectively unreasonable intent or conduct on the part of the harasser ; and (2) “an
objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to” harassment. Dunham v.
Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Mar. 2 8, 2006).
Objectively unreasonable conduct includes conduct that “goes beyond an acceptable
expression of outrage and civilized conduct, and instead causes a substantial adverse effect
2 The definition of harassment also includes (1) “ a single incident of physical or sexual
assault”; (2) “ a single incident of stalking ”; (3) “ a single incident of nonconsensual
dissemination of private sexual images ”; (4) “targeted residential picketing ”; and (5) “ a
pattern of attending public events after being notified that the actor’s presence at the event
is harassing to another,” none of which are relevant here. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)
(2018).
7
on another’s safety, security or privacy.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846. Statements that are
merely argumentative or inappropriate do not rise to the level of harassment. Witchell v.
Witchell, 606 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. App. 2000).
Here, Meyer argues that his language, while inappropriate and argumentative, is
insufficient to support a finding of harassment because his comments were not analyzed in
the proper context. In Witchell, an HRO was issued against husband for messages he left
his wife in their child-visitation notebook, including: (1) “Joint legal and joint physical is
what I want, and what you swore you would agree to for year s and years if we got a
divorce”; (2) “Please stop telling me what I need to do. Where I choose to go, and who I
choose to see is my decision we are separated”; (3) “Please do not use this book to threaten
me”; (4) “This is the intent and purpose of child support which I pay on a monthly basis at
the maximum rate. I will have my lawyer call your lawyer sometime to explain.” Id. This
court determined that Witchell’s comments, considered within their “context,” did not
constitute harassment. Id . Meyer argues that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to consider Meyer’s comments within “the context of the entire conversation and
within the context of the parties’ ongoing legal d ispute.” However, Meyer’s behavior is
substantially different than the parties in Witchell because Meyer made multiple statements
which were not related to parenting time or child support. Moreover, the district court need
not analyze Peterson’s conduct in its HRO, because the question before the district court
“was not why appellant conducted himself in the manner he did, but whether appellant’s
actions had, or were intended to have, a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security,
or privacy of respondent.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844.
8
Meyer also argues that Peterson failed to prove that th ere were repeated incidents
of intrusive or unwanted words. Though the district court considered two dates—October
4 and October 5 —to support its finding of harassment, Meyer argues that the statements
he made on October 5 were not harassment. Meyer cites to Peterson and Beach to support
the proposition that numerous threats that are made a s part of a single conversation —in
this case, on October 4—constitute only a single incident under the statute. See Peterson,
755 N.W.2d 766 (holding that the HRO was improperly issued upon only one incident of
harassing conduct); see also Beach v. Jeschke , 649 N.W.2d 502, 503 (Minn. App. 2002)
(holding that a “two -sentence statement, uttered on one occasion, does not meet the
requirement of ‘repeated incidents’”).
We are not persuaded by Meyer’s argument because there is sufficient evidence in
the record to support the ongoing harassment of Peterson. Peterson testified Meyer
messaged her outside the parameters of parenting their child “all the time” and that she has
asked him to stop threatening her “numerous ” times.3 The district court considered two
dates—October 4 and October 5 —in its order, to support its finding of harassment. The
messages on October 4 clearly constitute harassment. For example, on October 4, Meyer
messaged Peterson: (1) “I’ve only just begun with you ”; (2) “You have only seen the tip
3 Evidence of a prior OFW conversation on March 9, 2016, between Meyer and Peterson
was admitted during the hearing which ended with Peterson messaging Meyer: “Please
stop harassing me with this and I do not appreciate the way you talk to me.” However, the
district court did not include this instance in its HRO. “Accordingly, this court may assume
that the district court rejected those grounds for issuance of the HRO.” Peterson, 755
N.W2d at 766 (citing Kroning v. Kroning , 356 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn. App. 1984)
(district court “considered and rejected” argument because court “did not make a specific
finding” on the issue)).
9
of the iceberg from me in your life”; (3) “I will ruin you”; and (4) “I will never go away. . .
when I’m gone, my children will take up the fight for me. ” The October 5 comments
reiterated some of the threatening themes from the October 4 conversation. For example,
on October 5, Meyer messaged Peterson:
If you and the court haven’t figured it out yet, I will just
keep coming back regardless of the illegal obstacles you put in
my way. And in less than three years, I’ll have Ashlye and
Josh fighting for me. . . .
Just as an FYI, I’m writing a book and naming names. It’s all
documented and I’ve been waiting a long time for this. And
you can disregard what I say but you know I always follow
through. You and everyone involved will be outed.
“A district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard is given to the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.”
Kush, 683 N.W.2d. at 843-44. The record supports th e finding that Meyer perpetrated
“repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures” that were “intended
to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety , security or privacy” of Peterson. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). Accordingly, we determine that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in its issuance of the HRO.
III. The HRO is not vague or overbroad.
Meyer also argues that the district court’s order is overbroad and vague as applied
to him. A law “is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied if it prohibits constitutionally
protected activity in the particular context of the facts and circumstances of the case.” State
v. Hall, 887 N.W.2d 847, 856 (Minn. App. 2016), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2017).
Meyer argues that the HRO is overbroad because it unconstitutionall y punishes his First
10
Amendment right4 to criticize Peterson and threaten her with publ ication of a book. This
argument is unavailing. First, we see nothing in the HRO that prohibits publication of a
book. Second, Meyer’s argument that the HRO is overbroad because it prohibits him from
criticizing Peterson’s parenting to Peterson is unpersuasive. To illustrate his point, Meyer
offers this court a hypothetical: “But what if [Meyer] legitimately suspected [] Peterson of
child neglect and felt the need to send her a message telling her that her behavior must
change or else he will report her to child protective service s?” We note that i f Meyer, in
good-faith, believed that his child was being neglected or abused, the HRO does not
prohibit him from reporting that to the proper authorities. See Peterson, 755 N.W.2d 765-
66 (providing that it is not harassment to call law enforcement regarding concerns of child
abuse and endangerment if done in good faith).
Meyer argues that the HRO is vague because a reasonable person would be confused
as to the type of conduct the order prohibits. An order is unconstitutionally vague if persons
of “common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.” Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127 (1926).
The HRO prohibits Meyer from harassing Peterson, but provides that Meyer “may have
contact with [Peterson] through Our Family Wizard to discuss child -related issues only”
and “[t]he parties may also have direct contact while participating in any court -ordered
4 We note that this court has previously determined that the harassment statute is narrowly
tailored to regulate unprotected conduct and does not implicate the First Amendment,
likening that conduct to “fighting words,” “true threats,” or an invasion of privacy.
Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 565 -66. “[T]he harassment statute on its face is not a time or
place restriction on speech in a public forum . . . . Instead, it is directed at repeated intrusive
or unwanted conduct that potentially could occur at any time or place.” Id. at 565.
11
ADR process,” but “[n]o other forms of contact are permitted.” We determine that an
individual with “common intelligence” could understand the clear parameters of the HRO
and would not have to guess at its meaning.
Affirmed.