Kelly Cedarberg, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1189

Kelly Cedarberg,
Relator,

vs.

Dakota County Community Development Agency,
Respondent.

Filed April 29, 2019
Reversed
Jesson, Judge

Dakota County Community Development Agency

Christopher Scott, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota
(for relator)

Mary G. Dobbins, Landrum Dobbins LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johns on, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judg e; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Relator Kelly Cedarberg failed to timely report income from her short-term,
part-time employment due, she alleges, to symptoms stemming fro m her mental illness.
Following her late reports, resp ondent Dakota County Community Development Agency
terminated her housing benefits. Cedarberg now challenges the denial of her

2
reasonable-accommodation request and the termination of her hou sing benefits. Because
we conclude that the hearing offi cer erroneously upheld the den ial of Cedarberg’s
reasonable-accommodation request, we reverse.
FACTS
Relator Kelly Cedarberg has been a participant in Dakota County ’s Section 8
Housing Choice Voucher Program since April 2015. The terms of that program required
Cedarberg to report any changes in her household income to resp ondent Dakota County
Community Development Agency (the agency) within 30 calendar days. Cedarberg agreed
to abide by the requirements of the program.
In November 2016, Cedarberg sub mitted her annual application for recertification,
in which she reported no current employment. That changed in 2 017, when Cedarberg
held three part-time jobs for short periods of time. On February 23, 2017, Cedarberg began
working part-time at Carbone’s. Later in 2017, Cedarberg was employed at Benihana from
July 5, 2017 to July 15, 2017 and at Blazin’ Wings from July 7, 2017 to September 24,
2017. At each of these limited-duration positions, Cedarberg worked minimal hours.
Cedarberg informed the agency about her part-time position at Carbone’s in a letter
dated April 4, 2017. This notification of a change in her empl oyment did not fall within
the required 30-calendar-day reporting period. But due to staf f turnover at the agency,
Cedarberg’s late report was not addressed until August 2017, when the agency determined
that Cedarberg needed to repay ove rpaid housing benefits. Afte r receiving an interim
rent-change notification and a re payment agreement, Cedarberg c ontacted the agency to
i n f o r m t h e m t h a t s h e w a s n o l o n g e r e m p l o y e d a t C a r b o n e ’ s . T h e agency then asked

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Cedarberg to provide proof of her employment status. On August 25, 2017, Cedarberg
sent the agency additional paystu bs from Carbone’s and provided —for the f irst time—
paystubs from her positions at Benihana and Blazin’ Wings.
Throughout this time period, Cedarberg was experiencing symptom s from her
mental health conditions, which include bipolar disorder and AD HD. Cedarberg’s
mental-health care provider note d that Cedarberg can have diffi culty understanding her
reporting requirements and keeping up with paperwork as a resul t of her mental health
conditions. Further, Cedarberg’ s doctor was adjusting her medi cations during this time
period and believed that the change in medications at least partially explained Cedarberg’s
late reports of her employment.
About six months after Cedarberg notified the agency of her part-time employment
positions—at which point Cedarber g was no longer employed anywh ere—the agency
determined that Cedarberg’s failure to timely report her employ ment provided a basis to
terminate her housing assistance. 1 The agency sent Cedarberg a letter notifying her that
her housing assistance would be terminated, and Cedarberg requested an informal hearing
contesting the agency’s termination of her housing benefits.
Before the informal hearing, Cedarberg requested a reasonable accommodation
from the agency. Cedarberg’s re quest was based on her contenti on that her documented
mental health conditions prevent ed her from understanding her r eporting responsibilities

1 The agency did not reference Ceda rberg’s late report of income from her position at
Carbone’s as a basis for terminating her housing benefits. Instead, the agency focused on
her late reports of income from her employment at Benihana and Blazin’ Wings.

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and keeping up with paperwork she receives. At the time of the informal hearing,
Cedarberg’s reasonable-accommodation request was still pending with the agency, so the
hearing officer agreed to keep t he record open and delay a deci sion until the
accommodation request was decided.
In deciding Cedarberg’s reasona ble-accommodation request, the agency asked her
to provide a plan of action to ensure her compliance with repor ting requirements.
Cedarberg provided a plan she developed with her caseworker, which stated that she would
communicate any changes in income or employment to her caseworker, ask her caseworker
for assistance when completing a ny necessary paperwork, and man age her mental health
symptoms by attending appointments and taking her medications. A f t e r r e v i e w i n g
Cedarberg’s proposed plan, the agency informed Cedarberg of its intent to deny her
reasonable-accommodation request because her proposed plan did not show how she would
correct the compliance issues. Cedarberg’s counsel contacted t he agency, asked if there
was something additional they wer e looking for to ensure compli ance, and noted a
willingness to tailor Cedarberg’s plan to the agency’s needs. But the agency denied the
reasonable-accommodation request, explaining that “[i]t appears that the proposed plan
will not resolve the issues because it continues to put the burden of continued compliance
on Ms. Cedarberg.”
Shortly after the agency’s denial of Cedarberg’s reasonable-acc ommodation
request, the hearing officer is sued a decision summarily concur ring with the agency’s
denial of Cedarberg’s reasonable-accommodation request, noting that “the information
provided [did] not sufficiently ensure that the program complia nce issues that resulted in

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the termination of Ms. Cedarberg’s benefits will be corrected.” The hearing officer further
determined that termination of Cedarberg’s housing benefits was warranted on the basis of
misrepresentation, noncooperation, and unreported income. Cedarberg appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Cedarberg argues that her reasonable-accommodation request was improperly
denied and that her housing benefits were erroneously terminated. The agency’s denial of
Cedarberg’s reasonable-accommodation request and termination of her housing benefits is
a quasi-judicial decision. And in general, quasi-judicial decisions made by an agency will
be upheld “unless they are unconstitutional, outside the agency’s jurisdiction, procedurally
defective, based on an erroneous legal theory, unsupported by s ubstantial evidence, or
arbitrary and capricious.” Cole v. Metro. Council HRA , 686 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn.
App. 2004) (quotation omitted). We review an agency’s findings to discern whether they
support the decision, but do not make credibility determinations or retry the facts. Senior
v. City of Edina, 547 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Minn. App. 1996).
In order to prevent discrimin ation, individuals with disabilit ies may request
reasonable accommodations in the administration of the Section 8 housing assistance
program.2 Hinneberg v. Big Stone Cty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 706 N.W.2d 220,

2 We note that Cedarberg’s reas onable-accommodation request was, in nature, both
retrospective and prospective. I n her request for reasonable a ccommodation, Cedarberg
asked the agency to forgive her failure to timely report income and provided the agency
with a plan to ensure she would satisfy all program requirement s going forward. She did
not ask for different rules for herself prospectively like, for example, having 60 days to
report income changes in the future. At oral argument, with re spect to consideration of
these types of requests, the agency noted that it sometimes considers them, and sometimes
does not. But the agency did not argue that it was not required to consider a retrospective

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224-25 (Minn. 2005); 24 C.F.R. § 982.53(a) (2016). When evalua ting a
reasonable-accommodation request, we first examine whether a re q u e s t w a s m a d e a n d
whether it was reasonable. In order to prevail on a reasonable -accommodation claim, the
individual requesting the accomm odation “must make a prima faci e showing that the
accommodation she seeks is reasonable on its face.” Hinneberg, 706 N.W.2d at 226. To
do so, the individual bears the burden “to show that her reques ted accommodation is (1)
linked to her disability-related needs, (2) necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to
enjoy Section 8 benefits and (3) possible to implement.” Id. (quoting Huberty v.
Washington Cty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. , 374 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773 (D. Minn.
2 0 0 5 ) ) . I n c a s e s w h e r e a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e i s e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e burden then shifts to the
agency to demonstrate undue hardship. Id.
Here, the agency did not explicitly argue in its brief that Ced arberg failed to make
a prima facie showing. See State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. ,
558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (noting that appellate courts generally decline to reach
issues that are inadequately briefed). And at oral argument, counsel for the agency orally
conceded that Cedarberg establis hed a prima facie case in favor of her
reasonable-accommodation request. Accepting the agency’s conce ssion that Cedarberg
established a prima facie case for her proposed reasonable accommodation, the burden then

reasonable-accommodation request or that a recipient’s request to be excused from an
employment-reporting violation qualifies as a reasonable accommodation. As a result, we
do not decide either question. But once an agency decides to c onsider a
reasonable-accommodation request seeking, in part, retrospective relief—as the agency did
here—it must follow the legal framework governing reasonable-accommodation requests.

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shifts to the agency to demonstrate that providing the requested accommodation creates an
undue hardship for the agency. Hinneberg, 706 N.W.2d at 226.
But nothing in the record indicates that the hearing officer co nsidered whether the
accommodation would present an undue hardship for the agency. No findings relate to this
issue. And the record does not suggest that the agency present ed any evidence or
arguments to the hearing officer r egarding undue hardship. The hearing officer’s failure
to consider this question of undue hardship—as required by caselaw—was error. See Cole,
686 N.W.2d at 336 (identifying “a n erroneous legal theory” as a basis for reversing an
agency’s quasi-judicial decision) . Because the agency did not meet its burden to
demonstrate that Cedarberg’s r easonable-accommodation request would create an undue
hardship for the agency, the hearing officer’s decision to uphold the denial of Cedarberg’s
reasonable-accommodation request was not supported by substanti al evidence. 3 See
Carter v. Olmsted Cty. Ho us. & Redevelopment Auth. , 574 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn.
App. 1998) (noting that a housi ng authority’s decision must be based on substantial
evidence, defined “as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mi nd might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion” (quotation omitted)).
In conclusion, when an agency accepts for consideration a
reasonable-accommodation request, it must follow the framework established by caselaw.
Here, both the agency and the hearing officer failed to do so. The agency effectively

3 Because we conclude that it was error to deny Cedarberg’s reas onable-accommodation
request, we do not reach Cedarbe rg’s additional arguments regarding whether substantial
evidence supported the termination of her housing benefits and the propriety of introducing
certain evidence during the informal hearing.

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concedes Cedarberg made a prima facie case for her reasonable-a ccommodation request,
yet offered no proof that the acc ommodation would be an undue hardship for the agency.
The question of undue hardship was never even addressed by the hearing officer.
Accordingly, we reverse.
Reversed.