State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1203

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

David James Fineday,
Respondent.

Filed December 3, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-18-330

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Jessica M. Plotz, Assistant Cass County
Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mark D. Nyvold, Fridley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratv old, Presiding Judge; Worke, Ju dge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
A police officer stopped a driver, respondent David Fineday, o n a narrow, two-lane
road lined with significant snow banks. When Fineday pulled ov er and slid through the
snow into a ditch on the side of the road, he began to accelera te. The police officer,

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believing that Fineday was trying to flee, ordered him out of his vehicle at gunpoint before
arresting him for outstanding w arrants. In a subsequent search of Fineday’s vehicle,
officers discovered drug paraphernalia. Fineday moved to suppress the evidence found in
his vehicle on the basis that the stop violated his Fourth Amen dment rights. The district
court, without articulating a decision on whether the initial stop was valid, determined that
the evidence did not support the allegation that Fineday was trying to flee and, accordingly,
that the police officer did not have a valid basis to expand the scope of the traffic stop. In
this pretrial appeal, the state argues that the initial stop of the vehicle was valid based on
the police officer’s observation of a broken taillight and that the expansion of the stop was
justified because the officer suspected that Fineday was trying to flee. Assuming without
deciding that the initial stop wa s valid, we conclude that the record contained sufficient
evidence and an appropriate legal basis for the district court to determine that the expansion
of the stop was invalid. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Late one night in February 2018, respondent David Fineday was d riving on a
two-lane road in Cass County, Minnesota. The sides of the narr ow road were lined with
significant snow banks, and there was slight snow cover along t he center of the road.
Although the events leading to the traffic stop are disputed, t hese facts are not: a police
officer pulled Fineday over, ordered him out of his vehicle at gunpoint, and arrested him
for outstanding warrants. Police subsequently searched Fineday’s vehicle and discovered
a glass methamphetamine pipe in plain view. As a result, Fined ay was charged with one

3
count of fifth-degree drug possession and one count of fleeing a peace officer in a motor
vehicle. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.025, subd. 2(1), 609.487, subd. 3 (2016).
Fineday filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized in violation of his right to be
free from unreasonable seizures. At a hearing about his motion , Fineday argued that the
police officer lacked a valid b asis to initiate a traffic stop. Both parties presented their
version of what happened on the night police stopped Fineday. The state entered into
evidence the police squad car video of the stop1 and presented the testimony of the police
officer who stopped Fineday. The police officer testified that he noticed that a dark-colored
Ford Expedition had a broken ta illight and that he could not re ad the license plate, likely
because the license plate light was out. The officer further t estified that he followed the
SUV for a few minutes before ac tivating his emergency lights, but that the driver did not
immediately pull over or complete ly stop for approximately half a mile to a mile. In the
officer’s experience, this behavi or indicated that someone was trying to hide something.
Once the vehicle pulled over, it began to slide through the snow into the ditch. The officer
testified that the driver then accelerated and continued about 50 to 70 yards before coming
to a stop.
Because he thought Fineday was trying to flee, the officer tes tified that he got out
of his car and ordered Fineday out of the stopped vehicle at gu npoint. Fineday exited his
vehicle, put his hands in the air, and lay down on the pavement . The officer handcuffed
Fineday and put him in the police car. Next, the officer approached the stopped vehicle on

1 The video is not clear on the disputed issue of whether the vehicle had a broken taillight
and/or malfunctioning license plate light.

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the driver’s side to speak with the passenger, but had to open the driver’s door because the
window was broken. The officer testified that he found a glass meth pipe in plain view as
a result of opening the door. The officer and a second respond ing officer searched the
vehicle.
Fineday also testified. He testified that because of his mili tary training he observed
whether his vehicle’s safety equipment was functioning every ti me before he got on the
road. He also testified that his taillight had not been functioning a couple days earlier, but
that he had fixed it with Plexiglas and a red permanent marker. Fineday further testified
that on the night he was stopped, all of his vehicle equipment was functioning properly,
including the taillights and the license plate light.
The district court took Fineday’s motion under advisement in or der to watch the
video of the stop. In an order, the district court found that it “need not decide the issue of
whether the officer had a reasona ble basis for a traffic stop” despite the fact that this was
the issue that Fineday raised a nd the parties argued. Instead, the district court found that
the evidence did not support an argument that Fineday was tryin g to flee, so the officer
lacked “a reasonable articulable suspicion to expand the traffi c stop.” Accordingly, the
district court granted Fineday’s motion to suppress the evidence and dismissed the action.
The state appeals.
D E C I S I O N
As a preliminary issue in an appeal of a pretrial order by the state, the state must
demonstrate that the district court’s order “will have a critical impact on the state’s ability
to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order cons tituted error.” State v.

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Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). Determ ining whether it
will have a “critical impact” is a “threshold issue,” meaning that this court will not review
a pretrial order without such a showing. State v. Osorio , 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn.
2017) (quotations omitted).
We have previously determined that
“[d]ismissal of a charge has a critical impact
on the outcome of the trial.” State v. Myers , 711 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. App. 2006),
aff’d sub nom State v. Melde, 725 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. 2006). Here, the district court’s order
suppressed the evidence and dismissed the action. Because the pretrial order had the effect
of preventing the state from pursuing charges against Fineday, the state has met the
threshold critical impact requirement.
We now turn to the state’s arguments. The state contends that the police officer had
reasonable, articulable suspici on for both the initial traffic stop and any subsequent
expansion of the stop. Additionally, the state contends it did not have the opportunity to
address the second issue regardin g the expansion of the stop. When reviewing a pretrial
order on a motion to suppress evidence, we evaluate “the distri ct court’s factual findings
under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s leg al determinations de novo.”
State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007).
The initial stop
Both the United States and Minn esota Constitutions guarantee individuals the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 10. The United States Supreme Court has determined that “[t]emporary detention
of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period

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and for a limited purpose, constitu tes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of this
provision.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996)
But police may conduct a limite d, investigatory stop if they h ave “reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn.
1999). To demonstrate reasonable, articulable suspicion, polic e must show that the stop
was “not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‘specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational infer ences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)). Typically, an officer’s
observation of a traffic law viol ation, even a seemingly insign ificant one, creates an
objective basis to stop a vehicle. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997)
The state argues that the initia l stop was supported by reason able, articulable
suspicion because the police offi cer testified that Fineday had a broken taillight and
malfunctioning license plate equipment. But Fineday testified that all of his vehicle’s
equipment was working properly, and the squad car video of the stop does not resolve the
issue of whether the equipment was working properly or malfunctioning. Although these
are factual disputes based largely on the credibility of the co nflicting testimony between
the police officer and Fineday, the district court did not make any factual findings regarding
whether the vehicle’s equipment was broken or functioning properly. Further, the district
court did not draw a conclusion about whether the initial stop was valid.
Because the district court did not determine the validity of t he initial stop, this court
cannot decide whether it was valid or not. After all, trial co urts—not appellate courts—

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are in the best position to evaluate testimony and decide issues of fact. Schafer v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 348 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Minn. App. 1984). But we read the distr ict court’s
order as assuming without deciding that the initial stop was va lid because it continued to
address the expansion of the stop. Similarly, we assume withou t deciding that the initial
stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion based o n the police officer’s
observation that Fineday’s taillight and/or license plate light was malfunctioning.
The expansion of the stop
Assuming the reasonableness of the initial stop, we turn to ad dress the validity of
the officer’s decision to expand the traffic stop by ordering F ineday out of his vehicle at
gunpoint. The state argues that the expansion of the stop was justified based on the police
officer’s belief that Fineday was trying to flee.
Even if an initial stop is valid , each incremental intrusion by police officers during
the stop must be sufficiently related to and warranted by the r eason for the initial stop.
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88
S. Ct. at 1868). Accordingly, each additional step taken by police officers during a traffic
stop must be related to and jus tified by “(1) the original legi timate purpose of the stop,
(2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness as defined in Terry.” Id. at 365.
The district court determined that the expansion of the stop was not justified by any
of these grounds. In reaching this decision, the district court relied on the squad car video.
Although the police officer testified that he thought Fineday was trying to flee, the district
court found that the squad car video did not support that allegation. The district court found
that Fineday began slowing down almost immediately, and that gi ven the snow cover, it

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was reasonable for Fineday to take his time slowing down so tha t he did not risk sliding
into the ditch. Further, the district court found that Fineday ’s acceleration after he pulled
over was an attempt to prevent his vehicle from becoming stuck in the snow. Because
Fineday was not trying to flee, t he district court determined that it was not reasonable for
the police officer to expand the stop by ordering Fineday out of his vehicle at gunpoint.2
The district court’s findings are well-supported by the record. See Jordan,
742 N.W.2d at 152 (noting that t his court reviews factual findi ngs for clear error). Here,
the police video showed the entirety of the traffic stop and showed Fineday slowing down
s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e o f f i c e r a c t i v a t e d h i s l i g h t s a n d s i r e n s a n d also depicted the significant
amount of snow on the side of the road. Based on the squad car video, it was reasonable
for the district court to determine that Fineday accelerated and spun his wheels because he
was trying to get back on the road to avoid getting stuck in the snow, not to flee. Because
the district court’s factual findings are supported by evidence in the record, they are not
clearly erroneous.

2 Before we turn our analysis to whether the district court’s findings were supported by the
record, we address the state’s contention that the district court’s sua sponte decision about
the expansion of the stop depriv ed the state of notice and the opportunity to present
arguments about that issue. Despite the narrow framing of the issue by the parties, the
police officer testified broadly, explaining not only his reaso ns for the initial stop but his
rationale for ordering Fineday out of his vehicle at gunpoint. T h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t
testimony and evidence in the rec ord for the district court to make factual findings about
the expansion of the stop and address its validity. It was not improper for the district court
to do so. See State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 870 (Minn. 2008) (explaining that a district
court’s factual findings should not be disturbed if there is re asonable evidence supporting
those findings).

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F i n a l l y , w e t u r n t o t h e l e g a l c o nclusion that the expansion of the stop was not
supported by reasonable, articul able suspicion. We review lega l conclusions in pretrial
orders suppressing evidence de novo. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d at 152. Here, we consider
whether the expansion of the stop—the officer’s decision to order Fineday out of his SUV
at gunpoint—is supported by reasonableness.3 To determine reasonableness, we consider
all of the circumstances. See Terry , 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879; see also
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1735 (1967) (noting
that there is no definitive test for reasonableness other than “balancing the need to search
[or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails”).
The only argument offered by the state is that the police offic er’s expansion of the
stop was reasonable because the police officer believed Fineday was trying to flee. But the
district court determined that the officer’s observations—the fact that Fineday took his time
to pull over and accelerated once his tires slipped off the roa d into the snow—were
evidence of Fineday trying to avoid getting his vehicle stuck in the snow, not evidence that
he was trying to flee. It is not reasonable to order an individual pulled over for—at most—
malfunctioning vehicle equipment to exit their vehicle at gunpoint. Because the evidence
supports the district court’s finding that Fineday was not trying to flee, the police officer’s

3 The first two reasons which could potentially justify an expansion of the traffic stop—the
original purpose of the stop or independent probable cause—do not apply here. Askerooth,
681 N.W.2d at 365. The police officer stated that he initiated the stop because of
malfunctioning vehicle equipment, a traffic infraction that would not require the officer to
order Fineday out of his vehicle at gunpoint. Nor did the police officer have independent
probable cause to expand the stop because the district court fa ctually determined that
Fineday was not trying to flee.

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decision to order Fineday out of his vehicle at gunpoint was not reasonable. Accordingly,
the officer’s expansion of the traffic stop was not justified.
Affirmed.