Carol Vanerka Stephens, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1208

Carol Vanerka Stephens,
Appellant,

vs.

Stephen Stephens,
Respondent.

Filed March 4, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-16-1995

Carol Vanerka Stephens, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Colby B. Lund, Jeffrey M. Markow itz, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering , Smetak & Pikala,
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Carol Stephens challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to her children, respondent Stephen Stephens and D.S,
1 on appellant’s petition to reform a
deed and her equitable-interest claim relating to the home in w hich appellant resides.

1 D.S. is not a party to this appeal.

2
Appellant appears to argue on appeal that the district court er red in granting respondent
summary judgment on appellant’s r eformation claim and her “equi table interest” claim,
and that appellant’s due-process rights were violated. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1981, appellant and her mother, R.V., purchased real propert y in Forest Lake
(Forest Lake property) as joint tenants. Around five years lat er, R.V. conveyed, by
quitclaim deed, her one-half interest in the Forest Lake property to a custodian for her then-
minor grandchildren, respondent and D.S. This transfer of interest “modified the part[ies’]
interest in the property from joint tenants to tenants in common.” In 1998, the custodian,
in turn, quitclaimed the half interest formerly owned by R.V. to respondent and D.S. in two
one-quarter interests. As a result, the Forest Lake property was held as follows: appellant’s
one-half interest, respondent’s one-quarter interest, and D.S.’s one-quarter interest.
The Forest Lake property was sold in November 2000. Appellant signed the
warranty deed conveying the property herself and as “attorney in fact” for respondent and
D.S.
Respondent and D.S. never received any funds from the sale of t he Forest Lake
property, but in December 2000, appellant purchased real proper ty in St. Paul (St. Paul
property) for herself, respondent, and D.S. as joint tenants, u sing all of the sale proceeds
from the Forest Lake property. The sellers of the St. Paul property conveyed the property
by warranty deed as follows: an undivided one-half interest to appellant, an undivided one-
quarter interest to respondent, and an undivided one-quarter interest to D.S. The certificate
of title for the St. Paul propert y indicated the same interest allocation after a later

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correction.2 Appellant also signed several affidavits indicating that D.S. and respondent
were co-purchasers of the St. Paul property. In two affidavits, respondent and D.S. swore
that appellant told them she was purchasing the St. Paul property for the three of them “as
joint tenants.” Respondent and D .S. never resided long-term at the St. Paul property and
never paid for “mortgage payments, property taxes, maintenance, repairs and insurance on
the St. Paul property.” Appellant has never paid respondent an d D . S . f o r h e r u s e a n d
occupancy of the property.
In April 2016, appellant petitioned the district court to reform the St. Paul property’s
deed and amend its certificate of title to grant her sole ownership of the property. An initial
examiner’s report was issued in June 2016 which indicated that an amended petition may
be required due to the unusual nature of appellant’s claims. I n October 2016, appellant
filed an amended petition, seeking either reformation of the deed and title for the St. Paul
property so as to reflect appellant as the sole owner or, in th e alternative, for the district
court to determine that appella nt was equitably entitled to sol e ownership of the St. Paul
property. A supplemental examiner’s report was issued in Novem ber 2016, which stated
notice of the action should be given to respondent and D.S.
In January 2018, respondent moved for summary judgment, support ing his motion
with several affidavits. Appellant did not file any responsive, opposing memorandum. The
district court held a hearing on respondent’s summary judgment motion. The district court

2 In 2014, appellant successfully r eformed the St. Paul property ’s certificate of title to
correct an error concerning her i nterest percentage in the prop erty. The reformation
corrected her interest from an und ivided one-quarter interest t o an undivided one-half
interest.

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determined that the St. Paul property was Torrens property. Th e district court noted that
appellant had not properly filed any documents in the record with the district court and that
“[a]t the hearing, [appellant] did not dispute the authenticity of those exhibits offered by
[r]espondent prior to the hearin g or exhibit, H-2, which was re ceived without objection.”
At the hearing, the district court ensured appellant was:
[G]iven an opportunity to offer authority for her position and
to offer testimony and exhibits in support of her petition. Other
than her testimony, [appellant] offered nothing for the record,
nor did she supply the court with any legal authority in
opposition to the motion. Therefore, the only record before the
[district] [c]ourt is the original Petition, the Amended Petition,
the affidavits and exhibits offe red by [respondent], as well as
the arguments and testimony at the hearing.

The district court later gran ted summary judgment for respondent, concluding that:
The deeds are all clear and unambiguous as to the interest being
conveyed. The Certificate of Title correctly reflects the
interests stated in the deed for t h e S t . P a u l p r o p e r t y . T h e
[district] [c]ourt has no basis for reforming or changing the
deed to the St. Paul property, or amending the certificate of
title.

. . . .

. . . The [district] [c]ourt finds that [appellant] has not met her
burden [of presenting specific fac ts that raise a genuine issue
for trial], therefore the [dis trict] [c]ourt grants [respondent’s]
3
Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismisses this case.

This appeal follows.

3 The district court order stated that it was granting “plaintif f’s” motion for summary
judgment. Appellant did not move for summary judgment, and the district court dismissed
appellant’s petition for reformat ion. The references to “plain tiff’s” summary judgment
motion appears to be a clerical mistake by the district court.

5
D E C I S I O N
A district court shall grant a motion for summary judgment when a moving party
“shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact a nd the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. 4 Appellate courts apply a de novo
standard in reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgm ent against a claim of
reformation. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp. , 795
N.W.2d 855, 860-61 (Minn. 2011) (T he “standard of review does n ot change simply
because the claims at issue are for equitable relief.”). Appel late courts “review the grant
of summary judgment . . . to deter mine whether there are genuin e issues of material fact
and whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright
Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Facts are material if
their resolution impacts a case’s outcome. O’Malley v. Ulland Bros. , 549 N.W.2d 889,
892 (Minn. 1996). In order to establish a prima facie case for reformation, a “plaintiff must
establish [the necessary] elemen ts through evidence which is cl ear and consistent,
unequivocal and convincing.” SCI, 795 N.W.2d at 865 (quotation omitted). In reviewing
a grant of summary judgment, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party . . . and resolve all doubts and factual infere nces against the moving

4 The district court applied the former version of rule 56, whic h was recently “revamped”
to more “closely follow” the federal rules. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 56 2018 advisory comm.
cmt. When promulgating amendments to rule 56, effective on July 1, 2018 and applicable
to pending cases, the supreme co urt specifically indicated that amended language on the
standard for granting summary judgment reflects recent Minnesot a caselaw. Order
Promulgating Amendments to th e Rules of Civil Procedure , No. ADM04‐8001 (Minn.
Mar. 13, 2018). Because the legal standard is unchanged, we cite to the current version of
rule 56, even though the district court’s decision was issued before the amended rule took
effect.

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part[y].” Rochester City Lines, Co. v. City of Rochester , 868 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn.
2015).
I. The district court did not err by granting respondent’s moti on for summary
judgment on appellant’s “equitable interest” claim.

Appellant appears to argue that the district court erred by gra nting summary
judgment for respondent on appella nt’s “equitable interest” cla im. However, “equitable
relief cannot be granted where the rights of the parties are go verned by a valid contract.”
U. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Minn. State Zoological Bd., 307 N.W.2d 490, 497 (Minn. 1981); see
also Colangelo v. Norwest Mortg., Inc. , 598 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. App. 1999), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1999).
Appellant’s “equitable interest” claim is based on a theory tha t the Forest Lake
property’s joint-tenancy was not properly severed by R.V. and a ll proceeds from the sale
of the Forest Lake property remained appellant’s following R.V. ’s death. Appellant
claimed that she is equitably entitled to sole ownership of the St. Paul property.
In its order, the district court noted that “neither the facts nor the law support an
equitable action such as this” and that, even if everything appellant claims is true, appellant
is not entitled to equitable relief. The district court also found that R.V. validly conveyed
her one-half interest in the Forest Lake property to respondent and D.S., and the previous
owners of the St. Paul property validly conveyed the St. Paul p roperty to appellant,
respondent, and D.S. The distri ct court concluded that, becaus e there were “two valid
deeds conveying the property to t hese three persons, and establ ishing the ownership
interests in each parcel, equitable concepts do not apply.”

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We agree with the district court that summary judgment on appel lant’s “equitable
interest” claim is proper. Appellant fails, even in the light most favorable to her, to raise
any genuine issue of material fact that would entitle her to equitable relief.
II. The district court did not err by granting respondent’s mot ion for summary
judgment on appellant’s reformation claim.

Appellant appears to contend that the district court erred by g ranting summary
judgment in favor of respondent and D.S. on appellant’s reforma tion claim. Appellant’s
reformation claim was premised on contention that the previous owners of the St. Paul
property “intended to convey the property to the person who had the right to take the
property,” and that all parties to the deed were “mutually mist aken in the belief” that
respondent and D.S. were entitled to an interest in the St. Paul property.
“Reformation is an equitable remedy that is available when a party seeks to alter or
amend language in a contract so that the contract reflects the parties’ true intent when they
entered into the contract.” SCI, 795 N.W.2d at 864. A court may order the reformation of
a written instrument when a plaintiff proves that:
(1) there was a valid agreement between the parties expressing
their real intentions; (2) the written instrument failed to express
the real intentions of the parties; and (3) this failure was due to
a mutual mistake of the parties, or a unilateral mistake
accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct by the other
party.

Id. at 865 (quoting Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980)). A
deed is a written instrument and reformation “generally involves the original parties to an
instrument and those in privity with the original parties.” Slindee v. Fritch Invs., LLC, 760
N.W.2d 903, 911 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).

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In its order, the district court carefully applied law concerni ng reformation of a
written instrument and concluded that “the deed is not an agree ment between [appellant]
and her children. It is a document from the prior owners conve ying the property to
[appellant] and her children. As such, it is not a document su bject to reformation.” The
district court concluded that the deed to the St. Paul property is not ambiguous and “clearly
shows that [appellant] and her children were the ones to whom the property was conveyed.”
The district court also noted that the contemporaneous evidence demonstrates appellant’s
intent at that time to have respondent and D.S. reflected as owners of the property. Finally,
the district court concluded that appellant’s argument that the prior “dealings on the Forest
Lake property somehow affect the ownership interests in the St. Paul property” misses the
point of an action for reformation of an instrument.
Appellant fails to argue, let al one point to a genuine issue of material fact, on any
element of this claim. First, appellant points to no evidence in the record that contradicts
the district court’s determination that the deed was not an agreement subject to reformation.
Second, appellant does not point t o any evidence in the record that demonstrates that the
deed “failed to express the real intentions of the parties” at the time it was signed. Finally,
appellant fails to point to any evidence in the record supporti ng that the deed’s failure to
express the parties’ true intent “was due to a mutual mistake of the parties, or a unilateral
mistake accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct by the othe r party.” SCI, 795
N.W.2d at 865.
Appellant misunderstands the nat ure of reformation. As appella nt has repeatedly
stated, she does not seek to correct the deed; instead she seeks to alter it in order to obtain

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full ownership of the St. Paul property. Reformation proceedin g s a r e f o r c o r r e c t i n g a
document to its intended original meaning, not for adjusting a document based on a familial
falling out. See SCI, 795 N.W.2d at 864.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary ju dgment on
appellant’s reformation claim.
III. Appellant’s due-process clai ms are not properly before this court.

Appellant contends that her due- process rights were violated by the actions of
opposing counsel, the district court, and the examiner of title s. Appellate courts do not
typically consider constitutional issues that were not raised in the district court. St. Aubin
v. Burke, 434 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1989).
Appellant raises, for the first time on appeal, a potpourri of due-process claims. See id.
She cites no legal authority in support of her argument and doe s not provide a coherent
argument that her due-process rights were violated. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471,
479 (Minn. App. 2007) (a party who inadequately briefs an argum ent waives it). We,
therefore, decline to further address appellant’s due-process arguments.
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. We commend the district
court’s thoughtful and thorough consideration of appellant’s claims. We also note that our
decision affirming the district court is made with the understanding that respondent agrees
to voluntarily provide appellant a life estate in his interest, and that neither respondent nor
D.S. “has any intent to ever displace [appellant] from the Sain t Paul property or to
otherwise require her to sell it. Ever.”
Affirmed.