State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1216

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gellis Lee Walton, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed July 15, 2019
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-8912

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chie f Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijo,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Tracy M.
Smith, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of felony violation of an order for protection,
arguing that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and that he is entitled to

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a new trial because the district court committed plain error that affected his substantial
rights by inadequatel y responding to a question from the jury during deliberations. We
affirm.
FACTS
In October 2015, S.H., on behalf of minor A.K., obtained an ex parte order for
protection (OFP) against appellant Gellis Walton , Jr. Among other things, the OFP
prohibited Walton from contacting A.K. and entering A.K.’s residence, an apartment. At
the time, A.K. resided with her mother, who was dating Walton. The OFP remained in
effect until October 2017.
On October 6, 2016, A.K. called the police after seeing Walton with her mother
inside her apartment. Responding officers informed Walton that an OFP existed and that
he could not be at A.K.’s apartment. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Walton with
violating the OFP, but the case was dismissed. On February 9, 2017, A.K. called the police
because, when she entered her apartment, she heard Walton’s voice although she did not
see him. She testified that she could hear him in her mother’s room. Responding officers
verified the existence of an OFP against Walton and arrested him. The state charged Walton
with felony violation of an OFP under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2016),
because he h ad two qualified domestic -related offense convictions, including a
misdemeanor domestic-assault conviction from December 2014, and a gross-misdemeanor
violation of an OFP from June 2015.
Walton stipulated before trial that he had two prior domestic -related offense
convictions within the past ten years. A.K., C.K., two police officers, and Walton testified

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at trial. Walton testified that he thought “we were done with everything” after his October
2016 case was dismissed . When defense counsel asked, “When you say with everything,
what do you mean? What were you done with?” Walton replied, “Order for protection, all
of that, everything.” He maintained that when the October 2016 case was dismissed, he
believed the OFP was also dismissed. On cross -examination, Walton admitted that the
responding police officer on October 6, 2016 , told him that an OFP was in effect, but he
maintained that he did not know that the OFP was still in effect on February 9, 2017.
At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury as follows:
Violation of an order for protection, defined. Under
Minnesota law whoever violates an order for protection
granted pursuant to a domestic abuse act or similar law of
another state and knows of the existence of the order is guilty
of a crime.

Violation of an order for protection, the elements. The
elements of violation of an order for protection are: first, there
was an existing court order for protection; second, the
defendant knew of the existence of the order; third, the
defendant violated a term or condition of the order; fourth, the
defendant’s act took place on or a bout February 9, 2017, in
Hennepin County.

During deliberations, the jury submitted the following question to the district court:
The second element requires that the defendant knew of the
existence of the order. Does the state have to prove that he
believed the order was in effect and that he was, therefore,
violating the order . . . on February 9, 2017, or does the state
only have to prove that he was aware of an order that happens
to still be effective regardless of whether he knew of the
effectiveness (or duration) of that order?”

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The district court answered the jury’s question: “You have been provided with a copy of
the instructions, and the instructions are your guide.” The jury found Walton guilty, and
the district court sentenced him to 23 months’ imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Sufficiency of evidence
This court addresses a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction by conducting “a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict. Lapenotiere v. State, 916
N.W.2d 351, 360–61 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “When evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence, appellate courts carefully examine the record to determine whether the
facts and the legitimate inf erences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the off ense of which
he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
“The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be
assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id.
“The verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder, upon application of the presumption
of innocence and the State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
In this case, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) an OFP against
Walton existed on February 9, 2017, (2) Walton knew of the order, (3) Walton violated a

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term or condition of the OFP, and (4) Walton committed the crime within ten years of the
first of two or more previous qualified domestic-violence-related offenses. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd . 14(a), (b), (d) (2016). Walton argues that the circumstances proved
established a reasonable inference that he did not know that the OFP remained in effect on
February 9, 2017, and that the evidence therefore is not sufficient to sustain the conviction.
Walton argues that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review applies; the state
argues that the direct -evidence standard applies. Direct evidence is defined as “evidence
that is based on personal knowledge or ob servation and that, if true, proves a fact without
inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). The state introduced direct evidence that Walton had knowledge of the OFP on
February 9, 2017. An officer testified that he informed Walton on October 6, 2016, that an
OFP was in effect. Walton testified to that as well but stated that he believed the OFP had
been dismissed along with the charges arising out of the incident on October 6. The jury
judged the cr edibility of Walton’s testimony and the officer’s. Assuming that the jury
believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary, this testimony
would have permitted the jury to reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Walton
knew of the existence of the OFP on February 9, 2017, and that he violated the OFP. We
conclude that the direct evidence admitted at Walton’s jury trial was sufficient to support
Walton’s conviction.
Even if the direct evidence alone is insufficient to prove that Walton knew of the
existence of the OFP on February 9, 2017, the circumstantial evidence along with the direct
evidence is sufficient to prove Walton’s knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Circumstantial evidence is defined as “ evidence from which the factfinder can infer
whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation
omitted). In applying the circumstantial-evidence standard, “we review the sufficiency of
the evidence using a two-step analysis.” State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn.
2016). First, we “identify the circumstances proved , deferring to the factfinder’s
acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that
conflicted with the cir cumstances proved by the State.” Id. (quotation omitted). “After
identifying the circumstances proved, we independently examine the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved to determine whether the
circumstances proved are consisten t with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The evidence proved the following circumstances: (1) on October 20, 2015, the
district court issued an ex parte OFP prohibiting Walton from having contact with A.K and
entering A.K.’s residence; (2) the OFP was in effect on February 9, 2017; (3) on October
21, 2015, service of process of the OFP could not be effected; (4) on October 29, 2015, the
district court ordered alternate service of process, and the OFP was mailed to Walton; and
(5) during a domestic incident on October 6, 2016, responding police officers informed
Walton that the OFP existed and was effective. These circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Applying the
circumstantial-evidence standard, we conclude that the evidence of Walton’s knowledge
of the existence of the OFP on February 9, 2017, is sufficient to support his conviction of
violation of the OFP.

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District court’s response to jury question
Walton argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in its
response to a jury question during jury deliberations. Wal ton did not object at trial to the
court’s response to the jury’s question . “When a defendant fail s to object at trial, the
forfeiture doctrine generally precludes appellate relief.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782,
786 (Minn. 201 7). But an appellate court may consider a forfeited error under the plain -
error test when an appellant establishes (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected
appellant’s substantial rights. Id.; see State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)
(discussing plain-error test). If any requirement of the plain -error test is not satisfied, a
reviewing court need not consider the others. Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 786. If appellant
“establishes all three requirements, we may correct the error only if it seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
Here, the district court responded to the jury’s question, as follows: “You have been
provided with a copy of the instructions, and the instructions are your guide.” If a jury
requests additional instructions regarding the law during del iberation, “[t]he court may
reread portions of the original instructions.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(3)(b); see
State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Minn. 1986) (stating that in response to a jury’s
question, a district court may “amplify previous instructions, reread previous instructions,
or give no response at all”).
Walton argues that the district court’s response constitutes plain error because the
court did not answer the jury’s question with a definition for “know ,” and that the court
therefore failed to properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense. But the court’s

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instruction regarding the elements of violating an OFP was a verbatim recital of 10
Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 13.56 (2015), which included all of the offense elements in
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b), (d).
Walton also argues that the district court misled the jury with its answer regarding
the applicable law. The Minnesota Legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd.
14(d), in 2013. 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 47, § 1, at 204. Before this amendment, two distinct
mens rea standards existed, one for a misdemeanor violation of an OFP and one for a felony
violation of an OFP. A misdemeanor violation required that the defendant “kn [ew] of the
existence of the [OFP],” while a felony violation required that the defendant “knowingly ”
violate the OFP. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a) -(b), (d) (2012). Following the
legislature’s amendment, Minn. Stat. § 518.01, subd. 14 , contains only one mens rea
standard for both misdemeanor and felony violations of an OFP, that is, that the defendant
“knows of the existence of the order.” Walton argues that the jury’s question shows that
the jury may have been applying an outdated, mens rea standard, and that the jury construed
the ins tructions as suggesting strict liability. Walton fails to explain why the court’s
redirection of the jury to the jury instructions already provided did not resolve any
confusion by the jury. See State v. Crims , 540 N.W.2d 860, 864 –65 (Minn. App. 1995),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996) (stating that a district court “may properly refer to its
[jury instruction] when that [jury instruction] provides the jury with the guidance necessary
to resolve its confusion”). The court’s original jury instructions clearly state the applicable
law.

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We conclude that the district court did not err in it s answer to the jury’s question,
let alone plainly err. And even if Walton had satisfied the first and second parts of the plain-
error test, he has failed to establish that any error affected his substantial rights.
Affirmed.