A18-1219

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1218
A18-1219

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael John Martin,
Appellant.

Filed May 28, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Yellow Medicine County District Court
File No. 87-CR-17-264
Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-17-367

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Keith Helgeson, Yellow Medicine County Attorney, Granite Falls, Minnesota; and

Matt Haugen , Chippewa County Attorney, Christopher Reisdorfer , Assistant County
Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant was convicted of third - and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct . He
challenges the district court’s imposition of an executed prison sentence on his third-degree
conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a
downward-dispositional departure. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellan t Michael John Martin with third-
degree criminal sexual conduct by a correctional employee based on conduct that occurred
in Yellow Medicine and Chippewa Counties.1 The charges were based on allegations that
Martin sexually abused L.C.W. while she was under Martin’s supervision on a Sentence to
Service (STS) crew. Martin was an employee of the Minnesota Department of Corrections
at the time . Martin told L.C.W. not to disclose the abuse and that he was a person with
power who “knows people.” Martin provided L.C.W. with cigarettes and pop, allowed her
privileges in violation of jail rules, and dropped her off to see her children while he was
supervising her on STS. L.C.W. feared that she would get in trouble with the jail or not
see her children if she did not do what Martin wanted.
The state alleged that Martin engaged in sexual activity with L.C.W. in Upper Sioux
State Park in Yellow Medicin e County and at a location near Montevideo in Chippewa
County while Martin was supervising L.C.W. on STS. Pursuant to an agreement with the

1 A separate complaint was filed in each county, and the district court consolidated the
cases.

3
state, Martin pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct in the Yellow Medicine
County case and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in the Chippewa County case.
The district court or dered a psychosexual assessment. The assessment indicated
that Martin “was able to acknowledge that his behavior was wrong, because he was
unfaithful to his wife, but failed to recognize how his position of authority coerced the
victim into complying with the sexual abuse.” The assessment recommended that Martin
be required to complete a sex -offender treatment program and that he “should not hold a
position of authority over vulnerable individuals.”
The district court also ordered a presentence investigation (PSI). According to the
PSI, Martin stated that L.C.W. initiated the relationship by “making sexual comments to
[him] on a steady basis,” that he “found [himself] being pulled into her thinking,” and that
eventually the “relationship became physical and [he] felt trappe d.” Martin stated that he
“got caught up in [L.C.W.’s] drama,” that he “regret[ted] it” and was “sorry for it,” that he
never used his “authority to coerce her,” and that “[t]he only victim here is my wife.” The
PSI recommended an executed 48-month prison term for the third-degree Yellow Medicine
County offense and a stayed 48-month prison term for the fourth-degree Chippewa County
offense, based on “the seriousness of the offenses, [Martin’s] position of authority over the
victim which he fails to acknow ledge, and the fact that the sexual abuse occurred on
numerous occasions.”
Martin moved for downward durational and dispositional departures, arguing that
L.C.W. was the aggressor, that he was particularly amenable to probation, and that other
substantial grounds tended to mitigate his culpability. Martin provided a statement at his

4
sentencing hearing and, when asked what he had done to show remorse for his actions, he
said,
I don’t—I don’t know really how to answer that one.
Basically besides the fact that not a day goes by I don’t realize
what I have done. My health has suffered. I suffer from high
blood pressure, which I’m having a hard time controlling. I’ve
lost a lot of weight, thirty pounds since this has all started.
There’s not a day that goes by that I don’t realize what I did
was wrong.

Martin also stated that he was “embarrassed for [his] family and [L.C.W.].” But
Martin claimed that L.C.W. initiated the sexual activity and that he “could not have forced
[her] to do what she did.”
Martin argued that he was particularly amenable to probation because he was
trustworthy, he had left the state several times during the pendency of his case and always
returned, he did not have any substance abuse problems, and he did not have a criminal
record. He noted that he had sought counseling with a psychologist and made an
appointment with a neuropsycho logist to determine whether he may be suffering from a
mental condition such as “Asperger’s.”
A correctional employee spoke at Martin’s sentencing hearing and said that Martin
had “eroded the confidence that all citizens should have in [the] justice system” and that
his actions “not only devalued the victim, but also all the justice professionals who strive
for justice every day.” An employee of the Yellow Medicine County Sheriff’s Office also
provided a statement, saying that Martin broke the trust that he had developed with that
office and “caused a huge black eye and security threats to our facility, our staff members,
and our overall community.”

5
In ruling on Martin’s departur e motion, the district court rejected his claim that
L.C.W. was the aggressor . The district court stated that it had considered Martin’s age,
prior criminal record, and work in the community, as well as his level of remorse,
cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility. The district court reasoned that Martin’s
age did not weigh for or against a departure. The district court recognized that Martin had
support from his family and his pastor but stated that Martin had “clearly burned his bridges
with law enforcement. His former work peers no longer respect him and probation frankly
under these circumstances would—would be difficult.” As to Martin’s remorse, the district
court stated,
Martin has come to court today and said he’s sorry, but even in
his all ocution he —he said he apologized to his family, he
apologized to others, but he didn’t apologize to [L.C.W.].
When Mr. Martin spoke to law enforcement when the case
broke, he first again tried to deny what happened; when faced
with evidence, he ultimately admitted, but he was slow in
doing that; and then when he had confessed to a sexual
encounter, to two sexual encounters with [L.C.W.], this is what
he said, he said I am more ashamed than anything. He didn’t
say I am so sorry that I had sex with [L.C.W.] for her sake
because [L.C.W.] is absolutely the victim here. The
presentation today has described the effect of Mr. Martin’s
actions on his family, on his financial circumstances, on his
life, on his health, but he —he is woefully short in
acknowledging the effect of this on [L.C.W.].

The district court concluded that Martin was “not particularly amenable to
probation” and that “by no means has there been a showing that there are substantial and
compelling reasons to depart” from the sentencing guideline s. The district court entered
judgments of conviction for third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct and ordered
Martin to serve a presumptive executed sentence of 48 months for the third-degree Yellow

6
Medicine County offense and a presumptive stayed sentence of 48 months for the fourth-
degree Chippewa County offense.
Martin appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for a downward-dispositional departure on his third-degree criminal -sexual-
conduct conviction.2
D E C I S I O N
“A [district court] judge sits with a unique perspective on all stages of a case,
including sentencing, and the [district court] judge is in the best position to evaluate the
offender’s conduct and weigh sentencing options.” State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 397
(Minn. 1998). However, “[t]he sentences provided in the [Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines] Grids are presumed to be appropriate for the crimes to which they apply.”
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2016). A district court may d epart from the presumpti ve
guidelines sentence only if substantial and compelling circumstances warrant a departure.
Id. “Substantial and compelling circumstances are those circumstances that make the facts
of a particular case different from a typical c ase.” State v. Peake , 366 N.W.2d 299, 301
(Minn. 1985). Whether to depart from a guidelines sentence rests within the district court’s
discretion, and this court will not reverse the district court’s decision “absent a clear abuse
of that discretion.” State v. Oberg, 627 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 22, 2001).

2 Martin does not challenge the district court’s denial of his request for a downward -
durational departure.

7
Only in a “rare case” will a reviewing court reverse a district court’s imposition of
a presumptive guidelines sentence. State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1 981). A
district court’s failure to exercise its discretion or its reliance on an improper factor may
present the rare circumstance that warrants reversal. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.2
(2016) (listing factors on which the district court should not rely); State v. Mendoza, 638
N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn. App. 2002) (remanding because exercise of discretion by district
court “may not have occurred”), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002); State v. Curtiss, 353
N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. App. 1984) (remanding bec ause record established that district
court failed to consider arguments for departure).
When considering a downward -dispositional departure, the district court focuses
“more on the defendant as an individual and on whether the [guidelines] sentence would
be best for him and for society.” State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983).
“Numerous factors, including the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his
cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family , are
relevant to a determination whether a defendant is particularly suitable to individualized
treatment in a probationary setting.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). But
a district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to depart “from a presumptively
executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would
be amenable to probation.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. App. 2009).
“[A] defendant’s particular amenability to individualized treatment in a
probationary setting will justify departure” from a guidelines sentence. State v. Soto, 855
N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted) . The particular -amenability

8
requirement “ensure[s] that the defendant’s amenability to probation d istinguishes the
defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and compelling
circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Id. at 309 (quotation omitted).
Martin contends that he is particularly amenable to probation. He argues that “many
factors . . . weighed heavily in favor of probation,” including “his clean criminal history
for 48 years, his expressed remorse, his extensive family and community support , and the
fact that he pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility for the offense.” He also notes that
he “had sought out the treatments and assessments necessary to help him rehabilitate
himself from what he had done,” including an assessment to determine whether he was on
the autism spectrum based on a recommendation of his psychosexual assessment.
Martin assigns error to the district court’s reliance on his lack of remorse and the
purported difficulty of supervising him on probation as reasons to den y a dispositional
departure. As to remorse, Martin notes that the district court “criticized [his] showing of
remorse as inadequate” and argues that “a court’s finding of particular amenability to
supervision cannot hinge on whether a defendant’s showing of remorse is neurotypical or
highly emotive.”
“The presence or absence of remorse can be a very significant factor in determining
whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation.” State v. Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d
597, 600 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 1994). “Because the district
court has an opportunity to actually observe the defendant throughout the proceedings, a
reviewing court must defer to the district court’s assessment of the sincerity and depth of
the remorse and wha t weight it should receive in the sentencing decision.” Id.; see also

9
Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 311 (“[W]hether [the defendant’s] apology was genuine or should be
given much weight were matters for the district court to decide.”).
District courts commonly rely on a defendant’s attitude, statements, and actions
when assessing the defendant ’s level of remorse for sentencing purposes. See, e.g. ,
Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d at 598 -600 (stating that district court granted downward departure
based on defendant’s “extremely remorseful attitude” and statements of remorse both in a
psychological examination and at sentencing); State v. Nash , 342 N.W.2d 177, 180 -81
(Minn. App. 1984) (affirming denial of downward departure in part because defendant
failed to show remorse by denying his involvement in the offense), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 15, 1984). The district court here relied on Martin’s statements to the PSI reporter
and at the sentencing hearing, in which he expressed regret for the harm that he had caused
himself and his family, but he did not apologize to the victim or acknowledge that he had
harmed her. We discern no error in the district court’s assessment of Martin’s level of
remorse, and we defer to that assessment.
Martin argues that the district court’s second reason for denying a departure, the
purported difficulty of supervising Martin on probation given that he “burned his bridges
with law enforcement,” was improper. Martin notes that he
will be supervised under these difficult circumstances. [He] is
serving 10 years of probation on the Chippewa file, as well as
his supervised and 10 -year conditional release term on the
Yellow Medicine file. No matter how difficult this supervision
is, it will take place. The [Department of Corrections] has
already navigated one hurdle by sending [him] to an
undisclosed out -of-state facility to serve his prison term. It
may well be that he will be transferred to another county’s
supervision team, or that some other type of arrangement is

10
reached, during the next decade, when he will be on probation
regardless of what this Court decides. But the difficulty in
logistically implementing probation is unrelated to [his]
amenability to probation. Even the court conceded that [he]
“has had a long history of f ollowing rules.” [His] ability to
follow the rules, live safely in the community, complete
programming, and otherwise lead a law -abiding life, is not
affected by the logistical hurdles of probation. [He] is just as
amenable to probation on the first file as he is on the second,
and his past history as a correctional officer does not make that
any less true.

The district court mentioned “burned bridges” in the context of Martin’s position in
the community and the statements of the corrections and law-enforcement representatives
at the sentencing hearing . The district court seems to have determined that Martin’s
support from his family and other members of the community was undermined by the lack
of support from the law-enforcement community. When ruling on a departure motion, the
district court must consider the relevant factors and the reasons for and against departure .
Thus, the district court here could not have based its refusal to depart solely on the opinion
of any one stakeholder, including the la w-enforcement community. But the district court
could consider what is best for “society.” Heywood, 338 N.W.2d at 244. Given the
circumstances of Martin’s offenses, in which he used his position as a correctional officer
to sexually abuse a person entrusted to his supervision, the district court properly weighed
the opinion of law enforcement when assessing the greater societal concern. Moreover,
given the district court’s significant focus on Martin’s lack of remorse regarding the impact
of his actions on L.C.W., the record does not suggest that the district court would have
granted a departure but for its consideration of Martin’s “burned bridges” with law
enforcement.

11
In sum, this is not a rare case in which reversal is appropriate. Although the district
court was not required to justify its refusal to depart, it explained its refusal to do so , and
its reasoning was well within its discretion. See State v. Van Ruler , 378 N.W.2d 77, 80
(Minn. App. 1985) (“Although the [district] court is required to give reasons for departure,
an explanation is not required when the court considers reasons for departure but elects to
impose the presumptive sentence.”). We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.