A18-1240 Precedential Affirmed Processed

Heather Marie Romanowicz, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed April 8, 2019

The holding in the court’s own words

Because the HRO is supported by sufficient evidence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1240

Heather Marie Romanowicz,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Penttila,
Appellant.

Filed April 8, 2019
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-17-736

Terri A. Melcher, Fridley, Minnesota (for respondent)

John P. Guzik, Guzik Law Office, P.A., Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of a harassment restraining order to
respondent, arguing that the record does not support the district court’s findings and the
findings do not support the harassment restraining order against him. Because the record
supports the findings and we see no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Steven Penttila and respondent Heather Marie Romanowicz were friends
for 20 years. In 2016, Romanowicz and her two children moved into the upper level of a
duplex. Penttila subsequently moved into the lower level of th e same duplex. Penttila’s
girlfriend lived with him until their relationship ended in August 2017. Following the
breakup, the friendship between Romanowicz and Penttila became strained, which
Romanowicz believes was due to her support of Penttila’s ex-girlfriend.
In October 2017, Romanowicz petitioned for a harassment restraining order (HRO)
against Penttila alleging that, amongst other things, he had been yelling at her outside of
the duplex, blocking her from getting into the duplex, threatening to call the police on her,
making child-abuse allegations against her, standing in the yard and staring at her, and that
she had friends escorting her to and from the duplex for her safety. The district court issued
an ex parte HRO against Penttila. Penttila petitioned for an HRO against Romanowicz,
which the district court denied. Penttila requested a hearing on both the issuance of the ex
parte HRO against him and the denial of his petition.

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There was a two -day consolidated evidentiary hearing on both petitions.
Romanowicz testified and presented testimon y from the landlord of the duplex, her
roommate, and two friends. Penttila testified and presented testimony from a friend and
Romanowicz’s ex-husband. The district court granted Romanowicz’s petition and issued
an HRO against Penttila , which Penttila ap peals. The district court denied Penttila’s
petition, which is not challenged on appeal.
D E C I S I O N
We review the issuance of an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Peterson v. Johnson,
755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). “A district court’s findings of fact will not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard is given to the district court’s opportunity
to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Minn.
App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). Whether the facts as found by the
district court satisfy the definition of harassment is a question of law reviewed de novo.
Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761. We will reverse the issuance of an HRO if it is not supported
by sufficient evidence. Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844.
Penttila argues first that the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous
because they are not supported by the record. We disagree. “Findings of fact are c learly
erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn.
1999) (quotation omitted).
Penttila challenges numerous findings by t he district court including whether he
contacted a city building inspector after watching Romanowicz carry insulation to the

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upper duplex , whether he prevented Romanowicz from entering common areas of the
duplex, and whether he threatened to report Romanow icz to Child Protective Services
(CPS). Romanowicz and the landlord testified that Penttila contacted a city building
inspector about work being done in the upper duplex. Although Penttila claims he did not
contact the building inspector to inspect the upper duplex, he testified that he took classes
with the building inspector, discussed the repairs Romanowicz was doing with the building
inspector, and believed she was going “well beyond the scope of what you can do without
a p ermit.” The building inspec tor later inspected the upper duplex, but did not find
anything that needed to be corrected.
Although there was conflicting testimony about whether Penttila blocked
Romanowicz from entering the common areas of the duplex and whether Penttila had
threatened to call CPS, there was testimony to support both findings by the district court,
and we give due regard to the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 843 -44. Romanowicz and her friend te stified about
an incident where Penttila or his dog had blocked her from accessing the common area of
the duplex, but Penttila and his friend testified that this never happened. Romanowicz also
testified that she overheard Penttila yelling at one of her f riends, accusing her of drinking
during her parenting time and threatening to turn her in. Penttila denied this, but he testified
that he reported alleged child abuse to Romanowicz’s ex -husband, primarily that
Romanowicz had used hot sauce once as punish ment. This report led to a CPS
investigation, where CPS reviewed the information and closed the case . In reviewing the
record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

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See Fletcher, 589 N.W.2d at 101. Accordingly, the district court’s findings of fact are not
clearly erroneous.
Penttila argues next that the district court’s findings do not support the grant of an
HRO against him. A district court may grant an HRO if “the court finds . . . that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2018). Harassment includes “repeated incidents of intrusive or
unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are in tended to
have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another.” Id., subd.
1(a)(1) (2018).
The district court determined that “Penttila committed repeated incidents of
intrusive and unwanted acts and words that had a substantial adverse effect, or were
intended to have a substantial adverse effect, on the safety, security, and privacy of
Romanowicz.” The incidents identified by the district court are: Penttila repeatedly
confronting Romanowicz with accusatory statements at the duplex, Penttila following
Romanowicz on the highway, Penttila posting derogatory statements about Romanowicz
(without u sing her name) on social media, Penttila reporting alleged child abuse to
Romanowicz’s ex-husband, Penttila making repeated complaints about Romanowicz to the
landlord, Penttila obstructing Romanowicz’s access to the duplex common area, and
Penttila contacting a building inspector about Romanowicz. The district court concluded
that, “The totality of Penttila’s acts constitute objectively unreasonable conduct that would
lead a reasonable person, like Romanowicz, to objectively believe that she was subject t o
harassment.” See Kush , 683 N.W.2d at 845 (“The determination of whether certain

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conduct constitutes harassment may be judged from both an objective standard, when
assessing the effect the conduct has on the typical victim, and a subjective standard, to the
extent the court may determine the harasser’s intent.”).
Penttila argues that there was no “hard evidence” to support the district court’s
conclusion that he repeatedly harassed or intended to harass Romanowicz. We are not
persuaded. There was sufficient testimony by Romanowicz, the landlord, her roommate,
or her friends to support every one of the above -listed incidents. Penttila himself also
testified that he contacted the landlord five or six times , the police five times ,
Romanowicz’s ex -husband, and a building inspector regarding concerns with
Romanowicz. Penttila’s actions in repeatedly reporting Romanowicz were unwanted,
intrusive, and had a substantial adverse effect on Romanowicz’s privacy. It is clear that
his actions also had a substantial adverse effect on Rom anowicz’s safety and security
because Romanowicz, the landlord, her roommate, and her two friends testified generally
that she is afraid of Penttila, feels unsafe around him, and asks for friends to escort her into
the duplex, which the district court credited.
With deference given to the district court’s credibility determinations, we find that
the record amply supports the di strict court’s conclusion that Penttila committed repeated
incidents of intrusive and unwanted acts and words that had a substantial adverse effect, or
were intended to have a substantial adverse effect, on Romanowicz’s safety, security, and
privacy. Because the HRO is supported by sufficient evidence, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.