State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1252

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Lashaun Thompson,
Appellant.

Filed July 22, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-16035

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Coun ty Attorney, Nicole Cornale, A ssistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Lof tus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jess on, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Based upon information received from a confidential reliable in formant (CRI),
police officers obtained search w arrants for appellant Michael Lashaun Thompson’s

2
residence, a Pontiac Bonneville, and a Chrysler Town & Country minivan. On appeal,
Thompson challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to disclose the identity of the
CRI. He further challenges the district court’s determination that the search warrants were
supported by probable cause. Because we conclude that the CRI was not a material witness
and that probable cause supported the three search warrants, we affirm.
FACTS
In June 2017, Minneapolis police officer Jeffrey Imming, who i s also an investigator
w i t h t h e F B I V i o l e n t G a n g S a f e Streets Task Force, applied for and received search
warrants for a Pontiac Bonneville and a residence located at 37 08 Third Avenue South,
Minneapolis.1
Officer Imming’s affidavit stat ed that a CRI informed him abou t a drug dealer,
going by the name “Divine,” who was selling crack cocaine and h eroin in Minneapolis.
The CRI described “Divine” as a “black male, short haircut, lig ht trimmed beard,
approximately 30 years old and 5’9 with a stocky build.” According to the CRI, “Divine”
gave him a phone number to call when he wanted to buy drugs. A nd the CRI informed
Officer Imming that the CRI “ha[d] seen ‘Divine’ in possession of narcotics and that
‘Divine’ commonly drives different rental cars in order to avoi d detection [including] a
black Pontiac Bonneville with MN plate 519VMH.” Based upon this information, Officer
Imming opened a narcotics investigation.

1 The applications for both search warrants contained the same i nformation in the
affidavits.

3
Officer Imming then met with the CRI to set up a controlled bu y. The CRI called
“Divine,” who agreed to meet the CRI at a predetermined locatio n to sell the CRI drugs.
Officer Imming and other members of the Safe Streets Task Force went to the area of the
controlled buy to conduct surveillance. After some waiting, of ficers observed a person
matching the description of “Divine” get out of a gray Toyota C amry and meet with the
CRI. “Divine” gave the CRI crack cocaine in exchange for the p rerecorded buy money.
The suspected crack cocaine was field tested, returning a posit ive result for cocaine.
During the controlled buy, officers ran the Camry’s license pla tes and discovered the car
was registered to Enterprise Rental.
After the buy was completed, “Divine” returned to his car and l eft. Officers
followed the car to a residence located at 3708 Third Avenue So uth in Minneapolis.
“Divine” parked the car in front o f the residence and entered t hrough the front door.
Officers conducted surveillance on the residence and the car “f or a while,” but “Divine”
never left the house. While conducting surveillance, officers located the black Pontiac
Bonneville—the vehicle described by the CRI—parked in front of the same address. Over
the next four days, officers use d GPS surveillance to monitor t he Pontiac Bonneville
associated with “Divine” and found that the car would routinely park at the residence “for
the night.”
Based on his training and experience, Officer Imming identified “Divine” as
appellant Michael Lashaun Thomps on. Officer Imming showed Thom pson’s driver’s
license photo to the CRI, who positively identified Thompson as the drug dealer known as
Divine. After conducting computer searches, Officer Imming learned that Thompson was

4
born in Illinois, had several drug-related arrests, and “was do cumented as a Gangster
Disciple Gang Member.” Thompson had also been arrested for narcotics in Wisconsin and
previously went to prison for narcotics.
In coordination with Officer Imming, the CRI arranged another controlled buy with
Thompson. The CRI called the phone number and was given a pred etermined meet
location. Before the controlled buy, the black Pontiac Bonnevi lle was parked on the side
street near the 3708 Third Avenue South residence. 2 The car, driven by Thompson, left
the residence and went to the predetermined location, where the CRI met with Thompson
and bought drugs with prerecorded buy money. Thompson then left.
After the second controlled buy, Officer Imming conducted a fie ld test on the
narcotics, which was positive fo r cocaine. During this time, t he officers followed
Thompson back to 3708 Third Avenue South, where he parked the c ar on the nearby side
street, and entered the residence through the front door.
Based on this information, Officer Imming applied for and recei ved two search
warrants—one for the residence and one for the black Pontiac Bo nneville. Officers then
executed the search warrants. At the residence, officers found 0.2 grams of heroin, 2.5
grams of cocaine, and an empty handgun holster. And the office rs found 0.2 grams of
cocaine in the Pontiac Bonneville.

2 On the day of the second buy, officers conducted surveillance at the residence. Prior to
conducting surveillance, the officers were provided with a photo of Thompson.

5
After executing the search warra nts for Thompson’s residence a nd the Pontiac
Bonneville, Officer Imming applied for and received a search wa rrant for a white 1997
Chrysler Town & Country minivan that was parked near the 3708 T hird Avenue South
residence. The sworn affidavit Officer Imming submitted contained the same information
that was provided for the search warrants for 3708 Third Avenue South and the Pontiac
Bonneville. Additionally, Officer Imming included information about the contraband
found from the execution of the first two search warrants.
In his affidavit, Officer Imming further stated that during th e investigation, officers
spoke with a “cooperating defendant,” 3 who told them that Thompson used a vehicle
parked near the residence to sto re illegal drugs and weapons. The cooperating defendant
said the vehicle was a white Chrysler Town & Country minivan with the license plate MN
928EPV. Further, the cooperating defendant stated that the min ivan was parked around
the corner from the residence. Officers then located the minivan, which was parked where
Thompson normally parked the Pontiac Bonneville.
Upon executing the search warra nt, officers found a food-packa ging device with
possible cocaine residue on it, mail with Thompson’s name on it, a firearm, several money
gram receipts and 97.7 grams of suspected heroin.

3 Although the application for th e search warrant regarding the minivan refers to a
“cooperating defendant,” the prosecutor explained it was a typo graphical error and it
should have read “CRI.” Although Thompson briefly states in a footnote that this error is
relevant to whether the CRI’s identity should have been disclosed, he provides no argument
or caselaw to substantiate this assertion.

6
Based on the evidence found during the execution of the search warrants, Thompson
was charged with first-degree controlled substance possession, first-degree sale of
controlled substance, and being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm.4
Thompson moved to compel the disclosure of the CRI’s identity and to suppress all
evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrants. During a pretrial hearing,
the district court denied Thompson’s motions. After a four-day jury trial, Thompson was
found guilty of both first-degree drug offenses, but acquitted of the gun charge. Thompson
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Thompson raises two challenges on appeal. First, Thompson argues that the identity
of the CRI should have been dis closed. Second, Thompson assert s that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the se arch warrants for his
residence and vehicles lacked sufficient facts to establish probable cause. We address each
argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Thompson’s
motion to compel disclosure of the identity of the CRI.

This court reviews a district c ourt’s decision regarding the di sclosure of a
confidential informan t’s identity for an abuse of discretion. State v. Rambahal , 751
N.W.2d 84, 90 (Minn. 2008). Minnesota law recognizes a privilege to withhold the identity
of a CRI because of the state’s interest in protecting the iden tity of CRIs who provide

4 In violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subds. 1(3) (sale of 10 grams or more of heroin),
2(a)(3) (possession of 25 grams or more of heroin), 624.713, subd. 1(2) (ineligible person
in possession of a firearm) (2016).

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information to law enforcement. Id.; see Roviaro v. United States , 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77
S. Ct. 623, 627 (1957) (“The purpose of the privilege is the fu rtherance and protection of
the public interest in effective law enforcement.”). But when the disclosure of a CRI’s
identity or the contents of the information provided is relevant and helpful to the defense’s
case, the state’s privilege gives way, and it is the defendant’s burden to establish the need
for disclosure. Rambahal, 751 N.W.2d at 90.
When determining whether to order the disclosure of a confiden tial informant’s
identity, the district court considers four factors, including (1) whether the CRI was a
material witness, (2) whether the CRI’s testimony will be mater ial to the issue of guilt,
(3) whether the testimony of officers is suspect, and (4) whether the testimony of the CRI
might disclose entrapment. Id. But ultimately, when decidi ng whether to disclose the
informant’s identity, the district court balances the defendant’s right to prepare his defense
and the “public’s interest in effective law enforcement.” Id.
The first two factors essentially turn on whether the CRI was a material witness.5
We conclude that the CRI here was not for two reasons. First, the CRI was not present
when the search warrants were executed. While the CRI provided Officer Imming with
information about Thompson and participated in two controlled drug buys, when the search
warrants were carried out, the CRI was not there. Second, Thom pson’s interactions with
the CRI were not the basis for the criminal charges. Rather, t h e t w o f i r s t - d e g r e e

5 Because Thompson challenges only the first and second factors, and does not dispute the
district court’s determination on the third and fourth factors, we will only address the first
two factors.

8
controlled-substance charges arose out of the 97.7 grams of her oin found in the minivan,
and the gun charge resulted from the gun found in the minivan. And because the CRI was
not present when any of these items were located, the CRI’s testimony would not be helpful
in overcoming the charges.
Still, Thompson asserts that the CRI was a material witness be cause the CRI’s
involvement in the controlled bu ys makes the CRI more than a ti pster because he was a
participant in the transaction. Thompson’s argument is unavail ing. Here, the CRI
participated in controlled buys, but the controlled buys were not the basis for Thompson’s
charges. Accordingly, the CRI was not a material witness. See Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64,
77 S. Ct. at 629 (concluding that the confidential informant was the only other participant
in the drug transaction on which the defendant’s charges were b ased, making the
confidential informant’s testimony highly relevant and possibly helpful to the defense).
And when a trustworthy CRI is onl y a “transmitter of informatio n and not a competent
witness to the crime itself,” the identity of the CRI need not be disclosed. State v. Purdy,
153 N.W.2d 254, 262 (Minn. 1967).
6
Because the CRI was not a materia l witness, Thompson’s need for disclosure does
not outweigh the state’s interest in protecting the identity of confidential informants. See

6 Thompson also contends that because the CRI never knew “Divine’s” true identity, only
identified “Divine” as Thompson after being presented with a photograph, and that nothing
in the record shows that the CRI made a current identification of Thompson, the CRI should
have been required to testify as to Thompson’s identity. And that if the CRI was incorrect
in identifying Thompson, no connection would exist between the minivan and Thompson.
But Thompson provides no authority as to why this makes the CRI a material witness.

9
Rambahal, 751 N.W.2d at 90. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Thompson’s motion to compel the disclosure of the CRI’s identity.
II. The district court did not err when it denied Thompson’s motions to suppress
the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrants for hi s residence and
vehicles.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures, providing that no warrant shall be issue d without a showing of
probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. Probable cause exists
when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence o f a crime will be found.”
State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).
We review a judge’s decision to issue a search warrant for whether the judge had a
substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed. State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d
380, 384 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing the search warrant application and affidavit, we
consider the totality of the circumstances alleged, and we defe r to the issuing judge
“recognizing that doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the
preference to be accorded to warrants.” Id. at 384-85 (quotations omitted). The task of the
issuing judge is to make a dec ision based on common sense. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at
622.
Thompson challenges the district court’s ruling that probable cause existed for the
three search warrants, because, he asserts, a nexus between him self, the alleged criminal
activity, and the property and vehicles to be searched did not exist. And therefore, he

10
argues, there was insufficient probable cause to issue any of t he search warrants, and the
district court erred in denying his motions. We address each search warrant in turn.
Search Warrant for 3708 Third Avenue South
The relevant circumstances set out in the warrant included tha t Thompson was
observed leaving the controlled-buy location, driving to 3708 Third Avenue South, parking
nearby, and entering the residence. The car he drove would rem ain parked outside the
residence for periods of time, including overnight. During another controlled buy, officers
observed Thompson driving the car away from the residence and t o the location of the
controlled buy. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the facts
asserted in the search warrant application create a substantial basis for the issuing judge to
find a fair probability that controlled substances would be found at this residence.
But Thompson argues that the “evidence is not substantial enough under the totality
of the circumstances to constitu te a substantial connection bet ween [Thompson] and the
home.” To support his argument, Thompson draws this court’s at tention to State v. Gail,
713 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Minn. 2006) and State v. Yaritz, 287 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 1979).
In Gail, the supreme court determined that a sufficient nexus existed between the defendant
and an apartment because he placed a phone call using the apartment’s phone, and after the
police were called, the defenda nt was still found at the apartm ent, though some time had
passed. 713 N.W.2d at 859. Here, like Gail, Thompson spent time at the residence and
did not leave, as observed by officers conducting surveillance. Surveillance indicated that
Thompson would drive to that address, enter, and the car stayed there overnight.

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And in Yaritz, a case also cited by the state, the affiant police officer explained that
an informant told him that the d efendant was selling drugs and would meet customers at
prearranged locations for drug deals. 287 N.W.2d at 14 n.1. T he informant also gave
police the address of the defendant’s St. Paul home. Id. The officer arranged for the
informant to make two controlle d buys from the defendant at a p rearranged location. Id.
A police surveillance team obser ved the defendant leave his St. Paul residence and go
directly to the controlled-buy location. Id. The informant met with the defendant, bought
the drugs, and then met with police and turned over the control led substances. Id. The
supreme court held that probable cause supported the search war rant for the home in part
because when the controlled purchases were arranged, the police had the defendant’s house
under surveillance, and the officers observed the defendant go straight from his house to
where the sale took place. Id. at 15.
Here, similar to Yaritz, a CRI informed Officer Imming that Thompson was selling
drugs. While the CRI did not initially know Thompson’s actual identity, he provided an
accurate description and positivel y identified him as the drug de aler “Divine.” Officer
Imming then arranged for the CRI to make two controlled buys. After the controlled buys,
officers followed Thompson back to the residence and watched him enter through the front
door. And when Thompson left the residence for the second cont rolled buy, officers
observed the car leave the residence and saw Thompson driving. Even though the officers
did not witness Thompson leave the house, they witnessed him drive away in the car that
was parked next to the residence and drive directly to the pred etermined location to sell
drugs to the CRI.

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Under Minnesota caselaw, these facts demonstrate a sufficient n exus between
Thompson, the criminal activity, and the residence. Accordingly, the supporting affidavit
demonstrated a sufficient nexus between the evidence sought and the residence.
Search Warrant for the Pontiac Bonneville
Next, we turn to the relevant circumstances set forth in the w arrant application for
the Pontiac Bonneville. These circumstances included that the CRI provided information
that Thompson dealt narcotics from the Pontiac Bonneville. And that the vehicle was
parked at the residence where Thompson was seen entering, while he was under
surveillance. The Pontiac Bonnev ille remained parked at the re sidence, overnight.
Thompson was then positively identified as driving the vehicle to the predetermined meet
location for the controlled buy. And the vehicle was identified by the CRI by make, model,
and license-plate number. Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that the facts establis hed in the search warrant appli cation create a substantial
basis for the issuing judge to find a fair probability that con trolled substances would be
located in the Pontiac Bonneville.
But Thompson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the evidence found in relation to this search warrant because t here was not a sufficient
nexus connecting him to the Pontiac Bonneville. Thompson’s arg ument is unpersuasive.
Here, the CRI specifically iden tified the Pontiac Bonneville, a nd corresponding
license-plate number, as a car fro m which Thompson deals drugs. Thompson then drove
that car to the second controlled buy with the CRI, and sold the CRI cocaine. Further, the
Pontiac Bonneville was frequently seen outside the residence th at Thompson returned to

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following the two controlled buys, including overnight. Accord ingly, the evidence
articulated in the supporting affidavit clearly establishes a s ufficient nexus between
Thompson, the criminal activity, and the Pontiac Bonneville.
Search Warrant for the Chrysler Town & Country Minivan
Finally, we consider the relevant circumstances set forth in th e search warrant
application for the Chrysler Town & Country minivan. Here, the CRI identified the
Chrysler Town & Country minivan as a vehicle that Thompson uses to store weapons and
illegal drugs. The CRI identified the minivan by make, model, and license plate number.
Further, the CRI accurately descr ibed where the minivan would b e parked—near the
residence, on a side street—wher e Thompson routinely parked the Pontiac Bonneville.
And prior to applying for the search warrant for the minivan, officers had located drugs in
both the Pontiac Bonneville and the residence. Based on the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the facts in the search warrant application cr eated a substantial basis for
the issuing judge to find a fa ir probability that controlled su bstances would be located in
the minivan.
Still, Thompson argues that the s earch warrant was invalidated because the police
did nothing to independently corroborate the CRI’s information. But the information
p r o v i d e d b y t h e C R I w a s e x t r e m e l y d e t a i l e d . T h e m i n i v a n w a s d escribed as a 1997
Chrysler Town & Country minivan, with license plate MN 928EPV, parked around the
corner from the residence where Thompson normally parks the Pon tiac Bonneville. And
Officer Imming knew through his training and experience as an officer, and from previous
cases, that drug dealers commonly park away from their address in order to avoid detection

14
and will use different vehicles and methods in order to hide and conceal illegal contraband.
Also, the CRI’s information regarding the minivan was received after an extensive
investigation occurred, which linked Thompson to drug activity.
Thompson further contends that no evidence was presented to li nk the minivan to
the alleged criminal activity. Thompson relies on several case s to support his argument
that while in some cases, contraband found at another location may warrant probable cause,
that is not the case here, where no direct connection was estab lished between Thompson
and the minivan, other than the CRI’s information. But these c ases are not as helpful as
Thompson urges us to conclude. In State v. Ruoho, this court determined that, despite the
lack of direct observation of criminal activity in a residence, the information contained in
the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause to search the residence. 685 N.W.2d
451, 458 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004). And in State v. Bynum,
this court concluded that althou gh there were no direct observa tions of the defendant
leaving his residence, the sear ch-warrant affidavit supported t he district court’s
determination of probable cause. 579 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 18, 1998). Finally, in Novak v. State, the supreme court determined that the
search-warrant affidavit supporte d the inference that marijuana would be found in
defendant’s residence following a sale that did not take place at that house. 349 N.W.2d
830, 832-33 (Minn. 1984). Like these cases—where a connection existed between the
defendants and the residences, despite the lack of direct obser vations—there is a direct
connection between Thompson and the minivan.

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Based on the totality of the circumstances alleged in the affi davit, a direct
connection was established between the evidence sought and the minivan.
In sum, the three search warrants were supported by probable c ause, and as such,
the district court did not err when it denied Thompson’s motion s to suppress evidence
o b t a i n e d a s a r e s u l t o f t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t s . A n d b e c a u s e t h e CR I w a s n o t a m a t e r i a l
witness, the district court did not abuse its discretion when i t denied Thompson’s motion
to disclose the identity of the CRI.
Affirmed.