A18-1259 Precedential Affirmed Processed

Dementry James Loyd, petitioner, Appellant,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed March 4, 2019

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1259

Dementry James Loyd, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 4, 2019
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-13147

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
A man testified in a bench trial that masked men, including Dementry Loyd, robbed
him at gunpoint. The district court credited the testimony and found Loyd guilty of aiding
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and abetting first-degree robbery and second -degree assault with a dangerous weapon.
Loyd unsuccessfully petitioned for postconviction relief , arguing that the state offered
insufficient evidence to convict him . He makes the same argument on appeal from the
district court’s denial of his postconviction petition, and we affirm because the argument
fails.
FACTS
The trial testimony and the district court’s findings indicate that the following events
took place on an evening in May 2015. E.B. was cleaning his truck near his garage in north
Minneapolis when a dark green Chevy Tahoe pulled up. One of its passengers, Dementry
Loyd, exited the Tahoe and asked E.B. a question about a phone number. E.B. noticed that
Loyd appeared to be looking to see if anybody was around. He also walked around E.B.’s
truck, looking at it. After E.B. said he di d not have the number that Loyd was seeking,
Loyd told E.B. to find the number and that he would be back in five or ten minutes. Loyd
walked back to the Tahoe. It appeared to E.B. as if Loyd then “looked back like if he was
giving a signal or something.” He gestured in a manner that E.B. interpreted as indicating
the coast was clear. Loyd entered the Tahoe and it pulled away.
Moments later, three men “came from behind the garage with masks and black
hoodies on.” One of them, who had shoulder length dreadlocks, was holding a gun. He
threatened to shoot E.B. unless E.B. stayed quiet. The two other men rifled through E.B.’s
pockets and truck. They took jewelry, cash, credit cards, a cellphone, and the stereo from
E.B.’s truck. When they left, E.B. chased after them and saw them enter and leave in the
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same green Tahoe that Loyd had arrived and left in shortly before the robbery. E.B. called
the police.
Days later, E.B. contacted Minneapolis Police Officer Joseph Schany. E.B. showed
Officer Schany images on a Facebook page depicting several individuals with distinctive
jewelry stolen in the robbery. E.B. also recognized the shoes, hair, and clothing of the
individuals in the photographs as matching what the robbers were wearing. The Facebook
account where the images were posted belonged to user “Tommygun Tunchie.”
Tommygun Tunchie is actually Loyd.
Police arrested Loyd within five days of the robbery . Loyd was wearing the
distinctive chain with a cross pendant that belonged to E.B. and that E.B. had also seen in
the Facebook image. A search of Loyd’s home revealed clothes matching E.B.’s
description of the robbers’ clothes. A green Tahoe sat in Loyd’s driveway.
The state charged Loyd with first-degree aggravated robbery and second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon.
One witness in Loyd’s bench trial was Darryl Keys, who had ple aded guilty to
second-degree assault for his participation in the robbery. Keys had previously testified
that he pointed the gun at E.B. while Loyd and the other assailant took E.B.’s property.
Keys changed his story at Loyd’s trial. He said that he was the one who took E.B.’s property
and that, although Loyd was present during the assault and robbery, Keys alone committed
the crime and Loyd and the other man “didn’t know what was going on.” The district court
credited Keys’s plea-hearing testimony over his conflicting trial testimony and found Loyd
guilty of aiding and abetting both crimes. The district court sentenced Loyd to 88 months
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in prison for the first-degree aggravated robbery conviction and 45 months for the second-
degree assault conviction, to be served concurrently.
Loyd petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him on either count. The district court denied Loyd’s motion.
Loyd appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Loyd argues that the district court erred by denying his petition for postconviction
relief. We will not reverse a denial of a petition for postconviction relief unless the district
court abused its discretion. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). We review
legal issues de novo, but we will overturn factual findings only if there is insufficient
evidence to sustain them. Id.
We reject Loyd’s argument that postconviction relief is required because the state
presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of
the two crimes. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
determine whether the facts and inferences drawn from them would permit the factf inder
to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Minn. 2015); State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn.
2011) (applying the same standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to both bench
and jury trials). This is not a close case, as the evidence offered to establish Loyd’s guilt
easily supports his conviction.
Loyd focuses on the mens rea element, contending that the evidence does not show
that he intentionally aided in the robbery or the assault. To prove that a defendant aided
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and abetted the commission of a crime, the state must establish that the defendant aided,
advised, hired, counseled, or conspired to commit the crime and also that he knew the crime
would be committed and intended that his presence or actions would further its
commission. Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2018); State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40
(Minn. 2016). Loyd is correct that his knowledge was proved only through circumstantial
evidence. When a defendant is convicted based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a
two-step test, first determining the circumstances proved by resolving all questions of fact
in favor of the verdict, and then determining whether a reasonable inference inconsistent
with guilt can be drawn from those circumstances. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598
(Minn. 2017). In applying this standard, we defer to the factfinder’s credibility
determinations. See id. at 599.
The district court’s findings inform us of the relevant circumstances proved. The
district court credited Darryl Keys’s plea-hearing testimony, establishing as a circumstance
proved the fact t hat Loyd stole items from E.B. while Keys held E.B. at gunpoint. This
circumstance alone is enough to prove that Loyd knew he was aiding a robbery, since no
other reasonable hypothesis could explain his conduct. Other circumstances bolster our
conclusion. Loyd was the first one of the robbery band to engage with E.B., arriving and
then leaving in the same vehicle the robbers would soon use as their getaway car—the same
vehicle police also found outside Loyd’s home after they arrested him. Loyd donned a ski
mask between the time he spoke with E.B. about a phone number and the time, moments
later, when he reappeared with a gunman and took E.B.’s possessions. Loyd was the
member of the band who posted images of the robbers displaying one or more of the stolen
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items, and Loyd was wearing the stolen necklace when police arrested him. Loyd does not
even attempt to offer an innocent explanation for this set of proved circumstances.
Instead Loyd contends that Keys’s plea-hearing testimony is inherently incredible
because E.B. could not recognize Loyd as one of the robbers. The contention fails because
all of the robbers were wearing masks to conceal their identity. Loyd also maintains,
“Given that just seconds passed between Loyd driving away and when the three men ran
up on E.B., there is no way Loyd was one of those three men.” This argument assumes that
E.B.’s testimony was precise in his describing the attack as having occurred within only
about “five seconds” after Loyd left in the Tahoe. Loyd does not attempt to explain how
the three robbers could have fled the scene in the sa me Tahoe that Loyd had left in before
the robbery unless the Tahoe arrived back at the scene contemporaneous to the robbery.
More important for our review, it is evident from the findings and the verdict that the
district court, sitting as factfinder, either did not treat E.B.’s testimony about the five-
second window as literal or did not treat it as accurate. Its findings indicate only that the
robbery occurred at some point after Loyd left in the Tahoe. The district court’s credibility
determination of Keys’s plea-hearing testimony implicating Loyd is therefore not clearly
erroneous.
In every scenario presented at trial, Loyd was present immediately before and during
the robbery, and he possessed stolen goods when he was arrested. The evidence of his guilt
was overwhelming, and certainly sufficient.
Affirmed.