Herbert Eugene Pitts, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1262

Herbert Eugene Pitts, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 11, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-15-5664

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief following an
evidentiary hearing, arguing that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was
not intelligent. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 2 4, 2015, appellant Herbert Eugene Pitts was charged with violating a
domestic-abuse no -contact order (DANCO), under Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1)
(2014). On September 9, Pitts agreed to plead guilty in exchange for dismissal of similar
charges in another case and imposition of an executed 18-month sentence.
In his signed plea petition, Pitts disclosed that he was hospitalized due to mental -
health issues in 2009, and had been treated for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. But he
indicated he had “not been ill recently,” and was taking two types of medication for his
mental-health conditions. At the plea hearing, Pitts was questioned by his attorney, the
district court judge, and the prosecutor. When asked, Pitts provided his address and phone
number. He agreed that he had enough time to speak with his attorney, had gone through
the plea petition line by line with his attorney, and understood the trial rights he was giving
up by pleading guilty. His attorney verified Pitt s’s mental-health history, and asked Pitts
whether his mental health affected his “ ability to understand and comprehend ” the
proceeding. Pitts responded, “No.” The district court judge confirmed that, by signing the
plea petition, Pitts was “telling [her] [he was] satisfied that [he] understood it,” and that he
was “satisfied with [his] representation.”

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In verifying the factual basis for the plea, Pitts admitted that , despite the existence
and his knowledge of the DANCO, he attempted to enter the victim’s hospital room on
July 23. He also admitted that he had been told by nurses in the preceding days that he
could not have contact with the victim but “did so anyway.” The district court accepted
Pitts’s plea, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him in accordance with the p lea
agreement.
Nearly two years later, Pitts filed a postconviction petition seeking to withdraw his
guilty plea and supplement the record as to his “mental health and traumatic brain injury
conditions that rendered his plea involuntary and unintelligent.”1 The same district court
judge presided over the plea hearing and the postconviction evidentiary hearing.
Pitts testified that at the time of the charged offense he was actually suffering from
a brain injury caused by blunt head trauma , attention -deficit hyperactivity disorder,
posttraumatic stress disorder, and bipolar disorder. At the time of the plea hearing, he was
overmedicated, causing him to be “ not of this world .” Pitts stated that he was unable to
communicate, and did not know who he was, but he did remember that he did not receive
his medications on the day of the hearing . He does not recall the district court judge, his
plea, or his sentencing hearing. And he testified that he want ed to withdraw his plea
because he “never committed that crime.”

1 Although Pitts sought plea withdrawal “on the grounds that his plea was not voluntary
and intelligent,” his argument at the postconviction evidentiary hearing was limited to
whether his plea was intelligently made, and the postconviction court order addressed only
that issue. W e therefore decline to consider whether Pitts’ s plea was involuntary. See
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that an appellate court will not
consider an issue that was not raised or ruled upon by the district court).

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The postconviction court denied Pitts’s petition, concluding that “the record clearly
reflects that Mr. Pitts comprehended what he was doing on September 9, 2015 when he
entered his plea.” Citing examples of Pitts’ s plea-hearing testimony and noting that the
transcript indicates that Pitts was not “too ill at the time of his plea to understand what he
was doing,” the postconviction court rejected Pitts’ s argument as “not convincing .” Pitts
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A defendant must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea at any time if “withdrawal
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Manifest
injustice occurs when a plea is not valid. State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). A plea is valid if it is accurate, voluntary, and intelligently made. Id. A plea is
intelligently made if a defendant “understands the charges against him, the rights he is
waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Uselman v. State, 831 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Minn.
App. 2013) (quotation omitted).
We review the decision of a postconviction court for abuse of discretion, upholding
the court’s findings if they are supported by sufficient evidence and reviewing legal issues
de novo. Bobo v. State , 860 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Minn. 201 5). The supreme court has
affirmed the denial of a postconviction petition premised on the assertion that “mental
stress at the time of the plea[]” affected the plea’s validity when the assertion contradicted
the district court’s recollection of the plea hearing. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 340
(Minn. 2003). And this court affirmed the summary denial of a postconviction claim that
the “medication [petitioner] was taking at the time of the plea hearing ‘distorted’ her mental

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focus” where the allegations were directly contradicted by the plea petition and refuted by
the petitioner’s plea-hearing testimony. Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Minn. App.
2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). Such is the case here.
The record supports the postconviction court’s finding that Pitts’s plea was
intelligent and demonstrates the court appropriately considered his mental status before
accepting the guilty plea. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1 .5.a-c (requiring district court
to determine whether a defendant is under the influence of drugs or alcohol, is mentally
disabled, or is receiving mental -health treatment). First, although Pitts disclosed his past
diagnosis of and treatment for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, he test ified that he had
not been ill recently and his mental -health issues did not affect his understanding of the
plea proceedings. A reasonable inference from this testimony is that Pitts’s mental-health
conditions were regulated by his medications. Second, Pitts’s responses to questions posed
during the plea hearing were appropriate and demonstrated comprehension. Third, Pitts
agreed that he had gone through the plea petition line by line and had sufficient time to talk
with his attorney.
Finally, the postc onviction court expressly found that Pitts’s postconviction
testimony was not credible. It is not our role to second guess suc h credibility
determinations. See Bobo, 860 N.W.2d at 684 (stating that the “postconviction court is in
the best position to eva luate witness credibility”). Moreover, the record supports the
postconviction court’s assessment of his credibility . Pitts offered no medical records or
other evidence to support his new allegations that he was suffering from a traumatic brain
injury and other mental -health conditions that rendered his plea unintelligent. And his

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testimony about the precise medications he was taking that caused him to be overmedicated
at the time of his plea hearing —while he simultaneously claimed to have no recollection
of even being at the hearing —is suspect. Likewise, his assertion that he was “ not of this
world” at the time of the plea hearing, is defeated by the record, which shows he had no
difficulty providing rel evant answers to questions that ranged from the off ense, to his
understanding of court procedures, to his current address and phone number.
In sum, t he record amply supports the postconviction court’s determination that
“Mr. Pitts comprehended what he was doing on September 9, 2015 when he entered his
plea.” We discern no abuse of discretion by the postconviction court in denying Pitts’s
request to withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.