State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1267

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Troy William Hinds,
Appellant.

Filed July 1, 2019
Reversed
Rodenberg, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-17-705

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Kusz, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistan t Nobles County Attorney, Slay ton, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appella t e Publ i c De f e nde r , J e s s i ca Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg , Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant Troy Hinds argues that his co nvictions for fifth-
degree controlled substance crime and possession of drug paraphernalia must be reversed
because the evidence is insufficient to prove that he knowingly possessed the
methamphetamine and pipe found in a minivan in which he was one of two backseat
passengers. We reverse.
FACTS
At around 1:45 a.m. on August 14, 2017, Officer Jacob Refsland was on patrol in
Worthington. While stopped at a traffic light, Officer Refsland noticed the minivan in front
of him had multiple items attach ed to the front windshield obst ructing the driver’s view
and the passengers in the rear seat started making a significant amount of movement.
When the traffic light turned green, Officer Refsland followed the minivan for about
a minute before activating his emergency lights as the vehicles passed through a
construction zone. The driver of the minivan passed an intersection and several entrances
into business parking lots on the right-hand side of the street . The driver then turned left
onto a street that was not under construction, and then made another left turn into a parking
lot. Officer Refsland believed the driver of the minivan took longer to stop than the typical
motorist.
Once the minivan came to a stop in the parking lot, Officer Refsland approached the
passenger’s side of the minivan. He saw four people in the minivan: the driver (H.R.), the
front passenger (P.D.), a backseat passenger on the left side ( appellant), and a backseat

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passenger on the right side (“John ny”). Officer Refsland recog nized both appellant and
“Johnny” from prior contacts and greeted them. They were slumped in their seats, did not
respond, and only stared straight ahead. Neither of them was wearing a seatbelt. As Officer
Refsland talked with H.R., she provided a changing and inconsistent story about where she
joined the group and who was driving at that time. H.R.’s version of events did not account
for why she and the passengers were now in Worthington or why appellant and P.D. were
in the vehicle. Officer Refsland then returned to his squad car to run “license and vehicle
c h e c k s ” b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o t h e m i n i v a n a n d a s k i n g H . R . f o r p e rmission to search the
vehicle. H.R. did not consent to the vehicle being searched.
At some point during Officer Re fsland’s license and vehicle che cks, Officer Riley
and his canine unit came to provide backup, as did another officer. Officer Refsland asked
Officer Riley to conduct a canine sweep of the vehicle and bega n removing the three
passengers from the vehicle. Both back-seat passengers got out on the driver’s side of the
vehicle. In this process, Officer Refsland found a machete nex t to the driver’s seat. The
door opening to the passenger area of the car was left open, an d both H.R. and “Johnny”
requested that officers close th e door but the door was left op en. During the sweep, the
dog alerted, indicating that an odor of narcotics was coming from the front of the car, near
the bumper and engine compartment. No narcotics were found in that area, but it appeared
that someone had recently tampered with that area.
Officer Refsland began searching the rest of the minivan. In the backseat passenger
area, Officer Refsland opened, by way of a hinge, the side armr est compartment directly
next to where appellant had been seated. In that compartment, Officer Refsland discovered

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a resealable bag which contained folded up cellophane with a crystalline substance. Officer
Refsland then opened the armrest compartment where “Johnny” had been seated and found
a blue glass pipe with “a bulbous end.” Both the crystalline s ubstance and the pipe field-
tested positive for methamphetamine. Testing from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
later confirmed the crystalline substance discovered near appellant was approximately 0.2
grams of methamphetamine.
Appellant and “Johnny” were arres ted, and appellant was later p laced in Officer
Riley’s car. While appellant was in the car, Officer Riley formed the opinion that appellant
was under the influence of methamphetamine due to his “dilated pupils,” abnormal
sweating, and “extremely restless and extremely fidgety hands.” Officer Riley and
appellant then had the following exchange:
RILEY: Yeah. Well Troy I can tell that you’re high right now,
so.
APPELLANT: Okay, if that’s the case, I haven’t had nothing
on me. I had just gotten picked up. . . .

. . . .

RILEY: You on the phone Troy or . . .?
APPELLANT: No, I’m just talk ing about it. I’m just saying
I’m f-----g, f----d. Not doing nothing. I’m not doing nothing .
Okay, I might be high but I didn’t have no f-----g s--t on me. I
didn’t have nothing. I was getting a ride to go, ugh. This is
un-f-----g believable. Can you like, like tell me what it was
that they found?
RILEY: What?
APPELLANT: Pipes? Bag? What?

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Appellant was charged with fifth-degree possession (methamphetamine) under Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016), (count I), and possession of drug paraphernalia under Minn.
Stat. § 152.092(a) (2016) (count II), for the contraband discovered in both armrests.
Before trial, appellant stipulated that he had a prior control led-substance conviction,
which meant that count I was a felony. See Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4 (2016). At trial,
the state produced testimony from Officers Refsland and Riley a nd the squad car videos.
Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case, arguing that
there were reasonable alternative explanations, besides appella nt’s guilt, based on the
evidence produced at trial. The district court denied the motion.
Appellant did not testify at tri al, but H.R. testified that app ellant had only been in
the car for two minutes before Officer Refsland pulled them ove r. In closing, the state
argued that appellant had joint, constructive possession of the methamphetamine and the
pipe with “Johnny,” because the meth was discovered in the armr est nearest to appellant,
who admitted to being high, and the pipe was necessary to use the meth.
The jury found appellant guilty of both counts. The district court sentenced
appellant to 15 months stayed on count I, and did not sentence appellant on count II.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, appellant argues only that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to find him guilty of fifth-degree possession and possession of paraphernalia. Specifically,
appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he had constructive possess ion of the methamphetamine and pipe, or that such

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possession was knowing. He argue s that there are reasonable, a lternative inferences
besides appellant’s guilt. The state argues that, although its case was circumstantial, the
evidence produced at trial is consistent with appellant’s guilt and inconsistent with any
alternative, rational hypothesis.
Constructive possession can be proved through circumstantial ev idence. See State
v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 2d 825, 832-33 (Mi nn. App. 2015). When reviewing a challenge to
the sufficiency of th e evidence, an appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and determines whether the facts and inferences drawn from them
would permit a jury to reasonab ly conclude that the defendant w as guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Minn. 2015). Convictions based
on circumstantial evidence require “heightened scrutiny.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d
469, 473 (Minn. 2010). Reviewing courts apply a two-step test when an appellant is
convicted on circumstantial evidence. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017).
First, the reviewing court must “winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving
all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict, resulting in a subset of facts that constitute
the circumstances proved.” Id. (quotation omitted). Next, the reviewing court must
consider “whether a reasonable in ference inconsistent with guil t can be drawn from the
circumstances proved.” Id. Appellate courts do not defer to the jury’s choice between
reasonable, alternative inferences. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013).
To prove fifth-degree possession, the state is required to prov e that appellant
knowingly possessed the methamphetamine discovered in the miniv an. See Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2(1). Similarly, to prove possession of paraphernalia, the state must prove

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that appellant knowingly possessed drug paraphernalia. See Minn. Stat. § 152.092(a). As
the supreme court explained:
A defendant may possess an item jointly with another person.
Possession may be proved through evidence of actual or
constructive possession. There are two methods by which the
State may prove constructive possession. The State may show
that the police found the item in a place under the defendant’s
exclusive control to which other people normally did not have
access. Alternatively, if police found the item in a place to
which others had access, the Sta te must show that there is a
strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the
time the defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising
dominion and control over it.

Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601 (citations omitted).
Turning to the first step of the analysis, we must look at all of the circumstances
proved as a whole that are consistent with the jury’s guilty ve rdict. See Silvernail, 831
N.W.2d at 598-99. The circumstances proved at trial include that (1) around 1:00 a.m. on
August 14, 2017, H.R. and “Johnny” drove from Iowa to Worthington in a minivan; (2) at
some point before 1:45 a.m., they picked up P.D. and appellant; (3) appellant and “Johnny”
were seated in the backseat; (4) Officer Refsland observed “a s ignificant amount of
movement” by the backseat passengers before the traffic stop; ( 5) after Officer Refsland
activated his squad’s emergency lights, the minivan continued t o drive “for a slightly
longer amount of time” than what Officer Refsland considered typical; (6) Officer Refsland
noticed that appellant and “Johnny” were “slouched down” in the backseat, staring straight
ahead, and did not make eye contact with Officer Refsland; (7) Officer Refsland knew both
appellant and “Johnny” from prior contacts; (8) Officer Refslan d believed there was
reasonable suspicion to conduct a canine sweep and had all occu pants exit the minivan;

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(9) before the canine-sniff was conducted, “Johnny” and H.R. as ked Officer Refsland to
close the minivan’s passenger door; (10) the canine alerted at the front left quarter panel;
(11) officers searched the minivan’s interior and found methamphetamine concealed in the
armrest of the seat in which appellant had been sitting and a pipe concealed in the armrest
of the seat in which “Johnny” had been sitting; and (12) after appellant was arrested, and
while in the backseat of a squad car, he admitted that he was high.
At oral argument, the state conceded that appellant entered th e minivan last; we
decline to accept the state’s concession as one of the circumst ances proved. At trial,
evidence that appellant had been the last person to enter the m inivan came from H.R.’s
testimony and a squad car video i n which appellant stated he ha d just gotten picked up.
However, the jury was free to disbelieve H.R.’s testimony and appellant’s protestations.
The next step of the analysis is to determine whether, based o n the circumstances
proved, the events are “consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601
(emphasis added). As we explained in Sam, “when the state’s case is based largely, or
entirely, on circumstantial evidence, there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction if
and only if no other reasonable, r ational inferences exist that are inconsistent with guilt.”
859 N.W.2d at 831 (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that the circumstances proved do “not preclude the reasonable
inference that [appellant] did not know the methamphetamine and p i p e w e r e i n t h e
minivan.” The state argues that “[t]he circumstances proved he re are consistent with just
one rational inference: that [a]ppellant and [“Johnny”] jointl y possessed the

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methamphetamine and pipe found in the backseat of the minivan.” The state contends that
any other inferences are incons istent with the backseat movemen t prior to the stop, the
behavior of appellant and “John ny” during the stop, appellant’s taciturn admissions to
being high at the time of his arrest, and the locations of the methamphetamine and pipe.
We are unable to meaningfully distinguish this case from Harris. “When viewed as
a whole, the circumstances proved do not preclude a reasonable inference that [appellant]
did not know the [contraband] was in the car.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 602. Like Harris,
appellant did not own the car and both items of contraband were not visible to either the
occupants of the vehicle or to the officers until they opened t he armrests. See id. at 602-
03. There is no record evidence that the armrests were open at any time while appellant
w a s i n t h e m i n i v a n , a n d O f f i c e r Refsland did not testify that appellant made any
movements toward the armrest or that his movements were in any way indicative of putting
things into the armrest. Cf. Sam , 859 N.W.2d at 828. Although appellant essentially
conceded to Officer Riley that he was high, the record contains nothing concerning when
or where appellant used methamphetamine. The record also contains no testimony or other
evidence that there was any odor or other indication of recent use of methamphetamine in
the minivan. Apart from mere proximity to the methamphetamine in the armrest, no
evidence suggests appellant’s ownership or control of the methamphetamine or pipe. See
id. at 835. The car was owned by a third-party, none of appellant ’s personal items were
found in the armrest, appellant expressly disclaimed ownership of any contraband, and no
testimony was produced that linked appellant to possession of either the methamphetamine
or pipe. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 603.

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The circumstances proved at trial were limited to that appella nt was in a minivan in
which methamphetamine and methamphetamine paraphernalia were fo und, and the
methamphetamine was in a compar t m e n t n e a r w h e r e a p p e l l a n t w a s seated. These
circumstances do not, however, exclude a reasonable inference that the methamphetamine
and pipe were in the minivan before appellant entered and that he did not know those items
were there. See id. at 602-03.
Reversed.