State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1269

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lannon Lavar Burdunice,
Appellant.

Filed July 8, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-19342

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

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Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of second -degree intentional murder and
unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing that the district court (1) erred by rejecting his
challenge to the state’s peremptory strike of a black prospective juror, (2) abused its
discretion by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts, (3) abused its discretion
by admitting evidence of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes, and (4) erred by
convicting him of unlawful firearm possession without asking the jury to confirm the guilty
verdict. Appellant asserts additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 19, 2016, appellant Lannon Burdunice agreed via text message to sell J.H.
1.4 grams of marijuana for $20. J.H. then requested 3 grams for $40. Burdunice refused,
and J.H. responded, “Don’t ever ask me to buy sh -t from you again f-ck your sh-t n-gga.”
And then, “Your a b-tch.” Burdunice ultimately agreed to the sale.
When J.H. and his girlfriend, K.S., arrived at the agreed-upon location in Brooklyn
Center, Burdunice “looked angry.” Burdunice approached J.H.’s window and told him,
“[G]ive me the motherf -cking money.” The two men exchanged words, Burdunice

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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withdrew a pistol, and he shot J.H. twice in the left shoulder . Burdunice fled, and K.S.
called 911. J.H. died at the scene.
Police used information from J.H.’s cell phone to identify Burdunice as the likely
shooter. Burdunice initially denied any involvement but eventually acknowledged
shooting J.H., stating he d id so in self -defense. Burdunice asserted that J.H. was angry
about the quality of the marijuana, so Burdunice took the drugs back, then J.H. drove his
car toward Burdunice and pinned him against a nearby building while moving as though
to retrieve the gu n that Burdunice knew J.H. carried. Burdunice shot J.H. “to protect
[him]self.”
Burdunice was indicted for first -degree intentional murder during an attempted
aggravated robbery (felony murder) and unlawful possession of a firearm. Burdunice
claimed self-defense. After a trial, the jury found Burdunice guilty of firearm possession
but deadlocked on the felony-murder charge. The district court accepted the guilty verdict,
discharged the jury, and scheduled another trial on the felony-murder charge. The second
jury found Burdunice guilty of only the lesser -included offense of second-degree
intentional murder. The district court convicted Burdunice of unlawful firearm possession
and second-degree intentional murder and sentenced him to 480 months ’ imprisonment.
Burdunice appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not clearly err by rejecting Burdunice’s challenge to the
state’s peremptory strike of a black prospective juror.

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state may not
strike a prospective juror based on race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S. Ct.
1712, 1719 (1986). Minnesota courts apply the three-step Batson analysis to determine
whether racial discrimination motivated the state’ s peremptory strike. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.02, subd. 6a(3); State v. Onyelobi , 879 N.W.2d 334, 345 (Minn. 2016) . First, the
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the state exercised its peremptory
challenge against a prospective juror on the basis of race. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d at 345.
Second, “once the [district] court is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made, ” the
burden shifts to the state to articulate a race -neutral explanat ion for its peremptory
challenge. Id. Third, if the state presents a “facially race -neutral explanation, ” the
defendant has “the ultimate burden” of proving that the reason given was pretextual. Id.
Whether racial discrimination motivated the exercise of a peremptory strike is a
factual determination that a district court is uniquely situated to make. State v. Wilson, 900
N.W.2d 373, 378 (Minn. 2017). We therefore give “great deference to a district court’s
ruling on a Batson challenge and will not reverse the ruling unless it is clearly erroneous.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
During jury selection at Burdunice’s second trial, the state moved to strike
prospective juror 22 for cause. In response to the written questions, the juror indicated that
she did not know anyone who has been charged with or convicted of a crime. But p ublic

5
records, which the district court confirmed through questioning, revealed that her live -in
boyfriend and father of her child had several recent criminal charges and convictions. The
district court denied the state’s for-cause challenge, finding credib le the juror’s claimed
lack of knowledge about her boyfriend’s criminal record. The state then exercised a
peremptory strike. Burdunice contended that the strike was motivated by racial
discrimination because juror 22 is black, while “[t]he jury pool has been predominantly
white.” And Burdunice contended juror 22 was subjected to a greater “level of scrutiny”
than other jurors. The state argued that Burdunice did not meet his prima facie burden but
also emphasized juror 22’s boyfriend’s criminal history as a race -neutral reason for the
strike. The district court denied Burdunice’s Batson challenge, finding that Burdunice
failed to make a prima facie case and that the state offered a race -neutral explanation for
the strike. Burdunice challenges both findings.1 We address each in turn.
To establish a prima-facie case of discrimination , the proponent of a Batson
challenge must show : “(1) that one or more members of a racial minority has been
peremptorily excluded and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an inference that the
exclusion was based on race.” Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d at 345 (quotation omitted). This bar
is relatively low, but both elements must be present. Wilson, 900 N.W.2d at 382. Mere
use of a peremptory strike to remove a member of a racial minority does not establish a

1 Burdunice also contends the district court erred by deviating from the strictly conditional
sequence Batson mandates. We agree that Batson calls for summary denial if the party
challenging a peremptory strike fails to establish the requisite prima facie case. See State
v. Pendleton , 725 N.W.2d 717, 724 -25 (Minn. 2007). But mere “failure to follow the
prescribed procedure” does not require reversal. Id. at 726.

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prima facie case. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d at 726. Rather, the proponent of the challenge
must also identify circumstances indicative of discrimination, such as discriminatory
patterns in jury selection or the prosecutor’s questions during voir dire . Wilson, 900
N.W.2d at 382; see also Flowers v. Mississippi , No. 17-9572, 2019 WL 2552489, at *10
(U.S. June 21, 2019) (listing circumstances that may indicate discrimination).
Burdunice’s prima facie case fail ed on this second element. Despite Burdunice’s
emphasis on the “predominantly white” jury pool, there is no indication that the state’s
removal of juror 22 was part of a discriminatory pattern in jury selection. By juror 22, the
parties had accepted eight jurors and each had struck several prospective jurors. The record
does not reflect the rac e of any of these individuals or of the rest of the jury pool, but t he
district court observed that the state had not “attempt[ed] to eliminate all potential jurors
of color.” Cf. Flowers, 2019 WL 2552489, at *12 (recounting “blatant pattern of striking
black prospective jurors” indicative of discrimination). Likewise, the state’s scrutiny of
juror 22 during voir dire was not unwarranted. Burdunice did not object to the prosecutor’s
questions or suggest that it is inappropriate to consider either the criminal history of
someone intimately connected to a prospective juror or the prospective juror’s honesty
about that history. See State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 104 (Minn. 2009) (stating that “ a
family member’s involvement with the legal system is a legitimate race-neutral reason” for
a peremptory strike). And nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor singled out
juror 22 for this line of questioning. Rather, the prosecutor “looked into [the] background”
of “every juror in this case ,” and both sides questioned prospective jurors about personal
or familial criminal history. The district court did not clearly err by finding that Burdunice

7
failed to make a prima facie showing that the state exercised its peremptory challenge based
on race.
Moreover, we discern no error in the district court’s further determination that the
state satisfactorily explained the strike. The state identified two reasons : (1) it is
implausible that juror 22 could have a child with someone and live with him and not be
aware of his recent and current criminal activity and (2) even if she was entirely forthright,
her impartiality may now be in doubt due to her participation in a court process that made
her aware of her boyfriend’s criminal history. In short, juror 22 either misrepresented her
boyfriend’s criminal history or was apprised of his criminal history because of this case—
raising legitimate doubts either way that she coul d be an attentive and impartial juror in
this case. Faced with this explanation, Burdunice did not identify any pretext but merely
reiterated his prima facie arguments. On this record, we discern no clear error by the
district court in rejecting Burdunice’s Batson challenge.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of J.H.’s
prior violent acts.

Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court and will not
be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Guzman , 892 N.W.2d 801, 812
(Minn. 2017). A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense. California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct.
2528, 2532 (1984); Wilson, 900 N.W.2d at 384. But this right does not exempt criminal
defendants from the rules of evidence, “which are designed to assure fairness and reliability
in ascertaining guilt or innocence.” Wilson, 900 N.W.2d at 384 (quotation omitted). “To

8
obtain reversal of an evid entiary ruling on appeal, the appellant must show both that the
district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence and that the appellant was
thereby prejudiced.” Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 812 (quotation omitted).
When a defendant claims self-defense, he must present evidence that he was not the
aggressor. State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. 2006). To show that the victim
was the aggressor, he may present evidence of the victim’s violent character. Minn. R.
Evid. 404(a)(2); Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d at 201. Such evidence must be in the form of
reputation or opinion testimony , Minn. R. Evid. 405(a) , not in the form of specific prior
violent acts , Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d at 202 (citing State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 38 2
(Minn. 1983)). Prior-acts evidence is admissible as substantive evidence only to establish
another element of self-defense—that the defendant reasonably feared great bodily harm—
and only if the defendant was aware of the victim’s prior acts at the time of the alleged
offense. State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017).
Burdunice argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence
of J.H.’s violent conduct toward K.S. in 2015 and early 2016. Burdunice does not dispute
that he was unaware of this conduct at the time of the offense, contending only that it is the
most “convincing” evidence supporting his self-defense claim. But “convincing” is not the
standard for admissibility, and evidence that has “probative force” is routinely excluded
based o n other considerations, such as its potential for unfair prejudice. See State v.
Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 797 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted) (discussing exclusion of
unfairly prejudicial evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 403). Burdunice does not articulate any
basis for disregarding the plain language of rule 405(a) and binding supreme court caselaw.

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See State v. Curtis , 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (noting that court of appeals “is
bound by supreme court precedent”).
Burdunice argues in the alternative that evidence of J.H.’s prior violent acts was
admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) for the purpose of showing J.H.’s “pattern of
operation.” We are not persuaded. Burdunice’s argument demonstrates he sought to offer
evidence of J.H.’s specific prior conduct to show that he acted in conformity with his
violent character, which is precisely what rules 404(a)(2) and 405(a) prohibit. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding that evidence.
III. The di strict court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of
Burdunice’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes.

A district court ma y admit evidence of a defendant’ s prior felony convictions for
impeachment if “the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect.” Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). In determining whether the probative value of a
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect, the district court must consider five factors:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater
the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting use of
the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s
testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.

State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978). We review a district court’s admission
of a defendant’s prior convictions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d
645, 654 (Minn. 2006).
Burdunice asserts that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence
of his three prior felony convictions—second-degree assault in 2011, violation of an order

10
for protection in 2011, and terroristic threats in 2014. He does not dispute that the prior
offenses had impeachment value, were sufficiently recent, and bore on the paramount issue
of his credibility. Rather, he contends the district court abused its discre tion by not
“sanitiz[ing]” the convictions, limiting the evidence to the fact of two 2011 felonies and a
2014 felony. This argument is unavailing.
“[T]he decision about what details, if any, to disclose about the conviction at the
time of impeachment is a decision that remains within the sound discretion of the district
court.” State v. Hill , 801 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 2011). The record reflects that the
district court considered not only the Jones factors but also how the prior convictions would
be presented to the jury. It excluded testimony about “the specifics” of the convictions and
required that the assault be referenced “as an unspecified felony” and the terroristic threats
be referenced “as threats of violence.” And it repeatedly cautioned the j ury about the
limited use of th e evidence. See State v. Vanhouse , 634 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. App.
2001) (noting that cautionary jury instructions regarding the proper use of impeachment
evidence weighed against any prejudice in possible erroneous admission), review denied
(Minn. Dec. 11, 2001). The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting brief,
partially sanitized evidence of Burdunice’s prior convictions to assist the jury in evaluating
the credibility of his testimony and his self-defense claim as a whole.
IV. The district court did not err by convicting Burdunice of unlawful possession
of a firearm without asking the jury to confirm the verdict.

When the jury returns a verdict, the court must “read it to the jury, and ask the jurors
if it is their verdict.” Minn. Stat. § 631.17 (2018). “If no disagreement is expressed by the

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jury, the verdict is complete, and the court shall discharge the jury from the case.” Id.; see
State v. Crow, 730 N.W.2d 272, 278 (Minn. 2007) (“[A] verdict is not complete unless
deliberations are over, the verdict is read in open court, and no dissent is expressed by the
jury.”). But if a party requests that the jury be polled, the court must do so. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.03, subd. 20(5)(a). Polling the jury confirms that “each of the jurors approves of the
verdict as returned” and none has been “ coerced or induced to sign a verdict to which he
does not fully assent.” Burns v. State, 621 N.W.2d 55, 62 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001).
Burdunice argues the district court erred by convicting him of unlawful firearm
possession based on the first jury’s partial verdict because the district court did not follow
the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 631.17 or “provide the defense” an “opportunity” to
request polling the jury. We disagree.
The first jury deliberated for several days before informing the district court that it
was “hopelessly deadlocked” on the issue of attempted aggravated robbery, the underlying
offense for the felony-murder charge. The district court inquired of the foreperson, then of
the jury as a group, whether further deliberation would assist in reaching a verdict; the jury
unanimously agreed it wo uld not. At Burdunice’s request, the district court then asked
whether the jury reached a verdict on any counts. When the foreperson answered in the
affirmative, the district court collected the verdict forms, read the jury’s verdict of guilty
on the firearm-possession charge, and confirmed the other verdict forms were blank. The
district court then thanked and dismissed the jury. Neither Burdunice nor the state asked

12
the court to poll the jury or objected to this procedure, even after the district court asked if
there was “anything that the lawyers want to put on the record.”
The record reflects that the jury understood a unanimous decision was required to
return a verdict, and that the jury, the district court, and both parties understood the jury
was returning only one verdict. When the district court read the jury’s guilty verdict aloud,
no jurors dissented and Burdunice did not request that the jury be polled. Nothing in Minn.
Stat. § 631.17 or applicable caselaw precludes a district court from accepting a partial
guilty verdict, discharging the jury, and entering a conviction under these circumstances.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by convicting Burdunice of unlawful firearm
possession.
V. Burdunice’s pro se arguments lack merit.
Burdunice argues that insufficient evidence supports his murder conviction and the
prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for witnesses and misstating th e law. We
address each argument in turn.
In reviewing a claim that the circumstantial evidence supporting a conviction is
insufficient, we apply a two -step analysis. State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 -601
(Minn. 2017). We first identify the circumstances proved “by resolving all questions of
fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,” in deference to the jury’s credibility determinations. Id.
at 600; see State v. Landa, 642 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. 2002) (stating that the jury is “free
to accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony”). We then independently consider
the “reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Harris, 895
N.W.2d at 601. The circumstances proved must, when viewed as a whole, “be consistent

13
with a r easonable inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. “But we will not overturn a guilty verdict on
conjecture alone.” State v. Stewart, 923 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2019).
To convict Burdunice of second -degree intentional murder, the state was required
to prove that he caused J.H.’s death “with intent to effect [his] death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.19,
subd. 1(1) (Supp. 2015). A sta te of mind, such as intent, is “ generally proven through
circumstantial evidence.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010) . Intent
to kill may be determined from the act of shooting another individual at relatively close
range, even once. State v. Fardan , 773 N.W.2d 303, 321 -22 (Minn. 2009). Likewise,
leaving the victim visibly injured and bleeding evinces intent to kill. Id. at 322.
The state proved the following circumstances relevant to Burdunice’s intent. J.H.
antagonized and insulte d Burdunice during their text -message negotiations regarding
quantity and price. Burdunice brought his loaded gun to meet with J.H. and “looked angry”
when J.H. arrived. He stood outside J.H.’s open window, pointed the gun at J.H., and
demanded “the moth erf--king money.” Within moments, Burdunice shot J.H. twice.
While the shots were aimed toward J.H.’s left shoulder, at least one was fired from a range
of one-half inch to two feet away from J.H. Burdunice then fled, leaving J.H. obviously
gravely injured. See State v. Darris , 648 N.W.2d 232, 236 -37 (Minn. 2002) (inferring
intent from “the nature of the killing,” which included “multiple blows to the head”). Given
all of these circumstances, particularly the multiple shots from relatively close range, only
one hypothesis is reasonable —that Burdunice shot J.H. not in self -defense but in anger,

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intending to kill him. Accordingly, we conclude sufficient evidence supports Burdunice’s
murder conviction.
Burdunice next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the
burden of proof and vouching for K.S.’s credibility in various unobjected -to statements
during closing argument. 2 We review unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct under a
modified plain-error test, requiring the appellant to show prosecutorial error that was plain,
to which the state must then respond by showing the appellant was not prejudiced. State
v. Parker , 901 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017) . When assessing alleged prosecutorial
misconduct during a closing argument, we look to the closing argument as a whole. State
v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 751 (Minn. 2010). An argument is improper if it misstates
the burden of proof, id. at 750, or endorses a witness’s credibility, State v. Swanson, 707
N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006).
The prosecutor’s closing argument as a whole focused appropriately on discrediting
Burdunice’s self-defense claim. The prosecutor told the jury its role was to decide between
two mutually exclusive versions of events—K.S.’s description of an angry and intentional
killing or Burdunice’s description of a desperate attempt to protect himself from J.H.’s car
and anticipated shooting. He then explained to the jury why it should reject Burdunice’s

2 In his principal brief, Burdunice also asserts as prosecutorial error the introduction of an
unobjected-to recording of his conversation with two police of ficers without redacting
portions in which he offered to provide information about “murders” and the officers
referred to his invocation of the right to counsel. But the record indicates that the recording
was, effectively, redacted; the prosecutor played for the jury only the last several minutes
of the recording, to which Burdunice does not object. We therefore discern no prejudicial
error.

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description. He stated that Burdunice, while presumed innocent, is “not presumed to be
credible,” and highlighted the evidence that corroborated K.S.’s version of events and
undermined Burdunice’s version. Based on our careful review of the closing argument,
we discern no impropriety.3
Affirmed.

3 Burdunice also claims judicial bias based on the trial judge’s rulings on defense counsel’s
objections, refusal to admit Burdunice in chambers along with defense counsel, and
demeanor on the bench. He waived this claim by failing to support it with citation to legal
authority. State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002). But even if it were properly
before us, the claim fails on the merits . Review of the record, including those portions
Burdunice highlights as indicative of bias and the numerous rulings under review in this
appeal, reveals that the trial judge carefully considered numerous motions, objections, and
procedural matters over the course of two lengthy and complicated trials.