State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1273

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Randal Edward Carlson,
Appellant.

Filed July 8, 2019
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-CR-18-240

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Karen Kelly, Wabasha County Attorney, Jordan T. Cook, Assistant County Attorney,
Wabasha, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Randal Edward Carlson appeals his convictions of fifth-degree assault, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2016), and disorderly conduct, in violation

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of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1 (3) (2016), arguing that the state failed to prove the venue
element of each charged offense, and that he was improperly sentenced because the charges
arise out of a single behavioral incident. We affirm.
FACTS
This case was tried to a jury, and the following evidence was presented at trial. On
March 14, 2018, six -year-old W.K. was playing on the playground with his ten -year-old
sister, M.K., and two other friends, at the Eastwood Apartments building in Plainview,
Minnesota. W.K. and one of the friends were playing with a broken fishing pole. Appellant
approached the children, yelled at them, and told all the children, except W.K., to go inside.
Appellant then grabbed W.K., threw him to the ground, and struck him with the broken
fishing pole. M.K. was watching from the doors of the apartment building and saw
appellant hit W.K. with the fishing pole. W.K. then ran to his sister, and the two went
inside to inform their mother of the assault. W.K. had a red, swollen left cheek and ear.
During trial, M.K. testified about the assault. W.K.’s mother also testified about the
assault and stated that it took place at the Eastwood Apartments in Plainview. The
responding police officer testified about his investigation and stated that he spoke with the
victim and his mother “[a]t [the] Eastwood Apartments on Fifth Avenue Northeast in
Plainview.” An officer who interviewed appellant at the Wabasha county jail also testified.
The jury found appellant guilty of fifth-degree assault and disorderly conduct .
Appellant received a stay of imposition of sentence on both counts and was place d on
probation. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because
the state did not prove the venue element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. When
considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the record in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict. State v. Braylock, 501 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1993).
“[T]he state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged offense occurred in the
charging county.” State v. Bahri, 514 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied
(Minn. June 15, 1994) . “[A]n appellate court may find that venue was proven where the
state places the offense in a particular city in the state.” Id. at 583. Proper venue may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, id., and based on “all the reasonable inferences
arising from the totality of the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Carignan, 272 N.W.2d
748, 749 (Minn. 1978).
In assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we first identify the
circumstances proved and then “examine independently the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Minn. 2010) (quotations omitted). We affirm only if the reasonable
inferences from the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and “inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted).
W.K.’s mother testified that she and her children lived in the Eastwood Apartments
in Plainview at the time of the assault. The responding officer testified that he responded

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to a call from the Eastwood Apartments on Fifth Avenue Northeast in Plainview. A
Plainview Police Department investigator also testified that he interviewed appellant at the
Wabasha county jail.
Although no witness expressly stated that the crime occurred in Wabasha county,
based on the totality of the circumstances, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from
the evidence is that the offense occurred in Wabasha county. In addition, the district court
required the jury to find venue in Wabasha county as a separate element of the crime in
order to convict appellant. We conclude that b y showing the offenses occurred in
Plainview and requiring the jury to find venue in Wabasha county, the state proved the
venue element beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. The district court properly sentenced appellant on both convictions.

Appellant challenges the district court’s imposition of sentence on both counts,
arguing that because the convictions stem from a single behavioral incident, he can receive
only a single sentence. “Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is
a mixed question of law and fact, so we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear
error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.” State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d
264, 270 (Minn. 2016).
Under Minnesota law, “i f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense
under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one o f the offenses.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2016). “ [W]here multiple offenses arise from a single
behavioral incident, a co nviction or acquittal for one offense bars prosecution for any
additional offense . . . .” State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 876 (Minn. 2000). “The single

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behavioral incident statute protects criminal defendants from both multiple prosecutions
and multiple sentences for offenses resulting from the same behavioral incident.” Id.
“In determining whether a course of conduct consists of a single behavioral incident,
we have considered the factors of time and place and also whether the conduct was
motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” Id. “[W]hen crimes are
committed against different persons in the same incident, the district court has discretion
to impose one sentence per victim so long as such sentencing does not exaggerate the
criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Minn. 1996).
Appellant contends that his conduct is part of a single behavioral incident, arguing
he was convicted of striking W.K. and yelling at W.K. with the single motive of scaring
W.K. Because, appellant reasons, his conduct is part of a single behavioral incident, he
should have been sentenced on one conviction.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive. The disorderly conduct charge did not stem
from appellant’s conduct regarding W.K.; rather, the disorderly conduct charge related to
his conduct toward the other children. The charges related to different conduct aimed at
different individuals and were motivated by different criminal objectives. Under these
facts, “the district court has discretion to impose one sentence per victim so l ong as such
sentencing does not exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. The district
court properly sentenced appellant on both convictions.
Affirmed.