State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1274

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony Owen Kelley,
Appellant.

Filed April 1, 2019
Reversed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-21872

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jesse D. Berglund, Eden Prairie Prosecutor, Gregerson, Rosow, J ohnson & Nilan, Ltd.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Justin J. Duffy, The Law Office of John J. Leunig, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Roden berg, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by ap pointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In this direct appeal following a stipulated-facts trial and f inal judgment of
conviction for second-degree dr iving while impaired (DWI), appe llant Anthony Owen
Kelley appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the
officer did not have a reasonable, articulable basis to stop him for making a wide left turn.
Because Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b) (2018) 1 does not dictate in which lane of the
roadway being entered a left turn must be completed, we reverse.
FACTS
On September 2, 2017, Eden Prairie Police Officer Chad Streiff was working the
nightshift patrol and traveling westbound on Singletree Lane in E d e n P r a i r i e . A t t h e
suppression hearing, Officer Streiff testified that around 3:17 a.m., he observed a truck,
later determined to be driven by Kelley, stopped at a red light at the intersection of
Singletree Lane and Prairie Center Drive. At this location, Singletree Lane runs from east
to west and has two eastbound lanes and two westbound lanes, divided by a grass median.
Similarly, Prairie Center Drive runs from north to south and has two northbound lanes and
two southbound lanes, also divided by a grass median.
Kelley’s truck was stopped in the left-most lane of the westbou nd portion of
Singletree Lane. That lane is the only lane from which a left-hand turn onto Prairie Center

1 Although the traffic stop occurred in 2017, we cite to the current version of the statute as
it remains unchanged.

3
Drive can be legally made, and th ere are no markers extending t h e l a n e s t h r o u g h t h e
intersection onto Prairie Center Drive.2
Kelley’s turn signal was activated, indicating his intent to make a left-hand turn onto
southbound Prairie Center Drive. Officer Streiff testified that when the light turned green,
he watched Kelley’s truck make “a wide turn and actually turn i nto the far right lane, not
the near lane when making the left hand turn.” Upon exiting th e intersection, Kelley
completed his turn into a lane on the right side of Prairie Cen ter Drive, which was not the
inner-most lane, and then almost immediately, he signaled his turn into the right-turn lane
to exit off Prairie Center Drive.
Officer Streiff testified that he believed the wide left turn was a traffic violation, so
he initiated a traffic stop. He further testified that the wide turn and failure to signal were
the only reasons he initiated the traffic stop, and that his “s ole basis for stopping [Kelley]
was the left hand turn from Singletree onto Prairie Center Driv e;” it was not the “conduct
once [Kelley] was on Prairie Center Drive.”
After stopping the truck, Office r Streiff identified Kelley as the driver. While
speaking with Kelley, Officer Str eiff smelled an overwhelming o dor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from Kelley’s tr uck and noticed other indicia o f intoxication. Officer

2 This is not a two-lane roadway with two left-turn lanes where Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd.
1(f), might apply. Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(f) (2018). S ubdivision 1(f) authorizes
local authorities to “cause marker s, buttons, or signs to be pl aced within or adjacent to
intersections and thereby require and direct that a different c ourse from that specified in
this section be traveled by vehicles turning at an intersection.” Id. When markers, buttons
or signs are so placed, “no driver of a vehicle shall turn a ve hicle at an intersection other
than as directed and required by such markers, buttons, or signs.” Id.

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Streiff then had Kelley perform f ield sobriety tests, the resul ts of which suggested
impairment. Kelley took a prelim inary breath test, which indic ated that his alcohol
concentration was 0.21. Officer Streiff arrested Kelley and tr ansported him to the
Hennepin County Jail. Later that morning, around 4:22 a.m., Ke lley took a breath test
indicating that his alcohol concentration was .20.
The state charged Kelley with second-degree DWI—two or more agg ravating
factors, under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2016); second -degree DWI—alcohol
concentration of .08 within two hours, under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2016); and
careless driving, under Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd. 2 (2016).
Kelley moved to suppress the evidence and to dismiss the charged offenses, arguing
that the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable basis for the stop because his left turn
was legal. The district court held a suppression hearing where the arresting officer testified
and exhibits and the officer’s squad-car video were received as evidence. The district court
denied Kelley’s motion, concluding that the stop was justified because Minn. Stat.
§ 169.19, subd. 1(b), required Kelley to “enter the lane closes t to the centerline when he
turned onto southbound Prairie Center Drive.” The district court reasoned that the officer
had a valid legal basis for the stop because the officer observed a traffic violation when he
saw Kelley make a wide left turn and there was nothing obstructing Kelley’s ability to pull
into the lane closest to the centerline.

5
The state dismissed the careless -driving offense, and the case proceeded to a
stipulated-facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, reserving this suppression
issue for appeal.
D E C I S I O N
Kelley challenges the district court’s denial of his suppressio n motion. When
considering the denial of a pretrial suppression motion, we rev iew the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de n ovo. State v. Molnau , 904
N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn. 2017). A determination as to the existe nce of reasonable,
articulable suspicion is reviewed de novo. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn.
1999). “The State bears the burden of proving that police obtained the challenged evidence
in accord with the Constitution.” Molnau, 904 N.W.2d at 451.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 . But a law enforcement
officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of a person if t he officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person might be engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-81 (1968); State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842
(Minn. 2011). The reasonable-su spicion standard is not high, b ut the suspicion must be
something more than a mere hunch; the officer must have objecti ve support for his belief
that the person is involved in criminal activity. State v. George , 557 N.W.2d 575, 578
(Minn. 1997). The intrusion must not be the “product of mere w h i m , c a p r i c e o r i d l e
curiosity, but [be] based upon ‘ specific and articulable facts which, taken together with

6
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” State v. Pike, 551
N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).
Generally, if an officer observe s a violation of a traffic law, no matter how
insignificant, that observation forms the requisite particulari zed and objective basis for
conducting a traffic stop. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d. 818, 823 (Minn. 2004); George,
557 N.W.2d at 578. But an officer’s mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the
particularized and objective basi s for suspecting criminal acti vity necessary to justify a
traffic stop. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d at 824; State v. Kilmer, 741 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn.
App. 2007) (explaining that when a stop is premised on an ostensible violation of a traffic
law, a mistaken interpretation of that law cannot provide the r equisite objective basis for
suspecting the motorist of crim inal activity). “This holding a pplies even if the officer
believes, in good faith, that the driving conduct that prompted the stop was illegal.” Kilmer,
741 N.W.2d at 609.
Kelley does not dispute that he did not turn into the inner po rtion of the lane when
completing the left turn. Instead, he argues that the district court and the officer erred in
relying on Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b) to conclude that he violated a traffic law. He
asserts that the district court and the officer misinterpreted the statute because “Minnesota
law does not dictate which lane of the roadway being entered th a t a l e f t t u r n m u s t b e
completed in.”
Whether Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b) required Kelley to tu rn into the inner-most
lane is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Kruse v. Comm’r

7
of Pub. Safety , 906 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. App. 2018). The goal of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Id.; Minn. Stat. § 645.16
(2018). Statutory provisions which are part of the Highway Traffic Regulation Act, Minn.
Stat. § 169, are “in pari materia” and are therefore to be cons trued together. State v.
Bissonette, 445 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Minn. App. 1989). “Statutes in pari materia are those
relating to the same person or thing or having a common purpose.” Id. (quotation omitted).
If the language of the statute is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. State v.
Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016). In the absence of a statutory definition, we
generally turn to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase. Id. (quotation
omitted). We construe nontechni cal words and phrases according to their plain and
ordinary meanings and look to d ictionary definitions to determi ne the plain meanings of
words. Kruse, 906 N.W.2d at 558. When the text of a law is plain and unamb iguous, we
must not engage in any further construction. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d at 821. We must first
examine the statute to determine if any ambiguities exist; a st atute is ambiguous if it is
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Id. at 821-22.
The relevant portion of the left-turn statute provides that the driver of a vehicle
intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as follows:
(b) Approach for a left turn on other than one-way
roadways shall be made in that portion of the right half of the
roadway nearest the centerline thereof, and after entering the
intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the
intersection to the right of the centerline of the roadway being
entered. Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in
that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of t he
intersection.

8

Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b).
The first sentence of subdivision 1(b) provides guidance as to how one should
approach the intersection to make a left turn and requires that approach for a left turn, on
other than one-way roadways, be made in the portion of the roadway nearest the centerline.
Id. Here, there is no dispute that Kelley complied with this requirement.
Kelley argues that the district court and the officer erred in interpreting the second
phrase of the first sentence. Kelley argues that the statute’s language only requires that a
vehicle be on the right side of the centerline—not in the lane nearest the centerline—when
completing a turn in the roadway being entered.
To determine whether the statute requires a driver to complete the turn in the inner-
most lane, we look to s tatutory definitions and dictionary defi nitions. State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 2017). The second phrase of the first sentence
requires that “after entering the intersection the left turn sh all be made so as to leave the
intersection to the right of the centerline of the roadway bein g entered.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169.19, subd. 1(b). Leave means “[t]o go out of or away from.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language , 1000-01 (5th ed. 2011). Enter means “[t]o come or
go into.” Id. at 594.
A roadway is “that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for
vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk or shoulder.” Minn . Stat. § 169.011, subd. 68
(2018). “In the event a highway includes two or more separate roadways, the term
‘roadway’ shall refer to any such roadway separately but not to a l l s u c h r o a d w a y s

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collectively.” Id. A one-way roadway is “a street or roadway designated and sig nposted
for one-way traffic and on which all vehicles are required to m ove in one indicated
direction.” Id., subd. 50 (2018). An intersection is
[T]he area embraced within the prolongation or connection of
the lateral curb lines or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines
of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or
approximately at, right angles or the area within which vehicles
traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle
may come in conflict.

Id., subd. 36(a) (2018).
3
Here, the intersection is the square area where Singletree Lane and Prairie Center
Drive intersect. The plain language of the statute required Ke lley, after entering the
intersection, to leave the intersection to the right of the cen terline of Prairie Center Drive.
The statute does not require that a left turn be completed in t he inner-most, closest, or
nearest lane “to the right of the centerline of the roadway bei ng entered.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169.19, subd. 1(b). Both of the southbound lanes on Prairie Center Drive are to the right
of the centerline, and Kelley’s turn into the outer lane, which was on the right side of the
median, complied with this portion of the statute.
Moreover, unlike other provisions in Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd ivision 1(b) does
not require a left turn to be made “as close as practicable to the . . . curb or edge of the

3 Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subd. 36(b) also defines “intersection” where a highway includes
two roadways 30 feet or more apart. Minn. Stat. § 169.011, sub d. 36(b) (2018). That
definition of intersection is not applicable here because this i s a “ T ” i n t e r s e c t i o n .
Moreover, Kelley also asserts th at definition is inapplicable b e c a u s e t h e n o r t h a n d
southbound lanes of Prairie Center Drive are separated by a med ian of no more than ten
feet.

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roadway.” Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a) (2018); see also id ., subd. 1(e) (2018)
(providing that where both streets or roadways are one way, “bo th the approach for a left
turn and a left turn shall be made as close as practicable to the left-hand curb or edge of the
roadway”). The absence of language expressly stating that the turn must be completed in
the right-hand lane nearest to the centerline indicates that th e legislature intended to omit
language dictating what lane a left turn is to be completed in on the roadway being entered.
See State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn. 2017) (expression of one thing is exclusion
of the other); Martin v. Dicklich, 823 N.W.2d 336, 345 (Minn. 2012) (a statute should be
interpreted whenever possible to give effect to all of its provisions).
The state argues that the second sentence of the subdivision required Kelley to turn
into the inner-most lane of the roadway being entered because t here was nothing
obstructing Kelley’s ability to complete the turn in the inner-most lane. The state relies on
the language in the second sentence of subdivision 1(b), which provides that “[w]henever
practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the
center of the intersection.” Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b).
Practicable means “reasonably capable of being accomplished.” Black’s Law
Dictionary, 1361 (10th ed. 2014). Similarly, “practicable” has a plain-language definition
to like effect: “[c]apable of being effected, done, or put into practice; feasible.” American
Heritage, supra, at 1383. Synonyms of practicable include “possible.” Id. Whenever
means “[a]t whatever time” and also “[w]hen.” Id. at 1971.

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Given these plain-language mean ings and the statutory definiti on of intersection,
the “whenever practicable” provision in the statute only refers to a driver’s conduct when
going through the intersection, n ot when completing the turn. Consequently, Kelley was
not required to turn into the inner-most lane because it was “practicable” for him to do so.
Because the statute does not requi re which lane of the roadway being entered a left turn
must be completed in, the district court erred by concluding th at Kelley was required to
turn into the inner-most lane of Prairie Center Drive.
The district court, relying on our unpublished decision in Battle, concluded that
while the statute does not require the turn to be made in the i nner-most lane for all
situations, because there “was nothing obstructing [Kelley’s] a bility to pull into the lane
closes[t] to the centerline” and therefore “there was [a] sufficient legal basis for the stop.”
See Battle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. C2-01-113, 2001 WL 1222468, at *1 (Minn. App.
Oct. 16, 2001). Battle is inapplicable here. In Battle, we did not interpret the left-turn
statute because the appellant appeared to have agreed with the district court’s reasoning
that the final sentence of the left-turn statute required completion of a left turn in the nearest
lane, “[w]henever practicable.” Id. There, the appellant was not arguing that the statute
did not require him to complete the turn in the inner-most lane. Id. Instead, the appellant
conceded that he took a wide turn, but argued that a remand was necessary for the district
court to determine if it was prac ticable for him to have turned into the lane closest to the
centerline. Id. Consequently, because Kelley is challenging whether the stat ute required

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him to complete his left turn in the inner-most lane of the roa dway being entered, the
district court erred by relying on Battle.
In sum, the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b) does not require that
a left turn be completed in the lane closest to the centerline of the roadway being entered.
Because the officer’s stop was premised upon a mistaken interpr etation of the left-turn
statute and was the officer’s only reason for initiating the tr affic stop, the officer did not
have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the traffic s top. As a result, the district
court erred in denying Kelley’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic
stop.
Reversed.