State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1293

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Gordon Jerome Walker,
Appellant.

Filed May 28, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CR-17-771

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles L. Hawkins, Arthur J. Waldon, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for a controlled-substance crime, arguing that
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found duri ng a
warrantless search of his residence. We affirm.

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D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his home, because the search was not
justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement.
Police officers looked through a window of appellant’s home to ensure the safety of
a woman in the home, identified as K.A., following reports that appellant swung a shovel
at or near her in th e parking lot of a nearby bar. Officers saw K.A., who did not appear
injured. Officers also saw drugs and drug paraphernalia on a table near the window.
Officers obtained and executed a search warrant and collected the drugs. The state charged
appellant with controlled -substance crimes and criminal damage to property. Appellant
moved to suppress the evidence, but the district court denied the motion on the ground that
the officer’s warrantless search was justified under the emergency -aid exception to t he
warrant requirement. The district court conducted a stipulated -facts trial and found
appellant guilty of one count of first-degree possession of cocaine.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect an individual from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. 1, § 10. A “search” occurs “upon an official’s invasion of a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Minn. App. 2013), review
denied (Sept. 17, 2013). The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant before the
government can search the home of a private individual. State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d
197, 203 (Minn. 1996) . A search conducted without a warrant is presumptively
unreasonable and, if no exception applies, the fruits of the search must be suppressed. State

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v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992). Minnesota recognizes several exceptions to
the search warrant requirement, including the emergency-aid exception. State v. Lemieux,
726 N.W.2d 783, 787-88 (Minn. 2007); Richards, 552 N.W.2d at 203. “[T]he emergency-
aid exception is a subset of the exigent -circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.” Ries v. State , 920 N.W.2d 620, 631 (Minn. 2018) . Minnesota courts
“recognize exigencies in circumstances when police are objectively motivated by the need
to render aid or prevent injury.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether a recognized exception to
the Fourth Amendment applies is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v.
Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 621 (Minn. 2013) . The state bears the burden of establishing
that an exception to the warrant requirement exists. State v. Johnson , 689 N.W.2d 247,
251 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2005).
The district court determined that the officer’s act ions were justified under the
emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement. We agree. This exception permits a
police officer to conduct a warrantless entry “to render emergency assistance to an injured
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 787-
88. Minnesota uses a two -part test to determine whether the emergency -aid exception
applies. Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 632 (citation omitted ). First, the police must have
“reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need
for their assistance for the protection of life or property.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second,
“[t]here must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate th e
emergency with the area or place to be searched.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Under the
emergency-aid exception, it does not matter if officers have reason to believe some

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criminal activity is afoot as long as they are objectively motivated by the need to give aid.”
Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006)).1
Reasonable grounds to believe an emergency required immediate assistance
Under the first prong, we consider whether the police officers had reasonable
grounds to believe that there was an emergency and “an immediate need for their assistance
for the protection of life or property.” Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 788. A reviewing court
applies an objective standard to determine the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that an
emergency exists. State v. Othoudt , 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 ( Minn. 1992). To determine
whether an officer’s actions meet this standard, we ask “whether with the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the . . . search, would a person of reasonable caution believe
that the action taken was appropriate.” Id.
The first prong is satisfied. Witnesses reported to the police officers that appellant
and K.A. were fighting at the bar, and that appellant was trying to “fight every body.”
Appellant swung a shovel at or near K.A. and hit a vehicle with the shovel. Appellant
appeared intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics. An officer testified that “[w]ith a
bar fight it’s kind of a chaotic scene,” and “[his] concern was . . . there may be a domestic
assault that occurred.” The officer stated that his goal was “to find [K.A.] right away.”
Officers went to appellant’s home and knocked on the front door, but the occupants refused
to answer. Officers saw a woman open the curtains a nd then shut them immediately .

1Lemieux originally held that the officer’s search must not be primarily motivated by the
intent to arrest and seize evidence. 726 N.W.2d at 788. But the Supreme Court rejected
that approach in Brigham City , stating that “[t]he officer ’s subjective motivation is
irrelevant.” 547 U.S. at 404, 126 S. Ct. at 1948; Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 632 n.6.

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Concerned for K.A.’s safety, the officers looked through a window. They did not enter the
home. Based on this evidence, we determine that the officers had reasonable grounds to
believe there was an emergency requiring immediate assistance inside the home.
Appellant argues that the facts were not sufficient to justify the officers’ belief that
there was an emergency. We disagree. The emergency-aid exception does not apply when
a police officer has merely a vague understanding that a potential victim “may need help.”
State v. Fitzgerald, 562 N.W.2d 288, 288 (Minn. 1997). But the emergency-aid exception
does not require the commission of a serious or violent crime. Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 631.
Instead, “[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for
what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” Id. at 630 (quotation
omitted). Law enforcement officers are justified in interfering in an individu al’s privacy
without a warrant “to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an
occupant from imminent injury.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the violent altercation at
the bar, coupled with the officers’ experiences with domestic abuse situations, and their
concern for K.A.’s safety, were sufficient to give the officers reasonable grounds to believe
that an emergency existed in the home requiring immediate assistance.
Reasonable basis associated with the emergency
Second, we determine that there was a “reasonable basis, approximating probable
cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” Lemieux, 726
N.W.2d at 788. The record supports a finding that there was a reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with appellant’s home. See
State v. Gallagher, 275 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1979) (noting that probable cause “exists

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where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable
man of reasonable caution in [a] belief”). The second factor is satisfied.
Applying the two-factor test, we determine that the record supports a conclusion
that the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement applies. Accordingly, the
district court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress on that basis, and we affirm.
Affirmed.