State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1297

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stanley Gleason, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed July 22, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-30374

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person,
appellant argues that the district court erred by ruling that he did not present a prima facie

2
case of racial discrimination in jury selecti on where the state, in a preemptory challenge,
struck the only African American male juror and he claimed that the strike was based on
race. We affirm.
FACTS
In April of 2017, Brooklyn Park police officer Jason Buck was conducting an
investigation of an unrelated matter when he observed appellant Stanley Gleason Jr. driving
a Chrysler minivan. Officer Buck stopped the vehicle pursuant to the other matter, seized
it, and called other officers to assist with processing it. Officer Buon Xiong conducted an
inventory search of the van and found no firearms during his search.
Officer Xiong then transferred possession of the vehicle to Cardinal Towing, which
moved it to an impound lot. To prepare for scrapping appellant’s vehicle in July of 2017,
the vehicle was moved, and a Cardinal employee subsequently searched it for valuables.
During the search, the employee discovered a firearm. Another Cardinal employee
reported the gun, and an officer retrieved it. The gun was not registered to appellant.
The firearm, a revolver, was sent to the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Crime
Laboratory for forensic testing. After swabbing the firearm, the crime lab created a major
profile, compared it to Gleason’s DNA profile, and determined the profiles to be a match.
Based on this evidence, the state charged appellant with po ssession of a firearm by an
ineligible person in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016).
At jury selection, C.H., a potential juror, was the only African American male juror.
In response to a voir dire question from appellant’s counsel, C.H. stated:

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My experience with police officers hasn’t always been the
greatest. I have friends that are police officers. I know that it’s
not all of them that are kind of, you know—but, yeah, just in a
sense of [Gleason] is a black male, I am a black male and some
of our lives —we probably have gone through a lot of similar
kind of experiences even though I have never met him before.
It’s just how it is. And I am not sure if that affects me really.

C.H. said he has learned about criminal cases from his many attorney friends, “pretty
much” all of whom are “criminal defense lawyers.” He also admitted that he is “[v]ery
cynical” about the judicial system.
The state used a peremptory challenge to remove C.H. from the jury. Gleason
objected under Batson1 and argued that C.H. was a member of a protected class and that
the circumstances raised an inference that the strike was based on race. Gleason offered
two circumstances to support his racial bias argument: (1) C.H. identified himself as a n
African American man; and (2) C.H. spoke about the shared experiences of African
American men. When asked to be more specific, Gleason’s attorney responded, “I just
don’t think the prima facie stage is a very high burden, other than, you know, I see it, it
smells fishy, it feels funny, and therefore I call it on behalf of Mr. Gleason.” After a break
to allow the parties to submit additional authority, the district court noted that a prima facie
showing requires two things: (1) a member of a protected class that “has been peremptorily
excluded”; and (2) circumstances of the case that “raise an inference that the exclusion was
based on race.” The district court concluded that the first prong had been met, but that the

1 In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause forbids
the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.” 476 U.S. 79,
89, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986)

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second prong had not been met because there were no circumstances raising “an inference
that the exclusion of [C.H.] was based on race.” It also noted an African American woman
was seated as a juror.
The district court made a series of findings to support its conclusion: (1) “removing
the only minority juror is not sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of
discrimination”; (2) there was no “pattern of strikes against minorities made by
[respondent]”; (3) respondent did not deviate “from its normal pattern of jury selection or
questioning of [C.H.]”; (4) Gl eason’s case lacked racial overtones; and (5) there was no
victim in the case. Based on these findings, the district court ruled that Gleason failed to
make the prima facie showing required to satisfy the first step of a Batson challenge, denied
Gleason’s motion, and substituted an alternate juror.
After trial, the jury found Gleason guilty of the sole charge. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The district court properly denied appellant’s Batson challenge.
Appellant argues that the district court committed prejudicial error by denying his
Batson challenge to the state’s p eremptory challenge of C.H., the only African American
male juror in his trial. We disagree.
In a jury trial, parties generally have “a limited number of peremptory challenges.”
State v. Diggins , 836 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. 2013) . “ Unlike a challenge for cause, a
peremptory challenge allows a party to strike a prospective juror without having to explain
the reason for the strike.” Id. But, “The use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential
jurors is subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

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States Constitution,” which prohibits striking a potential juror based solely on race. State
v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2007) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct.
at 1719); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
In Batson, the Supreme Court established a three-step process to determine whether
a peremptory challenge was motivated by discriminatory intent. 476 U.S. at 96–98, 106 S.
Ct. at 1723–24; see also State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 345 (Minn. 2016); Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3). First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the
state exercised the challenge on the basis of race. State v. Wilson, 900 N.W.2d 373, 378
(Minn. 2017). Second, the burden shifts to the state to articulate a race -neutral reason for
the challenge. Id. Third, if the state successfully articulates a race -neutral reason, the
burden shifts back to the defense to establish “the proffered reason was merely a pretext
for the party’s true motive: purposeful discrimination.” Id. (quotations omitted).
A district court’s ruling on a Batson challenge “is a factual determination . . . and
should be given great deference on review.” State v. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn.
2003). We grant such deference because the district court “occupies a unique position to
observe the demeanor of the prospective juror and evaluate the credibility of the party that
exercised the peremptory challenge.” Diggins, 836 N.W.2d at 355. “[T]he district court’s
determination will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. ” State v. McDonough , 631
N.W.2d 373, 385 (Minn. 2001).
We agree with the district court’s analysis that appellant’s claim fails on th e first
step of the Batson test. Under the first step, a defendant may establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination by showing that (1) one or more members of a racial minority has

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been peremptorily excluded, and (2) the “circumstances of the cas e raise an inference that
the exclusion was based on race.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 831 (quotations omitted). The
“mere fact that the veniremember subject to the strike is a racial minority does not establish
a prima facie case of discrimination.” Angus v. State, 695 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Minn. 2005);
see also Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 831. Instead, a party “must prove that the real reason was
racial discrimination by identifying some circumstance that raises an inference of
discrimination.” Angus, 695 N.W.2d at 118.
At this first step, the “burden to establish a prima-facie case is low.” State v. Black,
919 N.W.2d 704, 711 (Minn. App. 2018). It should not be “so onerous that a de fendant
would have to persuade the judge—on the basis of all the facts, some of which are
impossible for the defendant to know with certainty —that the challenge was more likely
than not the product of purposeful discrimination.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162,
170, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2 417 (2005). Instead, the defendant must produce only “evidence
sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”
Id. If “the district court determines that a prima facie showing has not been made ” at step
one, “the objection is overruled and the prospective juror is dismissed. ” State v. White ,
684 N.W.2d 500, 505 (Minn. 2004); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7a(3)(a). We
reverse the district court’s ruling at this first step “ only in the face of clear error.” White,
684 N.W.2d at 507.
Gleason argues that the district court erred in two ways at step one of the Batson
challenge: (1) by ruling that Gleason did not present a prima facie case under Batson and

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failing to proceed to the final two Batson challenge steps; and (2) by misconstruing the
legal standard in multiple ways.
First, Gleason argues that he presented a prima facie case because he only needed
to show “that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an infere nce of discriminatory
purpose.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S. Ct. at 1721. He contends that the district court
failed to assess the totality of the circumstances, arguing that two circumstances give rise
to an inference that the strike of C.H. was based on race: (1) C.H. is a member of a protected
group as an African American man; and (2) C.H. shares a race with the defendant. These
circumstances, Gleason argues, support an inference that the state struck Gleason based on
race. To support this argument, he cites two cases whe re the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized prima facie cases when the state struck jurors who shared a racial identity with
the defendant. See State v. DeVerney , 592 N.W.2d 837, 843 (Minn. 1999); State v.
Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 501 (Minn. 1999).
Second, Gleason argues that the district court misunderstood and misapplied the law
on prong one of the Batson test. Specifically, he argues that the district court mistakenly
relied on the following circumstances: (1) the presence of another African American who
was selected to be on the jury; (2) the state’s lack of a pattern of discriminatory strikes; (3)
the district court’s own finding that “removing the only minority juror is not sufficient to
establish a prima facie showing of discrimination ”; (4) the n onexistence of racial
overtones; and (5) the state’s lack of deviation from its normal line of questioning. Gleason
contends that “ [t]he absence of any or all” of these circumstances “does not defeat

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Gleason’s prima facie case” at step one of Batson because step one is about “an affirmative
showing that a strike was race-based,” and the “burden is meant to be low, not onerous.”
The state contends that Gleason did not meet his burden at the first step by simply
arguing that C.H. was African American; he had to also identify an additional circumstance
that raised an inference of discrimination. This is especially true, the state argues, because
there were no racial overtones involved in the case and because C.H. was not the only
African American juror. The state cites two cases to highlight the importance of including
another African American juror besides C.H. In Wilson, the court ruled that the defendant
failed to present a prima facie case when the plaintiff struck two African American jurors
in the trial of an African American defendant, but an African American female remained
on the jury. 900 N.W.2d at 382. In State v. Everett, the court did not determine whether a
prima facie case was met in a case where a n African American juror was struck from a
jury, but a Native American juror remained. 472 N.W.2d 864, 868 –69 (Minn. 1991). It
did, however, note the significance of the fact that “the jury ultimately included a member
of a minority, a Native American.” Id. at 869.
Gleason’s argument fails because there are two prongs to the first step of the Batson
analysis, and he only met the first prong. Gleason proved that C.H., a member of a racial
minority, was peremptorily excluded from the jury. This satisfies the first prong requiring
Gleason to sho w that one or more members of a racial minority has been peremptorily
excluded. But, “[t]he fact that the prospective juror is a member of a racial minority, alone,
does not raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” State v. Wren, 738
N.W.2d 378, 388 (Minn. 2007).

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Thus, Gleason must also satisfy the second prong by showing “circumstances of the
case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 831
(quotation omitted). But he fails to satisfy this prong. The only other circumstance that
Gleason provided to the district court was that he was the same race as C.H. This is not
enough to establish a prima facie case.
In both Greenleaf and DeVerney, a prima facie case was established when the state
struck two Native American jurors from the jury at the trial of a Native American
defendant. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d at 843; Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d at 501. Here, Gleason
struck only one African American juror, and another African American juror remained on
the jury. Wilson and Everett both show that the presence of another minority juror on a
jury can support a district court’s finding that a defendant failed to establish a prima facie
case under Batson. Without presentin g additional circumstances that the exclusion of a
juror is based on race, showing that a juror is the same race as the defendant is not enough.
Because he failed to present any additional circumstances supporting the second prong of
the prima facie test under Batson, we hold that it was not clear error for the district court
to find that Gleason failed to establish a prima facie case that C.H. was struck from his jury
because of racial discrimination.
Since we conclude that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination at the first step of the Batson analysis, we need not address the remaining
two steps. See, e.g., Black, 919 N.W.2d at 710–12.
Affirmed.