Integrity Insurance Company, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1299

Integrity Insurance Company,
Appellant,

vs,

First Dakota Indemnity Company, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed May 13, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-14756

Richard S. Stempel, Gregory A. M aus, Stempel & Associates, PLC, Hopkins, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Mark G. Pryor, Erica A. Weber, Brown & Carlson, P.A., Minneapol is, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judg e; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Integrity Insurance Co mpany challenges the district c ourt’s order
dismissing its complaint, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that appellant

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lacks standing to bring the claim. Because our precedent estab lishes that appellant lacks
standing to bring its claim, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondents First Dakota Indemnity Company and Risk Administrat ion Services,
Inc. (collectively, Dakota) provi de workers’ compensation insur ance for White Gloves
Cleaning. An employee of White Gloves was involved in two moto r-vehicle accidents
while in an employer-owned vehicle. After each accident, the e mployee filed a workers’
compensation claim with Dakota. D akota denied both workers’ co mpensation claims.
After being denied by Dakota, the employee did not file a petit ion for workers’
compensation with the Workers’ Compensation Division of the Off ice of Administrative
Hearings. Instead, the employee filed no-fault insurance claim s with appellant Integrity
Insurance Co. for each accident. Integrity insured White Gloves’s vehicles. Integrity paid
the employee’s claims but maintained that Dakota wrongfully den ied the workers’
compensation claims. Integrity then filed suit against Dakota in district court for
reimbursement of the money that it paid out under its no-fault coverage.
The district court dismissed In tegrity’s claims, concluding tha t it did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the matter because Integrit y did not have standing to
bring a claim for reimbursement w here no workers’ compensation claim was filed by the
employee with the Workers’ Compensation Division.
This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
This case involves a question of standing, which is a jurisdictional doctrine that we
review de novo. In re Custody of D.T.R. , 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011). Integrity
argues that the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (NFA) provides it a right to
reimbursement and standing to bring its claim. The district court relied on our decision in
Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Minn. Assigned Risk Plan, 457 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. App. 1990),
review denied (Minn. July 31, 1990), to conclude that Integrity lacked standing to bring its
claim for reimbursement. Integrity argues that Colonial was wrongly decided.
Under the NFA, workers’ compensation benefits are primary, mean ing that they
must be paid out first, and a no-fault insurer may seek reimbursement if it makes payments
that “are paid or payable under a workers’ compensation law.” Minn. Stat. § 65B.61, subd.
1 (2018). Dakota argues that Integrity only has a right to rei mbursement under the NFA
after the employee has succeeded in bringing a claim for workers’ compensation under the
Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) or the workers’ compensation insurer has
agreed to pay the claim; otherwise the claim is not “paid or pa yable under a workers’
compensation law” as required by the NFA. Dakota concedes that Integrity would have a
right to intervene in a compensation-claim proceeding before the Workers’ Compensation
Division if the employee had brought one. But Dakota argues that Integrity lacks standing
to independently sue Dakota in d istrict court because, under th e W C A , a w o r k e r s ’
compensation claim must be filed with the Workers’ Compensation D i v i s i o n b y t h e
employee and a determination made on the claim.

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In Colonial, we recognized that the NFA provides that “workers’ compensati on
benefits ‘paid or payable’ are primary to the no-fault coverage .” 457 N.W.2d at 210
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 65B.61, subd. 1 (1986)). But we conclud ed that no-fault insurers
do not have standing to bring an action for reimbursement against a workers’ compensation
insurer in district court when the workers’ compensation insurer has denied coverage and
the employee has not brought a claim under the WCA. Id. at 210-11. We noted that the
NFA and the WCA must be construed in reference to each other an d that the Minnesota
Supreme Court “has held that a no-fault carrier has no independent right to be reimbursed
by a workers’ compensation carrier.” Id. at 210 (citing Freeman v. Armour Food Co., 380
N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1986)). We further stated that under the WCA, “only the injured
employee can bring a claim” and “[t]he claim must be brought in the Workers’
Compensation Division, not in district court.” Id. We concluded that a no-fault insurer
does not have standing to initiate an independent claim for reimbursement in district court
under the NFA because the WCA provides the exclusive means for proving such a claim.
Id. at 210-11 (citing Freeman, 380 N.W.2d at 820). We recognized that our decision put
Colonial “in a Catch-22 paradox” but concluded that the district court correctly dismissed
the claim.
Colonial is binding precedent, and under th e doctrine of stare decisis, “[w]e will
only overrule our precedent if provided with a compelling reason to do so. The reasons for
departing from former decisions must greatly outweigh reasons f or adhering to them.”
Ariola v. City of Stillwater, 889 N.W.2d 340, 356 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation and citation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2017). The doctrine of stare decisis encourag es

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us to “adhere to former decisions in order that there might be stability in the law.” Oanes
v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2000). We may determine that the
doctrine does not apply where “the reasons underlying the parti cular rule no longer exist
or the rule no longer conforms t o changed conditions of society .” Doe v. Lutheran High
Sch. of Greater Minneapolis , 702 N.W.2d 322, 330 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 26, 2005). The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that the “doctrine of stare
decisis has special force in the area of statutory interpretati on because the Legislature is
free to alter what [the courts] have done.” Schuette v. City of Hutchinson , 843 N.W.2d
233, 238 (Minn. 2014).
Integrity provides several reas ons for this court to overrule Colonial but none are
compelling or persuasive. We therefore decline to overrule Colonial and affirm the district
court’s order.
Affirmed.