State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1300

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdulaziz Mohamed Yussuf,
Appellant.

Filed May 20, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-16-10308

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Adam R. Klinnert, The Wolfgram Law Firm, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree assault, arguing that the district
court erred by excluding evidence suggesting that a prosecution witness was racially biased.
Because the erroneous exclusion was harmless, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Abdulaziz Mohamed Yussuf with one count of terroristic
threats and one count of second-degree assault. The case was tried to a jury over the course
of two days. On the first day of trial, the state called three civilian witnesses, J.P., C.S., and
J.M., as well as St. Cloud Police Officer Brian Heim. Their testimony showed that on the
evening of November 9, 2016, J.P., C.S., and J.M. were in a Lexus heading south on Ninth
Avenue in St. Cloud. J.P. was driving, C.S. was in the front passenger seat, and J.M. was in
the back seat. A gray sedan, driven by a man later identified as Yussuf,1 passed the Lexus,
moved in front of it, and slowed down. J.P. drove past Yussuf’s sedan and moved in front of
it. J.P. started tapping his breaks because Yussuf was tailgating him. Both cars stopped at a
stoplight. J.P. turned onto a side road, and Yussuf made a sudden U-turn and followed J.P.
Both cars stopped at a stop sign, with Yussuf’s sedan on the left side of J.P.’s Lexus.
J.P. and Yussuf “started exchanging words.” Next, C.S. started swearing and calling Yussuf
names. C.S. got out of the Lexus and walked between the Lexus and Yussuf’s sedan. C.S.
testified that Yussuf pulled out a gun, pointed it at C.S.’s chest, and smirked. C.S. described

1 Because the parties do not dispute that Yussuf was the driver of the sedan, we refer to the
driver as Yussuf throughout this opinion.

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the handgun as a “black handgun with a silver slide ,” which he thought was a “Smith and
Wesson . . . 9mm or a .45.” J.P. also testified that he saw Yussuf point a gun at C.S. And
J.M. testified that he saw Yussuf point what looked like a gun at C.S.
C.S. testified that Yussuf said he would “blaze” him. C.S. told Yussuf he would “beat
the s--t out of him” and reached for the sedan’s door, but Yussuf drove away. C.S. got back
into the Lexus and dialed 911. He reported the incident and described the handgun as a
“Smith and Wesson.” Officer Heim responded to the call, took statements from C.S. and
J.M., and obtained a description of the suspect vehicle.
On the second day of trial, Yussuf ’s attorney asked to recall C.S. and J.M. for
additional cross-examination. As support, Yussuf’s attorney reported that the night before,
Yussuf reviewed J.M.’s Facebook page and saw that J.M. had posted a news article regarding
the incident. In the conv ersation chain below the article, C.S. had commented, “False.”
Yussuf’s attorney stated that the post was public and that the “date of the article and the
posting” was December 16. Yussuf’s attorney wanted to question C.S. about the “F alse”
comment.
Yussuf’s attorney also reported that Yussuf had observed Facebook posts by J.M. that
were racist in nature. Yussuf did not present a copy of those posts, but his attorney claimed
that J.M.’s Facebook page was “rife with a lot of public posts” showing his “strong opinions
on Muslims” and “his distaste for Muslims in America, specifically Somali Muslims,” and
included a post “where he appeared to be defending Hitler.” Yussuf’s attorney wanted “to
use those posts to impeach [J.M.] if he [were to] testify that he had no racial bias or motive in

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his testimony or in his initial reporting to law enforcement about what happened.” The state
objected, arguing that the disclosure was untimely and unfairly prejudicial to the state.
The district court ruled that C.S. and J.M. could be recalled for cross-examination and
that Yussuf’s attorney could question C.S. about the news-article post and “False” comment.
The district court also ruled that Yussuf’s attorney could question J.M. about whether his
testimony was “influenced by any racial prejudice.” But the district court ruled that Yussuf
could not use J.M.’s other Facebook posts for impeachment and that they would not be
admitted as extrinsic evidence. The prosecutor asked the district court to clarify its ruling,
and the following exchange occurred:
PROSECUTOR: And with respect to [J.M.], the sole question,
from my understanding, is that he’s allowed to be asked whether
his reporting what happened was motivated by racial bias?
DISTRICT COURT: Correct.
PROSECUTOR: Regardless of his answer, no extrinsic
evidence will be referenced either as evidence or as
impeachment?
DISTRICT COURT: Correct.

The state resumed the presentation of its case and called St. Cloud Police Officer Jacob
Lanz. He testified that the day after the incident, he stopped the suspect vehicle. Yussuf was
the driver. Officer Lanz discovered a handgun in the vehicle between the driver’s seat and
the center console. Officer Lanz testified that, after removing the gun from the vehicle, he
identified it as “a Smith and Wesson M&P .40 caliber, black semiautomatic handgun.”
Officer Lanz interviewed Yussuf regarding the incident. Yussuf’s statement was
received as evidence at trial. In that statement, Yussuf admitted that he was involved in the
altercation with C.S., J.P., and J.M. He denied that he pointed a gun at C.S., but he admitted

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that he told C.S. he had a gun. Yussuf speculated that C.S. must have seen the gun in his
sedan. Although Yussuf claimed that he was trying to get away from the Lexus, he admitted
following it after it turned onto another street.
Next, the state recalled C.S. for questioning about the comment he made regarding
J.M.’s news-article post on Facebook. C.S. explained that his comment was made in response
to a comment by J.M. suggesting that Yussuf had pointed the gun at C.S., J.M., and J.P. C.S.
testified that he commented “False” because Yussuf had pointed the gun only at him, and not
at J.M. or J.P. The state rested without recalling J.M.
Despite the district court’s ruling, Yussuf did not call J.M. to the stand for further
cross-examination regarding whether his testimony was influenced by racial bias. Yussuf did
not present any witnesses, and he waived his right to testify.
The jury found Yussuf guilty as charged . Yussuf requested a downward
dispositional departure , which the district court granted . The district court entered
judgment of conviction on the second-degree assault charge and sentenced Yussuf to a
stayed 36-month prison term. Yussuf appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Yussuf contends that the district court erred by excluding evidence of J.M’s
Facebook posts, arguing that the posts were admissible as evidence of J.M.’s bias . “For
the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of bias, prejudice, or interest
of the witness for or against any party to the case is admissible.” Minn. R. Evid. 616. “In
criminal cases, the defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses for bias is secured by the
Sixth Amendment.” State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 2007).

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Bias is a catchall term describing attitudes, feelings, or
emotions of a witness that might affect [his] testimony, leading
[him] to be more or less favorable to the position of a party for
reasons other than the merits. Evidence of bias may properly
show hatred or enmity between a witness and a party. The
partiality or bias of a witness is always relevant as discrediting
the witn ess and affecting the weight of his testimony.
Moreover, extrinsic evidence of nonconviction misconduct
may be admitted to show that a witness is motivated by bias,
interest, or influence.
But not everything tends to show bias, and courts may
exclude ev idence that is only marginally useful for this
purpose. The evidence must not be so attenuated as to be
unconvincing because then the evidence is prejudicial and fails
to support the argument of the party invoking the bias
impeachment method.

State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 1995) (quotations and citations omitted).
As to extrinsic evidence of bias , the general rule is that “ [i]f the witness on cross -
examination denies or does not fully admit the facts claimed to show bias, the attacker has
the right to prove those facts by extrinsic evidence.” State v. Garceau, 370 N.W.2d 34, 40
(Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1985). Rule 616
“should make it clear that bias, prejudice, or interest is not a collate ral matter, and can be
established by extrinsic evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 616 1989 comm. cmt. But “the district
court may exclude any evidence, although relevant, for which the danger of unfair
prejudice or misleading the jury substantially outweighs its probative value.” State v.
Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 598-99 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. R. Evid. 403).
We review the district court’s evidentiary ruling in this case for a n abuse of
discretion. See Brown, 739 N.W.2d at 719-20 (reviewing district court’s limitation on
cross-examination of prosecution witness to show bias for an abuse of discretion); State v.

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Carillo, 623 N.W.2d 922 , 928 (Minn. App. 2001) (reviewing exclusion of bias evidence
for an abuse of discretion) , review denied (Minn. June 19, 2001). “Under an abuse -of-
discretion standard, [an appellate court] may reverse the district court when the district
court’s ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in
the record.” State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
The district court ruled that it would not allow evidence of racial motivation for
impeachment purposes. Specifically, t he district court ruled that it would allow “a rather
narrow inquiry as to whether [J.M .’s] testimony was at all influenced by any racial
animosity or ethnic prejudice,” but that it was “not inclined to allow any extrinsic evidence
of that to come in if there is a denial of any racial motivation .” The reason for the district
court’s ruling was two fold: the limited probative value of the evidence and the late
disclosure of the evidence
We begin our review of the district court’s ruling by noting that a defendant must
make an adequate offer of proof to enable appellate review of a claim that the district court
erroneously excluded evidence. See State v. Lee , 494 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Minn. 1992)
(“[D]efendant did not properly preserve the claimed errors for review by making an offer
of proof showing the nature of the evidence excluded so that courts on appeal could
determine if it was error to exclude the evidence and whether the error, if any, was
prejudicial.”). The state notes that Yussuf “neither offered photocopies of J.M.’s ‘bias’
posts nor articulated when they were mad e or what specific remarks they contained.”
Instead, Yussuf’s attorney generally described their content. However, the state does not
dispute the accuracy of the description that was provided and that description was the basis

8
for the district court’s ruling. Under the circumstances, the record is adequate to assess the
merits of Yussuf’s claim, even without a copy of the posts.
Probative Value
We first address the district court’s conclusion that evi dence of J.M.’s Facebook
posts had limited probative value. “Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the
jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all
evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.” United
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469 (1984); see State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d
793, 797 (Minn. 2005) (“Evidence of bias is al most always relevant . . . .” ( quotation
omitted)).
Yussuf argues, “In a case like this . . . any evidence of bias or prejudice of one of
these witnesses is incredibly important for the [j] ury to know in order to assess the
credibility of the testimony as the finder of fact.” The state counters that the district court’s
ruling was not an abuse of discretion because Yussuf failed t o demonstrate how J.M.’s
Facebook posts showed racial bias against Yussuf. The state notes that in district court,
Yussuf claimed that J.M.’s posts “showed hostility towards ‘ Muslims,’ ‘ Muslims in
America,’ and ‘specifically Somali Muslims.’” The state t herefore argues that any
evidence of bias in the Facebook posts did not specifically pertain to Yussuf because “[the
posts] were not describing a racial bias as much as a religious one.” The state concludes,
“[That] distinction limits the bias posts’ probative value because the defense never
established that Yussuf was a practicing Muslim —much less to J.M.’s knowledge.” See

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Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640 (“[N]ot everything tends to show bias, and courts may
exclude evidence that is only marginally useful for this purpose.”).
We disagree. Yussuf notes, and it is not disputed, that he is “visibly not white” and
is “of Somali-American descent.” The defense described J.M.’s posts as showing hostility
towards Somali Muslims, which could reasonably be interpreted to include Yussuf, who is
a Somali American. Because the posts showed that J.M. disliked Somali Muslims and
Yussuf is a Somali American, the Facebook posts are not “only marginally useful” or “so
attenuated as to be unconvincing.” See id.
The state also argues that to the extent “a person’s distaste for Muslims . . . may
affect their views of Somali individuals, . . . that alone does not establish admissibility ,”
noting that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury,” Minn. R. Evid. 403. The state argues that the danger of unfair prejudice was a
particular concern in this case because “the alleged Facebook posts [c ould] offend and
anger the jury.”
Again, we disagree. The law makes liberal allowance for bias evidence. See Minn.
R. Evid. 616; State v. Pride, 528 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn. 1995) (“Cross-examination to
show the bias, prejudice, interest or disposition of the witness to tell the truth is a matter of
right, the exercise of which is indispensable to show the truth.” (quotation omitted) );
Garceau, 370 N.W.2d at 40 (“If the witness on cross-examination denies or does not fully
admit the facts claimed to show bias, the attacker has the right to prove those facts by
extrinsic evidence.” (quotation omitted)).

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Although evidence regarding racial or religious bias could inflame a jury,
disallowing such evidence on that ground would be inconsistent with the law favoring the
jury’s consideration of bias evidence when assessing the credibility of a witness. See Lanz-
Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640 (“ The partiality or bias of a witness is always relevant as
discrediting the witness and a ffecting the weight of his testimony.” (quotation omitted)).
Moreover, evidence is not unfairly prejudicial unless it “persuades by illegitimate means,
giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006)
(quotation omitted). J.M.’s Facebook posts could have persuaded by the legitimate means
for which bias evidence is allowed. See Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640 (“Evidence of bias
may properly show hatred or enmity between a witness and a party.”).
Accepting Yussuf’s description of the Facebook posts —as the state and district
court seem to have done—we conclude that they showed bias and that they were relevant.
The district court therefore erred by disallowing any reference to the Facebook posts based
on its conclusion that they had limited probative value.
Late Disclosure
We turn to the district court’s conclusion that Yussuf’s “late disclosure” of the
Facebook posts justified their exclusion. The state argues that the district court properly
excluded the Facebook posts as a sanction for a discovery violation. Specifically, the state
contends that, “[e] ven if J.M.’s Facebook posts were admissible, the court still had
discretion to exclude them because the defense unjustifiably failed to disclose [the] posts
until after the State’s eyewitnesses had testified.”

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The state relies on State v. Lindsey, in which the supreme court held, “The
imposition of sanctions for violations of discovery rules is a matter for the sound judgment
and discretion of the [district] court.” 284 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Minn. 1979). The supreme
court stated that i n exercising such discretion, the district court should consider the
following factors: “(1) the reason why disclosure was not made; (2) the extent of prejudice
to the opposing party; (3) the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance; [and]
(4) any other relevant factors.” Id. The state argues that the Lindsey factors support the
district court’s ruling in this case and that “[e]xclusion was appropriate because the court
had discretion to protect the State from being unfairly surprised with this new evidence .”2
Because the state’s sanction argument depends on the existence o f a disc overy violation
under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure , we consider whether there was such a
violation.
A defendant’s disclosure obligations, without court order, are set forth in Minn. R.
Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 1. Generally, the defense is required to disclose documents and
tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests, notice of defense witnesses, statements
of defense and prosecution witnesses, notice of defenses other than not guilty, entrapment
disclosures, alibi disclosures, and prior convictions of the defendant. Minn. R. Crim. P.
9.02, subd. 1. At oral argument to this court , the state argued that the Facebook posts

2 The state’s assertion of unfair surprise is repeated throughout its brief. The state
complains that “neither Yuss uf nor his attorney satisfactorily explained what prevented
them from searching J.M.’s Facebook page for this evidence in the weeks before trial.”
Given the damaging potential of that evidence, p erhaps the better question is what
prevented the state from investigating and discovering the damaging public posts of its
own witness before calling the witness.

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should be treated as document s subject to disclosure under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02,
subd. 1(1), because if they were to be used “as evidence, it would presumably be in the
form of a document. . . . [I]t would have to be printed out.”
The state’s reasoning is not persuasive for two reasons. First, as the state notes,
Yussuf did not proffer a document depicting the Facebook posts; he described the posts
without providing any documentary support. Second, the district court’s ruling indicates
that Yussuf was not even allowed to refer to the Facebook posts for impeachment purposes.
A reference to the posts would not have been in the form of a document. The state does
not argue that any other disclosure obligation under rule 9.02, subdivision 1, applie d to
J.M.’s Facebook posts, and none is obviously applicable to us.3 Indeed, the state seems to
concede that the Facebook posts do not readily align with the disclosure requirements of
rule 9.02, stating that “a Lindsey analysis helps illustrate why the untimeliness justified
exclusion even if one did not treat the late disclosure as a discovery violation per se.”
But for the procedural posture of this case, in which the defense disclosed the
Facebook posts as justification for its request to recall C.S. and J.M. for additional cross-
examination, we question whether the defense was required to disclose its intent to use the
Facebook posts for impeachment purposes. Essentially, the state contends that it is entitled
to pretrial disclosure of evidence that the defense intends to use solely for impeachment .
The state does not cite any authority to support that contention, and we are aware of none.

3 The state does not argue that the Facebook posts are discoverable under rule 9.02,
subdivision 1(4), which requires disclosure of “[s]tatements o f prosecution witnesses
obtained by the defendant, defense counsel, or persons participating in the defense within
the defendant’s possession or control.”

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But we note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit takes a contrary
view and has held that the reciprocal requirements of the federal discovery rules do not
require the defense to disclos e evidence that is offered solely for impeachment purposes .
See United States v. Eason , 829 F.3d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding that “the fact
that defense counsel did not turn over [a] video to the government prior to trial [was] not
grounds to prohibit the defense from using the video for impeachment purposes”); United
States v. Medearis, 380 F.3d 1049, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court
abused its discretion by refusing to allow defense counsel to use an undisclosed letter to
impeach a prosecution witness).
We also note that Minn. R. Evid . 613 (a) provides: “In examining a witness
concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the statement
need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the
same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel .” (E mphasis added.) The plain
language of rule 613(a) indicates that impeachment disclosures to opposing counsel are
made on request at the time of impeachment, and not before trial. See In re Welfare of
D.D.R., 713 N.W.2d 891, 904 (Minn. App. 2006) (noting that, under Minn. R. Evid. 613(a),
defense counsel may examine a witness “without disclosing the contents of her prior
statement”); see also 11 Peter N. Thompson, Minnesota Practice § 613.01 (4th ed. 2018)
(“There is no requirement that the witness be forewarned by disclosure of the prior
statement or by other foundational questions before being asked about the prior statement.
To guard against possible abuse, counse l for the adverse party is entitled to see the
statement upon request.”).

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The committee comment to rule 613(a) explains, “The rule is based on the belief
that the truth finding function of cross-examination will be better served by permitting such
examination without providing the witness with a warning as to where the examiner is
going.” Minn. R. Evid. 613(a) 197 7 comm. cmt. That comment undercuts the state’s
argument that Yussuf should have disclosed the Facebook posts “before trial” so the state
would have had a “chance to contextualize this evidence during opening statements and
J.M.’s testimony.” Requiring a party to disclose impeachment evidence before trial so
opposing counsel can neutralize the impact of that evidence is inconsistent with the truth-
finding function of rule 613(a), as explained in the comment.
In sum, J.M’s Facebook posts, which were offe red solely for impeachment
purposes, did not fall within Yussuf’s disclosure obligations under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02,
subd. 1. Because Yussuf did not violate a discovery rule, the timing of Yussuf’s disclosure
does not provide a basis for a discovery sanction under Lindsey. The district court therefore
erred by excluding evidence of the Facebook posts based on the timing of Yussuf’s
disclosure.
Harmless Error
Having determined that the district court abused its discretion by prohibiting use of
J.M.’s Facebook posts for impeachment purposes, we turn to the remedy. The erroneous
exclusion of bias evidence is subject to harmless -error analysis. Carillo, 623 N.W.2d at
928-29; see Pride, 528 N.W.2d at 867 (stating that prohibiting a criminal defendant’s cross-
examination designed to expose a prosecution witness’ s bias is a violation of the
Confrontation Clause subject to harmless -error analysis). An error will be deemed

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harmless if an appellate court is “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the ev idence
had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average
jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” State v. Post , 512
N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994) (footnote omitted).
For example, i n Carillo, this court held that the district court erred by excluding
extrinsic defense evidence that a state witness had offered to change her testimony against
the defendant in exchange for money, reasoning that the evidence of “a solicitation of a
payoff in exchange for revised testimony . . . was offered for the impeachment purpose to
show veracity o r bias of a witness.” 633 N.W.2d at 928-29. But we also held that the
district court’s failure to admit the extrinsic bias evidence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt given the corroborating testimony of another state witness, “as well as
the abundance of evidence presented against [the defendant].” Id. at 929.
In this case, J.M. testified that he saw Yussuf point what looked like a gun at C.S.
Similarly, C.S. testified that when he approached the sedan , he w as face -to-face with
Yussuf, and Yussuf pointed a gun at his chest. J.P. also testified that he saw Yussuf point a
gun at C.S. C.S. described the gun as a “Smith and Wesson” during his 911 call following
the incident. Officer Lanz testified that he found a Smith and Wesson handgun in Yussuf’s
vehicle the day after the incident. The jury heard that Yussuf admitted that he was the driver
of the sedan, that he had exchanged words with C.S., and that he told C.S. that he had a gun
in his vehicle. But Yussuf denied pointing the gun at C.S. and suggested that C.S. must have
seen the gun in his vehicle. Yussuf’s inconsistent statements regarding the incident, which
the jury heard, suggested that his denial was not credible. On the one hand, Yussuf told

16
Officer Lanz he was trying to “get away” from the Lexus . On the other hand, Yussuf
admitted he went out of his way to follow the Lexus. And when asked why he did no t
drive away after stopping at the stop sign, Yussuf claimed he was “tryin’ to see [the other
driver’s] face because—‘cause you never know.” In sum, J.M.’s incriminating testimony
was corroborated by the testimony of C.S. and J.P. and there was significant evidence of
Yussuf’s guilt independent of J.M.’s testimony.
Yussuf claims that the damaging impeachment value of J.M.’s Facebook posts could
have negatively impacted the jury’s assessment of the credibility of C.S. and J.P., arguing,
In a case like this where the only evidence is the testimony of
the three witnesses, who were high school friends and now
roommates in college, any evidence of bias or prejudice of one
of these witnesses is incredibly important for the Jury to know
in order to assess the credibility of the testimony as the finder
of fact. It is also important that the only witnesses in this case
have such a close friendship, as extreme beliefs such as these
are likely to be shared by such close friends.

Yussuf concludes,
[T]his evidence of bias was spe cifically important in this case
because the only witnesses with a firsthand account had such a
close personal relationship that the bias of one witness could
reasonably be taken into account by the Jury in assessing t he
testimony of the other firsthand witnesses.

But there is no direct evidence of racial bias by C.S. or J.P. and no reasonable basis
to assume that they endorse the views expressed in J.M.’s Facebook posts. Thus, Yussuf’s
suggestion that he could have convinced the jury to reject the test imony of C.S. and J.P.
based on J.M.’s Facebook posts is unpersuasive.

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Given the corroborating testimony of C.S. and J.P. and the substantial evidence of
guilt independent of J.M.’s testimony, we are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
jury would have found Yussuf guilty even if the damaging potential of J.M.’s Facebook
posts had been fully realized. Because the district court’s erroneous exclusion of those
posts was harmless, we affirm.
Affirmed.