A18-1361

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1304
A18-1361

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. M. H. and A. W. S., Parents.

Filed January 22, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-JV-18-236

Darla Nubson, Nubson Law Office, PLLC, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant mother
J.M.H.)

Evelyn Schneider, Evelyn Schneider Law Office, Grand Rapids, Minnesota; and

Ross E. Trooien, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant father A.W.S.)

John J. Muhar, Itasca County Attorney, Mary J. Evenhouse, Assis tant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent Itasca County Health and Human Services)

Rachel Hughes, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Hoote n, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant-parents challenge the termination of their
parental rights, arguing that the record does not support a sta tutory basis for termination,

2
the county failed to make reasonable reunification efforts, and termination is not in the best
interests of the child. Because clear and convincing evidence shows that reasonable efforts
by the county failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement
and that termination is in the child’s best interests, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother J.M.H. and appellant-father A.W.S. are the pa rents of O.W.S.,
born in November 2016. Mother and father began their relations hip in December 2015,
two weeks after mother gave birt h t o a c h i l d f r o m a p r e v i o u s r elationship. J.M.H and
A.W.S. briefly ended their relationship during mother’s child-p rotection matter involving
her other child, but resumed thei r relationship after mother vo luntarily terminated her
parental rights to the child in June 2016. Respondent Itasca C ounty Health and Human
Services (the county) became involved with the family as a result of mother’s termination
proceeding involving the other child, which occurred while moth e r w a s p r e g n a n t w i t h
O.W.S.
O.W.S. was born premature in November 2016. The county initia ted a juvenile
welfare hold prior to his discharge from the hospital and place d him in foster care. Less
than two weeks later, the county filed a petition alleging that t h e c h i l d w a s i n n e e d o f
protection or services (CHIPS). At the time, the county identified the following concerns
for the parents: mother’s mental instability, father’s chemical use, and the parties’ history
of domestic violence. In January 2017, mother and father admit ted that O.W.S. needed
protective services, and an out-of-home placement plan was filed with the district court.

3
The out-of-home placement plan required that mother and father each: cooperate
and participate in all supervised visits with O.W.S.; remain sober; comply with all tests for
drugs or alcohol; complete a p arenting assessment; complete a r ule 25 chemical-health
assessment and follow all recommendations; attend, cooperate, and successfully complete
a domestic-violence program thro ugh Advocates for Family Peace; obtain and maintain
safe and sober housing; and cooperate with the county social wo rker, the in-home family
service provider, and the Itasca County public-health nurse. Additionally, the out-of-home
placement plan required that mothe r cooperate with her mental-h ealth team and sign all
releases of information requested, seek out and obtain either suitable employment or Social
Security benefits, and follow a ll recommendations of probation. The out-of-home
placement plan also required that father follow all chemical-he alth treatment
recommendations.
Mother has had ongoing mental-health issues for some time. To address her mental-
health needs and her case-plan goals, mother began receiving me ntal-health case
management services in January 2017 with an Adult Rehabilitative Mental Health Services
(ARMHS) worker. Mother’s ARMHS worker coordinated an initial diagnostic assessment
for mother, and mother was diagnosed with borderline personalit y disorder, generalized
anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Mother in itially requested to address
her mental-health issues with a peer-support specialist, but af ter attending a few sessions,
mother discontinued peer-support services. Following a search for an individual therapist,
in July 2017, mother subsequently received individual therapy s ervices. A few months
later, mother also began receiving medication-management services.

4
Mother and father have also had domestic violence in their rel ationship. In April
2016, prior to the CHIPS proceeding, father obtained a harassment restraining order against
mother. And, one month before O.W.S. was born, father was convicted of felony domestic
assault and violating a felony domestic-abuse no-contact order. Both involved mother as
the victim when she was pregnant with O.W.S.
On March 4, 2018, approximately one month before the trial in this matter
commenced, police responded to a report of domestic violence at the parents’ residence.
Although mother initially alleged that father threatened her with a knife, father was never
charged with any crime arising from the incident. A responding police officer testified that
mother had been experiencing mental-health issues that day and attempted to calm herself
by taking a shower while fully clothed. After mother and fathe r began arguing, mother
yelled at father and threw objects at him. Although mother had mental-health concerns in
the days prior to the incident, neither mother nor father reached out for help. Mother also
did not utilize her crisis plan developed with her probation officer. Mother pleaded guilty
to a gross misdemeanor domestic-assault charge arising from the incident.
Father has a history of chemical dependency that predates this child-protection
matter. As a condition of father’s probation for his convictions relating to domestic assault
and as a recommendation of his rule 25 chemical-health assessme nt, he is required to
refrain from alcohol use. During the pendency of this CHIPS pr oceeding, father used
alcohol at least three times in violation of his probation. The most recent violation was on
March 14, 2018. Father used alcohol with his own mother, and i t was reported this was
not an isolated incident.

5
During the pendency of the CHIPS case, mother and father have changed their
residence multiple times. At the start of the case, mother and father located and moved
into a rental house. But in February 2017, after the county moved supervised visits to the
parents’ rental house, the county raised concerns about potential mold in the home. Despite
the county’s concerns, mother rep eatedly denied the existence o f a potential mold issue.
The county encouraged mother and father to contact their landlord, look into renters’ rights
organizations, and locate mold-testing providers. Meanwhile, the county also searched for
providers and, by April 2017, acquired funding for mold testing to take place. After the
testing took place in July 2017, the house tested positive for mold.
A trial home visit started on S eptember 22, 2017, after the parents secured housing
with mother’s grandfather, mother began engaging in individual therapy, and the parents
completed domestic-violence intervention programs through Advocates for Family Peace.
The county terminated the trial home visit a little over one mo nth later, following an
investigation that raised concerns about O.W.S.’s safety, the parents’ abilities to meet his
basic needs, allegations of moth er’s use of profanities towards O . W . S . , a l l e g a t i o n s o f
father’s lack of care for the ch ild, the lack of nutritional fo ods offered to O.W.S., and an
incident between mother, O.W.S., and mother’s grandfather. 1 Due to the incident with
mother’s grandfather, in November 2017, mother and father moved out and purchased a

1 Mother was caring for O.W.S. on the date in question. While mother was in the kitchen,
O . W . S . w a s i n t h e l i v i n g r o o m w h e r e m o t h e r ’ s g r a n d f a t h e r w a s w atching television.
O.W.S. attempted to reach electrical cords in the living room. To keep O.W.S. away from
the cords, mother tried to put O .W.S. in a mechanical swing in the living room but he
refused. Mother placed O.W.S. back on the floor and he again t ried to reach the cords.
Mother’s grandfather then put O.W.S. in the swing and did so with “some force.”

6
mobile home. The county provided financial assistance to renovate the home. Less than
one month before trial, on March 30, 2018, an in-home parenting worker was in the home
and found that it was not ready for a child. But photographs a dmitted at trial showed the
home to be in adequate condition to care for the child.
On January 24, 2018, the count y filed a petition to terminate J.M.H.’s and A.W.S.’s
p a r e n t a l r i g h t s t o O . W . S . T h e county alleged statutory grounds for termination under:
(1) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2018), substantial, continuous, or repeated
refusal or neglect to comply with the duties imposed upon the p arent by the parent-child
relationship; and (2) Minn Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2018), reasonable efforts have
failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home-placement.
Following an eight-day trial, the district court terminated mo ther’s and father’s
parental rights. The district court considered the testimony a nd recommendations of the
county, the parents’ probation officer, O.W.S.’s foster parent, various service providers,
mother, father, and the guardian ad litem. The district court also heard testimony from the
police officer who responded to the call for assistance at the parents’ home on March 4,
2018. The district court found that the county proved by clear and convincing evidence
each of the statutory grounds fo r termination. Additionally, t he district court found that
the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that termination is in the best
interests of the child. Mother and father appeal.
D E C I S I O N
An appellate court reviews an order that terminates parental r ights “to determine
whether the district court’s findings (1) address the statutory criteria and (2) are supported

7
by substantial evidence.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App.
2012). We defer to the district court’s exercise of discretion but closely assess whether the
evidence is clear and convincing. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381,
385 (Minn. 2008). “We will affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when
a statutory ground for termina tion is supported by clear and co nvincing evidence,
termination is in the best interests of the child, and the county has made reasonable efforts
to reunite the family.” In re Welfare of Children of A.R.B. , 906 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Minn.
App. 2018).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determini ng that reasonable
efforts failed to correct the con ditions leading to the child’s out-of-home
placement.

A district court may terminate parental rights if clear and co nvincing evidence
shows that reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court , have failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement. 2 Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5). It is presumed that reasonable efforts have failed up on a showing that: (1) the
child has lived outside the parent’s home, by court order, for at least “a cumulative period
of 12 months within the preceding 22 months”; (2) “the court ha s approved the out-of-
home placement plan”; (3) the conditions which led to “placemen t have not been
corrected”; and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the s ocial services agency to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id.

2 Because Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) requires a reaso nable-efforts analysis as
part of the statutory basis for termination of parental rights, we do not provide a separate
analysis of the county’s reunification efforts.

8
Mother challenges the district court’s determinations as to the second, third, and
fourth factors—that the district court approved the out-of-home placement plan, mother
and father have not corrected the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement, and the
county made reasonable reunification efforts. Additionally, fa ther asserts that there is
insufficient evidence to support the district court’s determina tion that reasonable efforts
have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement.
A. Court Approved Out-of-Home Placement Plan
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(ii), a case p lan is presumed
reasonable if the court has appr oved the out-of-home placement plan. See S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d at 388. Here, the district court adopted an out-of-home placement plan in an order
dated January 23, 2017. The parents agreed to and signed the out-of-home placement plan.
Mother’s argument that the second factor has not been met is, therefore, unpersuasive.
B. Correction of Conditions Lead ing to Out-of-Home Placement
It is presumed that the conditions leading to out-of-home place ment have not been
corrected upon a showing that a parent has “not substantially c omplied with the court’s
orders and a reasonable case plan.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(iii). The district
court found that both parents hav e not substantially complied w ith their case plan, but
instead have “gone through the motions of attempting to comply.” The district court further
found that “[t]here has been no progress made by the parents fr om the beginning of the
case plan until the current time to address the underlying issues which precipitated the child
protection case.” Those underlyi ng issues include: mother’s me ntal-health instability,

9
father’s chemical use, and the parents’ history of domestic vio lence. The district court’s
findings are supported by the record.
Based on the testimony of the county social worker and mother’s ARMHS worker,
the record reflects that mother inconsistently engaged in menta l-health services. After
completing the initial diagnostic assessment in February 2017, mother attended only a few
sessions with her peer-support specialist. Although mother exp ressed an interest in
pursuing individual therapy in May 2017, she did not actually begin therapy until July 2017
despite her ARMHS worker’s offer to assist in locating a provider. Mother’s social worker
testified that when she worked with mother on her case-plan goals, mother was very vague
about her plans for mental-health services or “completely resistant.”
Throughout his involvement with child protection, father failed to refrain from the
use of alcohol. Prior to this cas e, father completed chemical- dependency treatment and
was aware of his obligations to refrain from alcohol use. But father violated his probation
by consuming alcohol on at least three occasions during the pen dency of this CHIPS
proceeding—the first because he felt like having a beer, the second because he joined in a
co-worker’s birthday celebration while at work, and the third o n March 14, 2018 with his
own mother. On one occasion, his alcohol concentration tested as 0.153. Father’s alcohol
use added stress to his relationship with mother.
Mother and father’s case plan also required them to address dom estic-violence
issues in their relationship. Although mother and father atten ded domestic-violence
programming as required by their case plan, the district court found that “both indicate they
did not learn much through the p rogram.” Additionally, the dis trict court found that the

10
March 4, 2018 domestic assault “demonstrates [the parents’] failure to learn from domestic
violence programming.”
At trial, the social worker testified that despite the services offered throughout
mother’s and father’s involvement w i t h c h i l d p r o t e c t i o n , t h e c ounty continued to have
concerns regarding domestic viole nce between the parents, mothe r’s mental health, and
father’s chemical health. The social worker further testified that “with all the providers
and services that have been offered for the year and a half . . . we’re still right back where
we had started.” The district court’s findings that mother and father failed to substantially
comply with their case plan and have not corrected the conditio ns leading to the out-of-
home placement are supported by the record.
C. Reasonable Efforts
During a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, the distric t court must also
determine whether a county made reasonable efforts to reunite t he parent with his or her
child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds.1(b)(5), 8(1) (2018); In re Welfare of Children of
T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008). Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond
mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children
of S.W. , 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). In order to determine whether efforts were reasonable, the district
court must consider whether the services offered were: “(1) rel evant to the safety and
protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally
appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under
the circumstances.” Minn. Stat . § 260.012(h) (2018). “Whether the county has met its

11
duty of reasonable efforts requires consideration of the length of the time the county was
involved and quality of the effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K ., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532
(Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). In addition, what constitutes
“reasonable efforts” depends on the facts of each case. In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d
886, 892 (Minn. 1996).
Here, the district court found that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the
family. The district court spec ifically found that mother and father’s case plan included:
in-home family services, public-health services, psychological or therapeutic services,
domestic-violence counseling, medical services, flex funding fo r home repairs, mold
testing, visitation, transportation, child-protection case-management services, and mental-
health case management.
Throughout its order, the district court detailed the services that the county made
available to mother and father. The district court found that mother received mental-health
services, including ARMHS case management, peer-support specialist services, individual
therapy, and medication management. Mother and father also received in-home parenting
instruction, Attachment Bio-behavior Catch-up programming, and psychological and
parenting-capacity assessments. Father received chemical-depen dency services through
probation, including chemical-de pendency assessments and urinal ysis requests. The
district court also found that p robation provided safety planni ng, phone cards, and gas
vouchers.
Mother and father argue that the county’s delay in procuring a mold test for their
rental house impeded their ability to secure adequate housing a nd make progress on their

12
case plan. The record does not support the parents’ argument. Although the testing
occurred a number of months after the county identified a potential mold issue in February
2017, the delay was not solely attributable to the county. Rather, the delay was also caused
by mother’s ongoing resistance to the existence of the potentia l problem, the landlord’s
unwillingness to become involved, and mother’s and the county’s inability to locate test
providers in the area. Importantly, mold testing is not a typi cal service offered by the
county. In addition, after the parents’ rental housing tested positive for mold in July 2017,
the parents were able to find suitable housing with mother’s grandfather and the trial home
visit commenced at this location. The parents moved out at the end of October after an
incident involving the grandfather, which ended the trial home visit. In November 2017,
the parents purchased and moved into a mobile home. The county provided funding to the
parents for renovations to make the mobile home suitable for a child. The county made
reasonable efforts to assist the parents with mold testing and to secure adequate housing.
The parents further assert that the county failed to offer reas onable services to
address the stress in their relationship. This argument also is not supported by the record.
The out-of-home placement plan, approved by the district court, provided domestic-
violence programming for each parent through Advocates for Family Peace. In addition,
mother was provided with mental-health services. And the count y social worker and the
parents’ parole officer both encouraged the parents to engage i n couples counseling. The
district court did not err in finding that the county made reasonable reunification efforts.
Further, the district court’s findings satisfy Minn. Stat. § 26 0C.301, subd. 8(1),
which requires “individualized a nd explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of

13
efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.”
The district court made an explicit finding that the county mad e reasonable reunification
efforts. In its findings of fact, the district court also detailed the services offered to mother
and father through their out-of-home placement plan and probati on. After detailing these
services, the district court ultimately determined that mother and father had not made
progress since the beginning of t heir case plan “to address the underlying issues which
precipitated the child protection case.”
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in invo king Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) as a basis for terminating moth er’s and father’s parental
rights. Clear and convincing evid ence supports the district co urt’s conclusion that
reasonable efforts, under the d irection of the court, have fail ed to correct the conditions
leading to the child’s placement. Because a single statutory b asis for termination is
sufficient to affirm a district court, we need not address the other statutory basis for
termination found by the district court. In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49,
55 (Minn. 2004).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determin ing that
termination is in the child’s best interests.

“The paramount consideration in a ll juvenile protection proceed ings is the health,
safety, and best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.0 01, subd. 2(a) (2018). “In
analyzing the best interests of the child, the court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the p arent’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest o f the child.” In re Welfare

14
of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd.
3(b)(3). The district court “must consider a child’s best inte rests and explain its rationale
in its findings and conclusions.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003).
“[C]onflicts between the rights of the child and rights of the parents are resolved in favor
of the child.” In re Welfare of the Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 902 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
This court applies an abuse-of-dis cretion standard to a distric t court’s determination that
termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of
D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008).
Mother and father argue that the district court’s findings rega rding O.W.S.’s best
interests are inadequate because the findings do not expressly weigh the three best-interest
factors. Mother further contends that the district court’s determination that termination is
in the best interests of the child is unsupported by the record.
This case is distinguishable from Tanghe cited by mother. In that case, the district
court failed to make any specific findings on the best interests of the children. 672 N.W.2d
at 626.
Here, the district court specifi cally found that termination of parental rights is in
“the child’s best interests.” T he district court explained tha t O.W.S. “deserves and has a
right to a home that is nurturing, safe, and able to meet his n eeds, which he is not able to
have with his parents due to [m]other’s emotional dysregulation , [f]ather’s chemical
dependency, and both parents’ poor decision making and lack of a safe and violence-free
home.” In addition, the district court specifically found that O.W.S.’s “needs cannot be

15
currently met by the parents, nor can they be met in the foreseeable future.” In making its
determination, the district court considered the evidence in the record, including testimony
from a psychologist about O.W.S.’s need for a stable environment, the recommendation of
the guardian ad litem that termination is in O.W.S.’s best interests, and testimony from the
parents that they love O.W.S. and wish to parent him. The dist rict court’s findings
regarding termination of parental rights, including its specific finding that termination is in
O.W.S.’s “best interests,” are s ufficient and supported by the record.3 The district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination is in the best interests of O.W.S.
Affirmed.

3 While it would have been preferable for the district court to make specific findings
regarding each of the three factors set forth in Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3),
t h a t r u l e , b y i t s t e r m s , d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g o n each of the three factors.
Rather, the rule provides that “the court shall make a specific finding that termination is in
the best interests of the child” and “analyze” the three factors. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05,
subd. 3(b)(3).