State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1305

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Jacob Watson,
Appellant.

Filed April 29, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-17-7104

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Assistant County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appella te Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johns on, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judg e; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After pleading guilty to one count of first-degree criminal se xual conduct, appellant
Michael Jacob Watson received an executed sentence of 168 month s in prison, with

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lifetime conditional release. On appeal, Watson asserts that t he district court abused its
discretion when imposing the 168-month sentence. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2017, appellant Michael Jacob Watson was charged wit h one count of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342,
subdivision 1(a) (2016). The complaint alleged that Watson had sexually abused a minor
female on more than one occasion.
The state filed notice of its int ent to seek an aggravated sent encing departure from
the sentencing guidelines because Watson had a previous convict ion for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct. But in January 2018, the state agreed to withdraw its motion for
an aggravated sentence, and Watson pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Watson admitted that over a peri od of approximately three years , he sexually abused his
niece at least six times, beginning when she was four or five y ears old. The district court
accepted Watson’s plea.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, probation filed a sex-offender evaluation report, a
presentence evaluation report, and a sentencing worksheet. The sentencing worksheet
indicated that the presumptive sentence would be 156 months, wi th a discretionary range
of 144 months to 187 months, a nd lifetime conditional release. 1 And probation
recommended that the district court impose a sentence within the presumptive range of 144
months to 187 months.

1 Watson received one criminal-history point from a prior third- degree criminal-sexual-
conduct conviction.

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On May 14, 2018, Watson appeared at the sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the
state asked the court to impose a top-of-the-box sentence of 18 7 months and noted that,
although it had withdrawn the request for an upward departure, the fact that Watson had a
prior criminal-sexual-conduct conviction should be “considered heavily.” The state also
argued that the facts of the case were egregious and supported a top-of-the-box sentence
because of the ongoing nature of the conduct, the family relati onship, and his position of
trust with his niece. And the state asked the court to conside r the fact that Watson had
performed poorly on supervision and might pose a greater threat to public safety than other
similarly situated defendants.
Watson argued that he had accepted respons ibility for the offen se from the
beginning, and now that this situation had been disclosed he co uld speak freely in
sex-offender treatment. And Wat son argued that a 156-month sen tence was appropriate
given his cognitive abilities, the overall facts of the situation, and because he would receive
the appropriate sex-offender treatment when in prison. Watson then apologized to the
court.
Before pronouncing a sentence, the district court addressed Wat son and stated its
concerns. The district court wa s troubled that Watson struggle d to provide the
psychosexual evaluator with information about the offense, that Watson was terminated
from sex-offender treatment three times while on probation for his prior sex-offense
conviction, but blamed others for the terminations, and that Wa tson does not think he
should be required to make change s to his lifestyle. And the d istrict court noted that
although there is no mathematical equation to determine the exa ct number of months

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appropriate, it found the facts of the case to be egregious, in volving multiple instances of
abuse over a period of years. With that, the district court im posed an executed prison
sentence of 168 months and lifetime conditional release. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Watson argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 168-month
sentence for the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and should have imposed a
156-month sentence. Both sentences are within the presumptive guideline range of 144
months to 187 months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B (2016).
Presumptive sentences for felony offenses are established by th e Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.C (2016). A p resumptive sentence for
any particular offense is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal
history and offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent. Gui delines 1.B.13 (2016). The
presumptive sentence is determined by locating the appropriate cell of the applicable
sentencing guidelines grid. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.13.b. Within the appropriate cell
is also the presumptive range, “w ithin which a court may senten ce without the sentence
being deemed a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B. And an y sentence within the
presumptive range constitutes a presumptive sentence. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428
(Minn. App. 2010). As such, when the sentence imposed is within the presumptive range,
this court will not generally review the district court’s exerc ise of its discretion. State v.
Starnes, 396 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 1986).
This court affords district courts “great discretion in the imposition of sentences and
[will] reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855

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N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014 ) (quotation omitted). The distr ict court is not required
to explain its reasons for imposing a sentence within the presu mptive range. State v. Van
Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985). Absent compelling circumstances, this court
will generally not exercise its authority to modify a sentence within the presumptive range.
State v. Freyer, 328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982).
Watson appears to argue that it was inappropriate for the distr ict court to consider
his dangerousness or a menability to probation or supervision wh en it imposed a
presumptive-range sentence of 168 months because those factors would only bear on a
dispositional-departure request, not on a durational-departure request. See State v.
Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 199 5). But Watson did not request a durational
departure—he asked for a lower sentence within the presumptive sentencing range. And a
district court may impose a sentence within the presumptive ran ge “without the sentence
b e i n g d e e m e d a d e p a r t u r e . ” M i n n . S e n t . G u i d e l i n e s 4 . B . T h i s is not a case where
compelling circumstances exist to justify a modification of a p resumptive sentence
imposed by the district court. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion when
imposing a presumptive-range 168-month sentence, we affirm the district court’s decision.
Affirmed.