A18-1513

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1318
A18-1513

Jeremy John Queen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 22, 2019
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-09-16293

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer L. Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
In this consolidated appeal, appellant argues that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to reimpose a ten -year conditional-release term , and if reimposed, the

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conditional-release term invalidates appellant’s guilty plea . Because the district court
retained jurisdiction and appellant’s plea is valid, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2009, the state charged appellant Jeremy John Queen with failing to register as a
predatory offender, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2008). The probable -cause
portion of the complaint indicated that appellant was a risk-level-three offender at the time
of his offense.
On June 4, 2009, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to a year
and a day in prison. Although a ten-year conditional-release term was discussed at the plea
hearing, it was not officially imposed. On June 24, 2009, the district court modified
appellant’s sentence and added a ten-year conditional-release term. The modification order
noted that, because appellant was a risk-level-three predatory offender, he “must be placed
on conditional release for [ten] years.” See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a.
In November 2015, appellant moved, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, sub d. 9, to
remove the conditional-release term. He acknowledged that risk-level-three offenders who
violate the registration requirements of section 243.166 are su bject to a ten -year
conditional-release term, but argued that such a term was improper because he did not
admit to being a risk-level-three offender at the plea hearing, and no finding by a jury was
made on that question. See State v. Her, 862 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Minn. 2015) (holding that
whether a defendant is a risk -level-three offender is a fact that mu st be admitted by the
defendant or found by a jury before a court may impose a ten-year conditional-release term
under section 243.166, subdivision 5a).

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The district court grant ed, in part, appellant’s motion. The court found that
appellant pleaded guilty to failing to register as a predatory offender , as prohibited under
section 243.166, subdivision 5(a), but he was not asked whether he was a risk-level-three
offender at the time of the offense, and no finding was made on that question . The court
concluded that the proper remedy was to submit the question to a sentencing jury, or, with
a proper waiver, to the district court.
In October 2016, appellant moved to deny the district court’s proposed remedy,
arguing that the proper remedy was to vacate the conditional-release term. Appellant also
argued that imposing a ten -year conditional -release term would render his plea invalid
because he “was not informed about conditional release during his plea or sentencing
hearing,” and he “was not informed that he could serve more than a maximum sentence of
five years.” The district court denied appellant’s motion. The court affirmed its previously
ordered remedy concerning the conditional-release term and concluded that the plea was
valid.
In December 2016, the parties proceeded via a stipulated evidence court trial, under
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to determine appellant’s risk level. However, the district
court did not issue a final written order on the matter until June 2018 .1 Prior to that , in
March 2018, appellant again moved, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, to correct his
sentence. He argued that the district court should vacate the ten-year conditional-release

1 In the June 2018 order, the district court acknowledged that it “failed to issue a written
order” following the stipulated evidence court trial.

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term because the district court did not have jurisdiction to impose conditional release after
his sentence expired.
In June 2018, the district court filed its order from the stipulated-evidence court trial.
The court found that appellant was a risk -level-three offender at the time of his 20 09
registration offense and that appellant is subject to a ten-year conditional-release term.
Appellant appealed the order in case number A18-1318.
The district court issued a separate order granting a postconviction hearing on the
issue of jurisdiction. In July 2018, a postco nviction hearing was h eld, and in September
2018, the district court filed an order denying appellant’s requested relief. The court
concluded that it “did not vacate [appellant’s] conditional release in its order on November
24, 2015.” And because appellant’s conditional-release term was never vacated, the district
court concluded that it retained jurisdiction. Appellant appealed the order in case number
A18-1513, and we consolidated the two appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Appellant first argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reimpose his ten-
year conditional -release term because his sentence expired. The parties agree that this
jurisdictional issue is subject to de novo review. See State v. Pflepsen , 590 N.W.2d 759,
763 (Minn. 1999) (“Questions concerning the authority and jurisdiction of the lower courts
are legal issues subject to de novo review.”).
Under section 243.166, subdivision 5a, a district court must impose a ten -year
period of conditional release for any person who commits a failure -to-register violation

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while assigned a risk-level three. In April 2015, the supreme court held that a district court
may not impose such a term unless the defendant admits that he was a risk -level three at
the time of the offense, or a jury makes that finding. Her, 862 N.W.2d at 695-96. In Her,
the district court imposed a 16-month prison term and a ten-year conditional-release term.
Id. at 694. Five years after sentencing, the defendant challenged th e imposition of the
conditional-release term, arguing that his risk level was never proved to a jury. Id. The
supreme court vacated the conditional -release term and remanded to the district court for
further proceedings, but expressed no opinion as to the proper remedy on remand. Id. at
700 n.4.
In September 20 17, the supreme court issued State v. Meger , which held that the
rule announced in Her does not apply retroactively to sentences that became final prior to
Her. 901 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Minn. 2017). The supreme court concluded that , “[b]ecause
Her does not apply retroactively to [the defendant’s] amended sentence,” the defendant’s
period of conditional release , which was neither supported by a jury finding nor an
admission by the defendant, was “not unlawful at the time it was imposed. ” Id. at 425.
The supreme court remanded to the district court for reinstatement of the defendant’s
conditional-release term. Id.
In December 2018, this court issued State v. Franson , in which we held that “[a]
district court has jurisdiction to reimpose a mandatory condi tional-release term if it was
authorized by law at the time the district court removed it from the sentence and the
defendant had not developed a crystallized expectation as to the finality of his sentence. ”
921 N.W.2d 783, 784 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). We stated

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that “the supreme court’s remand instructions in Meger and Her imply that a district court
retains jurisdiction to correct a sentence that contains a particular conditional-release term
or lacks a statutorily mandate d conditional-release term.” Id. at 786. We also stated that
there were no due -process concerns because the defendant was on notice that the
conditional-release term was part of his sentence. Id.
With this backdrop in mind, we conclude that, for two rea sons, the district court
retained jurisdiction to affirm appellant’s ten-year conditional-release term. First, Franson
is on point. Appellant’s conditional-release term was authorized when it was imposed, and
he did not have a crystallized expectation of finality in a sentence that did not include a
conditional-release term. A ppellant’s case became final in 2009, prior to Her, and
therefore his ten-year conditional-release term was lawfully imposed. See Meger , 901
N.W.2d at 425. The supreme court’s remand instructions in Meger indicate that a district
court retains jurisdiction to reinstate a conditional-release term that was lawfully imposed,
even if the district court vacated the conditional-release term and the underlying sentence
expired. Id. at 420, 425. In addition to the lawfuln ess of the ten-year conditional-release
term, there are no due-process concerns because appellant had no crystallized expectation
as to the finality of his sentence . Appellant’s ten-year conditional -release term was
imposed less than a month after his plea. Like in Franson, appellant was on notice prior
to the expiration of his sentence that he was subject to a ten-year conditional-release period.
921 N.W.2d at 788-89.
Second, the district court never vacated appe llant’s conditional -release term.
Appellant relies on two unpublished opinions, State v. Jones , No. A17 -0632, 2018 WL

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1145861, at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 5, 2018), and State v. Carlson, No. A18-0144, 2018 WL
4391101, at *2 (Minn. App. Sept. 17, 2018), in which we concluded that the district court
lost jurisdiction to reimpose a conditional -release term . In both cases, the defendant’s
sentence expired, and the district court then vacated the defendant’s conditional-release
term. Jones, 2018 WL 1145861, at *1 ; Carlson, 2018 WL 4391101 , at *1. Here, unlike
in Jones and Carlson, the district court did not vacate appellant’s conditional-release term.
The district court merely determined that appellant was entitled to proper fact finding on
the Her issue. The district court therefore retained jurisdiction.
II.
Appellant next argues that he is entitled to a plea withdrawal because his plea was
neither voluntary nor intelligent. In the alternative, he asserts that his conditional-release
term should not exceed three years and 364 days (five years minus one year and one day)
because he was told, prior to entering his plea, that the maximum sentence he faced was
five years. The district court concluded that appellant’s plea was voluntary and intelligent
and found that there was acknowledgment of the ten -year conditional-release term during
appellant’s plea hearing.
After sentencing, withdrawal of a guilty plea is permitted if the defendant proves
that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.
1. A manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not valid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643,
646 (Minn. 2007). “A valid guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State
v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000). Determining the validity of a guilty

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plea presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” Id.
In determining whether a plea was voluntary, a reviewing court considers the
relevant circumstances and “examines what the parties reasonably understood to be the
terms of the plea agreement.” Id. at 96. In determining whether a plea was intelligent, a
reviewing court must determine whether the defendant understood the charges, the rights
being waived, and the consequences of the plea. Id. Modification of the sentence is an
option if a plea is based on an unfulfilled promise or agreement. See State v. Brown, 606
N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
Here, the record indicate s that appellant’s plea was voluntary and intelligent.
Appellant was told that he would face a ten-year conditional-release term, and his plea was
not based on a promise or agreement. A ppellant signed a plea petition which noted that
“the maximum penalty the court could impose for this crime . . . is imprisonment for 5
years.” The plea petition also noted that it was a “straight plea,” and there were no promises
from, or agreements with, the state.
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor stated that the plea was a “straight plea,” and that
sentencing would be left “t o the discretion of the [c]ourt. ” Appellant indicated that this
was his understanding as well. Appellant’s attorney asked a ppellant if he was aware that
“there are very severe consequences to an executed sentence on this case as a felony and
that is that a ten-year conditional release term[] attaches to it ,” and appellant responded
that he understood. Subsequently, after some discussions about registration requirements
and conditional -release terms, appellant stated that he needed to be placed “on the

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conditional here ” rather than in the county where he had other matters pending . The
following exchange then occurred:
Attorney: So [appellant], what you’ re saying is that you
would—you’re asking me to ask the judge for a
year and a day rather than a gross misdemeanor
sentence?
Appellant: Yes.
Attorney: So that the conditional release comes out of
Hennepin County?
Appellant: Yes.
Attorney: Are you sure about that?
Appellant: 100 percent sure.

The district court later stated, “It appears from what everyone is telling me that you have a
lifetime registration here. You have a ten-year conditional release period.”
The plea hearing and petition indicate that appellant did not plead guilty based on
any promises that went unfulfilled , and appellant understood that a ten -year conditional-
release term was applicable. The plea was voluntary and intelligent.
Affirmed.