State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1331

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.
Alyssa Rose Knoblauch,
Respondent.

Filed January 22, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Klaphake, Judge*

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-17-2372

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joe Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Timothy S. Kilgriff, Assistant Mille Lacs County
Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for appellant)

Christopher Sailors, Sailors Allen Law, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent).

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challeng es the district court’s order dismissing two
counts of receiving stolen property for lack of probable cause. In a cross -appeal,
respondent Alyssa Rose Knoblauch challenges the district court’s order denying her motion
to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant. We affirm the district
court’s denial of Knoblauch’s motion to suppress evidence , but reverse and remand the
dismissal of the complaint because circumstantial evidence provides sufficient probable
cause to believe that Knoblauch possessed stolen property.
D E C I S I O N
I. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, respondent challenges appellant’s ability to appeal a probable-
cause dismissal. The state’s ability to appeal a criminal case is limited. State v. Rourke,
773 N .W.2d 913, 923 (Minn. 2009). Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1), the
prosecution “may appeal a dismissal for lack of probable cause only if the dismissal is
based on questions of law.” State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 352-53 (Minn. App. 2016)
(quotation omitted). When a district court dismisses a charge solely on a factual
determination that the state has not established probable cause, an appeal is precluded
because the state may marshal further evidence and reinstate the prosecution. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1); State v. Duffy, 559 N.W.2d 109, 110 (Minn. App. 1997). But
when a probable-cause dismissal is based on a district court ’s assessment of the elements
of the offense, statutory construction, or another legal issue, a question of law is presented

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for appeal. State v. Tice, 686 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 16, 2004).
Knoblauch argues that this probable -cause dismissal is not appealable because the
district court’s basis for dismissal was solely factual. But the district court made a legal
determination that the facts of the case were insufficient to satisfy the elemen ts of the
charged offenses of receiving stolen property. Because this was a legal determination, the
order is appealable by the state. See State v. Moe, 498 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. App. 1993).
II. The district court did not err in denying Knoblauch’s motion to suppress
the evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant.

Knoblauch asserts on cross-appeal that the district court erred in denying her motion
to suppress evide nce, arguing that a police officer’s affidavit filed in support of the
residential search warrant included false and misleading statements . Warrants supported
by deliberately falsified or misrepresented material facts may lack probable cause. Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978). Courts use a two-prong
test to determine if the warrant is invalidated on these grounds: (1) whether the affiant
deliberately made statements that were false or in reckless disregard of the truth; and
(2) whether the misrepresentation was material. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 327
(Minn. 2010). A misrepresentation is material if, when the misrepresentation is set aside,
the warrant would lack probable cause. Id. This court reviews the first prong of deliberate
misrepresentations under the clearly erroneous sta ndard and reviews the second prong of
materiality de novo. Id.

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Knoblauch asserts that the officer’s application included a misstatement of fact
concerning the identification of Knoblauch in a photographic lineup. The district court
found that the officer’s statement did not constitute a misrepresentation of fact. The district
court noted that the warrant application does not claim that Knoblauch was identified in a
photographic lineup. Instead, the warrant application included that police identified
Knoblauch as a suspect through the alleged victim, D. B., and other people involved in the
investigation. Because the warrant application does not include a misrepresentation of fact,
we need not reach the materiality prong. The district court properly deni ed Knoblauch’s
motion to suppress the evidence seized during the execution of the warrant.
III. The district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable
cause.

The state argues that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of
probable cause. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of probable cause
based on a legal determination. State v. Gerard, 832 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Minn. App. 2013).
“[T]he test of probable cause is whether the evidence wo rthy of consideration . . . brings
the charge against the [defendant] within reasonable probability.” State v. Florence, 239
N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. 1976) (quotation omitted). “Unlike proof beyond a reasonable
doubt or preponderance of the evidence, proba ble cause requires only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” State v.
Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 790-91 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). The district court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Knoch, 781 N.W.2d 170,
178 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010). And may not “assess[ ] the

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relative credibility or weight of . . . conflicting evidence.” State v. Hegstrom, 543 N.W.2d
698, 702 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 1996).
Knoblauch was charged with two counts of receiving stolen property, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2016). A person commits this crime if he or she “receives,
possesses, transfers, buys, or conceals any stolen property or property obtained by robbery,
knowing or having reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1.
The district court found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
jewelry found in Knoblauch’s possession was stolen, “other than [D.B.’s] allegations after
items were found pursuant to the search warrant.” But the district court also found that an
intruder, who identified herself as D.B.’s “sister Alyssa,” was discovered in D.B.’s house.
After learning that someone claiming to be her sister was in her home without invitation,
D.B. determined that items of jewelry and silver place settings were missing. Pursuant to
a search warrant, police searched Knoblauch’ s house and seized numerous pieces of
jewelry. A few days later, D.B. identified 29 items of jewelry found in Knoblauch’s house
as belonging to her. D.B.’s statements of ownership are sufficient to establish probable
cause to believe that the jewelry found in Knoblauch’s possession was stolen. The district
court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause. We therefore reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.